

Bridging across or sandwiched between? The political re-socialisation of Chinese immigrant women and their encounter with Taiwanese identity

Isabelle Cheng, *Asian Ethnicity* 17(3): 414-434. DOI: 10.1080/14631369.2014.973003.

School of Languages and Area Studies, University of Portsmouth, Portsmouth, UK

This paper presents the ambiguous and complex political re-socialisation of Chinese immigrant women and their encounter with Taiwanese identity. Contrasting their conceptions before and after migration along a central-peripheral conceptual hierarchy, this paper elaborates how their nationalistic curiosity and understanding of democracy confronted Taiwanese identity in their everyday life. These daily, sometimes *mundane*, experiences manifested the contradictions between the conceptual hierarchy and the ethnic divide and partisan politics in Taiwan. Their political re-socialisation proved that this conceptual hierarchy was inadequate to deal with the Taiwanese-Mainlander divide and the anti-China sentiment. Political re-socialisation gained through daily life gradually fed into their reaction to the Taiwanese identity. Situated amongst the antagonism between Taiwan and China, they were locked in an in-between form of tension and their subjective identification would therefore be challenged by the mutual suspicion and exclusion of both sides which demand their singular and undivided loyalty.

Keyword: marriage immigrant women; Chinese immigrants; Taiwanese identity; political re-socialisation

New citizens from the opposite side

In November 1987, the government of Taiwan lifted a nearly 40-year ban on travel to China.¹ Ever since the contact between Taiwan and China resumed, marriages across the Taiwan Strait have become more common.² *Mainlanders* (*waishengren*), the Chinese who fled to Taiwan in 1949–1950 with the Kuomintang (KMT) government retreating from the lost Civil War, were the first batch of visitors permitted to travel to China. Returning to their hometowns, some found wives, who could go on to be their carer in later life. Since then, the number of the cross-strait couples has boomed as contacts between Taiwan and China rapidly expanded. With more Taiwanese people investing, working, studying, travelling and forging expatriate communities in China, the number of cross-strait marriages increased to include the non-Mainlanders,³ and the ratio of younger and better-off couples marrying on the basis of affection has arisen.⁴

From 1987 to February 2013, a total of 307,876 men and women from Mainland China resided in Taiwan with the status of being spouses of local citizens, 95% of whom are women (293,631). Between 1987 and February 2013, there were 34% of them (99,115) acquiring citizenship, a ratio considerably lower than the percentage of foreign

The first draft of this article was presented at the Conference on Taiwan in Dynamic Transition, organised by Alberta International Conference on Taiwan Studies (AICTS), the Department of East Asian Studies, the University of Alberta, Canada, on 24–26 May 2013.

wives who have acquired citizenship (73%).⁵ As of presidential 2012 election, the ratio of citizens from Mainland China in the total electorate was 0.5% in January 2012.⁶ These citizens enjoy the constitutional right of political participation in Taiwan.

As Chinese wives settled in Taiwan, it also became an adopted home for 140,643 immigrant wives mostly from Southeast Asia.⁷ Whilst the latter are under pressure to be made into chaste wives and capable mothers for the sake of Taiwan's nation-building,⁸ Chinese immigrants pose a different challenge. They are situated in a precarious political situation defined by mutual antagonism. That is, whilst the growing subjective Taiwanese consciousness asserts Taiwan's sovereign independence from the People's Republic of China (PRC), this claim is denied by the PRC, which regards Taiwan as a renegade province and the people of Taiwan as part of the Chinese nation. Negating the Taiwanese identity by the Chinese nationalism is a defining difference between Southeast Asian immigrants and Chinese immigrants, as the former do not carry the baggage of confronting the self-identity of their host nation-state.

With this defining difference, it is important to compare the experiences of political re-socialisation of the two groups in Taiwan. However, the transnational political context – the PRC's denial of Taiwan's *de facto* independence and the Taiwan's anxieties and hostility towards China's threats, in spite of the ever-intensive, socio-economic contacts⁹ – warrants a separate investigation focussing only on the experiences of Chinese immigrants. This investigation will reveal whether and how immigrants, squeezed in mutual antagonism between the two ends of their migration, can be politically re-socialised. The findings will contribute to our understanding of political re-socialisation taking place in a country where political values, norms, and institutions are opposite to those of the immigrants' natal county and the very existence of the host state is questioned. Thus, this paper asks the following questions: How do Chinese immigrants perceive themselves in relation to Taiwan? Given that democracy as a value and an institution is essential to the Taiwanese identity, how do they perceive the electoral politics and partisan competition? Considering that the clash between native Taiwanese (*benshengren*) and Mainlanders (*waishengren*) is believed to polarise the national community of Taiwan, how do Chinese immigrants position themselves in this divide? If they have been politically socialised by Chinese nationalism propagated by the PRC government, would they be re-socialised after migrating to Taiwan?

An unknown political force from an authoritarian regime to a young democracy

There is no shortage of speculations for these critical questions. On the Taiwanese government part, Chinese immigrants are essentialised as being indoctrinated by communist ideology and Chinese nationalism,¹⁰ and as such they are feared for disturbing the electoral equilibrium and compromising Taiwan's future negotiations with China. Speculations charged by security concerns, nationalistic sentiments, and Taiwan's pride in democracy reached its peak in 2002–2003 when the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government proposed to prolong the qualifying period of residency for Chinese immigrants to be eligible for citizenship.¹¹ Although this attempt failed, in November 2012, the KMT government proposed to require Chinese immigrants to pass a test proving their understanding of 'democracy, civil society and pluralism' for their citizenship eligibility.¹²

The KMT's proposal is clearly fathomed along the expectation of Chinese immigrants' political re-socialisation. Re-socialisation theory generalises that immigrants' longer exposure to the political system of the host country correlates to a higher level

of political adaptation. Competing arguments are that the political beliefs acquired at the formative stage may be resistant to change, or that immigrants may transfer the political skills gained in the previous system to the new environment.¹³ When the immigrants in question are those from non-democratic or repressive countries, empirical evidence seems to support each strand of re-socialisation theory. For example, Bilodeau finds that in Canada and Australia, immigrants from repressive regimes abstained more from protest politics than those from non-repressive regimes.¹⁴ This conclusion is refined by his later finding that although manifesting strong democratic desires, immigrants from partly or non-democratic countries are under a long-lasting influence of their natal authoritarian political culture.¹⁵ Similarly, Philippov and Knalefman found that the political views of Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union, such as preference to strong leadership and hostility towards ethnic minorities, remained unchanged by Israeli political culture.¹⁶ However, Lien's study of the broader Chinese community in the US suggests that the influence may wane off. That is, although immigrants originating from China have a lower participation rate than that of Taiwan and Hong Kong, a longer period of residency allowed re-socialisation to take effect and the gap of participation level amongst the three groups closed in.¹⁷

These studies may shed light on Chinese immigrants' political re-socialisation in Taiwan. Unlike their Southeast Asian counterparts, Chinese immigrants encounter no language barrier for their adaptation. However, democratic institutions and practices may appear alien to their socialisation under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regime. Nevertheless, Chinese immigrants (and their Taiwanese partners) have been documented for their vibrant rights-claim movement, and staging protests is a common strategy to make their demands heard.¹⁸

If Chinese immigrants' re-socialisation in terms of political participation is a question with open answers as indicated by re-socialisation theory, it is also everyone's guess whether re-socialisation leads to a shift in their self-identity. In this regard, there is a lack of indication in current literature. Instead, what is available is how the host state and society react to the settlement of Chinese immigrants. For example, a study employing spatial analysis of locations of the cross-strait couples between 1987 and 2006 finds that the incidence of such marriages was lower in places where there was a high degree support for pro-Taiwan independence parties.¹⁹ This finding informs more of the political orientation of the Taiwanese husbands than that of Chinese wives. Focusing on the cross-strait couples' rights-claim movement, King argues that they succeeded in projecting the DPP's exclusionary citizenship legislation as exacerbating ethnic and political tensions.²⁰ However, this study did not delve into how Chinese immigrants absorbed and digested the 'ethnic and political tension' that was the chasm of Taiwan's electoral politics.

The exclusionary attitudes of Taiwanese society²¹ and the discriminatory citizenship legislation featured significantly in the works of Tsai and Friedman. The former argues that the opposition of Taiwanese society towards Chinese immigrants was a case of ethnic nationalism.²² Analysing the restrictions imposed on Chinese immigrants for their rights of family reunion and employment in the public sector even after they acquired citizenship, Friedman argues that their second-tier citizenship tarnished Taiwan's self-identity as a democracy.²³ These studies underpinned that the Chinese immigration to Taiwan is not only an unknown force to the electoral politics but also poses a challenge to the nation-building of the national community. Cheng and Fell take on this entwined issue. Examining the KMT and DPP's election campaign, they find that the Chinese immigration was invisible in their publicity *per se*. Instead, the issue of the rights and entitlement of Chinese immigrant women was included within a broader category of women's rights.

They conclude, after further scrutinising the restrictive citizenship legislation, that this invisibility and restriction showed the reluctance of both parties to accept Chinese as the members of the national community.²⁴ This reluctance echoes a critical question raised by Friedman: 'Can a Mainland Chinese become Taiwanese in anything more than name alone?'²⁵

The above review shows that gaps exist in our understanding of whether Chinese immigrant women are re-socialised and adaptive to the political environment of Taiwan. This paper aims to fill these gaps and explores their re-socialisation in their daily life, including their exposure to the divide between Taiwanese (*benshengren*) and Mainlanders (*waishengren*), their perceptions of electoral competition, and their responses to Taiwan's bid for membership of international organisations, as these are critical elements of domestic politics. Seeing their self-positioning in the Taiwan-China relationship as a worldview, this paper aims to find out whether their migration experiences in Taiwan have any impact on their worldview, and whether this impact has any bearing on their sense of belonging to Taiwan.

Framework of analysis and portraits of interviewees

To explore the potential change of the worldview of Chinese women, this research develops an analytical framework with regards to their conceptualisation of the Taiwan-China relationship. Grounded on my fieldwork findings, this paper argues that in the cognition of Chinese women, the relation between Taiwan and China is conceptualised into a hierarchy in which China is mapped to the centre, whereas Taiwan is placed in the periphery. As a worldview upheld by the people of China, this central-peripheral hierarchy is a projection of Han-centred Chinese nationalism as indoctrinated by the CCP. The historiography of this worldview is composed of four elements: (a) Taiwan is a part of China; (b) the Han Chinese in Taiwan and in China are of the same race, ancestry and culture; (c) no one in Taiwan, except the aborigines, is entitled to claim themselves as native; (d) plurality of ethnicity is not an obstacle for national unity – the 56 ethnic minorities in China are members of the Chinese nation under Han domination. In this conceptual hierarchy, China is the main and ultimate category which contains Taiwan as a *sub*-category; China is the root, whereas Taiwan is a derivation. This conceptual hierarchy is given a boost by the pride in China's rise as a great power, the expansion of the Chinese economy, and the CCP's denial of Taiwan's statehood.

This cognitive framework clearly contradicts the Taiwanese identity. Central to the Taiwanese identity is the re-configuration of Taiwan's continental Chinese heritage. From being the sole source in the past, this continental heritage is now conceptualised as one of the influential sources for the island's cultural inheritance. Thriving on this indigenous root of political stability, economic prosperity and cultural richness, the islanders assert their right to be treated as a nation distinctive from their continental origin, and an independent state separate from the PRC. As shown in the ensuing analysis, Chinese immigrant women are confronted with the contradictions between their worldview and the Taiwanese identity in their daily life in Taiwan.

Unlike some of the above-reviewed literature using quantitative data, this paper utilises qualitative data obtained from semi-structured interviews conducted in March–June 2009 in Taiwan. The intent is not to achieve statistical representativeness but contextualising the interviewees' subjective perceptions of the following categories and concepts: Taiwan, Taiwanese (*benshengren*), Mainlander (*waishengren*), the people of Taiwan (*taiwanren*), Chinese (*zhongguoren*), Mainland people (*daluren*), democracy,

voting, protest, unification, independence, the *status quo* and war. By narrating how they encountered these concepts in the events taking place in their everyday life, they demonstrated their dynamic interpretations of these concepts in their identities as an outsider, wife, mother, daughter-in-law, worker and citizen. The sampling developed from my initial contacts in Taipei with a Taiwanese woman who worked for a placement agency, an older Chinese woman in her second marriage and a younger Chinese woman in her first marriage. The latter two women attended the training courses provided by the Taipei-based Chinese Association of Relief and Ensuing Services (CARES). As a result of the snowballing of the three original contacts' networking amongst Chinese jobseekers and CARES participants, the final sample included 13 older women and 26 younger women. This paper acknowledges that due to the limitations of snowballing, the narratives relayed in this paper are the testimony of those who lived in urban northern Taiwan where protest politics of a national scale often takes place, and who had regular contact with their fellow immigrants because of networking facilitated by CARES or constant encounters with the general public because of employment. As displayed below, the interviewees came from a wide range of provincial origins, the diversity of which does not generate reliable indication of their political orientation towards Taiwan-China relations. However, as analysed later, the political and socio-economic differences resulted from their age and employment in China and Taiwan render stronger suggestions for their political socialisation in China and re-socialisation in Taiwan.

From Sichuan, Hubei, Guangxi, Jiangxi, Jiangsu, Guangdong, Fujian, and Hainan, the 13 older women, aged between 50 and 70, came to Taiwan for their second marriage. More than half of them had stayed in Taiwan for 10 to 15 years, and 8 of them had acquired citizenship. All of them lived in the metropolitan Taipei area. Leaving their adult children in China, the majority of them (eight) had retired from (or quit) their state employment before moving to Taiwan. The majority of their husbands were Mainlanders on their military pension, on which the couple relied for living. Seven of them had labour-intensive jobs, including caregiving, cleaning, dish-washing, childcare, catering, moving, and construction. A lower level of labour participation, a stronger Mainland accent in Mandarin, and not having their own children in Taiwan distinguished them from their younger counterparts. What also set them apart from the latter was that they reached political maturity after experiencing China's mass movements of the 1950s–1970s in their youth. They made references to the Korean War, the Three-Antis, the Five-Antis, and the Cultural Revolution, which was mostly referred to as political turmoil, and which was blamed for personal purges and the deprivation of education. Derived from this political socialisation and China's later economic success, they developed a conservative political outlook in the sense that they valued socio-political stability and economic development and disapproved of political uncertainty and social fragmentation. Although they suffered the CCP's repression, as epitomised by Mao Zedong's reign, they did not question the regime's legitimacy, which was, on the contrary, reinforced by the success of economic reforms.

Twenty-six younger interviewees, aged between 24 and 46, came to Taiwan from Sichuan, Hubei, Hunan, Shaanxi, Shandong, Jiangsu, Anhui, Shanghai, Guangxi, Guangdong, Fujian, for their first marriage. Nine of them had lived in Taiwan for 10 to 15 years, and 11 of them had acquired citizenship. Twenty-two of them lived in northern Taiwan. Twenty of them gave birth in the first 2 years after moving to Taiwan. The fact that nearly half of them were born around the year of China's economic reform made them a generation of higher geographical and occupational mobility. Unlike their older counterparts, only 5 of them were state employees and 14 of them worked in the private sector,

including 6 leaving rural homes in Anhui, Sichuan, and Guangxi to work in Hangzhou, Dongguan, Shenzhen and Shanghai. The higher mobility enabled them to comparatively conceptualise their movement inside China and from China to Taiwan. After migrating to Taiwan, nine of them were unemployed, mostly because of childrearing and housekeeping. For those who worked, most of them found jobs as shop assistants. Thanks to their adoption of local accents, slang and mannerisms, their employment in the service sector gave them a wider exposure to the mainstream society. Belonging to a generation of political stability, they made fewer references to China's turbulent past but were more discontent with corruption in local government, and showed more elasticity in conceptualising the relationship between Taiwan and China.

In the following pages, I will first of all discuss the perceptions of Chinese immigrants about Taiwan prior to migration. Viewed by the above-mentioned conceptual hierarchy, these perceptions are characterised as nationalistic curiosity. I will then move on to discuss their perceptions of Taiwan's democracy. Afterwards, I will display how they were politically re-socialised after migration. Gained in their daily interaction with family members and the general public, they became acquainted with the local political vernacular, which equipped them to comment on the divide between 'Taiwanese' (*benshengren*) and 'Mainlanders' (*waishengern*). Applying their prior political socialisation to the electoral politics in Taiwan, they viewed democracy from a passive perspective, but this did not prevent them from exercising their political rights and participating in rights-claim movement. The last section will focus on comparing the older and younger immigrants as to whether their conceptual hierarchy was affected by their political re-socialisation.

Before migration: nationalistic curiosity, chaotic democracy

As discussed above, Chinese immigrant women adopted a conceptual hierarchy in which China is placed in the centre and Taiwan is located in the periphery. Deriving from this is a nationalistic curiosity about Taiwan. It is nationalistic because of the fixed belief that Taiwan is a part of China. It is a curiosity because, before Taiwan opened the door to Chinese tourists, very few Chinese had actually visited the 'Treasure Island' (*baodao*). Taiwan seemed paradoxically close to, as well as distant from, China. This paradox, the political standoff, and the tightly controlled entry to Taiwan altogether increased its mystical lure.

The seeds of nationalistic curiosity are sewn by education. In the curriculum, ethnocentric concepts of nation, and concepts of the collective and the individual are allocated with specific proportions in order to nurture pupils' national identity and national pride.²⁶ From primary school to university, Taiwan as an object is taught in classes of Chinese language and literature, geography, history and political education. Wong Hong, a 36-year-old primary school teacher from Hubei, remembered that one lesson of Chinese language and literature for 7-year-old pupils stated 'Taiwan is the Treasure Island of our Motherland. Taiwan is a bright pearl glowing in the South China Sea.' Nationalistic sentiment towards Taiwan was cultivated by Taiwan-based Yu Kwang-chung's poem 'Homesickness', which depicted his love towards the Chinese Motherland and which was recited by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao in 2003 when Wen met the Chinese community in New York (*Asiaweek*, 21 December 2003). Documents related to the Taiwan policy are also used as teaching materials in the classes of political education.²⁷

Before 1979, Taiwan was demonised as a crony of the American imperialists to be militarily liberated.²⁸ Thus, older interviewees' perceptions of the Taiwan-China

relationship were framed around the conflict across the strait. For those who lived in Fujian, the image of Taiwan was particularly militarised. Fujian-born Zhong Meiling recalled that her village was within the range of KMT propaganda packets fired from Kinmen.²⁹ The packets contained clothing with Republic of China's (ROC) flag prints, banknotes, and pamphlets which described Taiwan as 'abundant for fish and meat' and which encouraged villagers to defect.³⁰ During the Cultural Revolution, people who had relatives in Taiwan were categorised as 'counter-revolutionaries',³¹ and were under the suspicion of being a KMT agent. Thus, similar to the condemned 'overseas connection',³² connection with Taiwan was a liability which might result in political persecution.³³ The connection also provoked social ridicule and humiliation popularised by political doggerels,³⁴ as informed by Ming Xianglan, who came from Hainan where there were Taiwanese conscripts left behind by the Japanese military after WWII, including her husband.

Checking the rising Taiwanese identity, the conception of Taiwan being a part of China was enhanced by the CCP's attack of Presidents Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian for 'creeping independence'.³⁵ The TV programme 'Across the Strait' (*haixia liangan*) was utilised to air the CCP's criticisms. Interviewees remembered watching news in which the PLA threatened to launch an attack. Long Yongru came to Taiwan in 2002 and was told by her father in Jiangsu about the railway transportation of tanks and other heavy weaponry. Her father believed that this was part of the deployment for attacking Taiwan and that 'Taiwan is soon to be *taken over*' (interviewed in Taipei on 27 March 2009). At those tense moments, Christian Zhong Meiling remembered praying for peace and safety of the people in Taiwan.

The CCP's criticism about Taiwan's electoral politics created an unintended publicity about the democratic system operating in Taiwan. The free-wheeling democracy as selectively reported by the CCP, such as the physical brawling by Taiwan's legislators, left Chinese viewers with the impression that, in Taiwan, politics was chaotic and that social life was in disorder. Dong Mei, a senior high school graduate who worked in a law firm and a tourist agency in Guangdong, remembered that her political education textbook described the change of government by election as 'a see-saw game played by politicians' and the wellbeing of people was at stake because of a lack of policy consistency. Nevertheless, such publicity strengthened the perception of political differences across the strait and fed the appetite of curiosity.

In spite of the indoctrination about Taiwan being a part of China, in reality, Taiwan may feel as *foreign* as any other country. The fact that entry to Taiwan is unilaterally controlled by the government of Taiwan drives home the message that Taiwan is outside the jurisdiction of the PRC government; Taiwan *proper* is not a part of China. For some, this was understood as 'One Country, Two Systems' as entry to Hong Kong was also controlled by the Hong Kong government; for others, this suggested that Taiwan and China are two separate political entities and that neither has control over the other. The blending of the nationalistic imagination and the political distance defines the lure of the Taiwan *mystique*, particularly before the government of Taiwan opened door for Chinese tourists. Chongqing-born An Qilan worked in Chengdu and Shenzhen for 10 years before moving to Taiwan. For her, moving to Mandarin-speaking Taiwan was different from moving to Cantonese-speaking Shenzhen and Hong Kong. This conceptual difference was so complex that she could only say 'Because of the history behind, you know, about Zheng Chenggong, Chiang Kai-shek, all that. If you're allowed to go to Taiwan, you'll see it as an honour. If you don't go, you'll regret it' (interviewed in Taipei on 23 March 2009).

From nationalistic curiosity and the paradox that Taiwan was neither foreign nor controlled by the PRC, there emerged a set of conceptions about Taiwan. That is, Taiwan is economically prosperous, politically democratic, and socially open. Moving to Taiwan is unlike a domestic movement within China because of the associated nationalistic *mystique* and the different political, social and economic systems. On the other hand, it is also unlike migrating to a foreign country where one cannot speak the local language and where there are physical differences. This makes Taiwan 'neither foreign nor domestic', a cognitive complex more realistic than the simplistic belief that 'Taiwan is a part of China'.

Holding onto the conceptual hierarchy spiced by the nationalistic curiosity and the 'neither foreign nor domestic' paradox, the interviewees entered Taiwan and were confronted by the contradictions between the conceptual hierarchy and the assertions of Taiwanese identity as well as the operation of an electoral democracy.

After migration: political re-socialisation in everyday life

Taiwanese versus Mainlander

One of the most significant aspects of their political re-socialisation in Taiwan was the exposure to the divide that underpins the partisan politics. Believing that the people of Taiwan, except the aborigines, are part of the Chinese *race*, Chinese women found themselves stepping onto the unfamiliar political terrain which is defined by the divide between native Taiwanese (*benshengren*) and Mainlanders (*waishengren*). This divide was a matter of confusion and its political connotation a source of potential conflict.

In spite of praising the civility of the people of Taiwan (*taiwanren*), the interviewees found themselves confronted by the former's discrimination and hostility. The unfriendliness and otherness that the people of Taiwan hold against Chinese immigrants was conveyed by the derogatory terms *daluren* (Mainland people) or *dalumei* (Mainland girls) uttered in Mandarin *as well as* Taiwanese language (*taiyu*).³⁶ Brief encounters with strangers or daily interactions with neighbours can amplify the sense of exclusion. The experience of Auntie Zhang, a retired accountant from Jiangxi, is a case in point. She was once publicly scolded by an elderly Taiwanese-speaking man in the Longshan Temple area of Taipei. She told the man that she could not understand his query in Taiwanese. The man shouted angrily 'Learn Taiwanese!' before he dashed off to his bus. Granny Yang, a retired chemical engineer from Wuhan, intended to learn Taiwanese, but her Mainlander husband discouraged her because her strong accent would immediately give away her origin and this revelation would invite more insults and ridicule, to which he himself was subject before. After her husband passed away, Granny Yang was introduced to a church by a neighbour whom she described as a 'second-generation Mainlander' and who took pity on her. The atmosphere in the church was amicable as long as there was no talk of politics. However, she was disappointed that the fellowship preferred to chat in Taiwanese in spite of her protestation that she could not understand. As they tried to persuade her to vote for the DPP presidential candidate in 2008, she claimed that her church was a 'pro-independence church'. These events not only convey the hostility of Taiwanese speakers (*benshengren*) but also indicate the hostility of the people of Taiwan (*taiwanren*).

Whilst Chinese women encountered animosity of Taiwanese speakers, they seemed to be included into the Mainlander community. Depending on their age, they might be mistaken for those who exiled to Taiwan around 1949 or the Taiwan-born second

generation. More importantly, Chinese women might also self-identify as Mainlanders. For example, Zhang Jie from Sichuan who had acquired citizenship regarded those who joined the anti-corruption demonstration in 2007 as ‘*We Mainlanders (waishengren)* are the main supporters of the anti-corruption protest’ (interviewed in Taipei on 15 April 2009). During a bus journey, Zou Zirong, a former state-owned factory worker from Guangxi, was told off by a Taiwanese-speaking woman, who complained about Zirong speaking loudly on the phone. They exchanged insults and accused each other as being *materialistic* and *condescending*. The silent bus driver, who later identified himself as a second-generation Mainlander, deliberately skipped the stop at which the local woman requested to get off. He complained to Zirong that, as a Mainlander, he was *also* discriminated against by Taiwanese speakers, a frustration that might derive from the allegedly intensified ethnic divide under the DPP government. On the whole, acquiring a Mainlander identity, either by prescription or subscription, seemed to be acceptable by Chinese immigrants as this categorisation felt more inclusive than being rejected as being rowdy and poverty-stricken Mainland people (*daluren*).

However, paradoxically, the amicability of Mainlanders in the public domain may not be felt in the private family life, as found by Auntie Zhang, Auntie Liu, and Luo Yingzhu. Although their step-children were second-generation Mainlanders and mainly spoke Mandarin, they were born and bred in Taiwan. If the three women had expected to have a friendly relationship with their step-children, they were disappointed that at times their step-children were *not unlike* the people of Taiwan (*taiwanren*), who uttered a sense of superiority to Chinese people, despised made-in-China products, and rejected foods brought back from China. Confused Auntie Zhang thus asked, ‘Aren’t they *also* Taiwanese (*taiwanren*)?’ At that juncture, even the belonging of the first-generation Mainlanders became uncertain. As Auntie Liu wittingly concluded, ‘the old men have lived in Taiwan for more than 60 years. They are *Mainlanders* in Taiwan, but they are *Taiwanese Compatriots (taibao)* in China. They belong to nowhere!’ (Zhang, Liu interviewed on 25 March, Luo on 17 March 2009, all in Taipei).

The interviewees’ random encounters with the general public and the daily interactions with their step-children illuminate not only the divide between ‘Taiwanese’ and ‘Mainlander’ but also the shifting boundary between the two categories. Hostility and discrimination towards Chinese immigrants was found amongst the people of Taiwan (*taiwanren*) and Taiwanese speakers (*benshengren*). However, exclusion as such was also confusingly evident in the words and deeds of their step-children, who were expected to be inclusive Mainlanders (*waishengren*). However, the question ‘Aren’t they also Taiwanese?’ (*taiwanren*) manifested how the boundary of categories shifted: by patrilineal tie (born to Mainlander fathers), they were Mainlanders; by primordial link (born and bred in Taiwan), they were Taiwanese (*taiwanren*); by factual acts (hostility), they were Taiwanese (*taiwanren*). This confusion was part of their political re-socialisation in the sense that it revealed the dynamic internal chasm of the host society and that *othering* Chinese was a way to ascertain the Taiwanese identity. Both made the central-peripheral conceptual hierarchy unrealistic and obsolete.

Machiavellian democracy and campaigning for self-interest

Democracy is integral to Taiwan’s self-identity, as seen in the legislative initiatives of the *Act Governing the Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area*. First raised by the KMT in the draft bill of 1990 and later repeated by the DPP in the amendment of 2002, democracy was upheld to mark the difference between Taiwan and

China. Whether the PRC Chinese were adaptive to a democratic life was an underlined concern of the incumbent government, as the founding values of communist and democratic systems were deemed incompatible.³⁷ Thus, it is important to explore how the Chinese women perceived the operation of democracy in Taiwan. As explained below, their conceptualisation of democracy was largely shaped by their political socialisation in China.

Auntie Shi's view on the KMT-anchored residency regulations is a good example in this regard. Between 1992 and 1999, under the KMT's watch, the habitation of Chinese wives in Taiwan was defined as one of visitation rather than residency. This definition permitted them only a maximum of a 6-month staying every year until they bore children or were married for 2 years.³⁸ This regulation forced Auntie Shi, a retired primary school teacher from Guangdong, to depart for China every 6 months. This incurred a heavy burden on their tight finances and deprived her elderly and sick husband of her care. What she inferred from this restriction was that Chinese immigration was not welcome by the KMT government: 'You want to get married, but there's a policy that restricts you. This is the law of the land that you've got to abide by. This is like in the Mainland that you're limited to have one child, otherwise you'll be fined.' It was notable that this restriction was thought of as inhumane as the One Child Policy. When asked whether she took part in protesting against this legislation in May and October 1998, she shrugged and replied 'We didn't think about revolting' (interviewed on 19 March 2009 in Taipei). It is clear that in her understanding, to protest in support of her self-interest was to rebel against the power of the state (be it democratic or repressive), and this was a fight that would not be fought by 'ordinary people' like herself.

Related to this passive view was to see democracy as a variation of *realpolitik*. Granny Yang witnessed the purge of her family and her Indonesian Chinese colleagues during the Cultural Revolution. In her perception, politics was fuelled by a craving for power and that Machiavellianism was the politicians' tradecraft. By nature, an elected president was no different from an emperor. In a pyramid society where the powerful were few and the masses were at the same time powerless, democracy facilitated a stage for the elites to perform populist acts in order to win the votes of the masses at the bottom of society. The equal value of each ballot 'either held by the Nobel Prize-laureate Lee Yuan-tze or held by a greengrocer' gave politicians incentives for vote buying (interviewed on 13 March 2009 in Taipei).

In spite of this passive view, other interviewees did not miss the facility provided by democracy to pursue their interest. Both Zhang Jinhua and Granny Yang argued that Chinese immigrants' rights and entitlement were an equation of the fluctuated Taiwan-China relationship. For Jinhua, a school teacher from Guangxi and a self-styled activist, a way to de-politicise Chinese immigrants was to support candidates who campaigned for immigrants' causes, regardless of their party affiliation. For her, this de-politicisation was also derived from her argument that Chinese women are not interested in politics:

Once we acquire citizenship and have a satisfying life slightly better than the one in China, we'll be quiet. We won't be mobilised or organised to oppose anyone. Why? We're just women who married to Taiwan. We have no political intentions. The [PRC] government won't use us as secret agents.... Marriage has nothing to do with politics. (Interviewed on 10 March 2009 in Taipei)

Jinhua's narratives highlighted her familiarity with the presumption that Chinese immigrants were inclined to support the KMT and were the Fifth Column of the PRC. Her appeal of de-politicisation revealed their vulnerability in the partisan politics and the Taiwan-China relationship.

Unlike Auntie Shi's inaction, other interviewees took part in the rights-claim movement in varying ways. Long Yongru, who had a string of laborious jobs and who was yet to acquire citizenship, went out onto the street demanding the improvement of the legal treatment for Chinese immigrants, whereas former school teacher Wong Hong disseminated information about the protest and encouraged others to join. For those who did not join the rally, they were also well versed about the unfavourable citizenship legislation under which Chinese were regulated. The unfavourable treatment results from the ambiguity that PRC citizens are still constitutionally regarded as ROC nationals, hence PRC citizens and foreign nationals are placed under two different sets of legislation and the duration of residency required of the former is longer than that of the latter for their citizenship eligibility.³⁹ This differentiation was perplexing because in the ethnocentric worldview of Chinese immigrants, they, and the people of Taiwan, are of the same Chinese race, culture and ancestry. Thus, the people of Taiwan should embrace Chinese immigrants as equal 'us-members' rather than treat them as outsiders of a legal status lower than that of Southeast Asian immigrants. This puzzle was another wake-up call to their ethnocentric worldview which did not consider the reality of the separation of the ROC from the PRC.

Taking part in partisan politics, facing it at work and home

If they were slow to come to terms with the political reality across the strait, they were highly sensitive to DPP's anti-China stance and perceived themselves as particularly unwelcome by the DPP. For example, Tong Hongying, a seasoned 28-year-old business-woman from Guangdong, detected a political agenda behind the DPP's introduction of entry clearance interviews in 2003: the DPP intended to put a brake on the settlement of Chinese immigrants. In response, some chose to openly confront the DPP. For example, Zou Zirong and Hu Hailan, a retired state-owned factory worker from Hubei, joined the 2007 'Red Shirt Army' anti-corruption demonstration. They went for days without attending their hourly-paid employment as a cleaner and a caregiver. Granny Yang, who described her church as pro-independence, refrained from wearing anything red to conceal her colour. Notably, unlike their older counterparts who chose to join the partisan protest, younger Chinese interviewees appeared less zealous. An Qilan, a former migrant worker from Chengdu to Shenzhen, consciously kept a low profile in her workplace. Working as a shop assistant in a high-end department store whose business relied on good customer service, she took the advice of a good-intentioned local colleague given on the first day on the job and refrained from talking about politics with another colleague who was known as a staunch DPP supporter.

The pressure of partisan politics was also, if not more, evident in the home. Zhu Yongli, who received 2-year primary education in rural Guangxi before migrating to Dongguan for work, was brought to understand the significance of voting in the context of partisan politics by her Taiwanese-speaking mother-in-law. Before Yongli acquired her citizenship, her mother-in-law was mindful about her ineligibility to vote and thought it regrettable that she could not instruct Yongli to vote. Little did she know that Yongli had already determined to abstain after becoming eligible. Living under the shadow of her matriarchal mother-in-law, Yongli perceived the latter's intention in the context of partisan politics along the line of Taiwan-China antagonism. Moreover, her narratives indicated an emerging constituency of Chinese immigrants as opposed to DPP supporters:

Of course *they, Taiwanese*, would hope to gain one more vote. If I helped the Taiwanese, surely *we Chinese* would be upset. If I didn't help *them* (Taiwanese), my husband and mother-in-law would be unhappy. (Q: But nobody can see what you're doing in the voting booth.) I'd rather do nothing and upset no one. (Interviewed on 21 April 2009 in Taipei)

If DPP supporters, such as Zhu Yongli's mother-in-law and Granny Yang's church, attempted at converting Chinese women's political inclinations, the party did not seem keen to achieve the same goals. In the eyes of Long Yongru, the DPP's anti-Chinese animosity was magnified by its 2008 presidential candidate Frank Hsieh's insult, which likened Taiwanese men who married Chinese women to those of prostitute clients. What can be inferred was that Frank Hsieh, and the DPP, were not interested in winning their votes. However, as far as citizenship legislation was concerned, the reluctance to admit PRC Chinese to become ROC citizens was consistently maintained from the KMT to the DPP government.⁴⁰ Granny Yang argued that, in this regard, the KMT was implicit and covert, and the DPP was explicit and overt. Zhang Jinhua further articulated that the KMT was anti-communist but the DPP was anti-China.

The above analysis demonstrated how the interviewees encountered the ethnic divide and partisan politics in the everyday interactions with their neighbours, families, colleagues, and members of the general public. Being some of the very few Chinese who could cast their votes in Taiwan, the interviewees were passive about their political rights in principle, but, for advancing self-interest, they did not leave their political rights idle. On the contrary, they utilised democracy and campaigned for improving their legal treatment.

In contrast to the government's *essentialisation* of 'un-democratic' Chinese, their communist upbringing did not necessarily automate an inability for democratic participation.

Holding to the central-peripheral hierarchy, they felt hijacked by the DPP's aversion to China. They were negatively affected by the divide between Taiwanese and Mainlanders, but their political re-socialisation could go as far as acquiring a Mainlander identity for its inclusion. Although there was a noted confusion of defining 'Taiwanese' and 'Mainlander', some were comfortable with the acquired Mainlander identity and some acted upon it in the anti-corruption demonstration. If their understanding of ethnic divide was intertwined with partisan politics, their dissatisfaction with their unfavourable legal status was beyond partisan politics. Whilst younger interviewees, such as Tong Hongying, were quick to criticise the hostility they received from the DPP, seasoned older interviewees, such as Auntie Shi, Granny Yang, and Zhang Jinhua, who called on their experiences of living under the KMT during the 1990s, argued that neither the KMT nor the DPP welcomed their settlement in Taiwan.

To sum up, my analysis shows that the interviewees were conscious of being the *inferior and hostile other* to the people of Taiwan. They were used as political tokens by the two political parties in their relationship with China. Auntie Zhang's puzzle, referring to the so-called second-generation Mainlanders – *Aren't they also Taiwanese?* – pronounced their unstated understanding that they personified China as *the Other* to the Taiwanese identity, behind which the people of Taiwan were unified as a whole by their hostility, discrimination and distrust towards Chinese. Whilst being excluded as *the other* and unable to clearly draw the distinction amongst local ethnic groups, they nevertheless found accommodation behind a Mainlander identity and acted upon this identity along the line of partisan politics.

With their political re-socialisation explained, I will turn to analyse whether these experiences have any impact on their conceptual hierarchy and whether this impact affects their self-positioning vis-à-vis Taiwan.

The conceptual hierarchy challenged: bridging across or sandwiched between?

As mentioned above, Chinese immigrants' worldview contradicts the Taiwanese identity. Although the latter does not shy away from its continental Chinese origin, it nevertheless stresses that Taiwan is a society built by immigration from China, and the immigrant society has developed a culture and identity distinctively varied from its Chinese origin.⁴¹

Attempting at resolving the contradiction, the interviewees capitalised on the immigration theme of the Taiwanese identity. They articulated that they were also part of the continental immigration, but were the latest arrivals after the earlier immigrant groups of Hoklo, Hakka and Mainlanders. This articulation was rooted in the central-peripheral hierarchy. That is, not only did it subordinate all ethnic groups in Taiwan to the ultimate unified Chinese nation but also emphasise their shared origins. Thus, the interviewees asserted their rightful membership of the national community of Taiwan. By doing so, the interviewees extrapolated their origin from the supreme, ultimate, and larger unit, and placed themselves above the 'Little Taiwan' and the people of Taiwan.

However, this appropriation failed to resolve other frictions. Taiwan regards itself as a sovereign and independent state separate from China, and the island's culture and nation have been transformed from a Chinese monopoly to a convergence of multiple origins. Taiwan is a new nation born out of, but not restricted to, its Chinese origin. For older interviewees, ethnocentrism reigned supreme. Taiwan remained Chinese, although they had difficulties in exacting the political status of Taiwan. They identified with Taiwan for endowing them with civility, the modernity of public infrastructure, an efficient civil service, and expanding welfare provided by a free democracy and a vibrant economy. They supported Taiwan in applying to join the World Health Organisation because 'it's good for the people of Taiwan', but they opposed the bidding for membership of the United Nations as Taiwan is not a state. In sum, tightly entwined with the ethnocentric worldview, they identified Taiwan for its beneficial way of life, but they could not identify Taiwan as it claims itself now: a sovereign ROC on Taiwan that is separate from and independent of the PRC.

Logically deriving from their worldview was to support an ultimate unification and ending the prolonged *status quo*. Nevertheless, they argued that there was no need to rush. For the time being, maintaining the *status quo* should be the top priority for both sides. However, *status quo* did not mean static. Rather, it was hoped to render more economic exchanges and thus achieve co-prosperity. The aspiration for prosperity was a deep reflection upon the hardship caused by futile mass political movements where their youthful years were engulfed. The interaction was also hoped to further open Taiwan to the Chinese so that the Chinese could witness how freedom and democracy operated in Taiwan.

Taking part in partisan politics and making use of democracy for their self-interests did not wipe out their impression of 'chaotic' democracy. The fierce electoral competition was cognitively analogous to 'class struggle' and was feared for its consequence: if the unification versus independence debate developed into a showdown with the PRC, the feared consequence was war. Having experienced 'what the CCP was capable of', and what war was like, they felt compelled to advise not to tempt fate with an angry giant. However, despite their repeated stress that war was disastrous and that nobody wanted a war, the ultimate unification was so *internalised* as a belief and destined as *the* sacred mission promised to Chinese ancestors that if everything failed to achieve it, as Auntie Shi proclaimed, then 'war is the last resort'. At this juncture, Granny Yang murmured 'that (the war) would teach you little Taiwan a lesson!' Placing herself as being opposite to the

'little Taiwan', Granny Yang's emotional response revealed that strictly adhering to the conceptual hierarchy was also a form of micro resistance with which to defeat the exclusion, discrimination, and *otherness* they were subjected to in Taiwan. Auntie Shi concluded that Taiwan's claim of statehood was not recognised by China and China's stance was internationally accepted. As if corresponding to Granny Yang's views, Auntie Shi concluded the discussion by saying:

China is no doubt a great power. It stands high in the world, and its voice counts significantly (中國肯定是大國,它的發言權很重要,在世界是頂天立地). (Both interviewed on 19 March 2009 in Taipei)

The rise of China clearly boosted Chinese immigrants' pride. Speaking out on behalf of China, their words politically dwarfed Taiwan, belittled the people of Taiwan who despised Chinese immigrants, and thus maintained their self-dignity.

In contrast to their older counterparts' uniform adherence to the conceptual hierarchy, younger interviewees showed a spectrum of deviation and developed identification with Taiwan of varying strength. For 42-year-old Long Yun, who held a doctoral degree in science from a foreign country, travelling on an ROC passport abroad meant that Taiwan should be considered as an independent state. But what made more sense to her was that this state should be formally titled 'Republic of Taiwan', rather than 'Republic of China'. After all, 'How can an entity strive to preserve a title that has been extinguished?' (interviewed on 5 April 2009 in Miaoli). After enjoying the freedom of information in Taiwan for 12 years, Jiang Derong supported neither unification nor independence but the *status quo*. She stressed that this was a conscious *deviation* from the fixed position of unification held by most Chinese because she now recognised there were other options. Had she stayed in China, she 'would not know *any other options* but unification because in China education is the means of brainwashing' and the brainwashing is 'as dogmatic as in North Korea' (interviewed on 12 June 2009 in Taipei).

For Gong Pingying, Jiang Juan, Lin Xiaoqi, An Qilan, Ma Xinting, and Tong Hongying, who were mostly mothers of young children, they envisaged that their future hinged on Taiwan's development and this was translated into their support for the *status quo*. What is noteworthy is that maintaining the *status quo* was not considered as a 'second best' option. Rather, it was *the* option that excluded either China forcing through unification or Taiwan declaring independence. This was because unification was perceived as 'better-off Taiwan being dragged down by a worse-off China' and declaring independence resulted in war. Neither was in Taiwan's interest, hence it was also not in their interest. Thus, they remained Chinese and saw Taiwan as a part of China, but they identified with Taiwan for the prospect of maintaining prosperity.

Wong Hong's change was most radical. She recognised Taiwan as an independent state whilst still adhering to her ethnocentric view that Taiwan is Chinese. The central-peripheral hierarchy used to be *the* guiding worldview for her to interact with local people. Similar to Granny Yang's utterance 'teach you little Taiwan a lesson', when Hong was insulted by the derogatory term *Mainland Girl* (*dalumei*), supporting the use of force was her weapons to defend her self-dignity, as expressed in her own words: 'Let's see if you dare [to call me Mainland Girl] *when we send troops over!*' In other words, the stigmatisation of Chinese people in Taiwan adversely reinforced the conceptual hierarchy, and the conceptual hierarchy was evoked as a means of micro resistance and self-defence. However, her marriage to a middle-class man located her in a friendlier social environment, which was conducive for her to 'gradually understand and accept that the history in

the eyes of Taiwanese people is different from what we (Chinese) think' (interviewed on 18 March 2009 in Taipei).

In her modified views, migrating to Taiwan was moving to another country and Taiwan is an independent state separate from China. China should realistically admit that Taiwan's 'state machines have been running independently of China's interference'. On the other hand, for Taiwan, without a formal independence declaration, the independence claim is inevitably subject to external challenges. Beside these modifications, there was also continuity, which was to view the nation of Taiwan as ethnically Chinese. What differentiates Taiwan and China is the political system and the way of life, not ethnicity; Taiwan remains ethnically Chinese.

The most dramatic projection of their self-positioning in relation to Taiwan and China was where the interviewees stood in the case of war. For older interviewees, they preferred to leave Taiwan because there was no doubt that the PRC would crush Taiwan. For younger interviewees, whose affection with Taiwan grew out of motherhood, betterment and home-building, they were reluctant to envisage the possibility of war. Jiang Juan imagined that they were the bridge to maintain the flesh-and-blood relationship between China and Taiwan. This imagination was inspired by her friend, who linked the macro political future to their micro familial tie across the strait:

Perhaps, in the future, the central Chinese leadership will be born to a family whose relatives have settled in Taiwan. Perhaps, in the future, the central Taiwanese leadership will be born to a family whose mother is originally from China. (Interviewed on 16 March 2009 in Taipei)

The metaphor of 'bridge' grown out of a mother identity demonstrated how family ties generated a *relational* identity⁴² linked to both sides. The gendered link across the strait visualised their *in-between* position. However, the in-betweenness could also lead to pessimism. For Ming Xianglan, who suffered the CCP's terror during the Cultural Revolution, her in-betweenness was punctuated by the expected distrust of both sides: she would be suspected by Taiwan as a communist agent and by China as a sympathiser of Taiwan. She would be disowned by both sides. Thus, the same in-between situation led to two extremes. One was a gendered optimism rendered by motherhood; the other was realistic pessimism reacting to the exclusionary and emotional politics of identity.

Conclusion

This research informed preliminary findings of the ambiguous and complex political re-socialisation of Chinese immigrant women and their encounter with the Taiwanese identity. Not attempting at reaching statistical representativeness, the small sample of interviewees provides dynamic and contextual understanding of norms, values, and institutions. By contrasting their conceptions before and after migration along the central-peripheral hierarchy, this paper elaborated the encounters of their nationalistic curiosity and understanding of democracy with the Taiwanese identity. Between them and family members, neighbours, colleagues and the general public, these daily, sometimes *mundane*, encounters manifested the contradictions between their worldview and the ethnic divide and partisan politics in Taiwan. Their political re-socialisation proved that their worldview, which perpetuated the inflexibility of the Taiwan-China relationship, was inadequate to deal with the Taiwanese-Mainlander divide and the anti-China sentiment. Adopting or being prescribed to a Mainlander identity could potentially ameliorate the impact and secure support for the KMT as shown in their enthusiasm in the anti-

corruption demonstration. Even without a Mainlander identity, the DPP's animosity towards China – magnified by its politician's discriminatory slur – was effective to cultivate their distrust towards the party.

Whilst being engrossed by the ethnic divide, they also brought to the foreground the shifting boundary between Taiwanese (*benshengren*) and Mainlander and highlight the fact that, by *othering* China and Chinese, 'Taiwanese' (*taiwanren*) has also become a collective identity shared by the people of Taiwan. The interviewees' narratives pointed out that behind the partisan rhetoric, when facing China and Chinese, the KMT and DPP converged on, rather than disagreed with, the concerns of security, stability and ideational values of democracy. What may seem ironic is that whilst the government of Taiwan is concerned about their adaptation to democracy, and in spite that some of them held a passive view about democracy, some interviewees were active in either protest politics or rights-claim movement. The former showed their political orientation; the latter informed that self-interest was a motive of political participation.

Political re-socialisation gained through daily life gradually fed into their interpretation of the Taiwanese identity. Whilst the older generation showed dim prospect of absorbing the reality of Taiwan's *de facto* independence, the younger generation presented *varying* degrees of deviation from the central-peripheral hierarchy. Their differences implied that a gendered *relational* identity based on motherhood and home-building would be more likely to cultivate a Taiwanese identity amongst the younger generation. Nevertheless, they would continue to see Taiwanese as ethnically and culturally Chinese. Situated in the antagonism between Taiwan and China, they were locked in an unenviable in-between tension. Their optimism of bridging across the strait would nevertheless be dampened by the suspicion and exclusion of both sides which demand their singular and undivided loyalty.

To conclude, this paper suggests that political re-socialisation is possible for immigrants who are from a political polity of opposing values or views. This paper aligns itself with the argument that studying political participation should not only focus on turnout rate or types of political acts (De Rooji 2010: 455). The interviewees' narratives illuminate that re-socialisation should not only be understood for *whether* and *how* they utilise political institutions (voting, protesting, campaigning) but also *why* they choose to do so. The latter may render more contextual indications to their integration and sense of belonging, the ultimate goal of re-socialisation.

Notes on contributor

Isabelle Cheng received her doctoral degree from the Department of Politics and International Studies of the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS). She is currently a Lecturer in East Asian Studies at the School of Languages and Area Studies of the University of Portsmouth, UK. She is also a Research Associate of the Centre of Taiwan Studies, SOAS. Her research concentrates on marriage migration from China and Southeast Asia to Taiwan with a reference to immigrant women's identity and political participation. Her research interests are citizenship, multiculturalism, household registration and Overseas Chinese Studies.

Author's post address: School of Languages and Area Studies, University of Portsmouth, Park Building, King Henry I Street, Portsmouth, PO1 2DZ.

Notes

1. Ma, "Policy towards the Chinese Mainland," 195.
2. Chen, *Issues related to the Residency*, 1.
3. Chu and Liu, *Analysis of the Identity*.

4. Friedman, "Marital Immigration and Graduated Citizenship," 76-7.
5. NIA, *Numbers of Foreign Spouses*.
6. Ibid.; and CEC, *Statistics of the Eligible Voters*.
7. See note 5 above.
8. Cheng, "Making Foreign Women the Mother."
9. Chen, 'China Threat'.
10. EY, *Draft Bill of the Act (1990)*, 15; and EY, *Draft Bill of the Act (2002)*, 21-2.
11. Tseng et al., "Politics of the Mainland Spouses," 212-6.
12. Cheng and Fell, "Changing Ruling Parties."
13. White et al., "Political Resocialization of Immigrants," 268-9.
14. Bilodeau, "Immigrants' Voice," 996.
15. Bilodeau, "Is Democracy the Only Game."
16. Philippov and Knaefman, "Old values in the New Homeland," 49.
17. Lien, "Places of Socialization", 474-5.
18. Chao, "Politics of Sentiment"; and Tseng et al., "Politics of the Mainland Spouses," 213-6.
19. Wan, *Spatial Analysis*.
20. King, "Taiwanese Nationalism."
21. Chen and Yu, "Political Attitudes."
22. Tsai, "Foreign Brides."
23. See note 4 above.
24. See note 12 above.
25. See note 4 above, 93.
26. Kao, *Study on the Curriculum*.
27. Yang, *Comparative Study*; and Liu, *Study of Political Ideologies*.
28. See note 1 above, 8.
29. For Taiwan's propaganda warfare, see Rawnsley, "Taiwan's Propaganda Cold War."
30. Szonyi, *Cold War Island*, 95-6.
31. Shen, *Comparative Analysis*, 27.
32. Godley, "Sojourners"; and Huang, *Returned Overseas Chinese*, 249-74.
33. Szonyi, *Cold War Island*, 40; and Huang, *Returned Overseas Chinese*, 273.
34. The rhymed doggerel goes like this: "報告司令官, 你的老婆在台灣, 沒有褲子穿, 撿到二塊布, 東補西補, 還要露屁股!"
35. For the People's Daily's report of Taiwan's presidential election, see Note 26 above, 89-91.
36. Shih, "Gender and the New Geopolitics."
37. EY, *Draft Bill of the Act (1990)*; EY, *Draft Bill of the Act (2002)*; and EY, *Draft Bill of the Act (2012)*.
38. See note 11 above, 208-9.
39. See note 11 above, 208.
40. See note 12 above.
41. See note 12 above.
42. Knop, "Relational Nationality."

Bibliography

- Bilodeau, Antoine. "Immigrants' Voice through Protest Politics in Canada and Australia: Assessing the Impact of Pre-Migration Political Repression." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 34, no. 6 (2008): 975-1002. doi:10.1080/13691830802211281.
- Bilodeau, Antoine. "Is Democracy the Only Game in Town? Tension between Immigrants' Democratic Desires and Authoritarian Imprints." *Democratization* 21, no. 2 (2014): 359-381. doi:10.1080/13510347.2012.712515.
- Central Election Commission (CEC). 第 13 任總統副總統及第 8 屆立法委員選舉人人數確定統計表 [Statistics of the Eligible Voters for the 13th Presidential Election and the 8th Session of Legislators]. Accessed June 20, 2014. <http://web.cec.gov.tw/files/11-1000-3478-1.php>
- Chao, Antonia (趙彥寧). "情感政治與另類正義: 在大陸配偶的社會運動經驗" [Politics of Sentiment and Alternative Social Justice: How Mainland Spouses Have Engaged in Social Movements in Taiwan]. 政治與哲學評論 [*SOCIETAS: A Journal for Philosophical Studies on Public Affairs*] 16 (2006): 87-152.

- Chen, Ching-chang. "The 'China Threat' in the Eyes of the Taiwanese: A Reflection on Taiwan's Security Policy, 1988-2008." PhD diss., University of Wales, Aberystwyth, 2008.
- Chen, Kuan-cheng (陳寬政). 台灣地區居民大陸配偶來台定居問題 [Issues Related to the Residency of Mainland Spouses of People of the Taiwan Area]. Taipei: Mainland Affairs Council, 1994.
- Chen, Chi-you Jay (陳志柔), and Te-lin Yu (于德林). "台灣民眾對外來配偶移民政策的態度" [Public Attitudes Towards Taiwan's Immigration Policies]. *台灣社會學[Taiwanese Sociology]* 10 (2005): 95-48.
- Cheng, Isabelle. "Making Foreign Women the Mother of Our Nation: The Exclusion and Assimilation of Immigrant Women in Taiwan." *Asian Ethnicity* 14, no. 2 (2013): 157-179. doi:10.1080/14631369.2012.759749.
- Cheng, Isabelle, and Dafydd Fell. "Changing Ruling Parties and Taiwan's Claim to Multiculturalism before and after 2008." *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs* 43, no. 3 (2014): 73-103.
- Chu, Juo-jo (朱柔若), and Chian-chia Liu (劉千嘉). "大陸新娘在臺灣的認同問題探討" [An Analysis of the Identity Issue of Mainland Brides in Taiwan]. 社區發展季刊 [Community Development Quarterly] 112 (2005): 179-196.
- De Rooji, Eline, A. "Patterns of Immigrant Political Participation: Explaining Differences in Types of Political Participation between Immigrants and the Majority Population in Western Europe." *European Sociological Review* 28, no. 4 (2012): 455-481. doi:10.1093/esr/jcr010.
- Friedman, Sara L. "Marital Immigration and Graduated Citizenship: Post-Naturalisation Restriction on Mainland Chinese Spouses in Taiwan." *The Pacific Affairs* 83, no. 1 (2010): 73-93. doi:10.5509/201083173.
- Godley, Michael R. "The Sojourners: Returned Overseas Chinese in the People's Republic of China." *Pacific Affairs* 62, no. 3 (1989): 330-352. doi:10.2307/2760626.
- Huang, Xiaojian (黃小堅). 歸國華僑的歷史與現狀 [The Returned Overseas Chinese: Past and Present]. Hong Kong: Hong Kong Press for Social Sciences, 2005.
- Ma, Ying-jeou. "Policies towards the Chinese Mainland: Taipei View." In *In the Shadow of China: Political Development in Taiwan since 1949*, edited by Steve Tsang, 193-211. London: Hurst, 1993.
- Kao, Chian-min (高建民). "大陸地區義務教育課程之研究 [A Study on the Curriculum of the Compulsory Education in the Mainland Area]." Master's Degree diss., National Taiwan Normal University, 1993.
- King, Winnie. "Taiwanese Nationalism and Cross-Strait Marriage - Governing and Incorporating Mainland Spouses." In *Taiwanese Identity in the 21st Century. Domestic, Regional and Global Perspectives*, edited by Gunter Shubert and Jens Damm, 176-196. London: Routledge, 2011.
- Knop, Karen. "Relational Nationality: On Gender and Nationality in International Law." In *Citizenship Today: Global Perspectives and Practices*, edited by T. Alexander Aleinikoff and Douglas Klusmeyer, 89-124. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001.
- Lien, Pei-te. "Places of Socialization and (Sub)ethnic Identities among Asian Immigrants in the US: Evidence from the 2007 Chinese American Homeland Politics Survey." *Asian Ethnicity* 9, no. 3 (2010): 151-170. doi:10.1080/14631360802349197.
- Liu, Sun-chi (劉勝驥). 中國大陸高校教科書中政治思想教育之研究 [A Study of Political Ideologies in University Textbooks in Mainland China]. Taipei: National Science Commission, 2004.
- National Immigration Agency (NIA). 外籍配偶人數與大陸(含港澳)配偶人數 [Numbers of Foreign Spouses and Mainland Spouses (Including Spouses from Hong Kong and Macao)]. Accessed April 4, 2013. <http://www.immigration.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=1186477&ctNode=29699&mp=1>
- Philippov, Michael, and Anna Knafelman. "Old Values in the New Homeland: Political Attitudes of FSU Immigrants in Israel." *Israeli Studies* 17, no. 1 (2011): 38-54.
- Rawnsley, Gary D. "Taiwan's Propaganda Cold War: The Offshore Islands Crises of 1954 and 1958." *Intelligence and National Security* 14, no. 4 (1999): 82-101. doi:10.1080/02684529908432572.
- Shen, Hsiang-yen (沈湘燕). "開放探親前後人民日報有關台灣報導的比較分析 [A Comparative Analysis on the People's Daily Reporting on Taiwan before and after the Lifting of the Ban on Visiting China]." Master's Degree diss., National Cheng-Chi University, 1992.

- Shih, Shu-mei. "Gender and the New Geopolitics of Desire: The Seduction of Mainland Women in Taiwan and Hong Kong Media." *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 23, no. 2 (1998): 287-319. doi:10.1086/495252.
- Szonyi, Michael. *Cold War Island: Quemoy on the Front Line*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
- The Executive Yuan (EY). 立法院議案關係文書院總第一五五四號，政府提案第三九三三號，中華民國七十九年十二月五日印發，案由：行政院函請審議「台灣地區與大陸地區人民關係條例草案」案 [A Draft Bill of the Act Governing Relations between People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area Submitted to the Legislative Yuan. The Legislative Yuan General No. 1554, Initiative of Government No. 3933]. Taipei: The Legislative Yuan, 1990.
- The Executive Yuan (EY). 立法院議案關係文書院總第一五五四號，政府提案第八七八六號，中華民國九十一年十月十六日印發，案由：行政院函請審議「台灣地區與大陸地區人民關係條例修正草案」案 [A Draft Bill of the Amendments to the Act Governing Relations between People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area Submitted to the Legislative Yuan. The Legislative Yuan General No. 1554, Initiative of the Government No. 8786]. Taipei: The Legislative Yuan, 2002.
- The Executive Yuan (EY). 立法院議案關係文書院總第一五五四號，政府提案第一三四三九號，中華民國一零一年十一月廿一日印發，案由：行政院函請審議「台灣地區與大陸地區人民關係條例草案」案 [A Draft Bill of the Act Governing Relations between People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area Submitted to the Legislative Yuan. The Legislative Yuan General No. 1554, Initiative of Government No. 13439]. Taipei: The Legislative Yuan, 2012.
- Tsai, Ming-chang. "Foreign Brides' Meets Ethnic Politics in Taiwan." *International Migration Review* 45, no. 3 (2011): 243-268. doi:10.1111/j.1747-7379.2011.00847.x.
- Tseng, Yu-chin, Isabelle Cheng, and Dafydd Fell. "The Politics of the Mainland Spouses' Rights Movement in Taiwan." In *Migration to and from Taiwan*, edited by Kuei-fen Chiu, Ping Lin, and Dafydd Fell, 205-226. London: Routledge, 2013.
- Wan, Min-wan (萬敏婉). "台灣地區婚配移民的空間分析—大陸及外籍配偶的比較 [A Spatial Analysis of Marriage Migration in Taiwan: A Comparative Study of Mainland Spouses and Foreign Spouses]." Master's Degree's diss., National Taiwan University, 2006.
- White, Stephen, Neil Nevitte, André Blais, Elisabeth Gidengil, and Patrick Fournier. "The Political Resocialization of Immigrants: Resistance or Lifelong Learning?" *Political Research Quarterly* 61 (2008): 268-281. doi:10.1177/1065912908314713.
- Yang, Ching-yao (楊景堯). "兩岸國中歷史教科書有關「台灣」記載之比較" [A Comparative Study of Historiography of Taiwan in the High School History Textbooks in Taiwan and China]." *Historical Monthly* (歷史月刊) 184 (2003): 66-74.

Appendix. Interviewees' Background

Name	Age	Hometown	Residency (years)	S	Domicile in Taiwan	Education	Marriage	No. of Children
Ming Xianglan	46	Hainan	15	C	Sanchung	JHS	1st	5
Zhang Jie	42	Sichuan	15	C	Keelung	JHS	1st	1
Yuan Panpan	38	Shanxi	14	C	Keelung	SHS	1st	2
Shi Huijing	38	Guangdong	14	C	Fangliao	JHS	1st	2
Yen Yifan	32	Anhui	12	C	Pateh	JHS	1st	2
Lin Jinxia	32	Fujian	12	C	Keelung	JC	1st	2
Jiang Derong	30	Hubei	12	C	Taipei	VS	1st	2
Chen Qing	39	Shandong	11	C	Tantsu	University	1st	1
Lu Minhan	32	Anhui	10	C	Keelung	SHS	1st	2
Long Yun	32	Shanghai	9	C	Taoyuan	PhD	1st	1
Zhu Yongli	36	Guangxi	9	C	Taipei	PS	1st	2
Hu Nanhua	36	Hunan	9	C	Taichung	VS	2nd	1
Zhang Ting	33	Sichuan	7	R	Keelung	PS	1st	1
Wong Hong	36	Hubei	6	R	Hsintian	university	2nd	1
Shi Yiping	33	Sichuan	6	R	Chaochou	JHS	1st	3
Dong Mei	26	Guangdong	4	R	Patu	SHS	1st	nil
Tng Hongying	28	Guangdong	4	R	Hsichi	JHS	1st	1
Bai Ling	37	Guangxi	4	R	Taipei	university	2nd	?
Gung Pingying	29	Anhui	3	R	Hsintian	SHS	1st	1
Jiang Juan	30	Shandong	3	R	Taipei	SHS	1st	1
Lin Xiaoci	26	Anhui	3	R	Taipei	SHS	1st	1
An Qilan	33	Sichuan	3	R	Taipei	SHS	1st	?
Ma Xinting	29	Anhui	3	R	Taipei	SHS	1st	?
Mi Yuping	32	Guangxi	2	R	Chungli	SHS	1st	1
Gu Minjun	24	Anhui	10 months	F	Kaohsiung	JHS	1st	1
Ren Xia	44	Shanghai	6 months	F	Taipei	SHS	1st	nil
Granny Yang	71	Hubei	15	C	Taipei	University	2nd	nil
Zhang Jinhua	?	Guangxi	15	R	Taipei	University	2nd	1
Auntie Shih	60	Guangdong	13	C	Taipei	University	2nd	2
Hu Hailan	57	Hubei	12	C	Taipei	SHS	2nd	1
Wu Lili	56	Fujian	11	C	Keelung	PS	2nd	4

(continued)

Appendix. (Continued).

Name	Age	Hometown	Residency (years)	S	Domicile in Taiwan	Education	Marriage	No. of Children
Auntie Chang	67	Jiangxi	11	C	Panchiao	SHS	2nd	2
Qian Aini	43	Fujian	10	C	?	PS	2nd	3
Zhong Meiling	?	Fujian	9	C	Tamshiu	Illiterate	2nd	4
Antie Liu	60	Sichuan	9	C	Panchiao	JHS	2nd	1
Long Yongru	47	Jiangsu	7	R	Hsichi	SHS	2nd	2
Xiao Yingran	48	Fujian	6	R	Taipei	?	2nd	2
Zou Zirong	50	Guangxi	4	R	Taipei	JHS	2nd	2
Lou Yingzhu	60	Hubei	4	R	Panchiao	JHS	2nd	1

Notes:

All dates are calculated in 2009 and 2010.

The Romanisation of the names and hometowns of the interviewees uses Hanyu Pinyin. The Romanisation of their domiciles in Taiwan uses Wade-Giles.

Residency (years) = years of residing in Taiwan

S = legal status

C = citizenship

R = residency

F = family reunion

SHS = senior high school

JHS = junior high school

PS = primary school

VS = vocational school

JC = junior college