Title

‘Persons of Versatility’: Private Security Officers and Private Policing in Residential Estates in Hong Kong

The thesis is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirement for the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of the University of Portsmouth.

By

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Abstract

This study is the result of exploratory research on the daily lives and experiences of private security officers working in Hong Kong housing estates. As the first qualitative investigation of its kind, it examined two case studies of separate estates through the lens of Nodal Governance, which involved interviews with security practitioners and end-users, work practice observations, and documentary analysis. Security officers were found to 'wear many hats'. Apart from crime prevention, the core roles and functions of private security in these estates are to enforce property owners' orders and maintain the residents' quality of life. These 'hats' were underpinned by the operational characteristics of property management businesses, especially that of security provision structures. The study found that security officers needed to improvise strategies that stopped short of exercising their legal powers, but dealt with suspects and rule breakers nonetheless. In this way, these officers and security companies provided a resident-orientated service style of private policing, with a focus on neighbourhood safety and harmony. The private security industry in Hong Kong is regulated by a 'hybrid regulation mechanism', with a unique mix of public and private actors, and closer inspection suggested that government ordinance initiatives on building management and security services have unintentionally shifted policing responsibility from the state to its citizens, which did much to address residential security inequity indirectly. These findings contribute to a variation on the theme of nodal governance in two ways: ordinances implicitly delegating security provision to citizens paradoxically centralised governance as an unintended consequence; and the genealogy of policing institutions in Hong Kong test the hidden assumptions in Western norms of governance. Elsewhere, the study shed light on private security industry regulation, shifting policing responsibilities, security inequity, *ad hoc* strategizing by actors with limited powers, and high-rise housing security for future reference and further research.

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Declaration

Whilst registered as a candidate for the above degree, I have not been registered for any other research award. The results and conclusions embodied in this thesis are the work of the named candidate and have not been submitted for any other academic award. (Word count: 79880)

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List of Abbreviations

ASIS	American Society for Industrial Security
AVSECO	Aviation Security Company Limited
BMO	Building Management Ordinance
DB	District Board
DWF	District Watch Force
FEHD	Food, Environmental and Hygiene Department
HKP	Hong Kong Police
HKSAR	Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
IPSA	International Professional Security Association
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PEAK	Institute of Professional Education And Knowledge
PRC	The People's Republic of China
PTU	Police Tactical Unit
Q	Wilkie Kwong
QAS	Quality Assurance Scheme
RIC	Royal Irish Constabulary
SCIU	Security Companies Inspection Unit
SGSIA	Security and Guarding Services Industry Authority
SGSO	Security and Guarding Services Ordinance
SPP	Security Personnel Permit
SSTB	Security Services Training Board
TPS	Tenant Purchasing Scheme
VTC	Vocational Training Council

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CHAPTER ONE:

Introductory Chapter

1.1 Introduction

This research is an exploratory criminological study of private security officers who are serving in residential housing estates in Hong Kong. Neuman (2011) suggests that exploratory research is used when the subject is very new, we know little or nothing about it and the goal is to formulate more precise questions that we can address in future research, while descriptive research presents a picture of a situation, social setting or relationship. Experiential accounts of private security personnel is sparse within the larger field of policing studies, and it is still a comparatively under-researched area in Hong Kong and the Asia Pacific region, especially when compared to OECD countries. The dearth of research is especially striking on residential security. Regional scholarly literature located in a preliminary search include Hamilton's 1999 unpublished PhD thesis on the history of Hong Kong private security guards and her book on private policing, published in 2008; a Chinese book describing the industry and the methods in handling security matters was published by Li in 2007; and an unpublished MSc dissertation authored by Murphy in 1996 on the control of the security industry in Hong Kong when regulation of the industry by the Security and Guarding Services Ordinance was still at an early stage. There are also a handful of other unpublished Masters theses on related subjects as researched by local scholars. However, an exhaustive search on the first-hand experiences of residential security personnel in Hong Kong revealed none. While there were occasional snapshots within the context of power relations in public space, the subject of the front-line personnel – a silent majority in the burgeoning industry – did not receive any in-depth treatment. This project strives to rectify the shortfall.

The changing currents of the private security industry, especially the perceived growth in law enforcement endeavours, are of tremendous interest to scholars across disciplines and continents. Conventional academic approaches view private security

through the lens of policing research, seeing the two activities relative to each other. Research has focused on such matters as the growth of the private security industry (Draper, 1978; Shearing & Stenning, 1987; South, 1988, Johnston, 1992; Button & George, 1994; Jones & Newburn, 1995; De Waard, 1999, Forst, 1999), private security powers (Jones & Newburn, 1998; Stenning, 2000; Jason-Lloyd, 2003; Button 2007), the operations of the security officers (South, 1988; McManus, 1995; Sharp & Wilson, 2000; Rigakos, 2002; Wakefield, 2003; Sharp *et al*., 2008), occupational cultures (Michael, 1999; McLeod, 2002; Button, 2007, Wakefield, 2007), and the governance of security (Johnston & Shearing, 2003; Wood & Shearing, 2007, Noaks, 2008).

van Steden (2007) suggests that police studies suffers heavily from Anglo-Saxon 'ethnocentrism', and so tends to ignore the influences of other local histories, policies, economics and cultures on emerging private security industries. The study will examine said influences on the private security industry in Hong Kong, systematically testing his hypothesis through intercultural scrutiny.

Across the globe, there have only been a handful of studies on private security officers and its contribution to residential security. In the UK, McManus (1995) found that the employment motives in private security were attributed to the concern by residents of increased levels of crime and minor incidents of disorder. These concerns generated a perceived need for additional police-enhanced patrol, which was not available, and they were compounded by the state's crime control policy of self-reliance and market ideologies espousing the freedom of choice. Noaks (2000) studied a community which subscribed to a security patrol scheme and found that 74% of the subscribers considered that the presence of security patrol was the priority, 45% of the subscribers joined the scheme to gain the peace of mind and enhance the feeling of safety, and 92 % were either satisfied or very satisfied with the patrol services. Sharp and Wilson (2000) examined the legitimacy of 'civilian policing' through three case studies in residential areas, including two 'Street Watch' programmes and one private security firm. The study found that the frequent improper use of powers by the 'civilian police' resulted in 'vigilante' activities, and suggested that the legitimacy of privately organized 'civilian policing' was crucially determined by the activities of the policing agent(s) and whether their activities are

recognized and supported by the state police. In Canada, Rigakos (2002) found that the power of Intelligarde, a Canadian security company, was vested in the concept of private property ownership in Ontario through the Trespass to Property Act. This gave Intelligarde security officers the necessary power to deal with any person whose acts are illegal or prohibited.

The Hong Kong security industry has shown substantial growth since the 1980s, in line with tremendous population growth within Hong Kong at large. This study strives to fill a gap in the primary narrative.

1.2 The Contextual Background of the Study

Private security is important in the provision of crime prevention, policing services, and maintaining order in many communal spaces and government buildings – arguably more so than its public counterpart (Bayley & Shearing, 1996; McLeod, 2002; Rigakos, 2002; Crawford *et al*., 2003, Button, 2004; Berg, 2010). Security personnel outnumber that of the state police in a number of Western democracies such as the UK, USA, and Canada (Johnston, 2000; Button 2007). Many other developed and developing countries have crossed this threshold. The private security to police personnel ratios were recorded as 1.77 in Ireland; 1.86 in China; 2.63 in Hungary; 4.98 in India; 1.86 in Japan; 1.4 in Luxemburg; 1.65 in Poland; and 2.57 in South Africa (Small Arms Survey, 2011). Compared with these countries, Hong Kong has a high security personnel (101,973) to police (27,768) ratio of 3.2 to 1 and the increase is continuing (Vocational Training Council Hong Kong, 2007; Hong Kong Police, 2011). This figure will be scrutinised in later sections.

A survey carried out by a local university, in association with the UN[1], revealed that Hong Kong is one of safest cities in the world (worldtourismdirectory, 2010). Cover-page statistics suggest that Hong Kong is a low crime-rate city compared to

[1] *the Hong Kong University Centre for Criminology and Social Sciences Research Centre in collaboration with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the University of Tilburg's Centre for International Crime Victimization*

cities like London[2]. There were 8,642 reported cases of burglaries (11 % of the total crime rate of 73,008) in 2001, dropping to 4,382 (6 % of the total crime rate of 75,936) in 2011. The two major types of recorded crime in 2011 were theft (35,026 instances) and violent crime (13,100 cases), comprising 46.13% and 17.25% of the of the total crime rate of 75,936 respectively (Hong Kong Police, 2012). Given the proportion of property-related crimes, security officers are prominently employed in most residential housing estates. The vast majority of Hong Kongers reside in high-rise residential buildings, including social housing tenants. This is presumably one rationale behind the high ratio of security personnel to public police officers, but the underlying mechanism merits further study.

Security personnel face different kinds of challenges from political and police instruments with regard to their powers and authority (Gill, 2006; White, 2010). Public awareness and concern with the increased involvement of private security officers in the policing of society is growing (George & Button, 1997; Jones & Newburn, 1998; Johnston, 2000; Button & George, 2006). The private security industry has supporters and detractors from both ends of the political aisle.

Button (2008) has identified four broad perspectives. The 'Radical Negative' and the 'Conservative Negative' are adverse to the growth and expansion of private security. The former views private security as a threat to society and as such it should be reduced to a minimum and regulated to restrict activities. The latter camp, comprising interest groups such as police unions, defends the roles of the state. The 'Traditional Positive' views private security as a private addition to the provision of societal security by the government in light of growing policing demand, and the state should establish security industry standards to improve its effectiveness and efficiency (Jones & Newburn, 1998; Loader & Walker, 2001 & 2007; Button, 2008). Finally, there is the nodal governance positivist perspective, which accepts the expanding role of private security but seeks to address the consequences of private sector expansion by facilitating 'bottom-up' community led security initiatives (Johnston & Shearing, 2003). These four perspectives are largely centred on private

[2] *75,936 crimes recorded in a population of approximately 7.1 million in 2011, compared to 741,977 crimes recorded in a population estimated at 8 million in 2011. (Greater London Authority, 2012; Hong Kong Police, 2012; Hong Kong Government 2012; Metropolitan Police Crime, 2012)*

security developments within mature economies in recent decades. This thesis seeks to develop ideas that challenge these perspectives and examine the possibility of discourse on geopolitical exceptionalism.

In Hong Kong, private security personnel, variously known as security officers, customer services officers, and other job titles, are usually employed by property management companies. They are responsible for guarding shopping malls, residential buildings and government buildings in Hong Kong. Ironically, the entrances to the Hong Kong Police Headquarters buildings are guarded by private security personnel. Property management companies are responsible for the management of the security provisions, cleaning, and building maintenance in Hong Kong as in some other countries, as mandated by the local Building Management Ordinance [BMO]. The Security and Guarding Services Ordinance [SGSO] stipulates that a person require a Security Personnel Permit [SPP]. A company requires a licence to provide security services in Hong Kong. The renewal of the five-year licence and SPP is subject to the decision of the Commissioner of Police based on holders' performances. This specific setting has affected their roles, functions, and status of private security personnel. They have developed specific relations with other social agents, namely the property owners, tenants, visitors, malefactors, the management staff, and the police. How they operate and exercise their powers in such a complex working environment is of great interest to social science disciplines.

Macaulay (1986) points out non-state entities are shaping the world not simply as providers of governance on behalf of state agencies, but as auspices of governance in their own right (Macaulay, 1986; Loader & Walker, 2001; Shearing, 2006). Nowadays, the private security industry is widely recognized as a 'relative' or 'Extended family' of the state police in the West (Jason-Lloyd, 2003; Johnston, 2003; Johnston & Shearing, 2003; Crawford & Lister, 2004; Jones & Newburn, 2006; Sharp *et al*., 2008). It smacks of naiveté to continue arguing that the state monopolizes the 'policing' in society.

Private security officers in residential housing chiefly function through their very presence, crime prevention, and order maintenance (McManus, 1995; Noaks, 2000; Sharp & Wilson, 2000; Rigakos, 2002). Private security officers are seen to carry out

many other policing functions that the state police may consider as trivial or mundane, such as sanitary and noise nuisance problems. In this setting, they are also involved in providing 'quality of life' police services beyond state policing capacities. The private security industry in Hong Kong differs from its counterpart in mature economies due to its pervasiveness and multi-disciplinary integration with property management roles that are often the province of local authorities.

Research findings indicate that the inequity issue in the provision of security is prominent (South, 1988; McManus, 1995; Crawford *et al*., 2003; Wakefield, 2003; Noaks, 2008). Roughly speaking, 51% of Hong Kongers live in private residential housing, and the other live in social housing (Census and Statistic Department, Hong Kong, 2011). High-rise dwellings with extraordinary urban population densities – even by East Asian standards – set residential Hong Kong apart from most world cities. With the exception of rural villages running 'Village Watch', a form of neighbourhood watch programme (Hayes, 1982), the majority of the Hong Kongers, regardless of income level, live in residential properties that are guarded by security officers. Private security provision in social housing is fully funded by the government. In private residential housing, fees are levied and split amongst property owners. Residents form either an 'Owners' Committee' or an 'Incorporated Owner' to employ a property management company. In turn, the company employs personnel, which also takes care of the maintenance and cleaning in addition to security enforcement. This situation parallels elements in the nodal governance concept as suggested by Johnston and Shearing (2003), who argue for the establishment of private security schemes in deprived communities to address inequities in the distribution of security. This study pursues evidence of an alternative to their proposals.

1.3 The Aims and Objectives of the Research

Government statistics suggest that Hong Kong has a very high security officer to police ratio of 3.2 to 1. The condition and figures of the 'Security Personnel Permit' issued suggests that 97% of the security officers are working in residential security (Security and Guarding Services Authority, 2012), as opposed to

commercial/entertainment premises, as is the norm in developed countries, or armed escorts, as with developing ones. The study examines the contribution of private security officers to residential housing estates policing. This study is executed in light of the dearth of research in high-density urban residences outside the Anglophone sphere. Through the lens of nodal governance, in which security provision is defined by spatial and circumstantial nodes, this evaluation of the private security industry will hopefully impart locally generated knowledge. Where necessary, an exceptionalism-based experiential approach will be used to analyse socio-economic forces that are consistently beyond compare in mature Western democracies. There are four major aims in the study:

The first aim was to analyse the effects of government regulation on the security industry with regard to their operations and development.

The second aim was to investigate the power and accountability of the private security personnel in policing private communal space.

The third aim was to reveal the underlying contribution of security personnel in residential housing context.

The fourth aim was to explore whether there is a locale-specific security governance model for residential security in Hong Kong.

There are four objectives that the project sought to achieve:

The first objective was to discover the key characteristics of the private security industry in Hong Kong.

The second objective was to explore the exercise of powers by private security personnel in private and communal space in private housing estates.

The third objective was to examine their day-to-day operational experiences, in order to identify their roles, functions, image and status in their working environment.

The last objective was to examine the effect of cultural values, customs, geopolitical factors, and institutional culture in respect of the Nodal Governance perspective.

1.4 Significance of the Research

Unlike other local studies that mainly focus on the material and managerial aspects of the Hong Kong security industry, this study was the first detailed qualitative study from the personnel's viewpoint. The vast majority of residential properties in Hong Kong are guarded by security officers, compared to the rest of the world, and its coverage extends to both public (government subsidised) and private apartment buildings. This results in an extraordinary security officer to public police personnel ratio. The confluence of British political institutions and a 95% Chinese population makes Hong Kong a unique control variable for exploring the functions in private security, particularly on the governance of security in residential property, which follows a typically East Asian high-density, high-welfare model, compared to virtually all European capital. The use of private police forces in other residential contexts, such as expatriate/high-wealth gated communities, now rides on a larger trend of police privatization, which is a matter of significant political concern in the Commonwealth, from the UK to South Africa and Australia. Hong Kong enacted the Security and Guarding Services Ordinance in 1996, one year before the handover of Hong Kong to The People's Republic of China [PRC]. This study has also examined the complex genealogy regulatory framework – a hybrid regime consisting of a tangled web of public and private agency – that is presently being operated in Hong Kong.

The players range from government-sanctioned authorities in public policing and vocational education, through private industry mechanisms, to a market that is wholly controlled by loose bands of individuals who produce and consume security services within the residential complex. Such a perspective, perhaps briefly described as 'policing the employer', garnered new knowledge on the working conditions of these security personnel. This residents' service style of private policing is the endgame of various historical, political, cultural, and economic forces.

The political question revolves around the evolution of private security provisions which brought an enterprising culture to delegate said roles and functions to security personnel. A measure of effectiveness is required in any exercise of power and authority; to that end, this study procured first-hand accounts of the power exchanges within these nodes, with divergent results from those conducted in mature economies.

The study has been concerned with examining Johnston and Shearing's (2003) perspectives of nodal governance. This study hypothesized on an exceptionalism approach grounded in their work, with an emphasis on inequity in security provision across the economic spectrum. As urbanisation continues across the world at a staggering rate, knowledge generated in this study may find application in the policing of other high-density housing estates.

1.5 Research Methodology

The research was conducted using two case studies, and a Mixed Method Research [MMR] methodology was adopted. Both qualitative and quantitative data were collected during the research for analysis. The research was conducted in two multi-storey residential housing estates with shopping, parking, and leisure facilities. One was wholly privately owned, whereas the other was a social housing project with an ownership scheme. The security officers and the end-users, such as the residents and 'malefactors', were interviewed or observed. Other professionals in the field were also included in the study. The Hong Kong police declined to participate due to operational confidentiality concerns. Full details of the research process will be illustrated in the methodology chapter. Seventy-one interviews were conducted with security officers, a security manager, an operation officer, a company Director, District Board members (locally elected non-legislative representatives, akin to local councillors in the United Kingdom), residents, shop operators, malefactors, professionals in the industry, and senior members of the security associations (privately organised industry associations). Security officers were shadowed on duty, and documentary data (such as company instructions, security officer's manual and police 'surprise check' reports) were collected for analysis.

1.6 Presentation Structure

This opening chapter first introduces the nature of study as an exploratory and descriptive criminological study of private security officers. The research initiatives, aims, and objectives of the study will be outlined through a contextual background review of Hong Kong. Finally, it outlines the significance of research and the research strategies that were being employed.

Chapter 2 begins by defining the concepts of security and private security. Zedner's (2003) and Prenzler's (2009) definitions are discussed and the reasons for adopting for the research are explained. It will analyse the *raison d'être* of the private security industry and discuss the inequity of security provision in Western industrial societies. Empirical research on the private security officers' powers and cultures was conducted. Lukes' three-dimensional views on powers and Wrong's concepts of force, manipulation, persuasion and authority as distinct forms of power are introduced. Finally, the different perspectives on security governance and new policing configurations that will form the theoretical framework of this research are reviewed in detail.

Chapter 3 discusses the rationales of choosing the Mixed Method Research methodology and the research design. The research process is explained in detail. It explains the reasons of employment of the three research strategies in the collection of data in the research, namely interview, observation, and documentary analysis. The validity of the research is discussed. Finally, it explains the handling of the ethical issues in the research.

Chapter 4 reveals the situation of the private security industry in Hong Kong. The possible reasons for the growth in the numbers of security companies and security personnel are explored. The relationships between the burgeoning private security industry and governmental initiatives implicitly delegating the responsibility to the citizens are examined. The roles of the Security and Guarding Services Industry Authority [SGSIA] and the Hong Kong Police are explored. It examines how the private security industry and security officers are regulated by government licencing schemes, training standards and market mechanisms.

The ‘Hybrid Regulation’ system is introduced in relation to the genealogy of regulation mechanisms. It will discuss in what sense the findings in the governance of security are in line with some of the elements suggested by Johnston and Shearing (2003) in their concept of nodal governance and also how they diverge in Hong Kong. The redress of security inequity in the face of government initiatives on governance of security and the effects of the regulation mechanisms is discussed.

Chapter 5 illustrates the potential and actual legal powers that the security officers can utilize when they carry out their duties. The universal legal tools possessed by the security officers were examined. It will also reveal the delegated legal tools that are available to security officers inside residential estates. The limitations on the use of these tools will be discussed. Allegedly, ‘parochial’ regulations set by the residents are weighed. It illustrates the expectations on the security officers – a policing agent like no other – in enforcing the laws and regulations laid out inside the nodes by the property owners and tenants.

Chapter 6 discusses the findings with respect to the policing of the nodes by the private security officers. It examines the conflict of roles and interests in respect to the indirect employer-employee relationship with the residents when the security officers intervening in the impropriety of the residents. The reasons why ‘watchman’ and ‘guard’ images still prevailed in the minds of the residents are discussed. The employer-employee relationship that affected their social status in the milieu will be explained. Finally, it concludes that the security officers are engaged in policing of the local, for the local and by power of local community.

Chapter 7 reveals the exercising of powers during the officers’ daily operations inside the nodes. The strategies of ‘arrest-shy’ personnel who would rather restrain or delay the culprits from leaving the scene and rely on the state police to make the formal arrest are explained. It explains how security offices can effectively protect the residents by utilizing their limited powers.

Chapter 8 explores the different roles the security officers play in the residential housing and the property management economy. It will explain the reasons behind their adoption in relation to the foundation of a unique type of private policing. It will discuss how the findings suggest that the major task of policing residential

housing is to maintain order without damaging community cohesion, especially through a very conservative approach towards pursuing litigation and an utmost priority to preserve the quality of life of the residents. Finally, it will discuss the focus on the neighbourhood safety aspect and the reason behind leaving prosecution of the offenders to government authorities.

Finally, the concluding chapter provides an evaluation of the achievement of the goals and objectives. It makes sense of the empirical findings in light of existing theories on private security and policing. It highlights the key factors and effects of the 'hybrid regulation mechanism' and the differences between the Hong Kong perspective and Western discourses in the regulation of the private security industry. It proposes that the Building Management Ordinance and Security and Guarding Services Ordinance unintentionally enacted a version of the Nodal Governance model as advocated by Johnston and Shearing (2003) in addressing the security inequity issue. The study argued that a resident-orientated service style of private policing has developed under these circumstances, and suggested that it may be used as blueprint for policing communities with similar characteristics, with a parallel emphasis on neighbourhood safety and the residents' quality of life. Finally, it will outline the contributions of the research, and draw out threads which merit further research.

2 CHAPTER TWO:

Private Security and the Policing of the Public

"Looking for Differences"

2.1 Introduction

This literature review chapter aims to formulate a theoretical framework for the study. It will indicate the orientations of the research by formulating questions on different aspects of security services provision. The aim of exploring a local model in the Hong Kong situation is to provide insight to issues that exist in societies other than mature Western economies or emerging ones that are so often the focus of developmental studies.

Beginning with the definition of basic concepts, since private security can be considered as a policing activity, themes in private security research tend to mirror those in policing studies. As van Steden (2007) points out, police studies suffers from heavily Anglo-Saxon 'ethnocentrism', and so tends to ignore the influences of other local histories, policies, economics and cultures on emerging private security industries. This chapter interrogates research and scholarship on developmental factors of the security industry namely, operations, regulation, security officers' powers, occupational cultures, and governance of security are the focus of this research.

2.2 Defining 'Security' and 'Private Security'

'Security' is a concept with various casual liaisons. 'Security' or 'Insecurity' can refer to:

- The 'imagined' feeling of safety;
- The subjective condition of feeling secure;
- The objective measure of risk people face;

- The pursuit of national, military or community safety;
- A commodity provided by private security company or policing bodies.

In addition, protection of the nation-state from outside threats (Johnston & Shearing, 2003; Wakefield, 2003; Loader & Walker, 2007; Wood & Shearing, 2007; Newburn, 2008).

Zedner (2003, as cited in Button, 2008, p. 4) provides us with a definition that covers most aspects:

> Security is both a state of being and a means to that end. As a state of being, security suggests two quite distinct objective and subjective conditions. As an objective condition, it takes a number of possible forms. First, it is the condition of being without threat: the hypothetical state of absolute security. Secondly, it is defined by the neutralization of threats: the state of 'being protected from'. Thirdly, it is a form of avoidance or non-exposure to danger. As a subjective condition, security again suggests both the positive condition of feeling safe, and freedom from anxiety or apprehension defined negatively by reference to insecurity.

In addition, a growing trend situates 'security' in a broader framework of 'human security'. Security in this sense includes human rights, good governance, access to education and healthcare, and opportunities and choices to fulfil individual potential (Commission on Human Security, 2003; Zedner, 2009). In this sense, security has become associated with the provision of safety ranging from personal to national and international level.

General understanding of the concept of 'private security' paints the picture of a cluster of policing or security services and activities that are provided by a commercial security company for monetary rewards. In reality, private security is more complicated than this. There is no one universally accepted definition amongst scholars to date. The

debates mainly pivot around the pluralistic nature of the private/public dichotomy. To complicate the matter further, it is inevitable to include the nature and functions of the public police as a reference point when defining private security.

Jones and Newburn argued that 'private' is referred to non-state bodies and the promotion of private interests rather than the public interest (Jones & Newburn, 1998; Jones, 2008a). The difference between private and public is becoming blurred because of the increasing involvement of private security in the public sphere and (Johnston, 1992; Jones & Newburn, 1998; George & Button, 2000; Johnston, 2000; Rigakos, 2002; Johnston & Shearing, 2003). Rigakos, in his study of a Canadian private security company, argues that the procedures of private law enforcement and surveillance are products of actuarial rationales attempting to bridge the gap between the public and private police; this gradually renders the distinction meaningless (Rigakos, 2002). Although Rigakos' argument is sound in an operational aspect, some manifest distinctions can still be found between private and public actors. For instance, in Hong Kong, private security personnel, like any other citizens, does not have the legal power to enter the premises of suspect or offender against the will of the occupier without a warrant, as the state police do. Prenzler (2009, p. 241) provides us a definition of private security that may prove more practicable:

> Private security encompasses all crime prevention, investigation, and law enforcement activities carried out on a contractual commercial basis or within private firms. In other words, it concerns those policing and protective services not provided by public sector police, funded by taxation, and delivered free of charge to citizens. It also excludes security activities provided on a voluntary or non-commercial community basis, such as neighbourhood watch programmes.

Zedner's (2003) definition of 'security' and Prenzler's (2009) definition of 'private security' are controversial. Zedner's (2003) definition can be criticized as intangible as it only describes the states of the mind but defines nothing physically. Likewise, Prenzler's (2009) definition can be argued that it has ignored those security services that

are provided by public police, but a charge is still imposed on the private users. Research carried out on private security indicated that security officers and companies are increasingly involved in the pluralized policing roles, up to and including national security (Johnston, 2000; Reiner 2000; Jason-Lloyd, 2003; Avant, 2005; Crawford *et al*., 2005; Jones & Newburn, 2006; Crawford, 2008). Based on this scholarship and the realities of the private security services market, this study proposes a working definition of private security as:

> A person or agency not under the payroll of governmental instruments, that provides any kind of security services required by their direct or indirect employers, by exercising legal powers which they personally wield as citizens, or the delegated powers by these employers, for a remuneration.

2.3 The Size of the Private Security Industry

The variety of the private security services makes measuring the size of the industry in the UK a challenge (Jones & Newburn, 1994 & 1998; George & Button, 2000). Even in Hong Kong, the results are still problematic, as it does not really help answer the question of how many officers are actively working in the field. For instance, Walker (1999) found that the number of door supervisors recorded at the time of writing was somewhere between 50,000 and 250,000 in the UK. There were 210,637 people holding a valid door supervisor licence in the UK in 2012 (Home Office, UK, 2012). However, there were no official or industry estimates on the number of people actively working as door supervisor, either in standard employment or under the table (cash-in-hand). Furthermore, the use of different definitions results in a rather arbitrary inclusion and exclusion of different security segments (Sarre & Prenzler, 1999; van Steden, 2007).

For example, in Hong Kong, members of the Triad Society (effectively cartel associations with criminal elements, membership of which being illegal in Hong Kong) are found working cash-in-hand or otherwise unofficially as bouncers in nightclubs or bars (Chu, 2000). As such, statistical results can only be treated as the best estimates of the size of the security employees. The industry is growing by most indirect metrics, in

any case, and the number of private security personnel is gradually outpacing that of the public police in some mature economies.

In the UK, George and Button (2000) estimated that there are 317,500 employees in the security industry. According to the British Security Industry Association [BSIA] figure, in respect of manned security guarding, there was a turnover of £1,575 million in 2005 (BSIA, 2012). (At the 2005 minimum wage of £5.05 and a 43-hour week, this translates to an upper limit of 140,000 full-time employees or part-time equivalent) 329,731 valid security licences exist in March 2012 (Home Office, UK, 2012). Again, the real number of active security officers is unknown.

Since the size of private security employees is simply the best estimate, the private security officer to public police officer ratio may be more significant in showing the size of the industry has outnumbered the public police. George and Button (2000) suggest that the private security to public police personnel ratio had reached 1.4 to 1 in the UK. In the USA, it was estimated (Cunningham *et al*., 1990) that the ratio will reach 2.6 to 1 in 2000 and it was recorded as 2.26 in the USA 2010 (Small Arms Survey, 2011); in Canada the ratio was 2 to 1 (Campbell & Reingold, 1994) and in Australia was 1.5 to 1 (Reynolds & Wilson, 1997) and reached 2.19 to 1 (Small Arms Survey, 2011); and in New Zealand was 1.2 to 1 (Bradley & Sedgwick, 2009).

The Anglophone world has reached or exceeded parity. The situation in the EU at large is also gradually moving into this direction. The private security officers to public police ratio estimate range has moved up to 0.71 to one overall in 2004, compared to the EU average of 0.43 to 1 in 1999 found by De Waard (De Waard, 1999). van Steden and Sarre (2007) conclude that well over one million people are employed in private security industries in the EU.

In Hong Kong, the Security and Guarding Services Industry Authority [SGSIA] was established on 1 June 1995 under the Security and Guarding Services Ordinance [SGSO] to administer a licensing scheme regulating the security industry. The SGSO stipulates that a person will require a Security Personnel Permit [SPP], and a company will similarly require a licence before they provide security services. A Manpower Survey conducted by the Vocational Training Council [VTC] records the number of full-time employee in security services at 107,652, a 2.2% year-on-year growth, which

translates to a security officer to state police personnel ratio of 3.2 to 1 (VTC Hong Kong, 2007; Hong Kong Police, 2009), much higher than that in Anglo-Saxon countries. In Hong Kong, the number of SPPs issued was recorded as 284,213 in 2010, and there were 911 registered security companies of various sizes in July 2011 (SGSIA, 2011a). Similar to other findings on security officers (Jones & Newburn, 1998; George & Button, 2000), the number of active security personnel is uncertain, and can only be roughly gauged by permit turnover rates.

To put the numbers in context, the geographical size of mountainous Hong Kong (about 423 sq. mile) is approximately 2/3 that of the plains of Greater London (about 609 sq. mile). Hong Kong has a population of just above 7 million, much like London (Hong Kong government census, 2011a), and it is estimated that there are 62.3 million people in the UK (Office for National Statistics, UK, 2011). Notably, the number of registered security officers (permit holders) in Hong Kong (280,963) is quite close to that of the entire UK (329,731). Why does Hong Kong need such a large number of private security officers? Who is paying for their services? What types of security services are they providing? These questions will be addressed in the research.

2.4 Reasons for the Growth of the Private Security Industry

Private security has been expanding since the 1960s to become a primary supplier of protection services in many societies (Shearing & Stenning, 1987; South, 1988; Johnston, 1992; Button & George, 1994; Jones & Newburn, 1998; De Waard, 1999; Sklansky, 1999; Juska, 2009). George and Button (2000) found that 217,000 private security officers were directly engaging in policing activities, compared with 156,300 public police officers in the UK. The reasons for the development and growth of the private security are generally attributed to a few major reasons.

The phenomenon, dubbed the pluralisation of policing, and the growth of the private security industry at large are interconnected to each other. McLaughlin (2007) suggests that without the pluralisation of policing, private security will not be able to expand and without the private security, industry pluralisation of policing may not be realized. Jones and Newburn (2006) suggest that the pluralisation of policing can be attributed to

the increasing size and pervasiveness of the commercial security sector; the proliferation of commercial security involved in the spread of technologies (such as CCTV); the incursion of the private sector into more areas of activity usually associated with public policing; and the growing commodification of the public police. Different forms of policing provisions have emerged that can be distinguished both from commercial security and from other state constabularies such as Police Community Support Officers, who are uniformed non-warranted civilians employed by police forces in England and Wales. Loader (1999) summarizes these changes into three headings—managerialism in which policing is becoming more of a business-like enterprise; consumerism is the re-presentation of public policing as a 'service' and of the public as 'consumer'; and 'promotionalism' is the increasingly professional promotion of the 'product'.

These suggest that the changing nature in policing has allowed other forms of provision to provide what the police are unable to provide to the public. Secondly, some functions are deliberately transferred from public to private sector; some public functions, such as enforcement of parking and traffic regulation, have been privatised. Structural changes in urban space also create issues in policing communal spaces. Finally, broader shifts in the structure and nature of 'late modern' societies have created a set of circumstances in which plural policing proliferates. Political dialogues suggest that pluralisation is a solution to the neo-liberalization of social policy by using privatization as a means of restricting public spending and refashioning the shape and functioning of the state.

Jones and Newburn (2006) suggest that the growing visibility of private security, the increasing 'responsibilization' of citizens and communities, and the growing corporatization of public policing bodies all complicate both the perception and the reality of policing. They argue that the political and cultural context are vital and play a crucially important role both in mediating and moulding particular developments. What is the progress of pluralisation in Hong Kong so far, and how will it affect the provision of security? The study will examine the policing functions that have been deliberately transferred from public to private sector. At the same time, it will also examine the issues in policing communal spaces.

The fiscal crisis of the state and the subsequent minimal state thesis argue that the inability of the government's budget to support the increase in demands for more police

services has created a vacuum for other agencies to fill (Johnston, 1992; O'Malley & Palmer, 1996, Reiner, 2001; Crawford & Lister, 2006). Countless governments have faced fiscal crisis since the 1960s. One way out is by cutting down government expenditure and reducing the state's involvement in providing public goods such as policing services. Many resources and budgets are cut, and the police can no longer meet the escalating demands of citizens, such as visible foot patrols, which are notably lacking (McManus, 1995). This has created a market for commercial security agencies to fill the vacuum. Moreover, the introduction of private sector management philosophies into public police has been considered as one of engines behind commercial security expansion. More and more 'police work' is being carried out by private security companies in order to increase the cost-effectiveness of spending on policing (O'Malley & Palmer, 1996; O'Malley, 1997, Wilson *et al*., 2001, Button, 2012). However, the claim of economy was rebuked by Jones and Newburn (1998) who argued that the sizes of state police and private security have virtually been expanding in tandem during and after the budgetary cuts. Similarly, the fiscal crisis thesis does not fully explain the situation in Hong Kong and merits further discussion.

The massive growth of private property in capitalist societies is perceived to fuel private security (Shearing & Stenning, 1981 & 1983; Johnston, 1992). The massive increase in the distribution of private property has created more chances for criminals to victimize individual property owners. This also created new demands in protecting private property rights. Public police can only concentrate on basic protection of vulnerable individuals while private police are able to provide 'more' services for those who can afford it. For instance, within the perimeter of private property, private security can be used to deter, refuse, or evict 'drunkards, tramps,' and 'unwelcome' visitors', while public police forces are not empowered to handle such incidents in private spaces (Shearing & Stenning 1981; Button, 2007). This situation seems to have been reproduced in Hong Kong. The powers and tactics that security officers use in classifying and refusing entry to 'unwelcome' and 'suspect' visitors will be explored in the research.

Another Marxist critique for the growth of private security can be attributed to the 'commodification' of products and services in many capitalist societies – a sense that departs from the meaning of commodity and commoditization in mainstream business

theory. Nowadays, policing is recognized as a service and the same applies to security provision. One characteristic of commodification is a will to drive up the demand for commodities that have been now fetishized. A sense of insecurity is created in society by media and politicians. Wilson (2011) points out that media portrayal of crime and politicians claiming to suppress criminality give a false impression to citizens that crimes are ubiquitous. Spitzer (1987) refers to this as 'security fetishism'. This makes people purchase more and more security services and commodities to lessen their fear of insecurity, for instance by installing burglar alarms at home.

Likewise, the increasing demand for more police control in society (McManus, 1995; Noaks, 2000) has provided opportunities for the private security industry to offer 'top-up' policing services to the citizens. The hypothesis of increasing formal control suggests that the police are unable to satisfy the increased demands from the public, following the demise of surveillance functions by secondary social control agents such as caretakers or bus conductors (Jones & Newburn, 2002). Private security has emerged to fill the vacuum as part of a general trend towards the increasing formalisation of social control. The high private security to state police personnel ratio in Hong Kong suggests that private security services are widely employed within the fabric of society. The study will identify the style of private residential policing.

Beck's (1992) 'risk based thinking and pragmatic mentality' thesis suggests that modernity transforms everything into decisions and therefore into 'risk'. There are risks around the person or their households. For instance, walking alone at night in the street is portrayed, and subsequently considered, as 'full of risks'. People may be assaulted, raped, robbed, or murdered. On the other hand, staying at home is also considered as risky and may become victims of burglary or assaulted by their domestic partner. This 'risk mentality' has created a consciousness of risk around people's living environment. People are expected to anticipate, identify, classify, and minimize risk through the application of rational techniques. This created an environment for private security to sell their risk management orientated services in order to reduce the fear of victimization amongst its buyers. Security services are thus transformed into a full-fledged essential commodity. Given the low crime rates (especially burglary rate) in the city, the motivations for Hong Kongers to employ security officers will be explored in the research.

The preceding debates have outlined the common reasons for the growth of the private security industry found in the West. However, these reasons have proved inadequate in Hong Kong. What could be the differences for the growth of private security in Hong Kong?

van Steden (2007) points out that police studies suffer from 'ethnocentrism' (Manning, 2005) and so tend to ignore the influences of local histories, policies, economics and cultures on emerging private security industries. In a study of the growing privatised policing at the Efteling Theme Park in Kaatsheuvel, Netherlands, van Steden (2007) found motivations such as crime and disorder problems; economics rationalities; government policy toward private security sector participation; and changes in labour laws. Similar causes were found in Feyenoord, Rotterdam, and in Hoog Catharijne, a shopping complex in Utrecht. In Korea, Lee (2004) found that the need for private policing increased when the public policing system failed to protect private interests after political decentralization. Secondly, the wide availability of private policing was made possible only when economic growth provided a ground for commodification of policing. The economic affluence and increase of personal income opened the door to widespread private policing. In South Africa, substantial growth of private policing functions has occurred and accelerated because of private 'infiltration' – some would say usurpation – into the sphere of public policing (Minnaar, 2005). Zhong and Grabosky (2009) suggest that the growth of the private security industry in The People's Republic of China is attributed to the tremendous societal transformations that were a result of economic development. The growth is the result of transition from a monopoly of public policing to an integration of public/private policing, with the public security police still playing a leading role in the policing network; there is also a trend towards privatizing some previously public policing bodies in order to 'strengthen the rule of law'. The findings have shown that the situations are different outside the developed Anglophone sphere.

Hong Kong has a unique political and cultural context, being a former British Colony and a Special Administrative Region of China with separate custom unions, under common law, and a post-colonial police force. The research will explore the influences of local histories, policies, economics and cultures on the growth of the private security industry in Hong Kong.

Hong Kong has also experienced the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and emerged relatively unscathed in the 2008 global financial crisis, with very few austerity measures that were typical of mature economies. Figures from Hong Kong Police show that the strength of police officers remains at 28,389 in the year 2002 and 28,118 in the year 2010 (Hong Kong Police, 2011). There were no conspicuous causality between the growth of private security in Hong Kong and the number of police officers being employed. The fiscal crisis thesis cannot fully explain the increased demand of the private security services, with an annual industry employment growth of 2% against a population growth rate of 0.9%. What are the other conditions that may cause the increase of demand of the private security in Hong Kong?

The ‘mass property ownership thesis’ illuminates another potential force driving the demand of security services. Hong Kong has experienced fundamental political and economic changes following two severe urban riots in 1966 and 1967 (Scott, 1989; Tsang, 2004). The MacLehose administration responded to the McKinsey (McKinsey, 1972) consultant report via a series of social and administrative reforms, including the implementation of the Ten-Year Housing Programme in 1972 with an aim to relieve housing pressures amongst the 1.8-million-strong working class. These subsidized rental units were then supplemented by the Home Ownership Scheme five years later.

At the same time, private developers took the chance to provide higher quality apartments to the aspiring ‘middle class’. The number of self-contained owner-occupied households grew dramatically. In Hong Kong, most property owners in private and subsidized-sale units have installed metal gate, solid wooden main door, and metal window grilles to their flats. Why do Hong Kongers still need security personnel to protect their highly ‘secure’ property? The study will explore the function of security officers beyond crime prevention.

2.5 The Inequity Issue in the Provision of Security

South noted as early as 1988 that private security was a business marked with confidence, optimism, and rapid expansion. Private security is able to offer services that are not met by the public police, in areas such as foot patrol. The private security is

responding to (and stimulating in the process) demands from the market in the private sphere, and it is policing more areas of public space than before. The growing demands from the public indicate some approval of their services and success. South pointed out the unequal protection issues within society, namely that the 'haves' can enhance their security by purchasing private police services, while the 'have-nots' need to rely on limited public police services. South rebuked this arrangement, asserting that a universally accessible scheme that provided for both physical security and insurance concerns will be more desirable.

Fundamental issues stand in the face of South's normative judgments are: Who should be initiating such a scheme? How should this scheme be formulated? Are there any reference frameworks? How should the scheme to be monitored? How should it be funded?

McManus's (1995) findings addressed some of these questions. He argued that the change from traditional public police patrol to private security provision of neighbourhood patrols is a shift from determinism to free will, or as he put it, 'from fate to choice'. He contended that state policy appears to be an important influence on both individual and organizational motivations behind private protection provision. Public police ineffectiveness also fuels the demand of private security patrols in neighbourhoods. He found that the rich exercised the freedom of choice, framing their community policing needs through the uses of private security services. In his study in the North London area, he found that a lesser need existed at Becton, in the Borough of Newham, for private patrol services. Becton residents appeared relatively satisfied with the level of public policing they received. The installation of the private patrol at Becton was instigated by Newham Council rather than residents. He found that the private patrol team had excellent co-operative experiences with the police in Moston, (a new town street in the North East) and Bridton (an estate in the rural North East), but not Becton. Becton's officers 'did not feel threatened by the patrol' and were willing to accept private agency. McManus analysed the crime patterns and found that there was a clear contrast in levels of burglary and theft between the patrolled and unpatrolled areas; the effects are especially marked at the Bridton estate. He contended that the significant low rate in the patrolled area might reasonably be seen in relation to enhanced surveillance which created the risk of identification or apprehension.

McManus observed a trend in social control moving away from community spirit towards active individualism and inactive collectivism. He argued that informal control characteristics, usually associated with the small homogeneous primary communities, was giving way to increasing formal control in the urbanized and heterogeneous societies in which they were located. Power is exercised by the association of the state and the individuals. Institutions of state, personal gratification, and the security market joined hands to create choices, and the trio is the dominating factor of control and the catalyst in an interrelationship between agency and structure where neither dominates the other. He argued that it is market forces, rather than fair policy, which govern the quality of service and consequently the quality of justice served. He finally suggests that a compulsory national system of property insurance and security would provide the necessary 'patrol personnel and devices' to enhance security for society.

A compulsory national system again brings the debate back to the fundamental issue of the distribution of security provision. What do we do about those who are unable to pay the cost? Denying those who cannot afford to secure themselves creates more inequity. What has been done to assure the 'have-nots' enjoy an equitable level of security in Hong Kong? What more could be done? Johnston and Shearing (2003) argued that the governance of security is increasingly oriented around plural auspices, and these 'corporate authorities' use professional agents to govern security, usually mixing these resources with other non-specialist and non-professional agencies. The problem-oriented modes of security governance are identified as the application of any means that will promote safe and secure places. People who live and work there are mobilized as informants so that their presence will contribute to the corporate authorities' knowledge and problem-solving capacities. Johnston and Shearing argue that the nodal governance of security will provide a solution to the inequity of security provision. We will explore this concept more in depth in a later section.

Roughly speaking, 51% of Hong Kongers live in private permanent housing, 30% live in public rental housing, and 17% reside in subsidized home ownership housing (Census and Statistic Department, Hong Kong, 2011). Ninety-one *per cent* of all domestic households were flats, either whole quarters or per room/cubicle, in multi-storey residential housing estates; as such, the residents employ security officers to police the buildings, mainly via patrolling their perimeters. Security provisions in public

residential housing are fully funded by the government via the Housing Authority [HA], a statutory body; the management of some 60% of the 720,000 flats in 160 public rental housing estates have been outsourced to property service agents (PSAs) according to the HA (Hong Kong Housing Authority, 2013). In private residential housing settings, including subsidized home ownership housing, the charges are levied as a flat rate amongst property owners through owner's corporations. Why are two-thirds of all Hong Kongers paying private firms for the 'public goods' that is security provisions, and is this arrangement equitable?

2.6 Powers of the Security Officers

The state police possess the legal power to stop and search, and to arrest suspects. Such powers are essential to the protection of the citizenry. Private security personnel operating in a similar capacity also requires legal instruments. The law may empower employees despite their unawareness of its very existence (Button, 2007). Further discuss on the powers of security personnel requires a working definition of power.

2.6.1 *Definitions of Power*

Lukes (2005) suggests that power can be explained in one-dimensional, two-dimensional, and three-dimensional ways. 1D: The one-dimensional view focuses on the decision-making behaviours on issues emphasizing the observable conflict of interests. Weber defined power as "…the chance of a man or a number of men to realize their own will in a communal action even against the resistance of others who are participating in the action" (quoted in Wrong, 1979, p. 21). Lukes (2005, p. 39) argues that "this view cannot reveal the less visible ways in which a pluralist system may be biased in favour of certain groups and against others."

2D: The two-dimensional view is the qualified critique of the behavioural focus of the first view; it involves examining both decision making and non-decision making processes. This view embraces coercion, in which the dominator secures compliance by 1. Threat of deprivation; 2. Influence which the complier changes his course of action

without tacit or overt threat from the dominator; 3. Authority where the complier recognises the dominator's command as legitimate or reasonable; 4. Force is used for stripping the complier of the choice of compliance and noncompliance; and 5. Manipulation, the aspect or sub-concept of force that is distinct from the former ones, since the complier does not recognize or acknowledge its existence. This refers to all forms of successful means an agent A uses to secure agent B's compliance (Lukes, 1974).

3D: The three-dimensional view, which is what Lukes advocated in 2005, revamps the preceding behavioural foci as too individualistic. 3D focuses on decision-making and control over the political agenda (not necessarily through decisions); issues and potential issues; overt or covert observable and latent conflict; and both subjective and real interests. Lukes (2005 p. 32) initially defines the concept of power by saying that "*A* exercises power over *B* when *A* affects *B* in a manner contrary to *B*'s interests." However, Lukes realized that he had the 'exercise fallacy' that is common in power relation dialectics. He recognizes that power is a capacity as opposed to the exercise of said capacity (and indeed, it may never be, and never need to be, exercised), and it was a mistake to define power in purely ex-post treatments (Lukes, 2005). He admits that the concept has defined the securing of compliance to domination, rather the presumably broader construct of power itself. Nevertheless, the definition provided scholars with a radical framework in studying power relations.

Wrong, working some two decades before Lukes, (1979, p. 2) operates as an 'essentially contested concept'. He initially defines power as "the capacity of some persons to produce intended and foreseen effects on others." He acknowledges that the definition suffered from three issues, namely intentionality, effectiveness and the dispositional nature of power. It cannot avoid restricting the term power to intentional and effective acts of influence by some persons on other persons. Secondly, there is an absence or failure of power when power has been exercised on the others but did not produce the intended and foreseen effect. Thirdly, the capacity to perform acts of control and the actual performance of such are two different things; therefore, when power is seen as a capacity, it inevitably becomes a dispositional concept. He refines the concept to "the capacity to produce intended effects, regardless of the physical or

psychological factors on which the capacity rests." (Wrong, 1979, p. 22). He further differentiates force, manipulation, persuasion and authority as distinct forms of power.

Force, according to Wrong, refers to physical and biological force. Physical force can either be the creation of physical obstacles restricting the freedom of another person, or the infliction of pain. The ultimate form of force is violence. There is also a non-violent form of force that involves people using their bodies as physical objects to prevent or restrict actions by others rather than directly on the bodies of others. Biological force is the deliberate effort to adversely affect a person's emotions or his feeling and ideas about himself, by verbally, or in other symbolic ways, insulting or degrading him. Biological force exists in the form of psychic violence, of which the intended effect of the perpetrator is to inflict mental or emotional harm to others (Wrong, 1979).

Manipulation occurs when the person exercises his power and conceals his intended effect from the subject. For example, manipulation occurs when the subject *B* is not aware of the person *A*'s intention to influence him but *A* does in fact mange to get *B* follow his wishes. Wrong (1979, p. 28) suggests that "any deliberate and successful effort to influence the response of another where the desired response has not been explicitly communicated to the other constitutes manipulation."

Persuasion is when *A* presents arguments, appeals, or exhortations to *B,* and *B* accepted *A*'s communication as the basis of his own behaviour after independently evaluated the contents, basing on his own value and goal. Wrong (1979, p. 32) argues that it is a form of power because "it clearly represents a means by which an actor may achieve an intended effect on another's behaviour."

Authority is related to the communicator's perceived status, resources or personal attributes that induces the compliances. In Wrong's sense it is a "successful ordering or forbidding" power relation. There are five types of authority, namely coercive, induced, legitimate, competent and personal.

Coercion: Coercive authority can be understood as a situation when a person *A* has obtained the compliance of *B* by the threatening of use of force and *B* was convinced that *A* has the capacity and is willing to use force against *B.* Inducement: Inducement authority is when *A* has offered the rewards to *B* for the compliance of *A*'s order.

Compliance is based on the exchange of rewards and there is no coercion, or the threat to use violence, in obtaining the compliance. It can be seen as the antagonist of coercive authority. Legitimacy: Legitimate authority is a power relation in which the power holder possesses an acknowledged right to command and the power subject likewise possesses an acknowledged obligation to obey. The source of the command endows it with legitimacy and induces willing compliance on the person being commanded.

Competency: Competent authority is a power relation in which the subject obeys the directives of the authority out of belief in the authority's superior competence or expertise to decide which actions will best serve the subject's interests and goals. Compliance is also based on the source of the command. For example, a client will comply with his lawyer's advice because the lawyer is a professional in the legal system.

Personal authority: When the subject obeys out of a desire to please or serve another person solely because of the latter's personal qualities it is recognised as personal authority. The command giver will not need to possess any coercive power, transferable resources, special competence or legitimacy conferred by a community when issuing an order, for instance, in instances where personality cults are operated in a voluntary capacity.

The thought experiment on Robinson Crusoe's power relations illustrates the need of a dominator and a complier in any definition of power. A rigorous discussion of power structures rests on a thorough identification and examination of the relationship of definite entities to each other. Wrong's definition and differentiation of power is sufficiently pragmatic and grounded in analytical framework to be used in this research project.

2.7 Legal Powers of the Private Security Officers

Research carried out on the legal power of security personnel indicates that they possess no special legal powers (Jones & Newburn, 1998; Jason-Lloyd, 2003; Wakefield, 2003; Button, 2007), except when they are being empowered by a person or statuary body possessing such power (Jason-Lloyd, 2003; Button, 2007). Private security officers rely

on the citizen's arrest power to exercise their arrest. This is defined by Sarre (2009, p. 20) as:

> Under common law, citizens can take whatever steps are deemed reasonable and necessary to prevent or suppress a breach of the peace. These reasonable steps may include detaining (arresting) persons against their will. Arrest involves depriving persons of their liberty. Therefore, in any society, the rules relating to citizen's arrest are strictly observed and enforced by the courts.

2.7.1 *Special Legal Powers*

Private security officers need to make use of their citizen's arrest powers more frequently than an ordinary citizen does. Exceptions abound in the industry, however, at the borders of jurisdictions. For instance, in Scotland, airport security constables may arrest a person without a warrant if he is reasonably suspected of committing an arrestable offence [3] (Jason-Lloyd, 2003). (Much of this section, along with the rest of the controversial Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, has been amended by 2013.)

In Hong Kong, the Aviation Security Company Limited [AVSECO] works with the Airport Authority Hong Kong, Hong Kong Police Force and the Airport Standards Division of Civil Aviation Department Hong Kong in the formulation and implementation of risk management and contingency plans to safeguard the integrity of Hong Kong International Airport (AVSECO, 2011). The 'authorised officers' – or any public officer appointed by the Airport Authority by instrument under his hand – of the AVSECO are empowered by the Aviation Authority under Aviation Security Ordinance, Ch. 483 & Ch. 494, to carry out passenger screening, hold luggage screening, Access controls to Restricted Areas, Terminal Buildings and Airfield,

[3] *under Section 82 of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, 82.3a 'unauthorised presence in restricted zone or on aircraft'; b. 'trespass on aerodrome'*

Baggage Reconciliation services (Justice Department, Hong Kong, 2011). While other private-public partnership modes of power delegation exist in the United Kingdom and elsewhere, generally speaking, private security personnel do not possess any special legal power.

Within the context of private property, guards are exercising the property owner's rights on their behalf (Shearing & Stenning, 1981; Stenning, 1989; McManus, 1995; Michael, 2002; Rigakos, 2002; Wakefield, 2003; Button, 2007). As the security manager in Intelligarde, a Canadian security company, stated in the interview '*Well, we (Intelligarde security officers) just do our job and we use the powers of every citizen and every landowner already has*.' (See Rigakos, 2002, p. 48). McLaughlin (2007) points out that "…as designated agents of 'mass private property' (the mechanism) allowed (the company) to exercise a range of pro-active surveillance and investigative powers that exceeded those of the public police."

Private security personnel will sometimes need to use coercive force to remove the malefactor (McLeod, 2002; Rigakos, 2002; Wakefield, 2003). Given the constraints on arresting power, in many circumstances they are required to tactically circumvent the limitations and/or be empowered by other means, in order to fulfil their duties (Rigakos, 2002; Button, 2007). Rigakos (2002) found that the power of Intelligarde was vested in the concept of private property ownership in Ontario and the Trespass to Property Act (R.S.O. 1980, c.511). Under s.9 (1) of this Act "a police officer, or the occupier of the premises, or a person authorized by the occupier may arrest without warrant any person he believes on reasonable and probable grounds to be on the premises in contravention of section 2." This gives Intelligarde security personnel the necessary power to deal with any person whose acts are illegal or prohibited.

McLeod (2002) produced a different argument on the powers of Intelligarde. He contended that a good management plan, adequate equipment, and training private security could be more effective and powerful than public police in some areas. McLeod noted that a prerequisite for community policing is the existence of a community itself. Intelligarde was able to build up such a community within its clients, while public police forces were unable to do so; this enabled them to realize effective community policing. It will be interesting to explore how the Incorporated Owners or

Owners' Committee in Hong Kong residential housing, formulated as a 'community within its clientele', is able to enhance the power of the security personnel.

Wakefield (2003) found that modern security strategies are able to use different environmental designs to enhance the feeling and impression of order and security in order to deter potential incivilities. Powers can be vested in the 'system' but not in the security personnel as persons. Security management strategies are not just about guarding the premise but to maintain and keep up the existing environment to present a sense of well-being via the employment of security personnel. Wakefield took up a different perspective and argued that the powers of private security in public accessible spaces are vested in the security functions which were fully integrated in the management structures of these spaces, alongside other functions central to these spaces' day-to-day operations, such as cleaning and maintenance; this enabled the sites to be governed according to holistic strategies.

It is argued that security officers are powerful within their domains because they are delegated with the necessary kinds of powers in executing their duties. Button (2007) found that private security personnel frequently utilize legal, physical, linguistic, and knowledge tools when exercising their powers to solve problems within their jurisdiction. A 'parapolice' inclination exists in those personnel who consider themselves as the 'thin blue line' between chaos and order: they are pre-occupied with the 'real work' that is often more dangerous and involve the use of legal tools. However, his research found that some officers did not utilize their full range of legal tools, did not understand their rights relating to their tools, were often not confident, and rarely exercise their tools. He concluded that security officers could be more powerful if they made full use of their legal and other tools linked with the 'parapolice' orientation. The study will examine how security personnel exercise their powers in the housing context.

2.7.2 *Use of Discretion*

These studies have indicated that security personnel, as policing agents, can possess significant powers in different aspects such as legal, knowledge, environment, policy,

and management. The issues of controlling such 'police' powers and accountability are intricately related. Reiner (2000) points out that the police inevitably have discretion in the enforcement of laws because there will not be adequate resources for full law enforcement, and even laws that are precisely worded will need interpretation in practical situations. Discretion is defined as "the freedom to decide what to be done in a particular situation" (Oxford Dictionaries Online, 2012). Jones (2008b) defines discretion, in the context of policing, as denoting the freedom of individual officers to act according to their own judgment in a particular situation. McLaughlin (2007) points out the private security personnel exercise their own discretion as to the matter of informing the public police or initiating the criminal justice process. Interviewees noted that some retailers let shoplifters off if they paid, in order to avoid the hassle of prosecution (LVSO17, Interview record, 2011). This research will explore the concept of discretion by private security personnel and how they exercise it in the course of their duties.

2.8 Private Security Officer Cultures

The parallels with public police has led to a similar 'cop culture' in private security, but significant differences remain (Reiner, 2000; Rigakos, 2002; Button, 2007). Private security in the UK and Canada exhibited some traits associated with 'police' culture such as solidarity, isolation, machismo, suspicion, and risk-focused minds (Rigakos, 2002; Button, 2007). Rigakos (2002) found a macho subculture in Intelligarde where the company treated its female officers differently from its male employees. This was seen to be motivated by the dangerous realities of 'Para policing' among Toronto's so-called lumpenproletariats, a sexist understanding of women's limitations in hostile environments, and a paternalistic[4]—— attitude towards protecting women. He also found that Intelligarde security personnel like to exploit 'escort exchanges' for informal gatherings. 'Escort exchange' is the delivery and pick up of documents and equipment at a specific meeting point (usually a patrol point) where they carry out during their patrols. Intelligarde personnel were seen to be socializing, trading gossip, and

[4] *or 'chivalrous' according to some perpetuators*

exchanging information on police recruitment in informal gatherings. Rigakos claimed that the underlying subculture craved to reinforce bonds amongst staffers, and produced visible displays of authority, solidarity, and cohesion for tenants and 'bad guys' that were malefactors. This was good for the morale of site security officers, because it reminded loiterers and drug dealers that backup and support was available to those officers. Similarly, Button (2007) found in his research that the work of front line private security personnel was similar to that of public beat patrol police officers. They formed a similar 'police' culture as that of the public police. The security officers in the study experienced solidarity, isolation, and inferiority while they carried out their duties. There was also a machismo culture since men dominated the industry. They have developed a suspicious and risk-focused mind as a result of their encounters with potential trouble-makers and assorted loss prevention tasks.

There is evidence of a 'wannabe' and 'parapolice' orientation cultures exist (Rigakos, 2002; Button, 2007). Rigakos (2002) found that Intelligarde personnel afflicted with 'wannabe' attitudes would like to pursue careers in law enforcement. They are typically young, energetic, and eager to be hired by public policing agencies. Button (2007) also found that the 'wannabe somewhere else' and 'parapolice' orientation cultures existed amongst Pleasure Southquay security staffers. He classified them into different categories on a spectrum continuum. At one end was the 'watchman' style and the other end was the 'parapolice' style. 'Watchman' style personnel were seen to be passive and perceive their job as mundane and ineffective. They always looked out for better opportunities to move on to a better job. The 'Parapolice' style described personnel who considered themselves as a member of the 'police' force. Usually they were young, proactive, wanted to stay in the industry, and expected career prospects in the industry.

2.8.1 *Private Security Cultures in Hong Kong*

This watchmen-parapolice spectrum was largely described within Western industrial societies. Kakalik and Wildhorn (1971) similarly depicted a negative image of United States security personnel in the seventies as a white male who is aged between 40 and 55, with no higher than ninth grade education, and earning low wages for 48 to 56 hours a week. The economic prospects of Hong Kong shifted from a manufacturing economy

to a service and finance economy in the late 1980s (Yu, 1997). The service sector usually requires higher levels of education and professional training than that of manufacturing industries. Many manual workers and some skilled workers and technicians were displaced out of employment in their late 30s or early 40s. Joining the Hong Kong Police, however, requires a high school certification in the 90s. Moreover, the strong paramilitary nature (Lau, 2004) and the later Police Tactical Unit's [PTU] training – mandatory to all officers – were taxing. The only jobs available to this cohort were catering, cleaning, and the security industry at that time. What kinds of cultures have formed amongst Hong Kong security personnel, who have a significantly different demographic profile to those in US, UK, and Canada? How does it affect their performance?

2.9 Perspectives on Security Governance and New Policing Configurations

Postmodernity denotes a conclusion of the twentieth century that is characterised by a society that is unstable and unpredictable, underpinned by fragmentation and diversity (Garland, 2001). Pluralisation of policing, which may be another characteristic of the same age, opens up the ground for the burgeoning of new policing entrepreneur, i.e. private security. Scholars suggest that private security industry seems to have occupied a better position to become the key player in the governance of security and policing, given their operational flexibility, and lack of political constraints in the provision of policing services (Jones & Newburn, 1998; Wakefield, 2003; Wood, 2004; Button, 2008). The different ways that academic perspectives foresee the future governance of security (and the configurations of future policing) forms a part of this thesis, thereby bridging the gaps where they remain silent in the case of Hong Kong.

2.9.1 *Radical Negative*

Button (2008) points out that the radical negative perspective is antipathetic to the private security, seeing it as a threat to democracy that must be reined in with urgency, through regulation or otherwise. 'Radical negative' views the growth of private security as an inevitable consequence of the crisis of capitalism wherein the state utilizes the

private sector to strengthen its legitimacy (Spitzer & Scull, 1977; Weiss, 1978; Couch, 1987, cited in Button, 2008). Private security is considered as a state-corporate alliance - a 'hard' approach towards protecting the state from threats from the labour force, political activists- and is thus politically motivated, adopting a confrontational style and reactive approach to suppress such threats (Flavel, 1973; Spitzer, 1987, cited in Shearing, 1992; Button, 2004). Loader (1996) argues that private security becomes a commodity, rather than a public good delivered by the state police; the provision of private security produces criminality in institutionalising anxiety by exacerbating concerns about crime and displacing crime to less protected areas. Crime rates are exaggerated in order to increase formal control on specific classes (Hall *et al*., 1978). Christie (2000) provides us with a radical example in his study on prisons where crime control changed from the defences against committing unwanted acts to the surveillance on any possible violation of regulations or laws by any person. He emphasizes that there is an unlimited reservoir of acts that can be defined as crimes in modern society, with an unlimited war waged against them. This created a crime control market for its entrepreneurs the state and the private security industry. Sklansky (2006), another writer associated with the radical negative, argues that the expansion of private security poses a threat to democracy and will lead to security provision inequalities. Police will lose their legitimacy and accountability during the course of competition with private security, and the subsequent gradual adoption of market-oriented mentalities in police management. He points out that private security companies are anti-union and efficiency-orientated, with little regard for rights and democratic principles.

2.9.2 *Conservative Negative*

Conservative negative fears that private security might threaten established interests, especially those of the public police. It adopts a defensive approach, per Burkean conservatism, by criticizing its performance and encouraging the state to impose restrictive regulations on the industry; it also opposes the privatization of public services and denies access to involvement in public services (Broughton, 1995; Prison Officers' Association, 1997). Stenning (1989) summarized the strategies the public police use to reject and suppress its 'junior brother' as by denial of existence, grudging recognition, denigration, competition, and open hostility. However, the strength of the

conservative negative influence has been diminishing, as a result of successive administrations who embraced New Public Management philosophy at a time of fiscal crises in many countries.

Two strategic configurations, namely residualization and managerialization, were adopted as a result. McLaughlin (2007) perceives that the residualization configuration is the consequences of post modernization of both social relation and policing, which resulted in policing and security being subjected to uncontrollable free-market hyper-pluralisation; others see a possibility of returning to pre-modern or New Feudalism forms of 'private' policing (Reiner, 1992; Taylor, 1999). Denied access to security services and technologies, the poor will fall back on public policing in which the state's role is ever diminishing. The managerialization configuration suggests that the state will 'reinvent' a public service model to display the efficiency and responsiveness of non-market solutions. Government departments will adopt private business management strategies such as customer services approaches and performance pledges. McLaughlin (2007) speculates that the (public) police force will become an entrepreneur in security and policing services, commercialising specialist police products, expertise criminal investigation, prosecution, forensic, and confidential information within our society.

2.9.3 *Traditional Positive*

The traditional positive (Button, 2008) or, somewhat arguably, the liberal democratic (Jones & Newburn, 1998) perspective concludes that the growth of private security is the outcome of increasing demands on public police services that cannot be satisfied by the public police. Research on the supportive and complementary roles of private security were carried out in the 1970s (Braun & Lee, 1971; Scott & MacPherson, 1971; Kakalik & Wildhorn, 1972; National Advisory Council on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, 1976; Draper, 1978). The growth is considered as positive and valuable to the sovereign state. However, state interventions are required at different levels in order to exploit the industry's full potential. Traditional positive scholars seek to establish standard of the security industry standards so that it can contribute to policing more effectively and efficiently. Private security is being seen as a positive development, an additional resource in the government's provision of societal security. A pluralized

policing system will emerge: this picture appears to be the dominant perspective in the UK (Jason-Lloyd, 2003).

McLaughlin (2007) identifies its future as the re-sovereignization configuration, as advocated by Loader and Walker (2004 & 2005), where the democratic state continues to retain its status as 'power-container' and 'norm-enforcer' in the promotion of security. These scholars stress that policing must be de-marketized, and it must re-establish clear boundaries between private security and public police to avoid unauthorised infringement of civil liberty. Other supporters respond with a pragmatic stance where the state needs strong governance and hard state formations by using policing apparatus to intervene and curtail threats to security (Button, 2002; Jones & Newburn, 2002; Rigakos, 2002; Crawford, 2005). The administrative situation in Hong Kong contains elements of this defence. As such, regulatory regimes and their effects on governance of security will be explored in the residential security context.

2.9.4 *Nodal Governance Perspective*

The nodal governance perspective does not pose strenuous objections to the growth of private security, seeing as how it poses a viable antithesis to conventional state-centred criminological views of the three Cs – cops, courts, and corrections. However, the nodal governance dialectic is chiefly concerned with the consequences of this growth for the most disadvantaged in society who cannot afford private security and their consequential demotion from citizens to denizens. It is also associated with 'bottom up' approaches to address gaps in the old Westphalian world. The concept of node is similar to the concept of Set in mathematics. A node can be a territorial base or community, founded upon membership base; nodes may fall within other nodes or intersect with others, and members of a node may stay in one, moving within, or across different nodes (Button, 2007). For example, a housing estate consists of shopping and leisure facilities; each leisure centre and restaurant can be considered as a territorial base node. Owners, tenants, and their kin can be classified as members of this community founded upon their residential membership base node. At the same time, the shopping and leisure facilities can be defined as a node within a bigger node, and in this case, they reside inside the residential estate as a whole. Shop owners, shoppers, visitors, and

passers-by can be defined as another community node: the users' node. People may possess more than one identity when they visit the node. For instance, a tenant eating in one of the restaurants is inside a multi-nodes situation: The territorial base node (the estate); The first community base (as a tenant); The second community base node (as a user of the facilities); Another territorial base node (the restaurant); And a community base node within it (a customer). Wood and Shearing (2007, p. 27) suggest, "Nodes are sites of knowledge, capacity and resources that function as governance auspices or provider. These site are often institutional (expressed in an organizational form), but can be also located with informal grouping." In this study, an estate itself can be defined as one of the many such nodes in Hong Kong.

Johnston and Shearing (2003) argue that the governance of security is no longer regarded as the sole or even the primary preserve of the state. Governance authorities now rely on authority of contract. They suggest that programmes and strategies aiming to guarantee security should typically involve six elements:

- They require stipulations about the activities which are permitted and proscribed;
- They requires the existence of state, corporate or communal authorities seeking to offer guarantees of security;
- Specific technologies are deployed;
- Institutional support is available;
- Certain security mentalities are present;
- And a configuration of the five elements which condition the nature of the resulting security practices.

Johnston and Shearing (2003) point out that policing institutions and technologies have changed over time, but the underlying mentality of punishment continues to be significant. They identified problem-oriented modes of security governance as the application of any means that will promote safe and secure places; the people who live and work in these places are mobilized as informants in order to contribute their knowledge and problem-solving capacities. No institutions or any set of persons are monopolizing the resources and modes of knowledge in an effort to promote security.

They also suggested applying the nodal governance model to the integration of governance in both security and justice.

In this model, the exact nature of governance, along with the precise contribution of various nodes, is a matter for empirical enquiry: no set of nodes is given conceptual priority. The relationships between governmental nodes will vary across time and space, and the relationships amongst different nodes of governance agents are in various states of co-operation and conflict rather than a homogenous one. Johnston and Shearing (2003) noted that mutual hostility and suspicion exist in commercial and state security sectors in the British examples, but state sponsorship to commercial security and vice versa exist in various resource-flow directions. The duo identified four significant sets of governmental nodes—the state sector, the corporate/business sector, the sector composed of non-governmental organizations [NGOs], and the informal or voluntary sector. They pointed out that the nodal model is powerful because players need to debate on security within a strategic and normative framework. The model refuses to prioritize any particular locus of power and treat governance as a relationship within a shifting network of alliances. It also refuses to posit any correspondence between mentalities, the 'objectives', institutions and technologies associated with them, and governmental 'outcomes'. Finally, their arguments on nodal governance may be interpreted as a manifestation of emergence. Under the right conditions, opportunities may arise to transform networked relations into advanced, just, and democratic outcomes. The existing conditions and the dynamics between different players in policing residential housing estates in Hong Kong will be examined in the study with this indicative condition in mind. It will test the concept and verify its completeness within the larger social context.

McLaughlin (2007) interprets Shearing's nodalization configuration as a set of aims to maximize the ex-post benefits of neo-liberal nodal governance provisions and minimize the security deficits. McLaughlin (2007) suggests that a 'security' rather 'police' budget ought to be allocated to disadvantaged communities in enhancing their security through the security market. Such an arrangement fulfilled the requirements of accountability, effectiveness, and justice. The security budget admits access to security and furtherance of democracy, empowerment, justice, and security. Security provisions become a social welfare in and of itself through a system of government subsidy, like other social

benefits. To a certain degree, Johnston and Shearing's claim that nodal governance has manifested itself is evident in developed societies. However, many aspects in the model need to be clarified before it can be accepted as a desirable analytical or even normativist model in security governance. The emergent conditions have yet to be prescribed, and it is not known whether they are applicable across all societies. There is also little information on the precise process and outcome through which this metamorphosis will take place. To that end, Shearing co-authored an elaboration with Wood.

Wood and Shearing (2007) suggest that the practice of governing is shaped profoundly by our imagination, and praxis depends on how we see the world and how we think we can shape events in that world. They developed a further nodal conception of governance with a multi-tiered composition. The essence of nodal governance is outlined by Wood and Shearing (2007, p. 13) as follows:

> Governance is not performed simply by institutions of the state, nor shaped solely by thinking originating from the state sphere. Today, ways of imagining and realizing security governance in the business sector as well as the 'third sector' (e.g. community groupings, NGOs) shape and influence the thinking of state institutions and vice versa.

The text suggests that states seek to govern indirectly through mobilizing third-party participation in crime control. Outsourcing security provision to non-state providers is an important manifestation of nodal governance. The reality of nodal governance is a complex of hybrid arrangements and practices in which different mentalities of governance and different sets of institutional arrangements coexist in perpetual negotiation. The 'steerers' (governments) and the 'rowers' (the institutions) align their interests in a common direction. Governance, thus reinvented, has greatly expanded the range and scope of non-state interests in the delivery of security goods.

Wood and Shearing (2007) claim that nodal security governance may produce good or bad consequences depends on one's place within the nodal relationships. For state

nodes, the capacity to enlist others in the pursuit of state-centred objectives serves to enhance their resources base and their strategic capacity. For corporate nodes, the capacity to enlist state and other nodes in realizing their corporately defined objectives presents corporations with high levels of self-direction and autonomy. However, for those with limited capacity to enlist others (weak actors), nodal governance will leads to less rather than more security. Wood and Shearing (2007) suggested that weak actors may seek redress by: Concentrating their collective power at the node and use it to steer governance; Recognizing and making full use of all the power possessed; Making use of expertise in concentrating knowledge at nodes, especially local knowledge; Locating, collecting and pooling resources at nodes to pursue agendas in negotiation with their state counterparts, and promote deliberative processes within nodes. Wood and Shearing (2007) suggested three principles in nodal governance for the future:

1. The 'politics of recognition' principle requires policing commissions to take into the views of all individuals and groups who are likely to be affected by particular forms of security provision, where they are enacted in spaces to which such individuals and groups would have access (including mass private property);

2. The 'politics of human rights' principle would ensure that the strategic decisions of a commission would not 'prejudice' the active rights of any individual or social group affected by the decision, or that the decision would 'act' in ways that are disproportionately detrimental to the other interests and aspirations of such individuals and groups;

And 3. The 'politics of allocation' principle would require commissions to ensure the equitable distribution of security resources, both by monitoring, for example, 'over-policing' of certain populations in contrast to the under-provision to the poor.

Based on these principles, policing commissions will undertake three functions. They will formulate policy and co-ordinate strategy, be in charge of 'authorizing, licensing, subsidizing' security provisions, and (as suggested by Loader) 'make good inequities in the (local) provision of policing and security'. Wood and Shearing (2007) concluded that 'nodal' conception of security governance accentuates diversity and hybridity in governing mentalities, institutions, and practices in a constructive manner. It provides a useful analytical guide in mapping this diversity and hybridity, inform governance

innovation, and it is designed to alter existing nodes and nodal relationships, as well as foster new mentalities and construct new organizational assemblages. The key facets of the four perspectives are listed in Table 2.1 below.

Table 2.1:- The Key Facets of the Four Perspectives on Private Security

Key facets of the four different perspectives on private security				
	Radical Negative	Conservative Negative	Traditional Positive	Nodal Governance Perspective
Views on private industry growth	threat to democracy	threaten established interests of state police	positive and valuable to the sovereign state	positive and asserts that security provision is no longer the sole or primary preserve of the state
Function of private security	politically motivated to suppress threats to the state possibility of returning to pre-modern or New Feudalism form of 'private' policing increase formal control on specific classes	ineffective secondary solution	positive and an additional resource in the provision of security to the society by the government	maximizing the benefits of neo-liberal nodal governance provisions and minimizing the security deficits
Effects on state policing	police will lose their legitimacy and accountability	residualization: erodes the state's role in policing and gradually demise in the future Or managerialization: the police will become an entrepreneur in security and policing services	a pluralized policing system will emerge police concentration on core functions, private security others. re-establish clear boundaries between private security and public police to avoid unauthorised infringement of civil liberty	become a subsidized social welfare indirectly through mobilizing third-party participation in crime control 'make good inequities in the (local) provision of policing and security' agents are in various states of co-operation and conflict rather than a uniform one
Regulation of private security	prevent its growth through regulation or otherwise	opposing privatization of public services or denying their involvement in public services impose restrictive regulations on the industry	state interventions to exploit its full potential to establish the standard of the industry state retaining the status as 'power-container' and 'norm-enforcer'	relying on authority of contract take into the views of all individuals and groups not 'prejudice' the active rights of any individual or social group ensure the equitable distribution of security resources

2.10 Exceptional Model?

The debates mainly revolve around the control of the private security industry on their policing status and service quality. The major concern of the radical negative and traditional negative is the expansion of the private security industry. The traditional positive 'regulate by inclusion' notion has ignored the issues of accountability, civil liberties and inequality in provision of security – all of which standard lexicon in the post-USSR Global West (Shearing, 1993; Reiner, 1997; 2000; Johnston & Shearing, 2003). The formal government regulation of the private security as it currently stands has only begun in the last decade. For instance, the British Parliament initiated the discourse in the modern form with the Private Security Act 2001. Apart from licencing its practitioners, further scrutiny of the industry can be considered as minimal apart from parliamentary hearings and ministerial interventions.

The majority of the stakeholders in the Hong Kong criminal justice system are local Hong Kong Chinese, despite adherence to common law jurisprudence. Ellis (2008, p. 187) found that the Japanese criminal justice system has "a high degree of dependency on and respect for institutions such as the family…Such informal methods of social control make the context within which the police and the justice system operate very different from other countries."

Although Hong Kong has inherited the British criminal justice system, criminal justice agencies have been critiqued for its characteristics that are strongly imbued by local politics, attitudes and certain values, such as dismissive approaches to democratic principles (Chui & Lo, 2008). This has affected the development of the security industry in Hong Kong within post-colonialist frameworks. Hamilton (1999 & 2008) found that the private security industry has always been closely monitored by the public police since British colonization in 1842, and the major reason was to prevent this 'private police force' from toppling the regime. Hong Kong is now a Special Administrative Region [SAR] of The People's Republic of China [PRC]. It has its independent administrative government except foreign affairs and national defences, which are the domain of the PRC. Internal security is mainly the responsibility of the Security Bureau and the Hong Kong Police. Moreover, it was noted by Gaylord and Traver (1995) that the Royal Hong Kong Police would play a key role in the orderly transfer of sovereignty to China in 1997. In light of the Realpolitik arrangement, the stasis in legislative talk of

delegating police powers to private security merits acknowledgement to larger geopolitical currents. The enactment of the SGSO in 1996, one year before the handover, replaced the former 'Watchman Ordinance' and extended the regulation on the practitioners' personal character in an effort to control the human resources quality of the industry workforce.

Although control has been tightened via the SGSO, the implementation of the BMO, revamped in 1993 from its 1970 predecessor, has opened up the opportunity for citizen to take part in deciding their security provisions. The BMO has stipulated the responsibilities of the property owners and tenants in managing the communal spaces of the buildings. As a logical extension of this civic delegation, state police will provide basic security services only when necessary, such as aggressive debt collection actions against tenants beyond legal bounds. In addition, Lau (2004) found that stigmatization of suspects and the public, as well as superiority complexes, and are prevalent in the Hong Kong police force. Secondly, seeking police intervention is ostensibly considered as breaking the peace and thus shameful by certain members of the public. Lau (2004) suggests that it is part of a wider taboo in Chinese culture, manifesting itself in neighbourly as well as domestic disputes. Seeking police assistance usually is the last resource in such neighbourhoods. A mediator who will keep the peace and solve the problem is preferably to an antagonistic response. As most private security personnel are employed by property management firms, the staff have adopted a 'service officer' orientation, which is more akin to property managers and housing officers than security 'guards' or 'officers' as is typically portrayed in the West.

Hong Kong offers a number of challenges to standard discourses in private security. For instance, these perspectives did not address the reason on the size of the security industry in a low crime rate society; and the setting and extent that the equity of security provision could be realized, especially where social housing is involved.

2.11 Conclusion

This chapter has formulated the theoretical framework of the study by interrogating literatures on private security and policing. It has introduced Zedner's (2003) concept of

security and Prenzler's (2009) definition of private security, with a synthesis of a working formulation.

The size and growth of the private security industry in mature economies industry are variously attributed to the pluralisation of policing; fiscal crisis and neo-liberalism; the growth of home ownership; security fetishism *a la* Marx; increasing formal control hypothesis; and risk mentality/risk based thinking. The issues of inequity of security provision have been discussed.

Lukes' (2005) three different dimensional views on powers and Wrong's (1979) concepts of force, manipulation, persuasion and authority as distinct forms of power are introduced. It follows by exposing the empirical research on the private security industry focusing on their powers and cultures. Security officers do not possess special arrest powers other than the citizen's arrest power. The different perspectives on security governance and new policing configurations that will form a part of the theoretical framework of this research are reviewed. Questions were formulated on different aspects of provision security services, such as the regulation of the security industry in Hong Kong, the issue of inequity of security provision; and the form(s) of security governance in existence.

3 CHAPTER THREE:

Research Methodology

3.1 Introduction

This chapter explains the rationale behind a qualitative approach of Mixed-Method Research (Johnson *et al*., 2007) in data collection. It details: The research approaches and design, data collection methods, research process, selection of the nodes, data collection process, treatment of the data, and the ethical issues in the research. Both quantitative and qualitative researchers in social research argue that their paradigms and methods are superior for research in the 'paradigm war' (Oakley, 2000; Burke Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). The discussion which follows aims to provide a justification to the approach adopted for the research.

3.2 The Research Design

3.2.1 *The Research Approach*

Quantitative approach emphasizes the construct of objectivity in measuring social reality. Research is carried out in a rigorous and highly structured way, such as large-scale surveys or controlled experiments. Halfpenny (1979) suggests that researchers should eliminate their biases, remain emotionally detached and uninvolved with the objects of study such that the real causes of social scientific outcomes can be determined reliably and with validity (as cited in Silverman, 2000). Quantified data are collected and analysed to create theory or theories in an attempt to generalize and predict future events. Researchers are able to test or otherwise empirically justify their stated hypotheses.

By contrast, the qualitative approach focuses on the naturalistic environment of social phenomenon and the personal interpretations of the participants. Weber (1949) said "…qualitative researchers hope to immerse themselves in the subject matter and develop 'sensitizing concepts' that enhance their understanding and explanation of

reality" (as cited in Hagan, 2010). Denzin and Lincoln (1994) suggest that qualitative research does not reject the positivist or post-positivist scientific methods of investigation, but strives hard to do better research by using methods and procedures which are considered by positivists as 'less rigorous 'to broaden and deepen the levels of investigation. Research questions in qualitative approaches are designed in an open way such that participants can freely describe or interpret their experiences. Data is usually collected in a narrative form. Observations are carried out in the participants' natural setting to record realities. Existing theories are evaluated and used to explain exiting phenomena. Theory will be reverse engineered, or otherwise synthesized upon a data-code-category hierarchy, as in the case of grounded theory method, to explain the phenomena. Kvale (1996) argues that the qualitative approach is more appropriate and powerful to gather more in-depth and detailed information in revealing human beings perceptions and interactions.

Mixed Method Research [MMR], also known as multi-methodology, has gained in popularity since the eighties as the 'third methodological movement' (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009). From a pragmatic viewpoint, it argues that qualitative and quantitative approaches can be used in conjunction with one another (Howe, 1988). Burke Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) defined Mixed-Method approach as: '…..research where the researcher mixes or combines quantitative and qualitative research techniques, methods, approaches, concepts or language into a single study'. A meta-analysis of 19 definitions from (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009) Johnson *et al.* (2007) provide us a 'composite' definition on MMR:

> The type of research in which a researcher or team of researchers combines elements of qualitative and quantitative research approaches (e.g., use of qualitative and quantitative viewpoints, data collection, analysis, inference techniques) for the broad purposes of breadth and depth of understanding and corroboration (as cited in Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009). (It should be noted, however, that contemporary compatibility theses broadly aligns [*sic*] with mixed approach designs, which require a distinction between research strategies and research approaches).

Teddlie and Tashakkori (2009) – as with apologist critiques by Roberts (2002) or Mutch's attack (2009) – pointed out that MMR partakes in methodological eclecticism in which researchers are free to choose the best tools for answering the research question by using combined methods; it focuses on the research question (or research problem) in determining the methods employed within any given study.

From the outset, the researcher wishes to document the daily life of security personnel and their contributions in policing in residential contexts. The study inclines towards capturing a 'first hand' narrative in order to reveal their contributions in policing, as well as answers to the four principal lines of inquiry through capturing interpersonal interactions. Opinions were collected from managerial and professional outposts of the industry in order to contrast narrative and observational accounts.

Other primary sources, in the form of social documents, will verify these narrative sources. With regard to the scope of fieldwork, the size of an estate determines the number of personnel staffed. Time and resource constrained the study to one with 30 to 50 security personnel under its employ.

In similar studies, Bradley, Rowe and Sedgwick reviewed quantitative data from a public survey for perspectives and attitudes on crime and policing in New Zealand, but later found that qualitative data collected from associated focus groups have provided the most valuable insight into the development of public attitudes toward crime and policing (see Bradley, Rowe & Sedgwick, 2011). As a result, this study adopted a qualitative approach; incorporating the Mixed-Method Research approach (Johnson *et al*., 2007) by using a Mixed-Method design to collect data.

3.2.2 *The Data Collection Methods*

The study employed three primary methods in collecting data, namely interviews (Fielding, 1993; Kvale, 1996; Silverman, 2004; Hagan, 2010), observation (Gold, 1969; Jupp, 2006) and documentary analysis (Scott, 1990; MacDonald & Tipton, 1993; Robson, 2002). There are several advantages using a mixed-method design. It provides a more accurate, reliable and complete description of reality (Robson, 2002), when research reflexivity is take into accounted. The disadvantages of one method can be

compensated by the strengths of the others (Burke Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). The mixed-method design allows the researcher to collect a wide range of data and enhance the robustness of the research. Equally importantly, the methods used in collecting data correspond to the ends that are research objectives. Each method is discussed in turn in the research process section.

The study has conducted 71 face-to-face semi-structured interviews. It comprised of Security personnel, aka 'security guards'; Security managers; The director of a private security company; District Board members, elected from the local council constituency to one of 18 districts in Hong Kong and serving as consultative bodies on district administration; Chairperson of 'Incorporated Owners' or 'Owners' Committee', elected by residents; Estate residents; Shop operators; Malefactors as identified by security personnel; Professionals in the industry; and senior members of security associations which have emerged from private industry capacities.

The interviews informed the operations and experiences of security officers in residential security, such as handling an assault on a colleague and dealing with 'rule breakers (*sic*)'. The interviews with the professionals and end-users cross-examined narratives described by frontline security. For instance, the reason security personnel are reluctant to exercise citizen's arrest powers was explained by a security trainer; the expectations from the residents were explained by the Chairpersons of IO/OC; and the exercise of powers was described by a malefactor.

The researcher carried out unstructured observation on the daily operation of security officers in their working environment for 160 hours. The observational data provided additional information on both verbal and non-verbal interactions which have not been fully described by interviewees such as the prosody and register used by residents when they speak to security officers as studied in interactional sociolinguistics.

Documentary data such as company instructions, security notices, security officer's manual, information in the Incident Book and police 'surprise check' reports were collected for analysis. The documentary data were able to provide a written counterpart on what and how security officers have performed their duties as they are specified institutionally. Secondary data were collected from various related web pages such as

the Security Bureau and the Security and Guarding Services Industry Authority websites to provide a fuller profile of the private security industry.

3.3 The Research Process

3.3.1 *Selection of the Nodes and the Reconnaissance*

The entirety of the housing estates grounds is defined as 'nodes' for the purposes of this study. The major considerations for the selection of a node were the accessibility to the participants and the possible amount of data that could be collected. Physical access to the node and security personnel is controlled by the security company for all practical purposes. Without the permission of the security company- as opposed to the residents - the researcher will not be able to conduct the study on the security officers within the nodes. Likewise, without the cooperation of security officers the researcher will not able to collect first-hand accounts. The amount of data will depend on the number of notable incidents occurring inside the nodes above the threshold of 'uneventful interactions', and the willingness of security personnel in providing information.

It was decided that the node should consist of a number of multi-storey residential blocks, a commercial complex within the property development itself, and a car park. The node should employ 30 to 50 security personnel across all ranks. The commercial complex and car park are open to the public. Some of these criteria were decided basing on the experiences of some successful studies on private security (Noaks, 2000; Sharp & Wilson, 2000; McLeod, 2002; Rigakos, 2002; Wakefield, 2003; Button, 2007). These parameters also fit within the average experience of high-rise living in Hong Kong. However, due to small sample size, generalization needs to be treated with caution.

Using the criteria mentioned above as a guideline, sixteen potential nodes were selected from an internet search in September 2009, and an invitation letter for the participation in the research was sent to either the security manager or property manager of each potential node by e-mail. Nevertheless, no responses were received. In view of this, the researcher contacted ex-colleagues who are working in the security industry to gain access for the research, despite the narrower pool of potential study nodes.

Eventually, six security managers and a company Director agreed to the study. All of them had provided three aforementioned nodes for the researcher to consider. The researcher carried out some initial reconnaissance on the potential nodes being offered in January 2010. The major aim was to identify the nodes that would generate sufficient information to achieve the research objectives and the amount of data would be manageable by the researcher. Secondly, it was aimed to locate nodes that best represented the typical type of housing estates in Hong Kong.

The first step was to meet with research gatekeepers to gather some initial information on the nodes. Gatekeepers (Jupp, 1999) control the researcher's access to information in the study. They were the security managers of the security company in this case. Questions on the security settings, crime situations, numbers of staff, the duties of the security officers and the types of security services were posed. After collecting initial information about the nodes, the researcher visited each potential node. The aims were to estimate the amount of data available and build up initial relationships with the security personnel, through a preliminary exchange with security supervisors. At the risk of sampling bias undermining the external validity of the study, it must nevertheless be noted that a management team that self-reported very few incidents, due to happenstance or negligence, may not generate enough interactions for analysis. Therefore, the researcher asked the security supervisors some preliminary questions, such as the kinds and frequency of incidents that occur in the nodes, to ensure that there would be sufficient data being collected. The researcher took the opportunity to meet the security officers during their handover of duties period, to ensure that some would agree to interviews. A quick introduction on the research was arranged and none of the officers objected to participating in the study.

Eventually, a decision was made in April 2010. Kings Security Company providing security services in Rees Garden, and the security team in Spinnaker Property Management Company serving Langstone Village were selected for the research. (All names have been changed in the course of this research. Pseudonyms are used throughout the thesis for the names of the security companies, property management companies and nodes). A confirmation letter was sent to the security managers of these two companies. The letter outlined the details of the research together with starting date

of the fieldwork. A synopsis, plan of actions, a sample of the interview schedule and the consent form were attached for their reference.

3.4 The Pilot Study

A pilot study helped improve the quality of the research and build up relationships with the participants. The researcher carried out a pilot study in May 2010 aiming to build up relationships with interviewees and to test out the interview schedule in the nodes. A pilot study allows the researcher to re-examine some unclear areas, to test out certain questions and to develop and solidify rapport with participants, and uncover some insights into the shape of the study (Valerie, 1994). It also helps identify unforeseeable issues and assesses the feasibility of the research. It is important for the researcher to undertake the pilot study because only he will understand the concepts which the questions are intended to measure (Arber, 1999). The researcher met the security officers in the pilot study to explain the aims of the research again, the research design, how the research is being conducted, what contributions are expected from the participants, and how ethical issues are addressed in the research.

At the same time, summary statistics such as the number of security officers, general crime situation, geographic and demographic details of the nodes were gathered. Documentary data such as plans of action, contingency plans, written instructions to deal with incidents, and emergency instructions were collected. Records of incidents and reports were collected for the duration of the research period. The information provided a general picture of the nodes and the security officers. The researcher also took the chance to liaise with the officers and to answer questions posted by the participants to reduce or eliminate their scepticism about the research. For example, when being asked the purpose of the research, the researcher explained to the participant(s) that it is to collect information for writing a PhD thesis. They were told that the interview questions are not intended to test their ability and knowledge in doing security work.

During the pilot study, three security officers at each node were interviewed to test out the interview questions. The aims of this were to test out the question wording, and add

questions on issues that were of particular concern to the respondents that the researcher had not thought of (Arber, 1999). It also helped the researcher to fine tune the interview schedule by omitting, refining or changing questions and altering the order of questions to provide a more logical flow (Arber, 1999). It was found that the security officers were sceptical about 'people who know the management staff' and would not talk much. Button experienced similar suspicions of being a company spy at the beginning in his research in Pleasure Southquay (see Button, 2007). A few questions were re-phrased in order to encourage responses and broaden the scope of the conversation. For example, when asked about their experiences with the end-users, they showed hesitation and murmured 'generally all right' to the researcher. This gave the researcher an impression that either they did not understand the question or they did not want to disclose the information. In view of this, two methods had been used to resolve the alleged problems. Firstly, alteration was made on the question (Q.24). The question was re-phrased. Instead of asking their experiences in personal confrontations, the question asked their feelings about the end-users and three prompts were added to steer them towards divulging their encounters with the end-users. The problem was considered solved because in the later interviews security officers were comfortable about discussing their confrontations with the end-users. Prompting also will encourage the respondent to produce an answer without having to put the words into the respondent's mouth (Fielding, 1993). Secondly, prompts were also prepared for many questions in the interview schedule to avoid 'leaden silences'. For instance, when asking about the training they have received, prompts such as 'what were some of the skills that you needed to use on duty?' were used.

Other participants can use the interview experiences of frontline security in the pilot study as a reference in understanding what will happen in the interview. This helped to reassure the participants in the researcher's aims and reduced the sceptical distance between the respondents and the researcher. It was also hoped that some participants might try to recall some incidents that they had experienced in order to provide information when their interviews were scheduled. During the pilot study, the researcher confirmed that the nodes had met the expected criteria of the study.

3.5 The Case Studies - Overt Study with Open Access

3.5.1 *The Interviews*

The interview is a powerful tool in obtaining information, gathering knowledge of the participants by means of conversations within the purposes the research is designed to explore (Jupp, 1989; Robson, 1993; Kvale, 1996). Interviews are frequently used to study participants' understanding, experiences, and perspectives of their social world (Hammersley, 1992; Kvale 1996). Interviews allow interviewer to have personal contact with the participant in which misunderstanding or confusions of the participants can be cleared and at the same time, interviewers can use their discretion to ask more sensitive or additional questions (Hagan, 2010). However, conducting interviews is time consuming and costly – and it is by definition non-reproducible, at least in its entirety. The interviewer effect or bias (Fielding, 1993) may distort the results because interviewers may make mistakes in asking questions or recording information, as well as when the responses are affected by the very presence of the researcher due to his identity or his response to previous questions, as is the case in most unstructured interviews.

Interviews can be classified into three principal types. In structured interviews or closed interview schedules (Hagan, 2010), interviewers ask a series of pre-established questions consisting of 'check-off' responses in the same order for all participants that are either factual or to which most responses easily fit an expected pattern (Fontana & Frey, 1994). The purpose is to minimise the effects of the interviewer on the result of the research (Hagan, 2010). The data is easier to administer and process since the answers are usually pre-structured. However, the information gathered is limited and they generally elicit only limited response patterns (Hagan, 2010) and provides little benefit beyond that of using a questionnaire (Robson, 1993).

Unstructured interviews advocate the natural generation of in-depth data (Patton, 2002) and uses open-ended questions to allow respondents to describe or explain their views (Fielding, 1993). Data can be the verbal perceptions, interpretation and descriptions of a specific event by the participants (Jupp, 1989). Question wording in interviews can alter responses and researcher's perception and interpretation will affect the codification of data. It may also be difficult for some participants, but provides more narrative space for others. Since most people do not have the experience of being interviewed and

answer questions, they may not response to what the researcher wants to know. Participants will sometimes disclose something irrelevant to the study during the interview. The researcher sometimes has to guide the participant in a constructive way. In this case, participants will talk in a way to generate data to the research under the 'guide' of the interviewer (Lofland, 1971). Unstructured interview provides qualitative detail and complexity of response to subject that is little known, however data are hard to codify and tabulate (Hagan, 2010).

Semi-structured interviews allow some questions to be pre-structured and some open-ended; sometimes they are constructed ad hoc at the scene according to the responses of participant. It combined the advantages of structured and unstructured interviews, at the expense of non-reproducibility and limited generalisation powers. The 'check-off' responses enable the researcher to find a pattern in the respondents and the open-ended answers provide breadth information about the subject being explored. The study utilized semi-structured interview in order to create greater room for variation in responses.

3.5.2 *The Interview Schedules*

Interview schedules were designed to collect information on the four aspects that address the research question. A different interview schedule was designed for each different type of participant. Pre-structured and open-ended questions were included in the interview schedule of security officers (Appendix 1). The interviews aimed to collect five types of information: 1) background information of the security officers; 2) their experience in the nodes; 3) the encounter with the end-users; 4) their perception on police and end-users; and finally 5) their views on the security industry. The interview schedules for the chairperson of Incorporated Owner and the chairperson of the Owners' Committee, residents, shop-operators, and malefactors (Appendix 2 – 5) were similar in design to the security officer's schedule. The major difference is that their views on security personnel were asked instead. This produced a picture of the impression of the end-users on the security officers. The interview schedules for the professionals (Appendix 6) and District Board members (Appendix 7) are mainly open-ended questions. This enabled the interviewees to talk freely on the topic, producing more

threads for analysis in the process. The development and the government regulation of the industry, suggestion on the improvement of the quality of the security services and personnel, and personal views on the future of the private security industry were all points of inquiry. These pointers will triangulate the findings on the security officers.

3.5.3 *The Samples*

There are two broad types of sampling method, namely probability and purposive sampling. Arber (1999) suggests that probability sample is best when the purpose is to estimate the population characteristics or to test empirical hypotheses, because each category in a population is selected randomly. In purposive sampling, the sample may not cover every category, and the results are best used for exploration and theory development (Arber, 1999). In view of the study framework, which emphasized narrative accounts and theory-building over descriptive analysis and hypothesis testing, purposive sampling was used.

Since no officers had shown any objection to being interviewed, the samples were deliberately chosen that would best reflect the age, gender, experience and rank of the security officers in the nodes. Half of the security team in each node were interviewed. A handful of non-frontline personnel and professionals in the security industry were also interviewed for data triangulation purposes (Denzin, 1970). This included 1. The security manager in the property management company; 2. A security manager in a hospital; 3. The Director of the security company; 4. An ex-police Inspector; 5. Two Security Trainers; 6. An ex-member of the Security Services Training Board; 7. Two senior members of different Security Associations and 8. An investigator/auditor in a sizeable public utility. Most of the (anonymous) interviews lasted from one to two hours. Table 3.1 listed the codifications of the interviewees and Table 3.2 follows outlined number of interviews conducted in the research.

Table 3.1: - **Codifications of Interviewees**

Types of Interviewee	Coded prefix
Rees Garden Security Staff	RGSO
Langstone Village Security Staff	LVSO
Security manager	SM
Security Operation Officer	SOO
Director of security company	DSC
Professionals in the Industry	PB
Rees Garden Owners' Committee	RGOC
Langstone Village Incorporated Owners	LVIO
District Board Member	DB
Rees Garden Resident	RGRR
Langstone Village Resident	LVRR
Shop owner/operator	SHO
Malefactor	MF

Table 3.2:- **Interviews** C**onducted in the** R**esearch**

	Rees Garden		Sub-Total	Langstone Village		Sub-Total	Total
	Male	Female		Male	Female		
	N			N			
Security Officer	22	2	24	8	10	18	42
Operation Officer	0	0	0	1	0	1	1
Security Manager/Director	1	0	1	0	1	1	2
IO/OC member	1	0	1	1	0	1	2
District Board Member	1	0	1	0	2	2	3
Resident	2	1	3	1	2	3	6
Shop Operator	0	3	3	N/A	N/A	N/A	3
Malefactor	0	0	0	3	0	3	3
Security Professionals	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	9
Total:							71

3.5.4 *Language Issues*

The interview was conducted in Standard Cantonese. *Putonghua* (aka. Mandarin) is the national language of China, but the majority of Hong Kongers speak Cantonese as their first language, a Chinese dialect that is marginally mutually intelligible with Putonghua despite sharing a written script. Bryman and Bell (2003) suggest that it is easier for interviewees to explain themselves full and efficiently in their first language. Standard Cantonese is understood by most Hong Kongers, even though it may be spoken with different accents, from local Hong Kong to various accents within the province of Guangdong (Canton), as well as effectively 'foreign' accents as spoken by ethnic Chinese who speak Mandarin, Wu, or other Chinese dialects as their first language(s). All the participants in the research are ethnic Chinese who speak Standard Cantonese with linguistic competence and performance; all interviews were conducted in the language as a result. The records were transcribed, and the transcriptions were translated into English accordingly, with an emphasis on fidelity (faithfulness), such that the translation accurately renders the meaning of the source text, instead of transparency, to the extent that a translation conforms to grammar, syntax, or idiomatic expression in the English language. All the documents produced including the transcripts were similarly metaphrased by the researcher.

3.5.5 *Consent of the Participants*

All the documents that concerned the interviewee, like the research synopsis, interview guide, interview schedules and consent form were written in traditional Chinese, one of two official languages in Hong Kong along with English. This consent form outlining the conditions was given to each interviewee and signatures were obtained. It also includes the agreement that the researcher can record each conversation by using a digital audio recorder. All the interviews were recorded and written notes were taken where necessary. No interviewee, including the 'malefactors', had any objection for audio recording. A copy of the research synopsis, research guide and the consent form were given to each interviewee for their reference. This applies to every participant who had been interviewed.

Before the start of the interview, the researcher explained the conditions in the consent form to each interviewee, emphasising the fact that the participation in the study is on a strictly voluntary basis and they could leave the interview of their own volition. At the same time, each interviewee was informed that the information collected would be used for compiling an academic research report for such as a PhD thesis and articles in academic journals. The treatment of, and access to, the documents are explained in the 'Ethical concerns in the research' section later.

3.5.6 *The Interviews of the Security Officers*

The frontline security personnel in the nodes were the major focus of this study. 42 semi-structured interviews were conducted. An interview schedule was designed for this purpose. Questions on their personal details; experiences; daily operation; interactions and perceptions on their colleagues and end-users; and view on the security career were asked. It was found in the pilot study that security officers preferred to be interviewed while they were on duty. The reasons stated for this was that they would be exhausted after a 12-hour shift and they wanted to spend the day-off with their family more than with the researcher. With the implicit agreement of the security manager, the interviews were conducted during their meal breaks. The security supervisors at each site had given satisfactory assistance in the arrangement of the interviewees. The interviews took place in their rest room when other officers were working outside, and the interview environment was undisturbed and comfortable to the participants.

The interview schedule (Appendix 1) of the security officers was designed to collect information on the four research aspects and consisted of 32 questions. Some of them were 'prompt' questions in case the officers did not know what kind of information the researcher wanted to collect. Questions 1 to 5 were designed to collect information on the interviewees' background. This included their age, education level, experience in joining the industry, and training received. This generated a profile of the security officers, which the researcher compared with the larger population in the security industry. Questions 6 and 7 were questions about their daily operations and strategies in handling a situation such as their duties and encounters with the end-users. Questions 8 to 23 were designed to collect information about incidents occurring during their duties,

the interactions between security officers and the end-users, the use of force, and the ways they settled the incidents. The questions generated a wealth of information on the roles, functions and the power and accountability of private security officers when exercising their powers in maintaining order in private and communal space compared to the state police. Question 24 asked their views on security officers' powers and authority. Questions 25 to 28 were designed to collect information on their attitudes towards the end-users. Questions 29 to 31 were aimed at collecting information on the perceptions of the end-users on the security officers. This included their colleagues, the end-users, the police, and the industry. The images and status of the security officers were outlined in the findings. The final question (32) was an open-ended question to enable the interviewee to add anything about their experiences in the security industry that the researcher might not have been aware of or otherwise missed.

3.5.7 *The Interviews of the Chairpersons of the Incorporated Owners (IO) and Owners' Committee (OC)*

The chairpersons of the Incorporated Owners (IO) of Langstone Village and the Owners' Committee (OC) of Rees Garden were the major intermediaries between frontline security staff and residents. The OC's chairperson in Rees Garden served two roles. He is the chairperson and a District Board member at the same time. As elected officials to geographical constituents as well as residents in their corresponding estates, they may be considered largely representative of residents' opinions. The researcher conducted a semi-structured interview with each of them that was aimed at gathering their views on their security officers. Questions about their perceptions, relationships, trustworthiness, ability and expectations on their security officers were asked.

The interview schedule (Appendix 2) was designed to collect information on the four research aspects and consisted of 31 questions. Questions 1 to 5 were designed to collect information on the interviewees' background. This included their age, education level and the time they have lived in the estate. This generated a profile of the interviewees. Questions 6 to 15 were questions about their views on the roles, functions, and perceptions on the daily operations of the security officers. Questions 16 to 22 asked their views on the powers and authority of the security officers. The data

informed the roles, functions, powers, and accountability of private security officers in maintaining order in private and communal space. Questions 23 to 30 asked their views and assessment on efficiency and effectiveness of the state police officers. This provided a counterpoint against private security personnel powers. The final question 31 was an open-ended question to let the interviewee add their personal views on the security services.

3.5.8 *The District Board Members*

The District Board [DB] members are elected representatives of the residents mainly engaging in consultative capacity on the political, social and welfare aspects in the community; this contrasts with other local authorities with administrative oversight. As elected politicians, they are chiefly financed by government grants, as opposed to political parties, donations, or local taxation. One of their functions is to channel the demands of their constituency to various government departments. These demands include calls for an increase in security provision in the estates. Since property management of the estate is part of a wider a government initiative (a key point which will be discussed at length in a later chapter), these DB councillors have been actively engaged in helping residents to form IO or OC. In view of this, they were invited to give their views in the research. A total of three DB members serving in the nodes were interviewed in the study.

The interview schedule (Appendix 3) was designed to collect information on different aspects of security provisions and consisted of 11 questions. Questions 1 to 5 were designed to profile the interviewees' background, mainly their participations and contributions in the security of their districts and inside the estates. Question 6 asked their knowledge on the private security industry. Question 7 was about the aspects they had contributed or participated in the security provisions in the estates. Question 8 collected their views on the security industry at large. Question 9 questioned their views on the roles and status of the security officers. Question 10 invited them to suggest ways the government could help the industry. Finally, Question 11 collected their views on enhancing the service quality of the security personnel.

3.5.9 *The Residents*

The residents were the end-users of the security services. The researcher conducted an individual semi-structured interview with six residents. The interviews were aimed at gathering their views on their security officers to compare with other end-users. The interview schedule (Appendix 4) was designed to collect information on the four research aspects and consisted of 31 questions. Questions 1 to 5 were designed to collect information on the interviewees' background. This included their age, education level and the time they lived in the estate. This generated a profile of the residents. Questions 6 to 15 asked their views on the roles, functions, encounters, and perceptions on the daily operations of the frontline security officers. Questions 16 to 22 asked their view on the powers and authority of the frontline security officers. The data had provided valuable information on the roles, functions and the power and accountability of private security officers in maintaining order in private and communal space. Questions 23 to 30 were questions on their views and assessment on efficiency and effectiveness of the state police officer. This provided information to compare their power with security officers. The final question 31 was an open-ended question to let the interviewee add their view on the security services.

3.5.10 *The Shop Owners/Operators*

Shop owners/operators in Rees Garden were invited to participate in the research interview and three shop operators participated in the study. The shopping mall at Langstone Village was managed under another property management company unaffiliated with the one that managed the residential estate, and access was denied. Therefore, no interview was conducted with shop owners in Langstone Village. Since the operators did not want to contribute their time outside their work, the interviews were conducted with the participants inside their shops at Rees Garden. The interviews gathered their views on their security officers. Questions about their perceptions, relationships, trustworthiness, and ability on their security officers had been asked. As with all identifying names in the research report, the shops' names were altered to guarantee confidentiality. The interview schedule (Appendix 5) was designed to collect information on the four research aspects and consisted of 32 questions. Questions 1 to 5

were designed to collect information from the interviewees' background, such as the time they had worked in the shops. Questions 6 to 16 were questions about their views on the roles, functions, and perceptions of the daily operations of the security officers. Questions 17 to 23 collected their views on the powers and authority of the security officers. The data revealed the roles, functions and the power and accountability of private security officers in maintaining order in private communal space. Questions 24 to 31 were questions about their views and assessment on efficiency and effectiveness of the state police officers. This provided a new public-private comparison within commercial contexts. The final question 32 was an open ended question to let the interviewee add their view on the security services.

3.5.11 *The Malefactors*

The study was aimed at studying the interactions, along with the views of the end-users of the security officers. For this purpose, a 'malefactor' is defined as a person who frequently violate the rules and regulations as codified by building by-laws, but not otherwise committing a criminal offence inside the nodes. For instance, hawking inside the nodes or causing excessive noise in the communal spaces after midnight was against building regulations, even though neither constituted a criminal offence. During the observation on the operation of security officers, the researcher recognized five hawkers and seven young adults in Langstone Village who frequently interact with the security officers. According to the security supervisor in Langstone Village, the hawkers were hawking their wares in the node every day and the young adults usually stay out at the same place nearly every night. The researcher approached each of them in a casual capacity. The researcher then introduced himself and briefly explained the research. By judging their responses, namely the questions they asked about the study, the researcher invited those who were interested in the research to be interviewed. Nine refused. Three malefactors were identified and were assessed to ensure that they were safe to contact. A sushi hawker and two young adults who hang about drinking at night accepted. The researcher conducted an unstructured interview with each of them. The interviews were conducted with the interviewees at a corner table of a fast food restaurant that was safe and free from interruption.

The interview schedule (Appendix 6) was designed to collect information on the four research aspects and consisted of 27 questions. Questions 1 to 8 were designed to profile the interviewee's background. This included their place of residence and the activities they engaged within the estate. Questions 9 to 20 were questions about their perceptions on the roles, functions and the encounters with the frontline security officers. Questions 21 to 27 collected their perceptions on the public police.

3.5.12 *The Professionals in the Industry*

Various professionals in the industry have been invited to participate in the research: 1. the security manager in another property management company; 2. a security manager in a hospital, 3. an ex-police Inspector, 4. two Security Trainers, 5. an ex-member of the Security Services Training Board, 6. two senior members of two different Security Associations and 7. an internal auditor in a sizeable public utility. The researcher conducted an unstructured interview with each of them. The interviews were conducted with the interviewees in their offices.

The interview schedule (Appendix 7) was designed to collect information on different aspects of the security industry and consisted of 11 questions. Questions 1 to 4 were designed to profile the interviewees' background, mainly their experiences in the industry. Question 5 gauged their knowledge on the private security industry in Hong Kong. Question 6 queried the aspects in which they serve within the industry. Question 7 collected their personal views on the industry. Question 8 questioned their views on the roles of frontline security personnel. Question 9 asked their impressions on the security services in Hong Kong. Question 10 invited them to suggest ways the government could help the industry. Finally, Question 11 collected their views on enhancing the service quality of the security officers.

3.5.13 *The Hong Kong Police*

It was decided to interview police officers responsible for the estates and 'surprise checks' on frontline security personnel. The police officers concerned would have been

asked questions about their perceptions, relationships, trustworthiness and ability, and interactions with the security officers. The Police College was responsible for the authorization of any research that would involve police officer. A Research Officer was in charge of the Research Centre. Any person wishing to carry out research on the police officers would need to put in an 'External Application for Academic Research' form. Information like the background of the researcher, the details of the research project, the use of the research findings, other relevant information, and endorsement of the supervisor of the Faculty were needed for the form. The application was rejected; no interview was conducted with police officers.

The Hong Kong Police refusal of access to the research is explained in an e-mail from the Research Officer based on two reasons. 'The Hong Kong Police is not supervising *per se* the security guards at the place of work', and 'the data collected in these interviews touch upon restricted and sensitive operational matters of security, upon which the Policy Wing is not privileged to disclose to any unauthorized party' (E-mail from the Research Officer, Police College, 2010) (Appendix 8).

Although the Hong Kong Police were found to carry 'surprise checks' on security officers, they denied that it is a form of supervision. Their denial of such a supervisory role will be discussed in the 'Hybrid Regulation of Private Security' chapter. Secondly, as the Hong Kong Police considered encounters between police officers and security officers (especially those in 'surprise check' scenarios) as 'restricted and sensitive operational matter', the researcher can only acquire data via other sources such as newspaper reports, observation and interview with private security personnel to verify and explore the situations.

Interviews are limited in studies that require a direct focus on interactions and social processes (Jupp, 1989). As with researching other criminal justice agencies, such as study on the police (Reiner, 1993; Punch, 1979 & 1993), private security personnel may find such discussions sensitive. For instance, they might lie or hide the truth to cover deviant activities during their tour of duty. Data collected was thus triangulated with other findings in observation and documents to maximize the reliability. Also, the opinions of security professionals and end-users – as parties who hold non-parallel interests to those of frontline security personnel – were used as a guide to understand

and triangulate the findings. In the interest of neutral, robust investigations, unstructured observation was employed.

3.6 The Observations

Observation can be defined as the act of recording a phenomenon for a variety of purposes. Recorded information can be interactions, verbal or otherwise. Sociological qualitative observations usually take place at the natural environs of the participants. Jupp (1993) suggests that the methodological commitments of ethnography to naturalism, empathy and to capturing everyday theorizing are most suited to an analysis of police culture. Sapsford and Jupp (2006) outlined four advantages of observation: Information about the physical environment and human behaviour can be recorded directly by the researcher without relying on the retrospective or anticipatory accounts of others; The observer may be able to 'see' what the participants cannot; Observation can provide information on those who cannot speak for themselves (such as those who cannot give informed consent); and data from observation can be used to 'triangulate' with data collected from other sources.

During observation, the researcher will be able to witness and record the interactions right at the scene of the 'phenomenological complexity of the social world', revealing their connections, correlations, and causes. The researcher will also be able to freely formulate concepts or categories that appear meaningful to the participants (Adler & Adler, 1994). Previously, observation has been used successfully to study the agencies of the criminal justice system and security companies and officers (Holdaway, 1983; Punch 1979 & 1985; Reiner, 1993; Rigakos, 2002, Wakefield, 2003).

One of the objectives of the research was to examine the interactions between security officers and the end-users. Moreover, it was found that many interactions in an incident could not be recalled and explained verbally. For example, interviewees were unable to recall the facial expression, tone, verbal responses, body languages and physical responses between security officers and end-users. Observation helps to clarify and inform issues that had arisen during an interview. It also provides opportunities for researchers to ask informal unstructured questions along the way (Jupp, 1993). This

helped to clear up some situations that could not be described by verbal transcriptions in the interviews.

In addition, the purpose of the observation is also to verify the consistency the participants' views and acts. This is a way of triangulation. Sometimes, law enforcers are found either unconsciously or intentionally to exaggerate their experiences to give a heroic impression to outsiders (Reiner, 1997; Rigakos, 2002; Wakefield, 2003; Button, 2007). Observations on security officers helped verify whether the participants would exaggerate their experiences, as was the norm in other law enforcement agencies.

3.7 Observation on the Security Officers in the Nodes

Observation can be carried out overtly or covertly and it will depend on the identity of the researcher. Gold (1969) defined four types of observer. The 'Complete observer' does not take part in the activities and the identity of the researcher is not known to the participants. The 'Observer-as-participant' does not take part in the activities, but the participants know the researcher status. The 'participant as observer' takes part in the activities, and the status is known to the other participants. The last one is the 'Complete participant' who takes part in the activities and the status is unknown to anyone but the observer/participant: it is effectively an undercover operation. The 'Observer-as-participant' researcher is sometimes described as 'non-participant' observation where researchers observe people's behaviour without joining in any way apart from mere virtue of acknowledged existence (Crow & Semmens, 2008). This terminology emphasizes the argument where the act of overt observation itself qualifies as participation in a sphere of activity, and that the observer runs a risk of changing the behaviour of observed simply by observing.

Observation can be carried out covertly where participants do not know that they are being observed or overtly where they are informed they are being observed; it can also be structured or unstructured (Noaks & Wincup, 2004). In structured observation, the researcher usually decides on a list of behaviours to observe. The unstructured observation aims to observe unexpected behaviours or events in depth.

Overt non-participant observations were carried out and the researcher had adopted an 'observer-as-participant' position during the study because the identity of the researcher was already known to the participants in the interviews. Observations had been carried out in the nodes on the daily operations, interactions, and confrontation between security personnel and end-users. During the pilot study, it was found that resident initiated incidents could occur at any time. According to the security officers interviewed, some incidents happen at regular times of the day. For instance, a salesperson would follow residents into the residential block during rush hours, and a drug dealer would carry out their activities during weekends. Therefore, the researcher adopted a tactical observation timetable. Observations were usually carried out between 1500 hours and 2300 hours in weekdays and between 1100 hours and 1900 hours during weekends. Some of the observations were carried out after midnight and early in the morning. At the same time, the researcher also took the opportunity to observe control room activities while waiting for an available officer to be interviewed. The researcher carried out 60 instances of observation, with 15 instances lasting from 2 to 3 hours in each shift, accompanying officers in the course of their duties (especially when an incident had occurred). A total of 160 hours of observation were conducted, with field notes written after each incident. The researcher shadowed the security officer, observed, and recorded how they carried out their duty. The observations were recorded anonymously to guarantee confidentiality and secured accordingly. The observation data recorded episodes of the interactions and confrontations of the security officers and the end-users, verifying the narrative accounts of the security personnel and simultaneously adding non-verbal context to it.

It is possible that the presence of an observer (the researcher) accompanying officers as they carried out the job or task assigned to them had an impact upon the way in which they behaved. There is no way of knowing if officers would have behaved differently had the observer not been present. Waddington (1994) noted in his study of public order policing in London, the presence of a researcher might have influenced behaviour as they sought to avoid ''in the job trouble'' by doing things ''by the book''. To limit this effect, the researcher spent extended periods in the node in order to win the confidence of the participant who became used to the presence of an observer (the researcher). There were grounds to believe that this strategy was effectively successful. It was evidenced in the interview that officers were prepared to voice opinions that were

critical of the company policy and their daily operation. Others complained, at times, about the qualities and behaviour of their colleagues or some of the requirements of the job.

3.8 The Documentary Data

Documentary data are documents that are produced by others for other purposes such as in media report and official document. Crime statistics collected by government sources, and not by the researcher himself, are categorized as secondary data. Documentary analysis is a method that has often been associated with historical research. Robson (2000) points out that the analysis of documents in research is primarily the written document, although sometimes it includes non-written documents such as films and television programmes. In this research, Hong Kong Police officers who come into contacts with the security officers in the nodes were inaccessible by means that are more direct. Newspaper reports were used as proof of existence of their surprise checks. Documentary analysis also eliminates 'the researcher effect' that is a running concern in interviews. However, documents are usually not designed for research purpose and may offer incomplete information.

There are different types of documentary data that can be collected for social research: MacDonald and Tipon (1993) point out that when using this data a researcher must take the authenticity, credibility, representativeness, and meaning of the document into account. Authenticity is decided by the genuine, complete, reliable, and unquestioned authorship of a document. Credibility means that the document is free from errors or distortion. Representativeness refers to whether the document is a representative sample of the universe of documents, as they originally existed. A document may carry literal meaning and deeper meaning. What is important is a document may not be what it appears to be and it may be compiled for a motive. Therefore, a researcher must compare the findings with other data, a process called triangulation.

The documents collected in the research consisted of: The Security Company's Rules and Regulations; Daily Operation Instructions; Health and Safety Instructions; General Instruction on Unexpected Incidents; Plan of action in Emergences, and the

Contingency Plan. Other documents examined for useful information include: The Incident Book and relevant records; Anti-crime leaflets produced by DB members; Security Association Journals, and Police (post surprise check) warnings and recommendations. Government statistics were also used for the research.

Scott (1990) suggests that documentary data can be categorized by authorship and access. Authorships include personal, private and official; access can be open published, open archival, closed and restricted. Table 3.3 illustrates the documents that were used in the study, as sorted by these categories.

Table 3.3:- **Documentary Sources** C**ollected in the** R**esearch**

Access	Authorship		
	Personal	Private	Public
Open Published		LV - Anti-crime leaflet by DB member LV & RG - Notices to residents	LV & RG - Security Officer's Manual
Open Archival		LV & RG - Company Websites	
Closed	RG - Security officer notebook	LV & RG - Company Rules & Regulations LV & RG - Daily Operation Instructions RG - Health and Safety Instructions RG - General Instruction on Unexpected Incidents RG - Plan of action in Emergences RG - Contingency Plan	
Restricted	LV - Police recommendation and warning letters	LV - Incident Book Records LV - Visitors Register LV- Warning letter to resident	
LV=Langstone Village RG=Rees Garden			

Source: Scott (1990), Classification of document

The documentary data collected in the research has been cross-examined with other available data sources. For example, the records in the Incident Book have been compared with the responses of security officers being interviewed. Likewise, the responses of interviewees were verified during observations. The accounts largely corroborated each other, increasing the internal validity of the research.

3.9 Data Analysis

Glaser and Strauss (1967) suggest that theory is 'grounded' in data rather than presumed at the outset of a research study. Silverman (2010) concludes that there are three stages in building a theory with the Glaser and Strauss's Grounded Theory concept: (1) an initial attempt to develop categories which illuminate the data, (2) an attempt to 'saturate' these categories with many appropriate cases in order to demonstrate their relevance, and (3) the attempt to develop these categories into more general analytic frameworks with relevance outside the setting. Charmaz and Bryant (2011) suggest that: "Grounded theory is a method of qualitative inquiry in which researchers develop inductive theoretical analyses from their collected data and subsequently gather further data to check these analyses". This method was adopted in the study to develop theories in private policing in residential security. A wide range of data was collected for analysing security officers' contribution to policing in residential security. The approach used in the study to the analysis of the qualitative data was both inductive and deductive by testing the different perspectives on the governance of security, attempting to discover a theory that may solve the inequity of security provision in an OECD society. At the same time, it aimed to develop theory in the regulation, powers, roles and function of the private security industry that is grounded in the data generated in the interviews and participation observation. There are three aspects of grounded theory; coding through memo writing; theoretical sampling and generating theories grounded in the data (Silverman, 2006). This method was adopted in the study to develop theories in private policing in residential security. A wide range of data was collected for analysing security officers' contribution to policing in residential security. Data was initially codified into four main types:

- The reasons for the growth and regulation of the security industry;
- The 'policing' experiences of security officers;
- The issue in inequity of security provision;
- And the characteristics of security governance in residential estates.

The interview conversation records were transcribed and then translated into English. The average pages of transcription for an interview that lasted one hour was 20. A total of 1,300 pages of interview transcription were produced. There were a total of 180 pages of observation notes produced during the participant observation and there were also a total number of 600 pages relevant documents of various types collected at the nodes and government websites.

Data has been classified into quantitative and qualitative. Quantitative data was used to produce the statistical information and aids explanations in the later discussions. This data mainly carries demographic information on the participants. Qualitative data is descriptive and perception data is the personal views of the participants on different people like the attitudes of the public and the images of themselves. Interpretative data are the participants' understandings of the incidents that occur in their social context they are working in. Interaction data depicts the strategies the private security personnel adopt when dealing with people and incidents. The data collected were initially analysed with other studies in private policing area to 'check hunches and to confirm that the properties of the grounded theorist's theoretical category are filled out' (Charmaz & Bryant, 2011, as cited in Silverman, 2011). Finally, the researcher developed theories based on the differences in social and political situations and links the concepts to Nodal Governance concepts in security provision.

Silverman (2006) points out that: 'Grounded theory is firmly rooted in an assumption common to qualitative researchers: do not begin with a prior hypothesis but induce your hypotheses from close data analysis.' During the analysis, the conversation in interviews and the detail of participation observations are categorized in two ways: (1) using pre-established themes in the theoretical concept or literature discussed in the literature review chapter and (2) open themes derived inductively from, data.

Interviews and observations were categorized to the point of theoretical saturation, whereby no new relevant data or themes are discovered. As Konecki (2008) has suggested:

> Open coding in the methodology of grounded theory means ascribing labels to his data. The labels should usually have a conceptual character shifting the researcher from direct description…Some of the labels become categories, which later become saturated with qualities, that is conceptual elements, which have their empirical references (that is references to actual events, situations, interactions, gestures, etc.) (as cited in Silverman, 2010).

A number of pre-established themes were outlined in order to illuminate the characteristics of the data. The themes were categorized in corresponding to conceptual elements in the major aims and objectives of the study. This includes the effect of government regulation; the security governance; the effect of cultural values, customs, geopolitical factors, and institutional culture; the exercise of power; the contribution; and the roles, functions, image and status, in respect of the security industry and personnel.

Information related to government ordinances, namely the Building Management Ordinance [BMO] and Security and Guarding Services Ordinance [SGSO] were categorized into the effect of government regulation. For example, the condition in the BMO has created the opportunity for the growth of the security industry was identified as an effect of government regulation. Likewise, company instructions were grouped into the theme of 'effect of institutional culture'. For instance, 'written instructions to deal with incidents' collected during the pilot study were codified as such. A typical quote that reflects the culture of the management was identified and used as to support the argument suggested in the thesis. Such as when the shift IC in Langstone Village was assaulted by a drunkard the company had issued an instruction not to interfere with drunkards and report the case to the police. This was used to support the claim that property management company usually adopts a 'leave the criminal/legal matter to the police' culture. Another example is the description by

the RGSO26 on the control of renovation workers, which was categorized as the 'exercise of power'. The event was treated as a security officer exercising the delegated property owners' power for the maintenance of parochial order. During participant observation, the action taken by a security officer when dealing with an incident was categorized into the 'role and function' theme. For example, the handling of noise and rubbish complaints by security officers was used to suggest their role in policing private spaces. The descriptions of encounters with end-users, excluding handling incidents were ascribed to the images and status category. For instance, the amount and frequency of verbal dispute was compared with other studies to assess their status in the nodes. The findings in their roles and function were also used to discuss their contribution in policing private places.

Since the size of study was purposive designed to fit the availability of time and resource all the interviews with practitioners and observation notes were used to extract data to produce theoretical analysis. Theoretical saturation was achieved with no new relevant data or themes being discovered from the interview transcriptions, participant observation notes or documentary sources. At the same time, Grounded theory analysis did not reveal any dominant themes based on geographical differences.

3.10 The Validity of the Research

The critiques on the reliability and validity of qualitative research from positivists' and post-positivists' paradigm will never end. The aim of this section is to justify the validity of the multi-method approach in this research, rather than critique on epistemology or ontology.

Positivists and post-positivists support and consider that quantitative approach is the most scientific way to conduct research and generate knowledge. This originates from their origins in natural sciences. Positivist research design and methodology dictate the interpretation of the findings; consequently, the subjective views of the researcher on the research findings are excluded. The Positivist school emphasizes objectivity, representation, generalization, and reproducibility of research findings. Research designs are mainly structured and controlled as in a laboratory

environment. Variables are being controlled to test out the hypothesis. Data are categorized and codified in a falsifiable manner for analysis. The level of reliability and validity will depend on the rigour of a research design.

Internal validity means the ability to rule out alternative explanations and provide strong evidence that a dependent variable produce the outcome that is asserted (Campbell, 1969, cited in Jupp, 1989). External validity means the ability to generalize causal inferences to the larger population based on specific studies, either across situations or across people. They are in an adversarial position insofar as theory building is involved. That means the more specifications are obtained to yield a higher internal validity, the less able the inference is to generalize to the population in the real world. The findings of the research can be reliable and valid but its generalization and predictability may be minimal especially in actual social context (Silverman, 2004). For example, a hypothesis that 'security measure 'A' can reduce burglary', tested out in district X, found that the reliability and validity are high, but even though the hypothesis is not rejected as a result, the same inference may not apply to a neighbouring district Y. To complicate the case, crime displacement may occur in district X because of additional security measure in the district, leading to an increase in crime in district Y. This further illustrates the shortfalls in hypothesis construction and testing, in that while we may propose that a security measure is effective, there is no valid inference from within the hypothesis as to why such a measure works. Such a macroeconometric analysis also fails to describe other developments that were incidental to the independent variable, namely the implementation of said security measure. Qualitative approach adopts a different view and strategy in order to test and exceed the boundaries set by positivism, such as introspective and intuitive knowledge that is roundly rejected due to its incompatibility to general laws in society.

Qualitative research adopts a naturalistic approach to social phenomenon. The researcher will try to understand the reasons that govern human behaviour and reproduce the perceptions of the participants. The notion of validity in qualitative research is based on how best to describe or interpret the experiences of the participants and others. It is variously defined as the accuracy that the research sets out to gauge within the context of the study; the trustworthiness of the subjects' reports, and the quality of the interviewing itself, which should include a careful

questioning as to the meaning of what is said and a continuing checking of the information obtained as a validation *in situ* (Fielding, 1993, Kvale, 1996). One cannot really speak for an 'other' person and interpret the experiences in a text form as in a research report. Denzin and Lincoln (1994) state that a text is valid if it is sufficiently grounded, triangulated, based on naturalistic indicators, carefully fitted to a theory and its concepts, comprehensive in scope, credible in terms of member checks, logical, and truthful in terms of its reflection of the phenomenon in question. They suggest that the validity of a research can be assessed by four methods, namely:

'Replication' or reproducibility is a check on the reliability of the research techniques such that they may be reproduced by another research with regard to durable data; 'Reflexivity' is the continuous monitoring and reflection on the research process; 'Triangulation' is the cross-checking data with other sources; and 'Respondent validation', aka member check or its variant**,** informant feedback**,** is the check on the authenticity of researcher's observation by discussing the interpretations with the subjects.

The validity of this research was assessed by these methods. By 'Replication', the use of two nodes has produced 'replication verification' to a certain extent; however, no secondary interviewers were available at the time of writing, and replication validity could only be stress-tested via a separate study on the same cohort. By 'Reflexivity', the researcher amended the workflow along the way, updating his supervisors and resolved the problems during the study, such as re-phasing some questions after the pilot study. By triangulation, the interviews data were compared with observation data and documentary data. For example, the attitudes of end-users as described by security officers were cross-checked by the researcher through observer-as-participant observation. Likewise, the descriptions of handling of an incident were verified in the 'Incident Book'. By 'respondent validation', the researcher strove to build rapport with the interviewee, in an interview setting with mutual attention, positivity, and coordination (Tickle-Degnen & Rosenthal, 1990). The researcher restated and summarized information before further questioning. While the underlying mechanism of member checks/respondent validation – with an emphasis on consensus building – may not sit well with non-positivistic qualitative research methods, such as those instituted in this study, it is nonetheless conducted for completeness. For instance, when the researcher observed that the security officer

did not monitor the CCTVs in the Security Office, the security personnel was actively queried on the matter with his subsequent explanation recorded.

3.11 Ethical Concerns in the Research

Research ethics are the moral principles that control and guide the researcher's behaviour in conducting research. They are the principles to protect not only the participants but to all parties involved in the research such as the researcher, the funding institution(s), the supporting organization(s), the participant's family and any related person(s) or institution(s). The violation of the researchers' codes of ethics will also reduce or even invalidate research result. The famous Milgram (1974) psychological experiment investigating obedience to authority is now widely criticized as unethical, and it is unlikely any ethics panel would grant him permission to carry out such research (Bok, 1984; Giles, 2002).

The ethical concerns in this research include: The human wellbeing of participants are human beings used as research subjects; The integrity of academic repute as a student of University of Portsmouth; and finally the commercial reputations of the commercial security company and the property management company in the study.

Research ethics falls into several general aspects in this study. The researcher had informed the participants that they have the right not to be researched; the participants' confidentiality would be guaranteed; the participants were allowed to comment on findings, and gain access to transcripts and publications on them; the participants would be informed of the consequences of the research; and the researcher must report any mistakes or failure during the research in their analysis.

In this case, they were the security officers, Chairpersons of the 'Incorporated Owners' and 'Owners' Committee', residents, District Board members, shop operators, malefactors, and the professionals in the security industry. In this research, these ethical principles have been applied.

The participants have been presented with a written document (Interview guide and Consents form of interviewee) to obtain their informed consent to participate in the

interview (Appendix 10); any observation following the interview is disposed of, including the related documents, audio recordings and research findings. These documents include information about who will have access to the interview and observation information; the researcher's rights to use the interview and observation records; the participant's rights to access these records and the interpretation of them.

The research interviews and observations records have been complied anonymously. The confidentiality of the participants was guaranteed by codifying their personal details. In order to protect the identity of the participants, a coded name was assigned to each individual and only authorized persons can access the information. The confidentiality of documents and records has been treated in the same way. Documents and records only bear their coded name and only authorized persons can access the information. The control of access to the information by the researcher helps to prevent unauthorized persons from identifying the participants.

The researcher's rights to use the interview and observation records to compile a research report and the possibility of further published work have been explained to each participant. The researcher secured the participant's consent by inviting them to read and sign the research consent form. The participants have been told that they could access and amend their records at any stage during the research period. The researcher has sole physical control of access to the records and documents, which would be destroyed when the whole research process has finished according to university research instructions. All written correspondence with the participants was written in traditional Chinese for ease of access. The above has been read and explained to each participant before each interview began and repeated while observations were conducted.

At the same time, a research synopsis was presented to the security companies. It was designed not to inhibit the functioning by imposing any unnecessary burdens on the companies; written consents were subsequently granted by the security companies. These are carried out in accordance with the Code of Ethics of the British Society of Criminology (British Society of Criminology, 2008). An Ethical Review report was submitted to the University Ethical Review Board and the study to be carried out was considered as ethical.

The researcher had secured all records and documents in his possession and only authorized persons could gain access to them. The participants were informed that they could access the documents related to them if they desired. They were also informed that these documents would be destroyed after the study had finished. This had been explained to the participants clearly before the interview. Different methods to contact the researcher are provided. This includes the researcher's telephone numbers in Hong Kong and the UK, as well as an email address. In the case of formal complaint on the study, they can launch their complaint to the Research Ethics Committee of University of Portsmouth. These are all outlined in the research guide and explained to the participants. There were no request or complaint received so far.

In doing so, the procedures have ensured the physical, social and psychological well-being of each individual is not adversely affected because of participating in the research. This has also protected the rights of the participants and their interests, sensitivities and privacy.

3.12 Conclusion

This chapter discussed the justification of choosing the research methodology and the research design. The qualitative approach was considered effective for completing the research objectives. A mixed-method design has been employed and three methods were used in the study, namely interview, observation, and documentary analysis. The research process and procedures were explained in detail. The validity of the research was examined. Finally, it explained the handling of the ethical issues in the research.

4 CHAPTER FOUR:

The Growth and Regulation of the Private Security Industry

4.1 Introduction

This chapter will first outline the reasons for the growth of the private security industry in Hong Kong in the post-colonial context, and discuss the key factors that contribute to the effectiveness of shifting policing responsibilities to the citizens. It will begin with a brief overview of Hong Kong to provide some background on the historical, political social and economic perspectives. It will show that the Hong Kong government have played an important role in the establishment of the nascent private security force and the regulation of the private security industry. It will discuss the effects of government initiative on delegating policing responsibilities to citizens via the implementation of the Building Management Ordinance. It will then examine the 'Hybrid Regulation Mechanisms' – a state of equilibrium amongst government authorities, industry oversight, and economic agents – as it exists in Hong Kong in respect of maintaining accountability of the security industry. It argues that citizens' backing, or at least the non-objection of the silent majority, with regard to said legislations on security provisions, bundled with effective continuous regulations on the security providers, are the two key factors that determine the effectiveness of delegating policing responsibility to citizens. It suggests that governmental initiative in policing responsibility and function transfer, as consciously instituted by administrative agents within the polity, serves as the prime mover. As a result, a 'mandated resident-led' situation whereby socio-political forces attempt to address the issues in residential security inequity persist.

4.2 A Brief Overview of Hong Kong

4.2.1 *Geography*

Hong Kong consists of the Hong Kong Island, Kowloon Peninsula (adjoined by Stonecutters' Island), the New Territories, and 262 outlying little islands with a total

area of about 1,100 square meters (423 sq. mile). Hong Kong Island is the second largest but most urbanized area in Hong Kong, after Lantau, where the airport and assorted new towns are situated. Stonecutters' Island, a former British Navy base, is now the Chinese People's Liberation Army's Navy base and has become part of the Kowloon peninsula due to reclamation. Kowloon Peninsula and the New Territories are located on adjoining mainland of China separated by the Shenzhen River as their border; per the Sino-British Declaration of 1984, the border delineates a separate customs and policing entity from that of Mainland China, and is presently secured save certain border checkpoints. Over 90% of Hong Kongers live in multi-storey residential buildings, and social housing often rises to dozens of storeys. There were just over 6.8 million residents in Hong Kong in 2011. The majority, about 95% of Hong Kongers are of Chinese ethnicity – either born in Hong Kong and consequently holders of the right of abode, or residents born elsewhere within China and holding various resident permits/naturalized status - and the remaining includes mainly foreign-born and some local-born persons originating from Southeast Asia, Europe, the Americas, and Africa (Hong Kong Government Census, 2011). The distribution of ethnicity is listed in Table 4.1. The official languages in Hong Kong are Chinese and English – the form of spoken Chinese was not specified as a constitutional matter. The majority speak Cantonese, a local dialect, as a first language. Hong Kongers are able to speak English and *Putonghua* (the Chinese National language) to various levels of competency, especially in the public and commercial sectors.

Table 4. 1:- Population Distribution of Hong Kong Censed in 2001 and 2006

	2001		2006	
Ethnicity	Number	% of total	Number	% of total
Chinese	6,364,439	94.9	6,522,148	95.0
Filipino	142,556	2.1	112,453	1.6
Indonesian	50,494	0.8	87,840	1.3
White	46,584	0.7	36,384	0.5
Indian	18,543	0.3	20,444	0.3
Nepalese	12,564	0.2	15,950	0.2
Japanese	14,180	0.2	13,189	0.2
Thai	14,342	0.2	11,900	0.2
Pakistani	11,017	0.2	11,111	0.2
Other Asian	12,835	0.2	12,663	0.2
Others	20,835	0.3	20,264	0.3
Total	6,708,389	100.0	6,864,346	100.0

Source: Hong Kong SAR Government Census, 2011

4.2.2 *Politics*

Hong Kong was a British colony between 1842 and 1997. The reasons for how and why Hong Kong became a British colony are beyond the scope of this study. However, the history of sovereignty of Hong Kong will help in understanding the beginning and development of policing, including private security guards. Hong Kong was originally a small Chinese fishing port with some scattered rural villages situated along the Southern shore of Guangdong province extending to the South China Sea (Map-1). The population was about 7,000 at the beginning of colonization in 1842. Historians suggest that its strategic proximity to Guangzhou (aka. Canton) - an important trading city in the nineteenth century, its deep water port for the British Navy fleet, and a reliable fresh water source supply at the Southern side of Hong Kong Island for the military and merchants were some of the vital prerequisites that

the British needed in extending their control over their colonies and trading in the Far East (Dwyer, 1971; Tsang, 2004).

Figure 1: Map of Guangdong Province and the Location of Hong Kong

Source: www.maps-of-china.com

4.2.3 *From Colony to HKSAR*

The occupation of Hong Kong began in 26 January 1841 when Captain Elliot hoisted the Union Jack flag at Possession Point on Hong Kong Island, claiming Hong Kong Island as a colony of the British Empire. Officially, Hong Kong Island was ceded in perpetuity when the Treaty of Nanking was signed in 1842 and ratified in 1843. Later in 1860, the Southern part of the Kowloon peninsula and Stonecutters' Island were ceded in perpetuity under the Convention of Peking (Tsang, 2004; Carroll, 2007). The New Territories and 262 outlining islands, comprising about 92% of the total land area of Hong Kong, were leased to Britain for 99 years from 1 July 1898 under the Convention of 1898. Thus began the British colonial rule of Hong Kong.

On 19 December 1984, the Sino-British Joint Declaration was signed between the late Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, and the Chinese government agreeing that when the lease of New Territories expired at midnight 30th June 1997, Britain would return New Territories, together with all other land ceded to Britain, back to The People's Republic of China [PRC]. Hong Kong Special Administrative Region [HKSAR] of the PRC came into existence on 1 July 1997.

The HKSAR political system is specified by the Basic Laws of Hong Kong and its own legislature. The Chief Executive is the head of government, elected by an electoral college, with an office largely equivalent to that of the Governor as stipulated by the Hong Kong Letters Patent 1843 and Royal Instructions 1843. The Legislative Council, LegCo, exercises legislative powers within a multi-party parliamentary system; however, as with a presidential system, the Chief Executive does not derive legitimacy from the legislature. The executive power is exercised by the government. According to the Sino-British Joint Declaration (1984) and the Basic Law, HKSAR will retain its political, economic, and judicial systems, its "unique way of life", and continue to participate in international agreements and organisations as a "dependent territory" for at least 50 years (Education Department, 1992). Hong Kong's national defence and foreign relation affairs are the prerogatives of the PRC government. However, internal security and local administration are the responsibility of HKSAR government. Hong Kong SAR has inherited the English Common law criminal justice system while PRC is based on the Roman law system. Hong Kong SAR has its own Basic Laws of Hong Kong SAR, which serves as a 'mini-constitution' that is nonetheless not a constitutional document.

The HKSAR has the powers and functions to draft and introduce government bills, motions, and subordinate legislation. Members of the Legislative Council may also introduce bills, known as Members' bills. Bills that do not relate to public expenditure or political structure or the operation of the Government may be introduced, individually or jointly, by Members of the Council. For bills relating to government policies, the written consent of the Chief Executive of the HKSAR Government is required before they can be introduced by Members. There are different requirements for drafting a bill. When a bill has fulfilled such requirements, it will be gazetted and it has to pass through three readings in LegCo before it is enacted (Legislative Council HKSAR, 2012).

4.3 Policing in the New Colony

The British turned Hong Kong into an entrêpot upon colonial rule in 1841 and created abundant opportunities, which attracted an influx of proximate economic immigration (Tsang, 2004). As a result, Hong Kong was swamped with pirates, robbers, thieves, prostitutes, drug dealers and, not least, traders and merchants from all over the world at the turn of the century. The first and foremost priority of the government was to maintain public order. At the beginning, policing was organized and commanded by the then Chief Magistrate, Captain William Caine. Police officers were mainly soldiers and sailors who were considered unfit for military services. The performance of these police officers was poor. The Hong Kong Police Force was established on 1 May 1844, and later that year Charles May was assigned as the Captain-Superintendent of this force. The Force's main function was to assist the garrison in protecting the European population who lived and ran their businesses in the colony.

4.4 The Emergence of the Private Security Force

Private security and the state police came to co-exist in policing Hong Kong soon after it became a colony, although the former was under the tight control of the government (Hamilton, 1999). This phenomenon persists to this day, and is the subject of a fuller treatment in a later section. The early colonial police was considered to be ineffective in preventing violent robberies threatening British colonists and foreign merchants, as the nascent Hong Kong police force was chaotic, disorganized, and made up of largely 'suspect individuals', including Chinese, European and Indians (Sinclair, 1994; Hong Kong Police, 2010). This created the opportunity for the private security industry to develop in Hong Kong. British companies fell back on self-employed security guards to reduce the threats of robbers and pirates. For example, the British trading firms (*Hongs*) which possessed political and economic power were able to establish their own armed security force of Indian sepoys – the East Point Police. The less wealthy and less influential foreign and Chinese merchants employed local Chinese as watchmen to safeguard their premises. The District Watch Force [DWF] was set up by Chinese merchants in 1866 under

such a premise (Hamilton, 1999). The DWF can be treated as the first indigenous security guarding force in Hong Kong. The DWF was strictly regulated by the government from the outset and this will be discussed in a later section.

4.5 The Building Management Ordinance [BMO]- Government Initiative on Security Provisions in Residential Property

Noaks (2000) finds that the 'top-up' policing provided by commercial security was linked to the privatisation of the British criminal justice services. There is no sign of criminal justice services privatisation in Hong Kong to date, unlike its former metropole: the 2012 consultation on changes to building regulations in England sets out a non-regulatory approach proposed in relation to domestic security, due to a lack of consensus (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2012). Crawford and Lister (2006) suggest that residential security patrols in England and Wales was stimulated by numerous governmental initiatives. However, there is currently no legislation mandating citizens to arrange security provision on private properties, or regulations on its manifestation. Residents are free to purchase security services of their own volition (see McManus, 1995; Noaks, 2000; Sharp & Wilson, 2000). This 'un-organised' and 'free choice' situation – in combination with a (voluntary) home insurance market in the UK which offers security system discounts to homeowners who have installed alarm systems – does not provide the legislative momentum for a delegation of responsibilities to the citizenry. Without such an administrative move, the contributory system creates inequity in the provision of security services. Affluent homeowners are able to enhance their security by purchasing private police services, while social or private housing tenants who are in no position to install security systems or purchase contents insurance, let alone employ security guards, fall back on limited public police services (South, 1987). This suggests that a vital legislation will is required so that the government can lay out a 'route' a citizen should follow in securing their homes, in order to align interests across social classes in the governance of security. It is hypothesized that such a choice architecture, as depicted by Sunstein and Thaler in a redub of libertarian paternalism, effective and the inequity can be reduced to minimum (Thaler, 2009).

In Hong Kong, 'the Home Affairs Department [HAD] has always encouraged and assisted owners in forming owners' corporations [OCs] to facilitate coordination among owners and effective building management.' (Guide to BMO, HAD, 2013) Before the BMO was enacted, Mutual Aids Committees [MAC] were formed as a government experiment in response to the inadequacies in the provision of public security services in public housings in the 1970s (Kuan, 1983). The establishment of MAC was voluntary. The MACs' security patrols were volunteers in their community but did not require a licence. A similar neighbour watch campaign was instituted in private residential buildings. MAC later developed into a committee that has some authority in supervising the daily management of the housing estates, such as cleansing, maintenance of public facilities and security services. Therefore, the BMO can be considered as a part of a wider legislative framework in which the government strives to address residential service shortfalls, of which security is one. The 'Long Title' of the BMO, Chapter 344 of the Hong Kong Ordinances reads as follows:– 'to facilitate the incorporation of owners of flats in buildings or groups of buildings, to provide for the management of buildings or groups of buildings and for matters incidental there to or connected there with' (Justice Department, 2012). The Ordinance states explicitly that property owners have a duty to maintain their possessions 'in good repair and condition', even if they were not obliged to do so under deed of mutual covenant (§34H, Cap 344). Although the ordinance does not specify the term provision of security services inside the content, in Section 18(1) – the Duties and powers of corporation indicates basic serviceable conditions and assorted maintenance of common parts[5].

Although property owners and residents are required by the law to take up management responsibility of their housing estates by the BMO, IO or OC are

[5] *"The corporation shall:-*

(a) maintain the common parts and the property of the corporation in a state of good and serviceable repair and clean condition;

(b) carry out such work as may be ordered or required in respect of the common parts by any public officer or public body in exercise of the powers conferred by an Ordinance;

(c) do any things reasonably necessary for the enforcement of the obligations contained in the deed of mutual covenant (if any) for the control, management and administration of the building "

formed voluntarily. Ho (2002) argues that OCs were formed after 1993 largely as a redress to inequitable power balances between owners and developers, which legitimized the BMO framework amongst homeowners. IO and OC carry out the same functions except that OC bears more legal responsibility while the IO can delegate the bulk of it to the management company (To, 2006). Furthermore, sub-section (a) and (c) of the Ordinance can be and are being interpreted that they have outlined the three major duties, namely building maintenance and cleaning "…maintain the common parts and the property in… good and serviceable repair and clean condition." Security is obliquely addressed via "…the enforcement of the obligations contained in the Deed of Mutual Covenant (if any) for the control, management and administration of the building." Section 2 (g) of the Ordinance further provides the incorporation of owners to excise its power in managing the building. "Section (2): A corporation may, in its discretion – (g) act on behalf of the owners in respect of any other matter in which the owners have a common interest."

Therefore, it has broadened the responsibility of IO and OC in community safety to such an extent that they may legitimately intervene in the matters of hygiene, building repairs, and not least crime and disorder. In respect of security, the ordinance has made property owners and residents develop a particular mentality as suggested in nodal governance concept (Johnston & Shearing 2003), namely, a 'neighbourhood-safety' mentality in policing their property and the communal area within the confines of a multi-storey building, as opposed to conventional definitions of 'neighbourhood'. This mentality has driven residents to employ private security company in a collective capacity, in order to execute and maintain their orders and regulations. Security provision is no longer the monopoly of the state and becomes a shared interest with every property owner and resident holding a stake. McLaughlin (2007) argues radically that there is no conspicuous reason why a society's need for social order requires the establishment and/or maintenance of a public police force at every level of the social sphere. The District Board member DB1 in Langstone Village revealed:

Public housing residents' demands for increasing the security provision have garnered support from DB councillors and the government. The Housing Department has enhanced security provision in all 'public housing' (social rental housing) since 1997.

These three aspects – maintenance, cleaning, and security – have the three core services provided by every property management company, in line with the Ordinance. Security provision is a common interest of most citizens. The Ordinance has served to strengthen the development of the property management economy, and as a result, an expansion of the security services provision.

4.6 The Provision of Security Services in Property Management

In residential housing, security provision is one of the requirements within a property management contract. It is rare for a security provision contract to be drawn separate from the property management contract. Security teams usually exist in three different employment models in residential housing. Langstone village falls into the 'subsidiary' model and Rees Garden falls into the 'outsourcing' model.

4.6.1 *In-house Model*

The first model is the 'In-house' model where a team of security officers are directly employed by the property management company. This model is considered the least cost-effective due to the economies of scale in recruitment and training, as well as healthcare and employee benefits, plagued by inflexible staff size and a risk of employee sit-ins. Given the high turnover rate in the industry, trained employees may move to a higher position in another company at any time. According to the security company director interviewed in the study, this model of employment is currently in decline in Hong Kong.

4.6.2 *Subsidiary Model*

The second model is a team of security officers that were employed under a subsidiary company of the property management company. This can be called the 'subsidiary' model. The same problems prevail, except that its operational cost can be better controlled. This model reduces the cost of operation and better utilization of

resources through a tighter control of wages and benefits. The subsidiary company provides the necessary labour to the property management company (parent company). The security section in Langstone Village falls into this model.

4.6.3 *Outsourcing Model*

The third model is the 'Outsourcing' model where a team of security personnel is provided by an independent security company. This model can reduce the cost of operation and risk of labour shortage. The outsourcing security company will be responsible for providing the required number of qualified staff. This model is adopted by other security consumers, such as banks. As a senior International Professional Security Association Hong Kong [IPSA- HK] member PB1 revealed, long-term costs are suppressed and volatile demands are smoothed out:

The trend is that most Hong Kong companies will out-source guarding provisions. It is more cost effective in long term. Big companies can select higher quality guarding services in the tendering process. In banking industry, the scale of investment in a location may vary greatly. For example, we may increase 10% staff this year and cut 20% next year. It varies a lot in my industry. So we prefer outsourcing. This is also the trend now. Outsourcing provides more options for a company to choose from, so it is easier to use outsourcing.

In this model, the management company or the end-users are only concerned with the monitoring of personnel operations to ensure that they have reached the standard they expected. This model could be the future trend of housing estate security and other business consumers of security. Kings Security Company in Rees Garden is an outsourcing security company that falls into this model.

In residential estates, security officers and residents have entered into an indirect employer-employee relationship. The employees are now are now policing the residents, their ultimate employers. These relationships have created different issues when the security officers carry out their orders or exercise their powers. A conflict

of interest and power dynamic exists in this social setting. The issues will be discussed later in the powers of the security officer chapter.

In Hong Kong, the emerging market in security provision in residential housing could be argued have been stimulated by governmental initiatives as Garland (2001) suggested in the concept of 'responsible citizenship'. The shift can be considered has been supported by residents in housing estates since over 1,000 new OCs were set up from 2002 to 2007, compared to a base of 6,500 in 2001: the Home Affairs Department lists some 40,000 private buildings (HAD, 2009). Some of them are single-block residential housing while others are buildings of housing estates consisting of 2 to 30 plus high-rise blocks. If the shift in policing responsibilities ultimately derives from an administrative initiative, will the future of policing return to the 'pre-modern' or 'New Feudalism' forms of 'without the state' policing as what Reiner and Taylor outlined (Reiner, 1997; Taylor, 1999), given the current rate of development?

Failure to regulate a private security industry may give rise to an anarchic patchwork without governance (Johnston, 2000). Without a 'after sale service', in a manner of speaking, the shifting would not be effective in quality control and will be unsustainable – or at least lead to undesirable outcomes. This 'after sale service' materialized in the form of continuous government regulation, overt or otherwise, of the private security industry which sought to guarantee the quality of security provisions. The study found that a 'Hybrid Regulation Mechanism' has been set in motion to guarantee the good character of the practitioners and quality of the services.

4.7 The Security and Guarding Services Industry Authority [SGSIA]

The SGSIA is one of the statutory bodies under the Security Bureau of the HKSAR Government. The SGSIA consists of a Chairman and five Members appointed by the Chief Executive, as well as a representative of the Secretary for Security, the member of the Executive Council in charge of the Security Bureau. A Secretariat has been set up to provide day-to-day administrative supports to the SGSIA (SGSIA, 2012a). All policy development and making policy related to the private security industry in

Hong Kong is administered by the SGSIA. The government aligns their interests with the institutions so that the industry can be effectively regulated. For instance, the SGSIA issued a consultation paper, 'Review of the policy governing the issue of security permits to persons with criminal convictions' on 29 June 2001(Kwong & Chu, 2005). The purpose of the paper was to invite security industry associations as well as the wider community of Hong Kong to put forward their views and needs, before the SGSIA recommended any changes to the permit issuing criteria to the Legislative Council for their consideration and approval.

The SGSIA is also involved in the regulation of the private security industry. According to the SGSO, a person will require a security personnel permit [SPP] and a company will require a licence before they can legally provide security services in Hong Kong. The establishment of the SGSIA is to implement this licensing scheme. One of its main functions is to specify the criteria and conditions for issuing the permit. The SGSIA is also responsible for considering and determining applications for a security company licence. The Hong Kong Police collaborates with the SGSIA in the licensing scheme. Under this administrative framework, the private security industry in Hong Kong is politically regulated by the Hong Kong Government through the SGSIA and the Hong Kong Police.

4.8 The Private Security Companies in Hong Kong

According to the SGSO, only a company acting under and in accordance with a licence shall supply, agree to supply, or hold it out as supplying any individual to do security work for another person for reward. The penalty for contravention is a fine of HK$100,000 and imprisonment for two years. Since security companies and security officers are required to obtain a licence it enabled the SGSIA to maintain a reliable record of licenced security companies and officers since its foundation in 1995. The records can be found in the SGSIA website. The database also contains useful information such as application procedures and statistics on security officers and security companies. In Hong Kong, the number of private security companies had reached 911 in July 2011. Security company licences are categorized into three types as listed in Table 4.2 below:

Table 4. 2:- Types of Security Company Licences

Type I security work	Type II security work	Type III security work
Provision of security guarding services	Provision of armoured transportation services	Installation, maintenance and/or repairing of a security device and/or designing (for any particular premises of place) a security system incorporating a security device

Source: SGSIA, 2011a

Summary statistics from the SGSIA identified the scope of businesses of the security companies. They are presented in Table 4.3. The total number of security companies recorded in July 2011 in Hong Kong was 911. The figures have shown that the majority of the companies were either solely engaged in providing security officers (Type I) or installing security devices (Type III). It has found that 472 (51.81%) of the companies solely possess a Type I company licence and 378 (41.49%) of the companies possess a Type III licence only. Five companies (0.55%) solely possess Type II licences that only provide armoured transportation services. 49 security companies (5.38%) possess Type I & III licences, four companies (0.44%) possess Type I & II licences and three companies (0.33%) possess Type II & III licences.

Table 4. 3:- The Distribution of Security Company Licences

Type I	Type II	Type III	Type I & II	Type I & III	Type II & III	Type I, II & III	Total:
472	5	378	4	49	0	3	911
51.81%	0.55%	41.49%	0.44%	5.38%	0%	0.33%	100%

The figures indicated that majority of the companies provide security guarding services. It found that more than 40% companies hold a Type III licence allowing them to carry out the installation of security devices. A small number of 49 companies are engaged in both of the services. The armoured transportation services are provided by 12 companies of which five solely possess Type II licence, four companies possess also Type I licence and three companies are engaged in all three types of services. These last three companies are large and well known in the security industry, namely The Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited [HSBC], Guardforce Limited and General Security (HK) Limited. According to a senior member of a Security Association PB2, armoured transport enterprises are not attractive investments, due to capital, human resources, and licensing requirements.[6]

4.9 The Security Officer in Hong Kong

According to the SGSO, a person is required to have a valid SPP before he or she may provide security services in Hong Kong. Security personnel permits were categorized into four categories as listed in Table 4.4. In Hong Kong, the number of private security personnel has increased dramatically in the last two decades. In 1973 the number of permits issued was 12,088 and the number jumped to 137,464 in 1999 (The Hong Kong Security Association, 2011). Since then the number has soared, and reached 280,963 in July 2011, an increase of just over 100% (The Hong Kong Security Association, 2011). However, the number of active security personnel is not certain: the new application to renewal application ratio is five to one (4959:1003) in November 2012, and 28% of all permits were expired or due to expire within four months (renewal and re-application of the standard five-year license cost the same). According to our interviewees' information, the turnover rate of security personnel of individual security companies is high, but most of them still remain in the field.

[6] *Armoured transport involved more complicated administration, licencing conditions, staff recruitment and large amount of capital investment on the vehicles and weapons. Therefore, this kind of business does not attract too many private investors.*

Table 4. 4:- Categories of Security Personnel Permit (SPP)

Category A	Category B	Category C	Category D
Guarding work restricted to a "single private residential building", the performance of which does not require the carrying of arms and ammunition	Guarding work in respect of any persons, premises or properties, the performance of which does not require the carrying of arms and ammunition and which does not fall within Category A	Guarding work, the performance of which requires the carrying of arms and ammunition	Installation, maintenance and/or repairing of a security device and/or designing (for any particular premises or place) a system incorporating a security device

Source: SGSIA, 2011b

The licencing scheme is not only a quality control measure. It also provides an incidental picture of the employment of security officers. Unfortunately, there is no statistical information of the number of active practitioners in the field; however, the renewal rate suggests that about three-quarters of new permit holders are not in continuous employment in the industry for more than five years. As in other democracies, there is limited data on the demographic distribution of the security industry personnel population (Jones & Newburn, 1998; George & Button 2000; van Steden & Sarre, 2007). Likewise, there is no information of the gender or ethnicity of the holders – age statistic is however available. The numbers of valid permits issued by category as on 31 March 2011 are listed below in Table 4.5. The following analysis is a conservative speculation of the researcher based on the data collected and the interviews with the professionals in the security industry.

Table 4. 5:- Number of Valid Permits Issued by Category as on 31 March 2011

Category	A	D	A +B	A+D	A+B+C	A+B+D	A+B+C+D	Total
Number	17,036	4,978	257,187	5	1,423	332	2	280,963
Percentage	6.06%	1.78%	91.53%	.001%	0.5%	0.11%	.0007%	100%

Source: SGSIA, 2011c

It found that 17,036 (6.06%) of the security officers were in possession of Category A permits alone. They were the officers who were working in single private residential building as depicted in the permit: "Guarding work restricted to a 'single private residential building', the performance of which does not require the carrying of arms and ammunition." There were 257,187 (91.53%) of the security officers who possessed Categories A and B permits. This suggested that the majority of the security officers engage in the "Guarding work in respect of any persons, premises or properties, the performance of which does not require the carrying of arms and ammunition and which does not fall within Category A." These are mainly the security officers who work in residential housing. There are 4,978 (1.78%) Category D permits holders. They are solely engaged in the "Installation, maintenance and/or repairing of a security device and/or designing (for any particular premises or place) a system incorporating a security device."

As technicians, they do not normally hold a Category A or B permit. However, there are always some exceptions. There are 322 (0.11%) of them that are holding three permits, namely A, B and D. Strictly speaking, Category D permit holders are recognized as security personnel as opposed to 'officers' who was variously defined in the industry to incorporate frontline staff. Category D holders are technical installation staffs who have no knowledge of security or systems design. PB3 claimed that:

Cat. D permit holders are actually technical staff. The company employs them to do installation of security system. We do not expect them to know anything about 'security' and security system. In view of this we are (security associations) negotiating with the SGSIA to re-categorize them.

The 1,423 (0.5%) Category A, B & C holders are believed to be mainly engaging in "Guarding work, the performance of which requires the carrying of arms and ammunition." They usually work in cash-in-transit and armoured vehicle services. For example, refilling cash in the ATM machine or collecting large amounts of cash from the Jockey Club Off-course Betting Branches, the only lawful bookmaker in Hong Kong. The SGSIA database has provided information on the age distribution of the security officers in Hong Kong. The SGSIA divides them into ten different age groups. There were 3,419 (1.22%) security officers that were aged between 18 and 20; 32,682 (11.63 %) officers aged between 21 and 30; 37,321 (13.28%) aged between 31 and 40; 71,597 (25.48 %) aged 41 to 50. The SGSIA divides the officers aged between 51 and 70 with a five years interval, presumably for finer resolution. The age distributions of permits holders are listed in Table 4.6 below.

Table 4. 6:- Age Distribution of Valid Security Personnel Permit Holders

Age	18-20	21-30	31-40	41-50	51-54	55-60	61-65	66-70	71-80	80+	Total
Number as at 31.3.2011	3,419	32,682	37,321	71,597	38,980	53,173	26,741	13,022	3,831	197	280,963
Percentages of total	1.22	11.63	13.28	25.48	13.87	18.93	9.52	4.64	1.36	.07	100%
Number as at 31.12.2010	3,533	32,488	37,761	72,799	39,340	53,149	26,235	12,766	3,671	148	281,890
Number of Increase/ Decreased	-114	+194	-440	-1202	-360	+24	+506	+256	+160	+49	-927
Percentages Increase/Decreased	-3.23	+0.59	-1.17	-1.65	-0.92	+0.05	+1.93	+2.00	+4.36	+33.11	-0.33%

Source: SGSIA, 2011d

There is no ‘official’ retirement age for frontline security personnel. The upper age limit associated with a Category B SPP is 65. However, there is no age limit for applying for a Category A SPP. Security /management companies usually will not employ people over the age of 65 unless they hold a ‘single private residential building’ post. Fortunately, there are many ‘single private residential buildings’ in Hong Kong. Some of them are high-value residential buildings and others are decrepit. The Owners’ Committees of the latter buildings will usually employ security personnel aged over 65, who would accept a lower pay to guard their premises. A person providing guarding services to this type of building will only need a Category A SPP. When compared with the age distribution of SPP holder and number of Category A SPP, it is very likely that the 16,585 of the 17,036 Category A SPP security officers who are aged between 66 and over 80 were more likely working in this type of single private residential buildings.

Unfortunately, the gender and ethnicity of the security officers were not provided by the SGSIA. However, the study found that the job nature of the post is influential in determining the gender of frontline security staff; this will be explained in chapter 6.

4.10 Regulating the Private Security Industry

When Hong Kong was a British colony, a locally organized private ‘police’ force – bordering on a militia by any other name – may have been perceived as a threat to the ruling regime. Therefore, these local Chinese watchmen had been placed under strict regulation by the colonial Government for political and security reasons. For instance, local Chinese had to obtain a ‘Certificate of Honesty’ issued by Reverend Charles Gutslaff from the Assistant Magistrate of the colonial Government’s Chinese Department if they wanted to work as watchmen (Hamilton, 1999). Although the DWF was funded solely by the Chinese merchants, it was under the control of the Registrar General and the Captain Superintendent of Police. In 1870, the Government further tightened the control by inclusion of the DWF by paying HK$1 per person per month. In doing so, the watchmen became accountable to the colonial Government, even though they were mainly paid by the local Chinese community. The colonial Government enacted the Watchman Ordinance in 1928 and it was

repealed in 1950 and re-enacted in 1960 to regulate watchmen. Following the Japanese invasion (Crisswell & Watson, 1982), the DWF was disbanded and members were absorbed by the Hong Kong Police. This Ordinance remained the principal piece of legislation controlling private security personnel until 1994 when the new Security and Guarding Services Ordinance was enacted.

Similar to the situation in the UK, there were two camps of security industry practitioners holding different views on the regulation of the security industry. One advocated self-regulation of the industry and the other prefers the continued regulation by the government. According to a senior member in the Hong Kong Security Association (interviewee PB3), an agreement was only reached after numerous meetings, negotiations and amendments on the proposed Ordinance with the representatives of the security industry, and the Hong Kong Government enacted the SGSO in 1994 to replace the former Watchman Ordinance. The debates in the meetings are confidential and the records are not accessible by the public. The Security and Guarding Services Industry Authority was established in 1995 under the SGSO as a Government agency to regulate the private security industry in Hong Kong. Although there are historical and political reasons behind government regulation, the continued presence of the regulatory regime indicates that the government is willing to recognize the legitimacy of private policing (White, 2010).

4.11 The Hybrid Regulation Mechanism

Hong Kong has an established state regulatory system on the private security industry dating from the beginning of colonization. The DWF was the first Hong Kong private security force, founded by the merchant elites of the Tung Wah Hospital, a charity association that was affiliated with the Chinese Mandarins in Canton and Peking (Sinn, 2003). During the colonial era, regulation enabled the colonial government to scrutinize this private quasi-police force (Hamilton, 2008). Holding a view similar to that of the radical negative, the Hong Kong government considered that this private police force was posing a threat to the ruling regime. However, after the handover of Hong Kong, the risks of violent social strife were largely dismissed by the public as business confidence rose; it is not known whether

the administration shared the sentiment. What would be the rationale for the continued implementation of private security industry regulation?

In guaranteeing the quality of private security services, the government is able to shift some of the police functions from the public realm to the private sector. Many governments are attempting to cut expense in public services, and policing in particular, in the 21st century. In addition, users are expected to pay for part of the cost of the public services provided by the government. The division of the provisions of policing services by the state or non-state providers to local communities has ploughed fertile ground for a plethora of commercial and volunteer organizations seeking to be involved in policing society (Loader, 1997; Johnston & Shearing, 2003). Nevertheless, a lack of overt control of the private security industry may lead to an undesirable situation. For instance, in the UK there was no official regulation of the private security industry before 2001. The industry was self-regulated by various trade associations and voluntary independent bodies such as the British Security Industry Association and Inspectorate of the Security Industry (Johnston, 1992; Morgan & Newburn, 1997; Button, 2002). Private security personnel in the UK were criticized for having poor standards, and they were not accountable to the public or even their employers and customers (Button & George, 2001). Johnston (2000) pointed out that, in the absence of regulation, private security could degenerate into an anarchic patchwork without governance. It suggests that regulation may bring benefits to the industry and users. The government will also able to reduce its burden on security provisions. The controls on the security industry have included licencing by the SGSIA, monitoring by the Hong Kong Police, the advocate of training by the VTC and the market mechanism control by the paying IO or OC. The functions of these controlling agencies are listed in Table 4.7 below:

Table 4. 7:- Control Mechanism on the Private Security Companies

Controlling Agencies	Function(s)	Action(s)
SGSIA	Licencing	Initial Application Defines licence conditions Approving licences
Police	Vetting Licencing Monitoring	Investigation Recommendation Checking on valid licences
VTC	Formulate Training Identify training needs	Monitoring training courses Accreditation of qualifications
IO/OC	Reflect security needs Drafting contract Monitoring operation	Re-new contract when satisfied

4.12 Regulation by Licencing Controls

In Hong Kong, the licencing control of the private security industry can be divided into two aspects following the enactment of the SGSO, namely the control of the security companies and the control of the security officers. The licensing criteria of security companies and security personnel are stipulated in the SGSO. As Livingstone and Hart (2003) point out the regulation of the UK security industry is an attempt to promote quality as a virtue, dispel the image of security as tainted occupation, and project a 'professional image'. The control of the security companies is mainly through the licencing regime.

4.12.1 *The Control of the Security Company*

The SGSIA is the statutory body that considers and determines the issuing of company licences to security companies. The requirements on the security company operators' background have guaranteed their 'good character' so that users will be confident in using of their services. There were 911 security companies of various sizes registered in July 2011 (SGSIA, 2011a). A 'Licenced Security Companies' list including licence number, company name, address, telephone number and type(s) of

security service(s) provided by the company is posted on the SGSIA website for public consultation. The application of a company licence must go through the SGSIA. First, applicants need to request an application form and demand note from the SGSIA. Second, applicants are required to return the completed application form to the SGSIA for consideration. Lastly, the SGSIA will forward the application to its counterpart – the Security Companies Inspection Unit [SCIU] of the Hong Kong Police - for investigation and vetting on behalf of the Commissioner of Police. The decision of the issue of a licence by the SGSIA will depend on the Commissioner of Police report and they are clearly stipulated in SGSO section 21(3) that[7] the applicant is 'fit and proper', and that the physical and institutional equipment is suitable.

Private security is a lucrative business (Draper, 1978; South, 1988; Jones & Newburn, 1998; Christie, 2000; Button, 2002). It attracts many investors, including criminals, to make profits out of providing security services. The term 'fit and proper' person is the essential criterion of issuing a company licence. However, what does 'fit and proper' mean? It is determined by criminal records, family relations, previous experience, financial soundness, and capital source of the applicant. An Ex-police Inspector PB05 who has worked in the SCIU has the following descriptions in the interview:

Vetting company and personal applicants involves background checks. This includes their criminal records; their affiliation with the Triad Society, if any; their family members' backgrounds; what kinds of business (es) *they have run before, and experiences in security. We also check their financial background for bankruptcy*

[7] *(3) The Authority shall not issue a licence to an applicant unless it is satisfied that-*

(a) the applicant is a fit and proper person to supply individuals to do security of the type proposed;

(b) any person who is a controller of the applicant is a fit and proper person to be a controller of a company that supplies individuals to do security work of the type proposed;

(c) the security equipment and methods used or proposed to be used by the applicant are adequate; and

(d) the applicant's proposed method of supervising the individuals it supplies to do security work is suitable.

and the sources of their capital for investment. We will also need to check on their offices and the equipment is up to standard.

Furthermore, the SGSO notices under section 6(1) (b) (iii): "Matter to which the SGSIA shall have regard when determining an application for a security company licence", has outlined the requirements in different aspects in applying for a licence for the 'Provision of Guarding Services'. These include the company background, premises, control room, central alarm monitoring station, training etc. Most important are the conditions on the company background that apply to all kinds of security companies. It requires that the applicant(s) must have a sound financial and character background. Other requirements vary depending on the company's business nature and they are mainly technical issues such as requirements on vaults and electronic technical workshops.

The applicants must fulfil four conditions on the company background. Firstly, the company must be registered in Hong Kong. Secondly, it must have a 'sound financial background' with a reference from a Hong Kong bank. Thirdly, the controller(s), directors, and executives must be of good character regarding criminal records and other relevant matters. Fourthly, the company must have insured for the extent of its business for a minimum of HK$10 million (approximately £900,000) per incident for public liability and employee compensation also needed to included. The SCIU is responsible for verifying that the applicant has met the conditions and producing a report for SGSIA on behalf of the Commissioner of the Police.

The criteria on personal character of the potential services providers will deter and prevent applicants who have committed serious crimes, Triad Society affiliation (Chu, 2000), and people who have records of running organized crimes from obtaining a business licence. The financial check on the backgrounds of the investors has prevented them from running a company without sufficient funding to employ staff and proper equipment to provide the services. The insurance requirements provided protection to the public when the company is being sued for any public liability. The other technical requirements are mainly to guarantee the companies have reached the necessary standards. Such a regulation framework is designed

guaranteed that a security company will not be operated by an 'unfit and improper' person. This indicated that the state has provided institutional support (Johnston & Shearing, 2003) in respect of the nodal governance of security concept. At the same time, it builds up the confidence of Hong Kongers in using the private security services.

4.12.2 *The Control of the Security Officers*

According to the SGSO, a person is required to have a valid SPP before he or she may provide security services in Hong Kong. The person is liable on conviction to a fine of HK$10,000 and to imprisonment for three months if he or she fails to do it. The Police Licensing Office of the Hong Kong Police is responsible for the administration of issuing the SPPs. The application of SPP is made to the Commissioner of Police. The Commissioner will consider whether the applicant is a 'fit and proper' person to do a specific type of security work. Applicants with a criminal record are not automatically debarred from being a 'fit and proper' person. They are examined on a case-by-case basis, but they must meet the criteria specified by the SGSIA before a permit is granted, details of which the researcher could not obtain because they are regarded as classified information. The Commissioner may refer the application to the SGSIA for consideration if the applicant does not satisfy those criteria. Moreover, the Commissioner may specify conditions on the permit. A SPP is valid for a period of five years, or a shorter period as the Commissioner may specify. Others aspects like variation in permit conditions, replacement and amendment (personal particular) in permit and employment change are also the concerns of the Hong Kong Police.

According to the Section 17 and 18 of the SGSO (Appendix 9), the Commissioner of Police and the SGSIA may apply for a revocation or suspension of the SPP when permit holder is no longer a 'fit and proper' person to hold the permit or where the holder of the permit has been in breach of any condition of the permit. In this respect, a list of the 'Revoked/Cancelled/Suspended SPP numbers is available on the SGSIA website for consultation by the public. The number of SPPs revoked under SGSO as on 31.03.2011 is listed in Table 4.8 below:

Table 4. 8:- Number of Revoked Licences as on 31.03.2011

Provoked under Section 17	7,046
Provoked under Section 18(4)	74

Source: SGSIA, 2011e

Under this system, the Government is using the SGSIA and the Hong Kong Police to scrutinize private security officers. The conditions for the revocation of the SPP are mainly based on the offences committed by a permit holder. A SPP holder is considered as no longer 'fit and proper' if they have committed any of these serious criminal offences. In other words, the holder is prohibited from providing any security services to another person. The mechanism of the revocation of the SPP had prevented SPP holders who have committed serious crimes to continue working in the industry. White (2010) finds that the UK Home Office and the Metropolitan Police were reluctant to regulate the security industry because it would indicate the state's recognition of the legitimate status of the security officers as a 'private police' force. The situation in Hong Kong is different. Government regulation reassured the public that private security officers have a good character, and thereby contained criminal infiltration in the industry. Additionally, it implicitly indicates that the government recognizes the legal status of the private security industry in the governance of security.

It has been found that security officers work long hours, and an average of 60 hours per week is common (Button & George, 1994; Dickinson, 2003). Button (2007) found that some of the security officers in his study were working 100-hour weeks. One of the conditions in the SPP is 'Permit holder must not work over 372 hours per month and not normally work over 12 hours per day': while this condition did not substantially reduce the working hours of the security officers, it did set the precedent of maximum working hour. It was found that security officers in the study worked a maximum of 72 hours per week in the nodes. While the sustainability of these working conditions may be questionable, it has prevented them from working as a security officer over 12 hours in the same day, volunteered or otherwise requested without pay.

4.13 'Unleash the Snakes' - Sting Operations

The licencing system is one of the means to regulate the security officers. The study found that residential security is chiefly concerned with one special kind of trespasser. 'Unleash the snakes' is Hong Kong Cantonese slang, roughly translated as 'sting operation' or 'entrapment', but with neutral to derogative undertones. It usually refers to law enforcement agencies using undercover agents to collect information or evidence (Hutton, 2005). In this case, they are the police officers who will pretend to be a trespasser to assess whether security personnel performance meets the conditions of the SPP.

Although the Hong Kong Police officially denied that they are supervising security officers at their work places, 'surprise checks' were known to be carried out occasionally. The denial could be the reason that the SGSO has only delegated the power to the Hong Kong Police to issue SPP permit when a person meets the condition. The act of delegation itself does not stipulate how the Hong Kong Police should carry out their assessment of the conditions, thus transforming it into a matter of wide interpretation. The SGSO 460 Section 6(1) (b) (ii) stipulates that the functions of the SGSIA is to specify "the conditions subject to which a permit is to be issued" and Section 27 delegated the power to the Commissioner of Police who "may authorize in writing any public officer to exercise any power vested in him or to perform any duty imposed on him by virtue of this Ordinance." The 'surprise check' powers can be said are based on the conditions as outlined in the SGSIA Manual for Security Personnel Providing Guarding Services in Building (II) (1) & (6) for SPP holder[8]: they must carry their permits for police inspection and only carry out work as permitted by their permit.

[8] *(1) "In accordance with the SPP conditions, all permit holders should carry their permits with them at all times while on duty and produce them for inspection on demand by police officers. Permit holders must perform only the type of security work as specified in their permits. Failure to comply with any condition of the SPP may lead to revocation/suspension of their permits and prosecution"*

(6) "Permit holders should not act contrary to the requirements of the duties as a security guard, such as being negligent or remiss in the execution of those duties. While on duty, permit holders should not sleep, consume alcohol, gamble or be involved in any unlawful activities"

These conditions in conjunctions with the SGSO provide the legal basis for the Hong Kong Police to check on the SPP holders. They were executed by police officers working in the licencing office who will check SPPs of security officers to make sure they are legally providing security services. One of the aims of their checks is to assess the alertness of the building security 'tower guard' in stopping a 'stranger' or an unauthorized person from entering into the building. When a Tower Guard has failed to stop a 'stranger', s/he is considered as being negligent or remiss. It may lead to the revocation of the SPP. LVSO05 described his experiences in catching/identifying the police officer who was carrying out the operation.

Q: *Do the police often 'unleash the snakes'(conduct stings)?*

LVSO05: *Quite often.*

Q: *How many police officers have you stopped before in one month?*

LVSO05: *I have stopped over ten of them so far this year. Sometimes, they may come several times on the same month and do not come for the next.*

Q: *What will happen if they succeed?*

LVSO05: *They will give me a hard time by asking: [You've let me in, and do you know when I got in? How did I get in? How long did I stay inside the building? How could you have missed me? Can you do your job properly?] Then, he will take out a form, tick the boxes, and write up something like a report. He will let you off with a warning if you are lucky. Otherwise, they will send a warning letter to me through my company. They are very sneaky when they are doing that. They dart to the lift like an arrow. You cannot stop them even if you shout at them.*

Q: *Chase after him?*

LVSO05: *No use. Once they are inside the lift, you are done for because they have entered (the premises), and are able to go up to the flats. Basically, you missed and failed the test.*

Although the Hong Kong Police did not consider that the police are supervising the performances of the security officers at their workplaces, it was found that their police officers have nonetheless put in pass-fail benchmarks on private guarding services through these surprise checks. For instance, the East Kowloon Police Region carried out a surprise check exercise known as 'Operation Alert' in 2005. The police launched 1,149 surprise checks at different locations to test the alertness of the security officers. During the operation, the police issued 130 verbal and 324 written warnings to property management companies and individual security officers. Another operation 'Operation Partnership' was launched by the police by using telephone hotlines, seminars, internet etc. The Force liaise with property companies, Housing Department, and security officers in an effort to enhance crime prevention measures (*Singtao* Daily, 2005; *Mingpao*, 2005).

The major objective of the vetting process is to assess whether the person is a 'fit and proper' person. However, 'fit and proper' is not defined in the ordinance. It is also outside the scope of this thesis to discuss the fairness and subjectivity of this method of assessment. Nevertheless, when security officers have been 'checked', the police will also forward a report to their property management office. The Security Operation Officer in Langstone Villages produced a few examples of the 'recommendation letter' and 'warning letter' from the Hong Kong Police to the researcher during the interview. The letters contain the name and Hong Kong Identity Card [HKID] number of the security officer, details of the 'unleash the snake' operation and the result. According to the Operation Officer, the company received both types of letter around once a month in the past 10 months. They were mostly recommendation letters and only one warning letter was received so far. When a security officer has received three warning letters, the company will consider terminating his/her employment. According to the senior member of IPSA Hong Kong PB1, since the Hong Kong Police are responsible for the renewal of the SPP, they have the discretion to consider whether the person is 'fit and proper' to carry out security work when they receive an application. Under this regulation mechanism, a security officer will lose his/her employment either way. The 'unleash the snakes' operations have enabled the Hong Kong police to monitor the situational alertness of the frontline security personnel. In this respect, the government has not only

provided institutional supports to guarantee security but also monitored the services quality of the private security officers.

4.14 Regulation of Security Officers through Quality Controlled Training Schemes

SGSIA is responsible for keeping the standards of private security practitioners. For instance, the SGSIA is currently running a 'Recognition Scheme' with the Vocational Training Council (SGSIA, 2004). The Scheme aims at providing support to the public and building management bodies with information on the basic security training courses available in the market that meet the standards set by the SGSIA. This will benefit those companies that need to train their staff through external sources, such as Owners' Committees that wish to send their guards for proper training, and the public who seek such training for vocational or personal reasons. With this official recognition, the quality of private security services is guaranteed to a minimum vocational standard. It also encourages standards improvement over time and hence enhance the quality of the outcome that is security services.

The Security Services Training Board [SSTB] of Vocational Training Council was set up which comprises representatives from security industry and training professionals, and various Government departments are collectively responsible for the Recognition Scheme. The Continuing Professional Development Centre [CPDC] (now Institute of Professional Education And Knowledge [PEAK] of VTC) is assisting the SSTB in administering the Recognition Scheme. The ultimate recognition power still remains with the SGSIA. The SSTB has developed a Quality Assurance Scheme [QAS] to ensure that training courses were properly delivered and were consistently maintained at a standard acceptable to the SGSIA. The QAS has set out the requirements in respect of programme administration, course content, qualification of trainers, training facilities, assessments and course evaluation, etc. The QAS was widely accepted by the trade associations, professionals, training providers, and trade unions. The SSTB has conducted surprise inspections and specified requirements for trainers. There is a warning and appeal system for the QAS to ensure the course providers' strict compliance with the relevant rules and

regulations. For in-house security practitioners, a Scheme for Quality Assured In-house Training [QAIHT] was implemented to ensure that in-house training courses provided by security companies are properly run and the standard of training of these courses maintained. The SGSIA announced on 14 September 2004 that the QAIHT Scheme as a concurrent quality assurance scheme.

4.14.1 *Profile of the Institutions Providing Basic Security Trainings Courses*

The study found that there were 67 institutions providing basic security training (QAS) courses at the time of the research. The list can be found in the VTC website. Any registered educational institution can run basic security-training courses. Apart from the private training institutions, some charity organizations and one university were also found providing security training courses. An analysis on these institutions was carried out and they are classified according to the nature of the organization. For example, G4S (Hong Kong Holding) Limited is classified as a 'security company' and Christian Action, although it has a charity background, is classified as 'teaching/training institution'. They are presented in Table 4.9 below.

Table 4. 9:- Classification of Security Training Institutions

Classification of Institutions	Number
Security Company	10
Property Management Company	4
Teaching/Training Institution	48
University	1
Social Welfare Organization	4
Total : 67	

The VTC conducts annual inspections of the courses with or without prior notice to ascertain the course providers are running the courses in compliance with the QAS requirements. Under the government quality-control mechanism the quality of the

private security officer can be said to have reached a defined training standard. This is reflected in the recognition of QAS courses by the SGSIA.[9]

The scheme is largely welcomed by the end-users. The study found that every security officer working in the buildings under the Housing Department are required to possess a QAS certificate. Although not every security company requires their employees to possess the qualification, the study found that 75% of the officers in Rees Garden and 55.5% of the officers in Langstone Village possess QAS qualification. The number of officers interviewed who are possessing QAS is listed in Table 4.10 below.

Table 4. 10:- Number of Interviewed Officers Possesses QAS

	Number of officers with QAS	%	Number of officers without QAS	%
Rees Garden	18	75%	6	25%
Langstone Village	10	55.5.%	8	44.5

At the time of the study, according to PB05 who has just started his own training institute in September 2010, "The SGSIA and VTC are formulating a required standard for the Trainer of security training courses." This further indicates that the government is progressively furthering its regulatory reach of the industry through its training schemes.

[9] *With effect from 1 April 2004, an applicant for Category A, B and/or C Security Personnel Permit who has sat and passed a course-end examination, within 1 year before submitting his/her application, of a security training course that has met the requirements of a scheme for quality assurance that has been endorsed by the Authority and announced in a manner that it thinks fit is deemed to have met the criterion of "Proficiency in Security Work" for issuing a Security Personnel Permit (SGSIA, 2004)*

4.15 Regulation of the Security Industry by Market Mechanisms

The study found that security companies and security officers in residential buildings were usually working under the property management contracts. This setting has provided the end-users the rights to select the security company and officers they want. Residents in residential housings are represented by their IO or OC.

Residents' demands on security provisions were passed onto the IO or OC. After a committee meeting, reasonable and feasible requests will be laid down as tender conditions for potential property management companies who want to take up a management contract. The survival of a property management company, and by extension a security company, will be governed by this market mechanism. In order to win a contract, a property management must be able to satisfy the end users' demands: a bargain, in short. It showed in the expectations on the property management company in the bidding of the new contract by the chairperson of the Langstone Village's IO:

We will have more demands in the coming year. I expect (the security companies) to add value to what the residents' pay. We usually tell the companies our expectations and they will present us with a proposal. We will pick the best option that fits our expectations. As a consumer, we would expect the cheapest price and the best services. But it is not always so ideal, so we will choose the most suitable one.

In this respect, residents have become the ultimate employers of the security companies and officers. They will supervise the performances of the company and officers. When a security company is unable to reach the expected standards, residents could make complaints via the IO or directly to the property management company. If a security officer is unable to or fail to do his/her duties, residents could also launch a complaint to the IO, the property management company or the security company. RGSO40 had revealed his experiences in the interview when questioned about the attitudes of the property owners and residents. RGSO40's experiences have shown that residents and members of the OC possess the powers of renewal of the management contract or the employment of the individuals: residents are 'customer'.

Q: *Do you feel that they are your boss?*

RGSO40: *They are more important than my boss. Some customers are very fussy here. They will complain about very minor things and if they are not satisfied they will complain to the management office.*

Q: *Are they monitoring you all the time?*

RGSO40: *Oh! They will patrol the estate and check on us all the time. If they see anything wrong they will phone the management officer or the manager. If we received too many complaints or a resident is wagging his finger at you, you may lose your job.*

Q: *Is that normal because they employed you to do that?*

RGSO40: *Yes. But sometimes it is too minor, like saying that we are not proactive. The demand is pressing but the wage is low.*

This hybrid regulation mechanism has guaranteed the minimum standard of three important aspects of the private security industry, namely the integrity of private security companies, the background and performance of security officers, and the meta-standards of security services qualifications. The Hong Kong Police assure that security companies will not be operated by any 'unfit and improper' person. The VTC's schemes accredit and recognise the qualifications of the private security officers so the standards of services are set. The market mechanism gives the powers to the property owners and residents in choosing their property management company, hence, security services. The survival of the security company is controlled by the end-users and depends on the performances of the company and officers.

As a result, it also addresses the issue of inequity of security provision. Figure 2 below highlights the result of this Hybrid Regulation Mechanism. In this setting, citizens in both private and public housing are provided with a minimum level of residential security services that is regulated to be homogenous across the board. At the same time, government will subsidize the policing costs for social housing

tenants via direct injection to the Housing Authority: apart from a spectrum of private low-value high-rise that remains unincorporated, virtually every urban citizen is guaranteed a minimum level of home security. Effective legislation that can gain support from residents to take up the policing responsibilities and continuous state regulation on the industry are the key elements of this policy.

Figure 2: The Result of the Hybrid Regulation Mechanism



4.16 Conclusion

The security industry emerged as the result of insufficient service provision by the Hong Kong police and the colonial policing style at the founding of the colony. The continuous growth of high-rise private residential property since 1970 has created a

condition for the private security industry to expand. The major reason for growth, once demographic and residents' purchasing powers were discounted, was governmental initiatives effectively shifting the responsibility of policing to the citizens through an important piece of legislation, namely the Building Management Ordinance. Citizens' acceptance of the 'policing' burden and duty can be attributed to the continuous state involvement in the security industry. In the 'Hybrid Regulation Mechanism' system, the government have guaranteed the character and financial status of the private security company operators, vetted security officers, and issued benchmarks on the quality of security services. At the same time, the end-users are empowered to select security services in the market freely and voluntarily. Economic survival of the security company depends on the end-users and the performances of the company and officers. It also indicates that the government has recognized the legitimacy of private security industry in the governance of security.

The study found that Hong Kong government have viewed the growth as positive and valuable to the sovereign state, and intervened at different levels to exploit its full potential. Two elements of the nodal governance model as suggest by Johnston and Shearing (2003), namely the deployment of specific technologies and the availability of institutional support, are explicit in the Hong Kong context. This is evidenced in the findings that the database of the criminal record of the Hong Kong Police, a matter of discretion by the Secretary for Security, is being utilized, and the SGSIA is supporting the development by keeping the quality of the services providers through continuing education initiatives via the VTC.

Since Hong Kong citizens are the biggest stakeholders in the governance of security (home insurance penetration rates being lower than those in other mature economies), they are actively involved in determining the style of security provisions inside residential housing. The government is involved in guaranteeing the good character of the practitioners in the industry, but the involvement in the security provisions level is minimal. It suggested that a 'mandated residents-led' situation has developed in the provision of security in residential estates. This, as a result, has addressed significant issues in the equity of security provision.

5 CHAPTER FIVE:

Powers of Security Officers in Hong Kong

5.1 Introduction

This chapter explores the sources, typologies and limitations of private security officers' powers in Hong Kong. Private security officers are visually prominent in protecting housing estates in Hong Kong. The Building Management Ordinance has created the situation for security officers to take up some of the crime prevention and security provision functions of the state police in these estates. Security personnel need powers when they execute their duties. This chapter discusses the citizen's arrest power and the powers delegated to them by property owners, as well as their involvement in the stipulated activities that are permitted and proscribed (Johnston & Shearing, 2003) in residential estates. It reveals how security officers utilise their delegated powers in their social dynamic context. It finally discusses the limitations on their use of powers.

5.2 Police Powers in Hong Kong

Police power generally refers to the power of the state police. Some aspects of the police powers are considered relevant to those wielded by security personnel in policing private communal places (or common parts, in BMO terminology) in housing estates. Therefore, the powers of the Hong Kong Police will be examined and used as a reference. The powers of the Hong Kong Police are stipulated in Chapter 232 of the Hong Kong Ordinances, namely the – Police Force Ordinance. Police officers are empowered to carry out policing duties such as crime prevention, investigation, and order maintenance. There are extensive studies of police powers in other jurisdictions. However, study of police power is sparse in Hong Kong. Wong (2002) points out that one reason may be that is the Hong Kong Police are reluctant to be studied, due to perceptions it will affect their operational effectiveness, professional autonomy, and political legitimacy within a delicate post-colonial

balance. The researcher was refused permission when he requested an interview with police officers who carry out 'surprise checks' on security officers. Since Hong Kong has inherited the common law system, but has otherwise undergone no independence deliberations as is typical of virtually all post-colonial societies, the studies undertaken on police powers in the UK, will be used as references in understanding the powers of security officers in Hong Kong.

Private security officers sometimes encounter situations similar to that of a state police officer, such as stopping a suspect in their domains. Button (2007) suggests that the function of the written form of legal powers is to provide the authority for the 'office of constable' to secure compliance and consent. Once compliance and consent has been secured, the relationship between the suspect and the police changes, making investigations become more feasible or effective. For instance, the officer can evade the legal obligations required by the laws for conducting a search. Once a police officer has obtained the suspect's consent, the officer can search the suspect without reasonable grounds of suspicion (Dixon, 1997). Button (2007) notes that there are many ways police officers do not need to exercise legal powers to achieve their objectives. The public believe that the police possess greater powers than they actually possess due to authority emanating from their image (Loader, 1997). Therefore, the public will often consider the act of a police officer on the street 'legal' and will obey voluntarily (Jason-Lloyd, 2005). Besides this, Dixon (1997) points out that the use of language; the threat of the use of legal powers, arrest, search, detain, exploitation of the suspect's ignorance of his rights; and inviting to the police station to 'help with enquires' are all found to be in common use by the police. It has been found that state agencies vested with enormous legal powers will not usually use their powers to the full extent (Dixon, 1979; Reiner, 1993). Their *modus operandi* is to secure the suspect's compliance and consent by various strategies.

Security officers are found using their skills to convince others that they have the powers over a situation (Rigakos, 2002). Mopas and Stenning (2001) named the different skills security officers used in achieving their objectives as the 'tools of the trade'. Button (2007) adopted the term and classified them into 'Universal legal tools' and 'Select legal tools' in his examination of the sources of powers of the security officers in England and Wales. In this study, the researcher classified the

'tools' of security personnel into 'Universal Legal tools' and 'Delegated Legal tools' in the examination of the powers of security personnel in Hong Kong.

5.3 Universal Legal Tools

Discussion on the powers of the police usually refers to the powers stipulated by the laws, like making an arrest, investigation, or interrogation. Like other findings on the powers of private security personnel (Jones & Newburn, 1998; Jason-Lloyd, 2003; Wakefield, 2003; Button, 2007), it has been revealed that private security personnel in Hong Kong do not possess any special legal powers unless specifically delegated or authorized. Their powers are identical to those of an ordinary citizen. Security officers cannot carry out a 'stop and search' or an 'invitation to the police station to help an investigation' as the state police can. Their actions are more passive, responsive, and restrictive compared to the state police. They are relying on the 'any person' powers as stipulated by the Laws of Hong Kong when they are making an arrest. Security officers in Hong Kong do not have the power of 'stop and search' in public place, but in communal spaces inside the housing estates, they are empowered by the property owners' rights to stop and question suspicious person. Instead of securing compliance or consent from the person, it is found that security officers preferred to make 'enquiries' of a person when considered necessary, i.e. when they are considered suspect.

5.3.1 *Power of Arrest*

Private security officers are more likely to find themselves in situations that require them to exercise their citizen's arrest powers than an ordinary citizen due to the nature of their duties. Button (2007) lists several Acts in England and Wales that have broadened the power of arrest as a citizen. However, a search of similar legislation in the Bilingual Laws Information System of the Department of Justice of Hong Kong did not find any similar legislation that broadens the power of a citizen in respect of arrest. In Hong Kong, the power of arrest of a citizen is known as the

'(Section) 101 power' of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance [10] . 'Summary apprehension of offender', Subsection (2): – "Any person may arrest without warrant any person whom he may reasonably suspect of being guilty of an arrestable offence."

"Arrestable offence" is defined as any crimes that can be sentenced for more than 12 months' imprisonment. Once an arrest is made the suspect must be delivered to a police office as soon as possible for court proceedings. It is stipulated in Subsection (5) that the arrested, as well as property, if any, must be delivered to a police officer[11].

All security personnel were taught during their basic training, and were aware of the power of arrest of a citizen in Hong Kong, when asked during their interviews. The definition of the term 'arrestable offence' is crucial in exercising the citizen's arrest power and the essence is in there. Security officers might discover such crimes during their course of duty. A popular activity that security personnel may encounter during their patrols is gambling in public places. The Gambling Ordinance (CAP 148) penalises unlawful (non-establishment) gambling operators to a maximum of two years' imprisonment.[12]

People are often found gambling in open spaces inside housing estates. They will usually gather in communal spaces and gamble with playing cards, Chinese chess, and other games. However, security officers are unable to prove that gambling has actually taken place. The researcher observed on a number of occasions while accompanying the security officers on patrol that a crowd of people gathered in the remote part of the Langstone Village leisure area watching other people playing

[10] *Hong Kong Ordinances, Chapter 221- Criminal Procedure Ordinance, Section 101.*

[11] *Every person who arrests any person under any of the provisions herein contained shall (if the person making the arrest is not himself a police officer) deliver the person so arrested, and the property, if any, taken possession of by him, to some police officer in order that he may be conveyed as soon as reasonably may be before a magistrate, to be by him dealt with according to law, or himself convey him before a magistrate, as soon as reasonably may be, for that purpose*.

[12] *Hong Kong Ordinances, Chapter 148, Gambling Ordinance, Section 13: "Gambling in any place not being a gambling establishment or in the street", Subsection (1): Any person who operates or manages or otherwise controls unlawful gambling in any place whatsoever (not being a gambling establishment) whether or not the public have or are permitted to have access thereto, or in any street, commits an offence and is liable on conviction to a fine of $50000 and to imprisonment for 2 years*

chess or cards. Money changed hands after each card game. While the claim of unlawful gambling was plainly substantiated, obtaining proof was difficult. As LVSO01 said, even the state police could not intervene:

We know they are gambling with cards but they never put money on the table. They claim that they are just playing games, (emphasis) NOT GAMBLING. Even when the police see them, they cannot prove it and arrest them for gambling unless they go undercover. I can do nothing.

Security personnel are often threatened, and intimidation offences are punishable on summary conviction by up to two years' imprisonment[13]. Security officers are frequently threatened during the course of their duty, but few will execute a citizen's arrest. Button (2007) found that security officers potentially have a plethora of legal powers but rarely use them. Many such 'arrestable' situations arise in Hong Kong. It is a matter of whether they will pursue the case. Since it is difficult to prove the offence, it was found that they rarely exercise their citizen's arrest power to arrest offender(s) in these kinds of situation. A citizen or a security officer sometimes may need to use force when making an arrest. The 'Using of force in making arrest' is stipulated in Chapter 221, Section 101A, Sub-section (1) "A person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders or of persons unlawfully at large."

Whether the level of force that had been used was reasonable or unreasonable will usually be determined in court, by the doctrine of self-defence cf. Palmer v The Queen (1971).

[13] *Hong Kong Ordinances, Chapter 200: Crimes Ordinance, Section 24: 'Certain Acts of Intimidation Prohibited' stipulated that "any person who threatens any other person, with any injury to the person…with any illegal act with intent…to cause the person so threatened…to omit to do any act which he is legally entitled to do, shall be guilty of an offence." If a person had threatened another person and found guilty, the penalty is stipulated in Chapter 200, Section 27: Any person who commits an offence against section 24 or 25 shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine of $2000 and to imprisonment for 2 years and shall be liable on conviction upon indictment to imprisonment for 5 years.*

5.4 Delegated Legal Tools

According to the figures of the SGSIA, 91.53% of the licenced security officers are Type A & B permit holders. It suggested that private security officers mainly provide guarding work in respect of any persons, premises, or properties, the performance of which does not require the carrying of arms and ammunition. Security officers act on behalf of property owners to exercise some of their powers when guarding residential property. We now examine the relevant legal powers that had been delegated to the security officers.

5.4.1 *The Rights of Property Owners*

It has been revealed in the police power section that the state police will usually circumvent the procedure by securing a compliance or consent when carrying out a search or bringing a suspect to the police station for further investigation. Security officers were found using a different strategy. The strategy has avoided the use of the citizen power of arrest but it nonetheless achieves the aim of getting the perpetrator arrested and prosecuted. This strategy will be examined in chapter 7.

There are different kinds of trespass and the most pertinent form is the civil form of trespass to land or property (Button, 2007). Trespass is the most common infraction a private security officer will confront when working in private residential housings. When a person has entered private premises without the permission of the property owner, s/he commits trespass. Security officers working as door supervisors in a nightclub or pub in England have always needed to refuse entry to, or remove, 'unfavourable' people from the premises (Winlow, 2001). Likewise, security officers in Hong Kong will need to remove or refuse various kinds of trespasser when working in residential buildings. The study found that the common types of trespasser that private security officers encounter while working in residential housing are vendors, salespersons and leaflet distributors trying to gain access to apartment mailboxes in the same way a postal worker would. When they are found inside a building, security officers will approach them and demand them to leave by using the property owner's power delegated to them. They will escort them from the

buildings, or outside their responsible territory. When they refuse to leave, assistance from the police is sought.

5.4.2 *The Power to Stop, Question and Record*

Security officers do not have any statutory power to stop and search a person if they feel that a person is acting suspiciously in the estate area. However, the IO or OC have delegated the property owner's powers to the security officers to stop, question and register any visitors entering, leaving or inside the communal area of a building. They were employed to defend the property from unauthorised access, predation, or damage, and in some circumstances, they were authorized to employ physical force and/or pervasive and continuous random surveillance in doing so (Hermer, *et al*., 2005).

Although the findings suggest that they rarely use physical force, they were found to exercise their persuasion power and legitimate authority (Wrong, 1979) frequently. They can stop suspicious persons – or any persons – entering or loitering in the building, and record the person's identity (usually their Hong Kong Identity Card [HKID] number): section 17C of the Immigration Ordinance stipulates that every Hong Kong resident aged 15 or above must carry proof of identity. Security personnel do not have any power to demand any person to produce their HKIDs as a police or other law enforcement officer do. As an alternative, if a person refused to produce his/her HKID claiming that it is an invasion of his/her privacy, a security officer could request him/her to produce a staff identity card instead (SGSIA, 2012b). Details and reasons for entering or being inside the building must be recorded in the register. If anyone refuses to provide a satisfactory reason for their presence, entry can be refused and they will be requested to leave the building. In the case of refusal to leave the premises, security personnel will seek the assistance of other colleagues. If the situation cannot be resolved, they will call the state police for assistance. Security personnel will under no circumstances use force to evict a trespasser or visitor.

It was noted that the state police would try to circumvent the necessary procedures when conducting a search or making an arrest, by verbally securing the consent of

the suspect so that coercive statuary power is not needed (Dixon, 1997). In some cases, private security officers find a need to carry out a de facto stop and search on suspicious visitors. Private security officers have been found to use their interpersonal skills as a way of securing the consent of a person they need to search (Button, 2007). It was observed that if they needed to stop and search a person, they would start by greeting him/her or asking him/her a casual question. Once the person 'being stopped' responds to the private security officer, they can continue the conversation. Security personnel may sometimes pretend to be nosy or curious and ask what the person has in his/her possession and demand to request the person to let them 'have a look' at their possessions. Generally speaking, people would not notice that a security officer is utilizing his/her interpersonal skills rather than legal powers (which they do not possess) to secure compliance and consent in such cases.

Most people believe that a person in uniform will have some sort of authority (Bickman, 1974; Milgram, 1975). Notably, many security officers wear uniforms resembling the local state police[14]. It was found that they were able to exercise their delegated powers to stop and question in order to acquire the consent of the person they want to handle. For instance, Tower Guard LVSO09 said that he was able to stop visitors – presumably tradespeople – who were carrying dangerous goods simply by asking which flat they were visiting. As LVSO09 said:

Whenever I saw suspicious people entering the block, especially those carrying something like a bucket, I'd ask them which flat they are visiting. I can tell whether they are residents or visitors. If it's a visitor, I will make sure he registers, and if I think that he is carrying some hazardous liquids, I will ask him to wait and ask a colleague to accompany him to the flat, or ask him to leave (the goods) at the counter first.

Although security officers cannot make an arrest after they have discovered a suspect with potentially criminal intentions, they can successfully prevent that possibility.

[14] *In general, Hong Kong Police beat officers will wear a dark blue hard-top cap, dark blue outer jacket (in winter), short-sleeves light blue shirt (long-sleeves in winter), a pair of navy blue trousers and black leather shoes while on duty.*

The powers to stop, question and record enabled security officers to prevent crime proactively and protect the residents.

5.4.3 *Impounding Illegally Parked Vehicles*

Illegal parking is commonly found in private residential estates. Some drivers, most of them are visitors, will take a chance in parking a vehicle on the roadside or empty parking spaces inside residential estates for a short period of time, usually 15 to 20 minutes. It causes obstruction on the road, inconvenience to other road users, and upsets residents who have rented a parking space. One of the main duties of security officers is to resolve this situation. Security officers cannot issue a fixed-penalty ticket to the driver or car owner as the police or traffic wardens do, but they have the powers to impound the vehicle under some conditions. Chapter 374O – Road Traffic (Parking on Private Road) Regulation, Section 8: 'Designation of restricted parking areas' stipulated the power of property owners to designate any place on their private road as a restricted parking area by erecting or placing a sign. Section 11: 'Impounding and removal of vehicles' stipulated the power to deal with such illegal parking by impounding or removing any vehicle which is parked on a restricted parking area on that road in contravention of any sign or road marking. A security officer can either locate the driver, ask him to move the illegally parked vehicle, or s/he can impound a vehicle, usually by lawfully 'clamping' the vehicle. The impounding or removing of a vehicle shall be exercised only when the vehicle is unattended and the driver cannot be located or the driver is unable to remove the vehicle, or the driver refuses or fails to remove the vehicle on being requested to do so by the owner of the private road concerned or an authorized officer in respect of that (private) road.

The power of impounding or removing a vehicle may be exercised by the owner of a private road or an authorized officer. Such as owner or authorized officer may fix an approved immobilization device to the vehicle and an impounding or removal charge and storage charge can be collected from the car owner or driver. Security officers are often required to execute the clamping of the vehicles inside private places. They were very likely to encounter challenges when clamping vehicles. The laws have

provided protection for the rule enforcers in this respect. Section 15 'Obstruction' stipulated the penalty for obstructing the owner or authorized person to a small fine and a maximum of six months' imprisonment[15]. Thus, security officers are being delegated the necessary powers in dealing with illegal parking in private properties by the landlords via a separate ordinance.

5.4.4 *Power to Intervene with People Smoking in Prohibited Areas*

In Hong Kong, many areas such as leisure parks and passenger lifts have been legally designated as 'No smoking areas'; violations are fined. As with most health and safety regulations, the Smoking (Public Health) Ordinance was initially confined to restaurants, then took over entertainment venues and reached communal areas within a private property. The laws of Hong Kong, Chapter 371: Smoking (Public Health) Ordinance Section 3: 'Prohibition on smoking in certain designated areas', subsection (2) stipulated that: "No person shall smoke or carry a lighted cigarette, cigar or pipe in a no smoking area. The manager of a no smoking area or any person authorized in that behalf by any such manager may require the person to extinguish the lighted cigarette, cigar or pipe. When the person fails to extinguish the lighted cigarette, cigar or pipe, the authorized person may require the person to give his/her name and address, proof of identity and to leave the no smoking area by the use of reasonable force if necessary or detain him and call for the assistance of a police officer to assist in the enforcement. The person is liable on summary conviction to a maximum fine of HK$5,000, or a fixed-penalty arrangement of HK$1,500. Private security personnel are not authorized to prosecute smokers. They are required and expected by the property owners to intervene, however. When a security officer sees a person smoking in the prohibited smoking designated area s/he can approach the person and request him to stop or leave the place.

[15] *Any person who without lawful authority or reasonable excuse obstructs the owner of a private road or an authorized officer in the exercise of any power conferred, or the discharge of any duty imposed, under these regulations commits an offence and is liable on conviction to a fine of $2000 and to imprisonment for 6 months.*

5.4.5 *The Powers of Referring Complaints to Government Departments*

Many quality of life problems affected residents in dense multi-storey residential estates. Security officers frequently need to handle three kinds of complaints, despite not having legal powers to prosecute violators. They are 'noise nuisance', 'dropping objects from height', and 'water dripping from air conditioner'. Security officers cannot prosecute the violators, but they can refer the violations to the relevant government departments or take appropriate action to stop the violations. This will be discussed in the exercise of powers chapter. The major functions of their universal and delegated legal tools are shown in Figure 3 below.

Figure 3: Major Functions of the Legal Tools of Private Security Officer



5.5 Authority of Private Security Personnel

Authority is a 'successful ordering or forbidding' power relation (Wrong, 1979) According to Wrong (1979), there are five types of authority, namely coercive, legitimate, induced, competent and personal. Coercive authority was explicit in the case of impounding illegally parked vehicles and controlling access. The study found that security officers possessed legitimate authority: they have an acknowledged right to command and the power subject has an acknowledged obligation to obey. For instance, in the case of access control in Langstone Village, Tower Guards can request any visitor entering the building to disclose their identity, question their intention and make a record of it. The power subject, the visitors in this case, have the obligation to obey; otherwise entry will be refused. Security officers did not have any inducement authority because under no circumstances did they need to reward a person for the compliance of an order. Competent authority was not found amongst security officers since they were not perceived as having any superior competence or expertise to decide which actions will best serve the end-users' (as in visitors and inconsiderate drivers) interests and goals. Likewise, security officers were not found to have any personal authority that they can use to mobilise any person to follow their instructions when they execute the orders of the property owners.

5.6 Limitations on the Use of Security Officers Delegated Powers

The study found that all security officers in the nodes possess both the 'universal legal tools' and the 'delegated legal tools' illustrated in the preceding sections: these tools are the sources of their powers. In general, each residential estate has its own boundary, and it could be defined as a node in this spatial sense. Security officers will only exercise these powers within their nodal parameters. Although the node is open to non-residents, it is still considered a private place by the property owners. The spaces inside the node can be divided into two types, namely private and private communal. Private space refers to the flat where the residents reside, while private communal refers to spaces open to every resident or public but the ownerships belong to property owners in a collective manner. Private communal can also be understood as the term 'hybrid or quasi-public' (Button, 2007). It can be argued that

there is no public space inside the node because all the communal spaces are owned by all the owners inside the node. Owners tend to claim that it is a 'totally' private property. Security officers in residential estates can exercise their powers in the private communal spaces. They cannot enter a resident's flat without the permission of the occupant. However, they can intervene in anything happening inside a flat insofar as that may affect other residents. For instance, a security officer may intervene when someone is producing excessive noise inside a flat. When security officers have entered into a properly public place, such as a public road leading up to the estate, their identities will change from that of a private security officer to that of an ordinary citizen as far as their powers are concerned. They cannot use their delegated legal tools on other persons anymore.

Their powers are unique amongst policing agents in that they are limited to the spatial nodes in which they are policing. Once they have left their nodes, their capacities will revert to that of an ordinary citizen and in possession of the universal legal tools, such as 'any person arrest'. They will not be able to use any of the delegated tools outside the node since the property owner's power cannot extend to public places – as the sporadic cases of public space 'infringement' by commercial property management and the resulting public furore attest.

5.7 Conclusion

This chapter illustrated the legal powers that the security officers can utilize when they carry out their duties. All security officers possess the universal legal tools that every ordinary citizen also possesses. They can utilize these tools beyond the nodes they are policing. It also illustrated the delegated legal tools that were available to security officers in residential estates. Property owners delegated some of their legal powers endowed by virtue of possession to private security personnel, and expected them to enforce the laws on behalf of them inside the nodes. They will utilize their delegated powers very frequently, especially when dealing with illegally parked vehicles and trespassers inside the estates.

6 CHAPTER SIX:

Governing of Security in Rees Garden and Langstone Village

Policing of the local, for the local and by the power of the local community

6.1 Introduction

The protagonists in this research study were the frontline security personnel who were working in private residential properties in Hong Kong – 'security officers' being an umbrella term in private sector terminology. The chapter will begin with an overview of the security companies as providers of policing in residential property, and uncover the social context of security officers during their course of duty. It examines their power relations in respect of their employment relationships with the policed that resulted in a 'every resident's employee' social stratum. It moves on to discuss the findings on security personnel in Rees Garden and Langstone Village. Individual profiles will be analysed to shed light on the undercurrents of 'negative images' and 'low statuses. It concludes that security companies and personnel have developed a resident-orientated service style of policing, an emergent phenomenon which has grown to fill a security gap in Hong Kong in a unique and incomparable manner.

6.2 The Employment Relationship between the 'Police' and the 'Policed'

The employment relationship between state police officers and the policed could generally be read as that of civil service, by 'servants' who receive remuneration from taxpayers via the government. For instance, the police force/service is almost wholly paid by the government to provide policing services to the public. Alternatively, we can say that the government is employing the police on behalf of the citizens to provide policing services to the public. By contrast, there is no employment relationship between private security officers and the state when the

former carry out policing duties in residential estates, even in social housing situations – in Hong Kong, the Housing Authority generally outsources the task to private contractors, who then employ frontline personnel. More importantly, they are popularly perceived to be employees of property owners, even if the direct employers of these frontline staffers are the security companies for whom they work. The study found that this relationship has allowed policing resources to be more pragmatically utilized and controlled in this setting than alternative arrangements involving state or voluntary agents. It argued that local communities are now actively involved in the provision of security of the local community through their economic capacities, by way of exercising their pooled purchasing powers. The purchase and direction of private security in Hong Kong by local communities is much stronger than what has been found in previous studies of private security provision for residential security (Noaks, 2000; Sharp & Wilson, 2000; Rigakos, 2002; Crawford *et al.*, 2003).

Direct control of police deployment by citizen collectives is generally weak, if at all (Jefferson & Grimshaw, 1984; da Silva, 1999; Noaks, 2000; Reiner, 2001; Crawford *et al*., 2003). Every citizen can claim to be the employer of the state police, but no individual citizen has the power to deploy the police to act according to his or her wishes, unless these wishes happen to align with police interests. The Police follow orders from within the hierarchy, whose authority may stem from the political apparatuses of a representative democracy, but the service does not follow immediate orders from citizens. Even in sporadic cases when citizens have paid the state for extra police services, individual demands are not satiated by institutional design.

Crawford *et al*. (2003) conducted a study on the 'additional patrol and security cover' purchased from the local police by a housing trust in response to demands from residents. It was conducted in the form of a contracted community policing initiative in England, and was promulgated by the government in power. The study found that the scheme did not meet residents' expectations, and they did not secure control of their 'commodities'. The housing trust terminated the scheme almost a year before schedule. During the course of the initiative, both crime and reported fear of crime increased, and residents' satisfaction with the local police service declined. The case shows that a budget was purposively granted to the New Earswick community to pay the police for the induced demand in extra human resources, but the residents were not in a position to control the deployment of the extra patrol they

purchased, nor were the force able to satisfy the specific demands the residents were expecting.

The study found that the deployment of the extra patrols and their relevant duties was determined by the Chief Police Officer's policing priority, rather than the expectations of the residents. By contrast, commercial private security officers primarily respond to orders from those who pay the piper. The employer-employee relationship between the private security officers and the citizens they are serving in private property is less convoluted than that between the state police and the citizenry. The 'buyers' have a better control of the commodities they are paying for.

Hong Kong government has adopted a laissez-faire policy (Lau & Kuan,1991; Chiu, 1994). Private gated communities are seen to be most prevalent in places with laissez-faire approaches and weak state supply of public goods (Caldeira, 2000; Glasze, 2006). In Hong Kong, property management companies, hence security firms are able to take the advantage and supply private policing services to the residents. Pow (2009) pointed out that private developers of gated communities in Singapore offer an 'ideal lifestyle' with greater level of proprietary control by draconian by-laws and housing covenants such as restricting the size of pet dogs, banning dogs in common areas of the estate and mandating dog licences. This perceived higher quality of life is also matched by the provision of shared amenities, such as 24-hour security services. This phenomenon also appears in Hong Kong.

The expectation of the chairperson (LVIO1) of the Incorporated Owners in Langstone Village on security services had shown that the security company is under the buyer's control - in that 'every property owner is (the guards') boss':

They are here to protect estate property and prevent people from damaging it. They are working for the IO. Every property owner is his or her boss. We (the IO) are the representatives who will pass on the demands and orders. We delegate the powers to the security guards to execute the orders.

The multipronged employment relationships between the residents (represented by the IO or the OC in the Rees Garden case), the property management companies, the

security companies, and the security officers have given all residents a prerogative due an employer over all security personnel. This resulted in some unique characteristics of residential policing, compared to commercial or public variants. The 'Everyman's piper' status diminished the security officers' authority when they are intervening in their employers' improprieties. Moreover, they were subject to do just about any work an employer would demand within the confines of labour protection law – and sometimes beyond. Private 'policing service' companies ended up providing more service than policing in this respect.

6.3 Rees Garden

The first node selected for the study was Rees Garden located in East Kowloon District, with a population density of 43,000/km^2 (eight times that of London and three times that of Islington, its densest borough). It was a wholly private multi-storey residential estate. It was completed and occupied in 1985. It comprises 20+ residential blocks with 5,000+ flats: for the remainder of this study, further particulars are redacted in the interest of privacy. (The exact figures are not shown in order to avoid identification of the node).

A three-storey commercial complex and a six-storey car park on top of it are located in a separate building. Rees Garden features various leisure and recreational facilities, including a swimming pool, a tennis court, a badminton court, a basketball court and a garden. The main pedestrian entrance is on a main road that separated the estate from a social rental housing estate nearby. There are other minor entrances situated at various locations. The estate maintains public rights of way, and pedestrians could access the estate in different entry points from different directions. According to Chief Security Officer RGSO33 in Rees Garden, there were a large number of retired and elderly residents living with their family members in the estate. The majority of the residents were owners. They had to pay a monthly management fee to the management office.

The property developer owned the commercial complex. There were different types of shops at each floor. For instance, there was a Malaysian restaurant on the ground floor, some property agents, and a small supermarket. A Jockey Club Off-Course

Betting Branch – the sole legal bookmaker in Hong Kong – was located on the second floor. A popular American fast food restaurant was on the third floor. The complex would be closed at midnight, but the entrance would not be locked because the complex needed to be patrolled during the night. A security officer would guard the entrance when the centre had closed. The car parks were on the 4th to 9th floor. Security officers had to patrol the car parks round the clock and they had to include the complex in their patrols after midnight.

Kings Security Company was responsible for the security of Rees Garden. It was working under contract with Carry-On Property Management Company, under the Outsourcing model outlined in chapter four. The security officers were responsible for the patrolling and handling incidents inside the residential blocks, shopping centre, communal spaces and the car parks. Sometimes, they would need to relieve the 'Tower Guard' while there was a staff shortage. 'Tower Guards' were directly employed by Carry-On Co. and they were only responsible for the security of the entrances to the buildings. The Security Office was on the ground floor of the commercial complex building next to the car parks entrance.

6.3.1 *The Security Team in Rees Garden*

The security team in Rees Garden consisted of 17 security officers on duty in each shift. Kings Security Company employed a minimum of 34 officers, but more may be dispatched depending on rotas. There were usually three extra officers in each shift who would relieve other officers on their day-off or annual leave. The Company would deploy officers from other sites when there is a staff shortage. The security manager of Kings Security Company would visit the site occasionally, but is otherwise firmly based at the back office and far removed from the environs of the residential properties. Operation instructions or administrative matters were communicated on the phone. The Security Manager was responsible for overseeing all the security teams in the company, arranging training for the officers, follow-up complaints, and the recruitment of staff. The Security Manager seldom visited the node.

The security officers worked on a 12-hour fixed-shift system, a common practice in the industry in most countries (Sarre & Prenzler, 1999; Button, 2007; van Steden, 2007; Zhong & Grabosky, 2009; Button & Park, 2010). Dayshift was from 0700 to 1900 hours, and nightshift from 1900 to 0700 hours the next day. There was one Chief Security Officer [CSO] who worked with one Senior Security Officer [SSO] during the day shift; two SSO will work on night shift, along with three Security Officers [SO], and 12 Security Guards [SG]. SOs and the ranks above wore a white long-sleeved shirt, a pair of navy blue trousers and a pair of black shoes that resembled the Inspector's uniform in the Hong Kong Police. SGs wore a light blue long-sleeved shirt, a pair of navy blue trousers and a pair of black shoes that resembled the police constable's uniform: all were required to wear a navy blue soft cap and a black tie. The Hong Kong Police beat officers, in comparison, wore a blue hard top cap and no tie. Private personnel ranks in this company were shown on their shoulder tabs – a design which also resembled police ranking. The staffers were ranked as SG (blank), SO (one pip), SSO (two pips) and CSO (three pips). The ranks represented a superior-subordinate insignia. Moreover, the rank had also defined the scope of duties of the security officers.

For instance, the SGs were responsible for patrol and standing guard at various locations. They were expected to carry out initial interventions on irregular matters such as illegal parking. The SOs were mainly responsible for taking follow-up actions or investigations of complaints as instructed by the SSO or CSO. They were also required to check on the SGs at their posts confirming that they were carrying out their duties properly. The SSO and CSO were responsible for the administrations and supervisions on the SOs and the SGs. When a SG is unable to resolve a situation, they would inform the Control (where a senior SO usually resides). The Control would send a SO to the scene to assist the SG. If a SO also unable to resolve the problem, then the SSO and or the CSO would attend the scene. The CSO was the person who in charge of all security officers in the node.

6.3.2 *The Chief Security Officer and the Senior Security Officer*

The CSO was responsible for running the shift. The duties of the SSO were similar to that of the CSO, and the former would act as the CSO during the latter's absence. The CSO's duties might be divided into administrative and operational.

However, the CSO was mainly responsible for administrative matters. During the observation, it was observed that the SSO was more involved in the daily operation aspects. When the CSO and SSO were both inside the Security Office, the SSO would respond to unresolved incidents promptly. The CSO would need to prepare the duty roster and was the contact point of the property management staff. Sometimes the CSO would need to act as the mediator/negotiator between the end-users and the security officers. As the CSO RGSO33 in Rees Garden had said, appeasement is the name of the game:

Sometimes when I receive a complaint against my colleague, I would try to appease the complainant and handle the complaint at my level. Most of the time, they were "attitude problems". I don't want to bother the manager all the time. It makes me look incompetent.

In the operational aspect, the CSO needed to brief the SOs and SGs coming on duty at the beginning of each shift, assist and give instructions when a situation arose, delegate the security officers to an incident, attend the scene of an incident, make decisions (such as calling the police) and writing reports. Apart from routine security duties, the CSO had to report to the management staff for any follow-up matters or incident investigations. The property management office would sometimes ask the security officers to execute other special duties, like delivering warning letters to residents. When a complaint of air-conditioning water dripping at a specific location was passed onto the CSO, he had to send an SO to the scene to carry out a further investigation. The CSO RGSO33 elaborated on a hierarchy in which complaints are resolved:

The property management office will pass on complaints from the residents to us, for example, an air-conditioner dripping water complaint. I will need to delegate a SO to carry out an investigation and make a report to (the residents).

6.3.3 *The Control Room Officer*

The Control Room and the Security Office were located in the same place. It was manned by a SO. The Control Room officer was responsible for monitoring 12 CCTVs inside the Control Room, answering telephone calls, deploying officers to a scene, recording incidents in the Incident Book and checking on the status of the SGs and SOs over the radio. Each CCTV showed nine different locations on each floor of the multi-storey car parks. It was observed that the SO seldom actually monitored the CCTVs. When questioned on the functions of the CCTVs, the SO RGSO42 explained that CCTVs are primarily used in investigations after a crime had already occurred:

The car park is patrolled by the guards. There is rarely a crime there. The CCTVs are mainly for situational surveillance. For example, if there was a 'hit and run' incident and the victim reported to the police, they will come and look at the record trying to identify the suspect.

RGSO42's response was later verified by the researcher during an observation in the Control Room. A car was alleged scratched by another passing vehicle and the SO identified a suspect car by reviewing the recording. The observation is summarized as follows:

A car owner came into the Control Room and claimed that his car had sustained a scratch on the driver's side door. He suspected that a car parked next to his had caused it. The SO took the complainant's details and went and operated the CCTV monitor panels, rewinding and pausing the recording to the time the car owner claimed he had left his vehicle. The SO and the car owner saw on the recording that the car next to the complainant's was driven away. They replayed the

segment a few times. The SO had identified the vehicle and said to the car owner that the Security Office would contact the other car driver. The driver was later contacted and he denied he had caused the scratch.

Once the Security Office officer had provided the necessary information to the complainant the matter is resolved as far as security personnel is concerned, since it then became a private matter between the car owner and the other driver. RGSO42 explained that the personnel does not arbitrate or mediate:

We are only responsible for providing information when requested. We will not get involved in their affairs. If they cannot solve the dispute, they will call the police themselves.

6.3.4 *The Security Officer*

SOs were mainly responsible for solving unforeseen incidents that occurred in the node. They were required to carry out follow-up actions or investigations of complaints passed on by the SSO or CSO. They were also required to monitor the SGs at their posts. The incidents that a SO would usually handle were noise complaints; an object falling from height; air-conditioner dripping water; assisting the SGs; and discovery of a crime. RGSO37 claimed that the higher pay came with more responsibilities:

We are the white shirts (i.e. SO). Therefore, we will be dealing with every unexpected incident because we are being paid more. Don't expect the guards to do anything extra. Their abilities and mentalities are different.

6.3.5 *The Security Guards*

The main duties of the SGs were patrolling; controlling traffic at the Y-Junction near the main vehicle entrance to the estate; operating a guard kiosk; and guarding at a

specified location. They were assigned to different locations and needed to walk a designated patrol beat. The Control Room SO or the SSO would send the guards to the location of any incidents. The main road in Rees Gardens was a two-lane unidirectional single carriageway. Vehicles were prohibited from parking on the right-hand lane. The SGs needed to stop irregular/illegal parking, handle vehicles that are occupying other people's spaces and remove parked vehicles that are obstructing the emergency accesses. The SSO or CSO would make decisions on clamping an irregularly/illegally parked vehicle.

The SG would need to check and report on the condition of common facilities such as lampposts, trees, drainage pipes etc. They may sometimes need to perform Tower Guard duty when there was a shortage of Tower Guards. Tower Guards were not the employees of the Kings Security Company. They were directly employed by the Carry-On Property Management Company, the company that provides property management services to the estate. The Tower Guard post was considered as a 'good' posting. RGSO41 claimed that Tower Guards '(do) nothing' apart from greeting residents and opening the gates:

The Tower Guard do nothing apart from greeting the residents and opening the main gate for them. When there is an incident occurring inside the block, they will call us. They just sit there doing nothing. We are the 'concubine's son' (bastard children)[16]*. We have no say in anything. We have to do as (Carry-On Co.) tells us.*

6.3.6 *The Car Park Security Guard*

Another major area where the SGs needed to maintain order was the car parks and the unloading bay at the shopping centre. They were responsible for the traffic control inside the car parks and patrolling the multi-storey car parks. One of the rules in the Rees Garden car park set by the Owners' Committee was that goods vehicles could only stay in the unloading bay for no more than 30 minutes. The Car Park SGs would need to record the time when a vehicle had arrived at the bay. If the vehicle

[16] *A mistress' child is Cantonese slang for a person unjustly vilified by others due to larger circumstances beyond his or her control; cf. the Cinderella effect in evolutionary psychology.*

had stayed over 30 minutes, they would need to request the driver to move the vehicle away from the unloading bay. They also needed to make sure that the drivers had parked their vehicles properly inside a parking space. Even though the guards considered themselves lenient on the parking time, disputes between the drivers and the guards were frequent. RGSO23 noted that lorry drivers were perceived as 'malevolent' or otherwise 'shady characters':

The lorry drivers are usually the problem. They are rude. They just swear at us if we ask them to move (their vehicles). Many have tattoos[17] all over their bodies. Even if they are not a member of a triad or something, they still pose a threat to us. We are earning only a few thousand (HK dollars a month). It is not worth our while to offend them. You don't know what they will do afterwards. If there is a problem, I call the control and deal with them along with my colleagues or the white-shirt.

6.3.7 *The Tower Guard Duty*

Tower Guard duty was only occasionally required by the SGs of Kings Security Company. The Tower Guards were stationed at the foyer sitting behind a security counter in each block. The counter was a U-shaped wooden lectern about four foot long, four foot tall and three foot wide, and a desk was attached to the counter. The Incident Book and Visitor's Record Book were on the desk. The main duties of the Tower Guard were to screen people using the entrances and exits and provide assistance whenever necessary; record complaints in writing and pass on to the security Control Room or management office; register visitors, and stop undesirable people from entering the block such as salespersons, dealers and debt collectors.

[17] *Editor's note: Tattoo is a popular 'body art' now amongst people. However, tattoos are considered as by some Hong Kongers to denote membership of a Triad or other organized crime syndicates.*

6.4 Langstone Village

The second node in the study was Langstone Village located in Tuen Mun, New Territories. Langstone Village was initially a public rental housing estate, but it had been converted into a Tenant Purchase Scheme [TPS][18] estate like many others. It was completed in 1991. It comprised over six residential blocks with over 3000 flats. (The exact figures were not shown in order to avoid identification of the node). All the ground floor units were commercial office spaces and were occupied by various charity and social welfare organizations. The District Board member's surgery was also located in one of the units. The estate had limited leisure and recreational facilities. There was a five-a-side football pitch, a basketball court and a Chinese garden with a large pond. The shopping centre was an independent building with a multi-storey car park above and a market underneath. There were also parking spaces on the service road surrounding the estate.

Langstone Village was a TPS estate and under a combination of private and government ownerships. Under the TPS scheme, tenants were encouraged to purchase the flat they were living in from the government. As an owner, they do not need to pay rent but they would need to pay government rates and management fees. Tenants who did not purchase their flats would only pay a monthly rent to the government, inclusive of rates. The government would pay the management fee on behalf of their tenants.

Spinnaker Property Management Company was responsible for the property management of the residential buildings, the parking spaces and the car parks. The shopping centre was under the management of 'The Link REIT'[19], a company

[18]*The Tenants Purchase Scheme (TPS) was introduced by the Housing Authority's (HA) in 1998. In 2002, the Government reviewed its overall housing policy. In support of the Government's repositioned housing policy, the HA terminated the TPS after the sale of TPS Phase 6B in 2005/2006. According to prevailing policy, tenants in the existing TPS estates can still opt to purchase their flats.*

[19]*The Link Real Estate Investment Trust ("The Link REIT", Hong Kong stock code: 823), is managed by The Link Management Limited. The Link REIT is the first real estate investment trust in Hong Kong and currently the largest REIT in Asia in terms of market capitalisation. As at 31 March 2011, the portfolio consists of properties with an internal floor area ("IFA") of approximately 11 million square feet of retail space and approximately 80,000 car park spaces, including 180 properties, primarily shopping malls and carparks, formerly owned by the* Hong Kong Housing Authority, *a* Hong Kong Government *agency and was created to privatize the said properties.*

responsible for all government shopping centres. Security officers in Langstone Village were employed by a subsidiary of Spinnaker, named Superman Security, under the Subsidiary model as described in chapter four. The security officers were responsible for patrolling, guarding, and handling incidents that occurred inside the residential blocks, open spaces and car parks.

6.4.1 *The Security Team in Langstone Village*

The security team in Langstone Village consisted of 17 security officers on duty, plus a Security Operation Officer overseeing the two shifts. A minimum of 34 officers were employed by Superman Security (a subsidiary company) under Spinnaker Property Management Company. The Security Office and Control Room were located at one of the ground floor unit in one of the residential buildings. There were usually four extra officers in each shift who would relieve other officers who were on their day-off or sick leave. The Company would deploy officers from other sites when there is a staff shortage. They worked on a 12-hour fixed-shift system and they would not need to change shift. Dayshift began at 0700 hours and finished at 1900 hours and nightshift started at 1900 hours and finished at 0700 hours the next day. They were all called ‘security guards’.

On each shift, there was one Supervisor, one Control Room Guard, eight Tower Guards, five Open-space Guards and two Car Park Guards. Each post had its specific scope of duties and their posts were usually fixed except when someone was on leave. In this case, an Open-space Guard would substitute the person on leave. They all wore a light blue shirt, a pair of navy blue trousers and black shoes that resembled the police constable uniform of the Hong Kong Police. They were not required to wear any headdress or tie. They were classified by classes and their ranks were shown on their shoulder tabs, but they bore no resemblance to the Hong Kong Police uniform. The lowest class was second-class and it was blank on the shoulder tabs. The next was first-class and there was one straight bar on the shoulder tabs. Then the ‘upper 1st class’ had one straight bar and one V-shape bar on the shoulder tabs, and the supervisors were carrying two straight bars on their shoulder tabs. The ranks reflected a superior-subordinate insignia. However, they would usually obey orders

from the Control, the Supervisor or the Operation Officer to the exclusion of other seniors.

6.4.2 *The Operations Officer*

The Operations Officer was responsible for overseeing daily operations of the security guards, arranging training for the officers, and following up complaints of the staff referred by the supervisors. The Operations Officer has to liaise with the Property Manager and Security Manager of Spinnaker and external bodies (e.g. the Police), recruit staff and arrange or lead special operations. The Operations Officer LVSO19 had given two examples in the interview, including adverse police assessment reports and a hawking issue at the shopping centre:

When I received an unsatisfactory 'surprise check' report from the police, I need to interview the officer concerned and warn the officer about the seriousness of the report. The police can revoke his or her security personal permit. There is an on-going hawker problem at the shopping centre. Although this has nothing to do with us, when they carry out their operations, the hawkers are forced to move into the estate perimeter. We will need to send guards there to stop it.

6.4.3 *The Supervisor*

The Supervisors were responsible for running the shifts. The duties could be divided into administrative and operational. In administrative aspects, the dayshift Supervisor was the contact point of the management staff. Apart from routine security duties, the dayshift Supervisor had to report to the property management staff for any special instructions. For instance, there was a complaint of a water leakage during one of the researcher's observations in the Control Room. The Supervisor had to send an Open-space Guard to the location to examine the leakage and return with a verbal report. The management office sometimes would ask the Supervisor to perform other special duties. This included putting out notices, recording utility meter readings and investigating complaints from residents. The dayshift Supervisor also needed to

investigate the complaints against the security guards and were responsible for preparing the duty roaster.

In the operational aspect, the Supervisors needed to brief the security guards coming on duty at the beginning of each shift, assist and give instructions when a situation occurred, delegate the security guards to an incident, attend the scene of an incident, make decisions such as calling the police and write up reports. Sometimes the Supervisor would need to act as the mediator between the end-users and the security guards. The dayshift Supervisor LVSO06 of Langstone Village said in the interview how s/he bore the brunt of residents' displeasure in conflicts with security guards by sending subordinates away and apologizing on their behalf:

Sometimes a security guard said something inappropriate that offended a resident. In order to cool down the situation, I will send the officer away and apologize on his behalf. It is hard to ask the officer to apologize in the heat of a dispute. I will talk to the officer privately afterwards in the office.

6.4.4 *The Control Room Guard*

The Control Room Guard was responsible for monitoring 17 CCTVs inside the Control Room. It was usually manned by a female guard in Langstone Village. She would be acting as the Supervisor when he was engaged in other incidents. The Supervisor LVSO06 disclosed that there were two reasons behind putting a female guard in the Control Room, including taking advantage of the chauvinistic attitudes amongst callers who tend to be less unpleasant to women, and the fact that male officers were more likely to require smoking breaks. LVSO06:

The management will sometimes pass on complaint phone calls from the residents to us. People will be gentler when they hear a woman's voice. However, some people don't care. They will swear right away when (the Control Room Guard) answers the call. Usually female officers do not smoke, so it is easier for them to stay in the Control Room all the time. Male officers don't like this post; they like to be outside.

Each CCTV showed nine different areas of a location. There was a specific CCTV monitoring the barrier at the main vehicle entrance, the only vehicle entrance. When asked about the rationale, the Control Room Guard LVSO04 explained that this allowed access and intercom exchanges with emergency responders, who can reach the flat quicker as guards would be dispatched to call the lifts:

I would notice when an emergency vehicle is coming into the estate, and I'd lift the barrier from here. At the same time, I will ask them which block they are attending. I can inform the Tower Guard to grant emergency access and hold a vacant lift for the emergency staff to save time.

6.4.5 *The Tower Guards*

The Tower Guards were stationed at the foyer sitting behind a security counter in each block. The counter was a rectangular shaped wooden lectern about six foot long, four foot tall and three foot wide, and a desk was attached to it. There was a CCTVs system showing the inside of the lifts and the foyer area that was hidden from the Tower Guard's view. A telephone is installed on the desk panel. The Incident Book and Visitor Register Book were on the desk. Different kinds of information leaflets were placed on top of the counter for residents.

The main duties of the Tower Guards were many: patrol the block; screen people using the entrances and exits; provide assistance when necessary; record complaints on anything and report to the Control Room; register visitors; stop undesirable people such as vendors from entering the block; monitor the activities on the CCTVs; patrol the block from top to bottom while relieved by an Open-space Guard; and open the specific accesses for emergency vehicles and provide assistance.

Sometimes, homemakers, the elderly, or 'someone who's a bit of a loony' would approach the counter and chat or air their dirty laundry. Tower Guard LVSO05 and LVSO09 described a curious relationship that bordered on caregiving rather than caretaking.

Some housewives would approach me and talk about their husbands and children. Some would gossip about a neighbour. I will listen and say something vague or irrelevant. I will not suggest or respond to anything because then it's my word against theirs. Then I will be in big trouble. (LVSO005, Interview record, 2011)

Customers are a bit of a laugh! One day she scolded me about the way I handled the broken down main entrance. The other day she chatted with me non-stop about a neighbour. What am I supposed to do? I can't walk away. This is my post. So I just listen and hope that she will finish soon and go away. (LVSO009, Interview record, 2011)

6.4.6 *The Open-Space Patrol Guards*

The Open-Space Patrols Guards were usually the juniors or those who liked working outdoors. The main duties of the guards were patrolling in the node and attending to unexpected incidents. They were deployed to different locations and patrol designated beats. The Control or the Supervisor would send them to the scene when an incident occurred. They would also need to relieve the Tower Guards for toilet breaks, patrols, and mealtimes. They would need to check and report on the common facilities such as lampposts, trees and drainage pipes. LVSO01 described her care-giving capacity:

I need to keep an eye on the people just in case they damage the property or hurt themselves.

6.4.7 *The Car Park Guards*

There were two car park guards in Langstone Village. As with Rees, the major road in Langstone Village was a two-lane unidirectional carriageway encircling the estate. The car park mainly catered to vehicles who parked by the month. The occasional vacant monthly spaces would be used as hourly parking spaces. There were ten hourly parking spaces on the road and people could park their cars in the spaces.

There was a barrier with an automatic unmanned parking ticket machine at the entrance.

The entrance was monitored by an individual CCTV in the Control Room. There was a cashier kiosk at the exit manned by a Car Park Guard. There were two Car Park Guards responsible for the road and the car parks. They worked alternately to carry out their duties. When one was in the kiosk, the other would be patrolling the road and the car parks and vice versa. They needed to record all the registration numbers of the vehicles parked inside the node on a regular basis. LVSO16 explained that their principal motivation was to avoid complaints from owners:

We need to record all the vehicle numbers because we need to make sure that they aren't parking on other people's spaces. We don't want complaints from car owners, and we don't want to be on the lookout for people who took the wrong spaces in the middle of the night. At the same time, it provides a record of the vehicle's existence. When a vehicle is stolen or damaged, we can provide information on when it was last seen and checked. It is also evidence to prove that we have checked the vehicles as the owners would have expected.

Car Park Guards also needed to remove vehicles occupying other people's spaces or blocking the emergency accesses. They did not usually clamp irregularly/illegally parked vehicles. It was considered the management office's responsibility. However, security guards were responsible for locating the drivers and requesting them to move their vehicles. LVSO07 had revealed how he had handled such a situation, either by phone or by waiting it out:

I will try to locate the driver. Usually the control will have the car owner's phone number. The control will phone the owners and request them to move their vehicles. If there was no record, I would wait at the scene for the drivers to appear and explain to them the problem they have caused and request them not to do it again in the future.

6.5 The Profiles of the Security Officer in the Nodes

The study discovered that there were some common patterns in the profiles of the security officers being interviewed in both nodes. Half of the security officers were interviewed at each node; the entire cohort was of Chinese ethnicity.

6.5.1 *Education Level*

Educational levels of the security officers interviewed were minimal at best. There is limited research on the educational levels of security officers. In the UK several studies have found between 60 to 70 % of the security officers were without a qualification such as CSEs or O Levels (Flynn, 1997; Michael, 2002; Button, 2007). The vast majority, 38 (90.4%) were recorded as below Secondary 3. Secondary three was the compulsory education every Hong Kongers under the age of 16 received since 1978. In other words, any Hong Kongers under the age of 44 should at least possess a Secondary 3 education qualification. These officers can be considered as possessing the lowest educational qualification in the entire local job market. Only four officers (9.6%) had reached Secondary 5. This has limited their choices of career to the lowest strata of the employment market. In terms of training in the industry, people who wanted to become a security officer must possess a Security Person Permit [SPP] and to get a SPP they must pass a training course in security.

6.5.2 *Training of the Officers*

In the market, there are also professional qualification courses run by reputable international security associations such as the International Professional Security Association and American Society for Industrial Security [ASIS]. However, these courses are conducted in English and tailored for supervisory and management grade. The basic training course that would qualify a person for a SPP was a 16-hour course, which usually lasted for two days at the time of writing. In the UK, the basic training of security officer is set by the SIA (in partnership with the industry) which specifies three days off the job and one day on the job training as minimum

(Prenzler, 2012). There were courses that lasted from seven days to 30 days in the market that also would qualify a person for a SPP; the curriculum of the courses that lasted over 12 days would cover more details and areas that a security officer would face in their jobs. The '12-plus days' courses were designed in view of the government 'Re-training Scheme', targeting the unemployed or people from industries in decline, such as garment and toy manufacturing. There was a cash subsidy for attending these courses when the applicant fulfils certain conditions. The two common courses the security officers had attended were the two-day and 12-day courses. Some officers have attended longer courses for personal reasons. The types of training courses the officers have attended are listed in Table 6.1 below.

Table 6.1:- Security Training Courses Attended by the Security Officers

Course types	Number of officer attended						%	Total
	Rees Garden			Langstone Village				
	Male	Female	%	Male	Female	%		
2 days	8	0	33.33	5	5	55.56	42.86	18
7 days	0	0	0	1	1	11.11	4.76	2
12 days	10	2	50	2	3	27.78	40.48	17
15 days	2	0	8.33	0	1	5.56	7.14	3
30 days	2	0	8.33	0	0	0	4.76	2
	22	2	100	8	10	100	100	42

The study found that the choice is a personal one and usually based on costs and time. The major attraction for attending the Re-training Scheme courses over 12 days was that they would receive a government grant during the training. However, some officers considered that it was a more proper training course compared to the two days basic course. RGSO26 viewed it as a 'formal' achievement and a source of pride:

Q: *What kinds of training have you received before joining?*

RGSO26: *I attended the (emphasis) formal course.*

Q: *What do you mean by formal course?*

RGSO26: *The two-week course. The one that was subsidised by the government. There was a thousand dollars plus subsidy. There wasn't enough work for me during the day so I (thought I had) better take that also. For the two-day course, you have to pay them a few hundred dollars.*

By contrast, LVSO08 held a critical view on the courses and said it all boiled down to common sense:

Security is common sense. I just needed a job. I don't think the longer one would do me any good. Some people take these courses for the grant money. I would rather find a job earlier and make more money that way.

Ten of the security officers interviewed in Langstone Village had attended the two days basic training course required for the SPP; eight officers had attended the 7+ day training course. The reasons that they had attended the 12-day course were because there was a financial subsidy and they had the time to do it. Security officers who had only attended the basic course were usually those who were seeking a job urgently. As LVSO07 disclosed, it was seen as easy money:

I can't find a job in my trade anymore and I needed money. Some friends told me to get a security permit, attend the two-day training, get a certificate, and you can land a job anywhere.

The findings had suggested that the basic training course had covered the bare minimum for a person to get a SPP working as a security officer. Longer courses were preferred by the officers who did not need a job urgently and had the time to attend. The government subsidy for training was also considered an attraction for some of the officers. Security officers desired to receive more training but they were constrained by the time available and the financial expenses involved. RGSO38 had

attended a few courses for her own benefits out of her pocket, and she considered that moving into property management is a promotion in the career. She noted that training would be enhanced if property management office operations were included:

Q: *What kind of training have you received?*

RGSO38: *A two-week course subsidised by the government. I attended a two-day property management course later. It is related to building services management. Like repairs, scaffolding requirements, and external wall repairs.*

Q: *What would you suggest adding to the security course?*

RGSO38: *I would suggest they add 'The work of management office'. When I was working in Easy Point, I needed to follow the ICs to handle some of the problems involving property management. It would be better if we can understand what the property management team is doing and how they do their jobs.*

6.5.3 *The Age Distribution of the Officers*

The age of the security officers was of concern by the residents. Demographics were disclosed in the interviews with the chairperson of the OC in Rees Garden and the chairperson of the IO in Langstone Village. The study found that seven out of ten interviewed security personnel in the nodes were over the age of 50 and resembled similar demographics as found in other studies (Michael, 2002; South, 1988; Winlow, 2001). It suggested that the security officers in the study remained in the 'well-worn, negative stereotype of the aged watchman' as described in the 1971 Rand Corporation study. (See Kakalik & Wildhorn, 1971; Cunningham, 1990).

The age distribution of the security officers interviewed is presented in Table 6.2 below. Although a slightly different categorizing method had been used in the study, when comparing the figures of interviewed security officers over the age of 50 in the nodes (71.43%) with the SGSIA figures of age distribution of the SPP holders over

the age of 50 (32.80%) the study found that this age group was over-represented amongst the officers being interviewed.

Table 6.2:-Age Distribution of the Security Officers Interviewed

Age groups	Rees Garden		% in Rees	Langstone Village		% in Langstone	% sub-total	Total no. of officer
	Number			Number				
	Male	Female		Male	Female			
18-29	1	0	4.1	0	0	0	2.38	1
30-39	2	0	8.3	0	0	0	4.76	2
40-49	5	1	25	1	2	16.7	21.43	9
50-59	10	1	45.8	4	8	66.7	54.76	23
60+	4	0	16.7	3	0	16.7	16.67	7
	22	2		8	10		100	42

6.6 Why Did They Choose a Security Career?

The study found that the majority of the interviewees in the 'over 50 age group' formerly worked in the production and the catering industries. Declining job opportunities and previous jobs becoming too demanding were the two major reasons behind the switch. A similar situation was found by Winlow in Sunderland, North East of England. Winlow (2001) argued that the diminishing of the shipping building and coal mining industries in the 1970s, the social upheavals of post-modernity, and de-industrialization in subsequent decades forced a large number of unemployed workers to become door supervisors in order to maintain their breadwinner status.

There were five (33.3%) in Rees Garden and nine (60%) in Langstone Village of the interviewed officers in the over 50 age group that had changed their careers because of job opportunities in their previous careers were going. There were two (13.3%) in Rees Garden and four (26.6%) in Langstone Village who had considered that their previous jobs were becoming too demanding and they were unable to manage. The other reasons found in individual officers were 'lost interest', 'poor prospect', 'early

retirement', 'too far from home' and 'children growth up and seeking extra incomes'. SSO RGSO34 believed that social stigma prevented the young from entering the industry:

If you needed a job and you don't have qualifications, there are three common choices: security, catering or cleaning. Young people will not do security even if it pays better because they think they'd lose face amongst their peers. They would rather work as a salesperson on the street. At least, no one will look down on them.

The Security Manageress in Spinnaker Property Management echoed the relative 'freedom' and 'dignity' in catering businesses for young jobseekers:

Young men prefer to work in catering. They don't need to wear a uniform. They can smoke when they are not on the job. They can flirt with girls passing in the street or customers in the restaurant. You are not allowed to do any of that as a security officer! And you are insulted all the time. What would you choose?

All of the security officers interviewed had worked in other careers before they 'ended up' in the security industry, with only one exception in Rees Garden and two in Langstone Village. The officer in Rees Garden started as a security officer once he had emigrated to Hong Kong from Mainland China because he knew that he would not be able to find other jobs. One guard in Langstone Village was working as a cashier in the car park. The job was assigned to the security company and so she had transferred to a security guard. The other was an empty-nest mother, so she sought some extra money. The security officers interviewed had worked mostly in manufacturing trades such as garment and electronic production. A minority had worked in other trades such as sales, goldsmith and technician. The demise of the manufacturing industry and the changing face of the Hong Kong economy from manufacturing to finances and services forced them to change their careers. In order to maintain their living standards, these skilled workers were forced to join other careers that they deemed to be less desirable.

6.7 Gender of the Officers

There has been hardly any research on gender and private policing. Some of the research which has been conducted of women in private security has found women there is a perception they are more capable of handling physical violence and aggression (Monaghan, 2003; O'Brien *et al*., 2007). Hobbs *et al*. (2007) found that the SIA in the UK were promoting the role of women as a strategy to remove the violent and aggressive image of bouncing. They also found that women are perceived to have emotional qualities at diffusing violent situations involving female and male customers and operators of some venues support this. In Hong Kong the reason for female participation in security roles was slightly different. In Langstone Village, female security officers slightly outnumbered the males. There were 20 female officers and 16 male security officers. In Rees Garden, the situation was different. There were 36 male officers and six female officers. The study found that this was determined by the nature of their duties. Female officers were more likely to be placed at the foyer counter working as Tower Guards. In Langstone Village, there were eight Tower Guard posts and the security company had put female officers in seven of these posts. The reason that they had not put eight was because they had not found a suitable female officer at the time of the study. It was considered by the management that female officers were able to communicate better with the residents, resulting in fewer confrontations. The use of communication and interpersonal skills is pivotal to the effective provision of residential-oriented style service. This is especially when considering a community culture in which disputes or conflicts are considered best resolved through mediation rather than police intervention. This suggests that private security can be considered a protective service that occupies a contradictory cultural location (Erickson *et al*., 2000): while protective jobs include elements generally coded as male, service elements are often coded as female.

Male officers were mainly deployed on patrols and dealing with unexpected incidents since it demands more physical strength and it might involve a certain element of danger. For instance, when LVSO08 was dealing with an 'air-conditioner dripping water' case he was verbally assaulted and threatened by the violator with strong language:

LVSO08: *I went up to the flat with the leaky air conditioner. I knocked on the door and requested him to sort out the drip. He started swearing at me.*

Q: *What did he say?*

LVSO08: *He said, 'Motherfucking cunt, don't fucking bother me anymore.' I replied, 'I am sorry to bother you. I am done now and I am leaving.' But he wouldn't let me go and followed me downstairs.*

Q: *Did he chase after you?*

LVSO08: *Yes. My colleague stopped him when he was following me downstairs. I left the scene and I thought that it was settled. Apparently, it wasn't. He was seeking me out in the whole estate.*

Q: *How did you know he was looking for you?*

LVSO08: *He asked my colleagues for me. I thought we could settle it so I went to talk to him. But he wouldn't listen and I had to call to the police in the end.*

Tower Guards in Rees Garden were directly employed by the management company. Security officers in Rees Garden were mainly responsible for the open spaces and dealing with unexpected incidents and only occasionally relieving the Tower Guards when there was a labour shortage due to sickness or leave. This could explain why the majority of the officers were males in Rees Garden.

6.8 The Year of Experiences of the Officers in the Security Industry

The security officers being interviewed ranged from novices who had been on the job for only two weeks, to senior officers who had worked over ten years in the industry. There were two (4.8%) that had worked less than a year. There were 20 (47.6%) of them that had worked over one year and below three year and another 20 (47.6%)

that had worked over four years in the industry. The junior officer was a 26 years old male officer in Rees Garden who had only worked in the industry for two weeks. The veteran was the Supervisor in Langstone Village who had worked in the industry for over 12 years. There were nine (37.5%) officers who had only worked in Rees Garden, and ten (55.6 %) officers who had worked in Langstone Village only. Curiously, they had worked for more than one security company, despite staying in the same position at the same residential complex over the years. The reason is that the IO or OC may decide to change a property management company after holding a General Meeting with the owners. It is often the case that when a site switched property management companies, the incoming security company will continue to employ the security staff working in the site. Therefore, these officers can remain working in the same estates even if the property is under new management. The other 23 officers had worked in more than one site and one company due to different reasons, such as wages and commute times. The years of experience of the security officers are listed in Table 6.3 below.

Table 6.3:-Years of Experiences in the Security Industry of the Interviewees

Years of experience	Rees Garden			Langstone Village			Total	
	Male	Female	% (*n=24*)	Male	Female	% (*n=18*)		%*(n=42)*
Under 1 year	1	0	4.2	1	0	5.5	2	47.6
1-2 years	6	0	25	2	2	22.3	10	23.8
3-4 years	9	0	37.5	1	0	5.5	10	23.8
5-6 years	3	2	20.8	1	3	22.3	9	21.4
7-8 years	2	0	8.3	0	1	5.5	3	7.1
Over 8 years	1	0	4.2	3	4	38.9	8	19
	22	2	*(Added up not 100%)*	8	10	*(Added up not 100%)*	42	

6.9 The Images of the Security Officer in the Nodes

A perceived lack of training and 'competitiveness' engendered a poor public image of security officers. They were considered unprofessional and unable to handle situations effectively. Their age was also associated with their physical incompetence where violent crimes are concerned. Although the government and the security industry strove hard to improve the image of the security officers, security personnel was still perceived by the residents as 'watchmen' or worse. Livingstone and Hart (2003) found that security officers are portrayed into three common stereotypes, namely the Watchman, the Gangster and the Hired Gun. The post 'Security Officer' had been used to replace 'Watchman' widely within the industry and in the market, with the term denoting a position of authority in a hierarchy, as with the armed forces.

When the government replaced the 'Watchman Ordinance' by the Security and Guarding Services Ordinance, Chapter 460, it had shown that the government and the industry were taking baby steps to change the 'watchman' image. Watchmen or guards are generally called 'security officers' nowadays. They are also being called Customer Service Officer in most large shopping malls, and some premium residential buildings, emphasizing their roles in customer interaction. The permit they must possess before they could work in the security service is called a Security Personnel Permit. The SPP had replaced the old Watchman license when SGSO was enacted. However, the rebranding was largely a cosmetic manoeuvre.

The research found that the security officers interviewed shared demographics as found in other studies, such as 'retiring' or retired people, aged 50+ and close to 60, education level was usually low and manual worker from other declining industries (Kakalik & Wildhorn, 1971; Michael, 2002; South, 1988; Winlow, 2001). However, some characteristics were unique to the nodes. For example, it was found that there were female officers whose children had grown up, and they are earning extra money to support their families, or an 'early retired person' working as a pastime. These officers divulged their reasons for working as a security officer during the interview: a combination of extra income and killing time.

My two sons have graduated from the university now. I don't have to take care of them anymore, so I can work for some extra money for my family to live a better life. (LVSO011, Interview record, 2011)

I am retired at 60, but I don't want to stay at home and do nothing. My friends told me working as a security guard is an easy job – it's just sitting and walking around. So I decided to take up the job to kill time. (RGSO25, Interview record, 2011)

These characteristics were generally known to the residents, resulting in no small stigmatism. The residents were sceptical of their efforts and abilities as a security officer. The interviews with the IO chairperson LVIO1 and DB member LVDB2 in Langstone Village showed that the residents were concerned with the age of the security officers.

The responses from Langstone Village District Board member DB2 had also showed in the interview that the residents had similar concerns.

Q: *In what aspect can the security service be improved in this estate?*

IO1: *I hope they can employ someone younger. They can think a bit faster. I told some of the (older) guards that if there is someone unreasonable they just need to say 'yes' and tell the resident he will follow up the complaint. After that, they should inform the ICs and let the ICs help them.*

The security officers in the nodes also perceived themselves as 'lower class' or 'grassroots' workers in respect of their own educational levels, ages, job nature, incomes, and working hours – it should be noted that term 'working class', in the British sense of identity politics and pride, does not translate in Hong Kong Cantonese. During the interviews, many officers expressed that they were occupationally immobile as a result LVSO02 was 55 years old at the time of the interview. When asked why she had decided to join the security industry as a security

officer, LVSO02 gave a response similar to that made by many other officers: for want of a better option.

Q: *Why did you decide to join ten years ago?*

LVSO02: *Ten years ago, because of my age, there was not much choice for us. Other than this (line of work), what would you want me to do? Without any academic qualifications, the only choice was security. Besides, security (is an industry in which I would) last longer.*

Q: *What do you mean?*

LVSO02: *It is easy to find a job, and companies won't fire you usually. Every building everywhere needs security, wouldn't you say? (The field) has a wide range of choices (for the jobseeker). You can easily stay in the industry longer.*

The security officers in the nodes were still being perceived as watchmen (and women) or guards who were marginally more respected by the residents. It was found that the Chinese transliteration of the English word 'security' had been used as a term of derision on the industry. RGSO37 said in the interview: "They (the resident) call us 'Sik jiu' and sometimes 'Sik jiu lin pei.'" Cantonese rhyme, much like its Cockney counterpart, is full of sexual innuendo in its puns. 'Eating a banana with the skin on' invites sexual connotations for what is considered a "debasing" occupation. The insulting reference also implied that security officers existed to rid residents of 'frustrations'.

Livingstone and Hart (2003) opined that the 'watchman image' of security officers is a reflection of their collective 'gross incompetence', and the media show no mercy when security officers failed to carry their duties. Weale (1999) points out in The Guardian '…(that) poking fun at Group 4 became a national pastime after they managed to lose seven prisoners within three weeks of taking on the first private prisoner escort service' (As cited in Livingstone & Hart, 2002). Likewise, Button (2007) found that employees show no respect to security officers in the Armed

Industry when they are being requested to produce their ID or being stopped for speeding inside the compound. The 'incompetent' stereotype of security officers consequently lowers their status in the nodes. As a result, security officers are frequently verbally abused and their instructions are often ignored.

6.10 The Status of the Security Officers

Working as a security officer was not a desirable job as far as the cohort was concerned. For the majority of the officers it was a choice of survival or 'beats doing nothing at home and going on benefits'. The security officers in the nodes did not enjoy a respectable status because of their ages, low incomes, and because they were perceived as incapable in handling complaints effectively. It could also be attributed to the negative characteristics of the watchman images in the past.

The security officers in both nodes had considered themselves as having low or no status inside the estates. Employment relationships had made them 'servants', rather than 'employees', of every resident, and this attitude had also extended to the visitors. Even a cleaner sometimes could blame security personnel for not patrolling enough in preventing fly tipping. Visitors ignored requests of rectifying impropriety. Occasionally, non-security related tasks such as moving furniture for functions were assigned to the officers. Moreover, they were vulnerable to frequent verbal assault. RGSO28 described an incident where he was being sworn at – and the way he responded:

A taxi stopped at the middle of the road at the car park entrance, blocking vehicles going in and out, so I went to tell him to move. He swore at me, saying that I was a 'Heung ha lo' (redneck)[20] and so on with obscenities. So I swore back at him. I asked him to leave. I told him if he refuses to leave, I will call the police. He wouldn't dare to stay. We are doing the right thing and we are asking him politely.

[20] *Heung ha lo, literally, village hick, with similar offensive connotations to rural and less educated working classes as the term redneck is used in southern United States.*

Some insults were imbued with cultural hatred. The scene depicting Chan Chun (portrayed by Bruce Lee) in the film 'Chinese Connection' kick-breaking a wooden notice saying 'Chinese and Dogs Not Admitted' outside the Shanghai's Huangpu Park during the International Settlement period reflected the gravity of any canine reference within Chinese cultures. The fictive account invited many scholarly debates on the issue (Bickers & Wasserstrom, 1995). Security officers were frequently being verbally insulted by calling them 'watchdogs' (literally, door guard dog), except without the impartial or loyal connotations in the English phrase. Security guard LVSO02's experience had shown that security officers did not have any status inside the node: self-image was dismissed as irrelevant in the face of overpowering prejudice.

Q: *How would you describe your role in the estate?*

LVSO02: *Security.*

Q: *Would you say 'private police'?*

LVSO02: *There is no point in talking about what you consider yourself to be. What other people think matters more. Although we're in a kind of estate where even I myself live here*[21]*, there are many people looking down on you. They themselves are like dirt, but they still try to look down on you. They call you names to your face, like 'guarding dog', 'cunt', 'useless' etc.*

The IO or OC had the powers of controlling the renewal of the property management contract. The security company and the management company could not afford to offend the residents. As a result, they were always characterized as an employee to the residents, which lowered their status as a 'servant' even further. Therefore, their status as a regulation/rule enforcer was hardly recognized; when they requested residents to stop or rectify their impropriety, they were frequently being ignored.

[21] *LVSO02 refers to the estate as 'low-status', predominantly due to a lower-income tenant demographic with diverse social backgrounds.*

The mind-set of some violators did not recognize the security officers as a rule enforcer on behalf of all residents. Two incidents handled by RGSO30 in Rees Garden had shown the mind-sets of the violators: one purported to be a property owner in a failed attempt to 'override' the personnel's authority, and another denigrated the personnel as a 'newbie'. As RGSO30 described:

It is prohibited to dump renovation or construction wastage at the garbage point. Some guy wanted to dump the wastage and claimed that he is a property owner. I have no reason to confront him. So I told him to approach the management office. If the management office let him do it, he can dump there. If the management office refused, I cannot let him do that because I became failing to do my duty. He said, 'It's none your business,' and walked away. Another time, a woman was coming in with a trolley of ceramic tiles. I stopped her. She was not happy and said, 'They (as in the security guards) are new,' and started swearing. In the end, we have to call the ICs and the ICs called the management office. When the management staff came, they let her leave (the trolley) there. What can I say?

Lack of status in society (Button, 2007) was not unique to Hong Kong security officers, and is a perception usually attributed to the nature of work. The research found that the nature of the employer-employee relationship was the major factor that determined the status of security officers in private residential housing in Hong Kong. This relationship diminished the officers' status when it came to policing the residents themselves.

The low status phenomenon could also be attributed to the low wages of the security officers (Michael, 2002; Wakefield, 2003; Button, 2007). The Supervisor disclosed the salary of most of the security officers in Langstone Village at around $6,000 (approx. £500, or £700 by purchasing power) per month and only recently before the study started, the IO subsidized $500 (approx. £40) extra per month because of the inflation rate had surged rapidly in Hong Kong. In Rees Garden, the officers were earning around $7,200 per month but officers needed to travel to work. None of the officers was living in Rees Garden. The time and travel expense was a concern for the officers. Generally, the officers would spend about HK$15 (approx. £1.2) and

two hours in their commute each way. After the deduction of the travel expenses, the wages of the officers in both nodes were more or less the same. Hong Kong has implemented the minimum wages ordinance in May 2012. During a visit to Rees Garden in March 2013, CSO (RGSO33) disclosed that it has an adverse effect on the calibre of the officer. He stated that people join the industry because it is a more comfortable job compare to catering and cleaning. The long working hours plus the travelling time meant that they had less time to spend with their families, as was shown in RGSO21's description of his relationships with the residents:

We are familiar with the residents and see each other every day. I work 12 hours every day in here. I don't even see my wife and children that long every day. I only stay and sleep at home for a few hours. It will be 9 o'clock by the time I get home. I wake up at 6 o'clock come here to work about 7 o'clock.

Given the lower level of wages and long working hours, it would be hard to attract a higher calibre of security officers to work in these nodes. This created a vicious circle of higher calibre officers seeking to work in more desirable sites that pay higher and had fewer working hours. Such a 'wannabe (somewhere else)' culture was found in other studies in the security officers (Rigakos, 2002; Button, 2007). It would be nearly impossible for the security officers to join the Hong Kong Police because of the academic and physical requirements. However, moving to some more desirable (better pay) sites or 'moving into' the property management career was considered as advancement in the career. RGSO38, who was the only one officer interviewed that had attended extra training courses in property management wanted to move on. "I have learnt a lot by following the management staff to work in other sites. One day I want to move into property management and leave security."

6.11 Changing Career?

All but three of the officers were not considering changing their careers due to their ages and qualifications. Security, catering and cleaning were the trades that do not require any experience and professional qualifications at the time they joined:

indeed, at the time of the study. It depended on the individuals' preference and ability to find a job within these three categories. A re-visit of nodes September 2011 found that a few of the interviewees had left the security company. Some had found jobs in other careers and some had moved to more desirable companies.

6.12 Conclusion

Property Management Companies employ security officers in different forms of contract on behalf of the residents. Security officers were engaged in an indirect employer-employee relationship with the residents across different models of employment. As a result, the duties of the security officers were determined by the resident – the policed – to a far greater extent than would be predicted by economic forces. Private security officers were employed to police the residents and any people who had entered the estate's perimeter. The situation was complicated when security officers need to intervene. There was a conflict of roles and interests between the 'police' and 'policed'. A negative image was attached to the security officers because of their education level, age, and perception that they were incapable to handle complaints. The 'watchman' and 'guard' images of security officers still prevailed in the minds of the residents. The employer-employee relationship had further diminished their social status as 'servants' in the context.

However, it could not be denied that security officers were policing the perimeter of the residential estate for the resident. Fortunately, the majority of the residents were compliant, and only a minority of the residents would not comply with the instructions or requests issued by the security officers. Although security officers did not enjoy much respect or a favourable image in policing residential properties, they were engaged in policing of the local, for the local, and by the power of local community. The security companies and their officers in the study have developed a 'resident-orientated service' style of policing in their housing estates. The next chapter will explore how private security officers exercise their policing powers in private properties, and their contributions to nodal forms of security governance.

7 CHAPTER SEVEN:

The exercise of powers in Rees Garden and Langstone Village

"There isn't any golden rule. Improvise!"

7.1 Introduction

The preceding chapters suggest that security officers possess different kinds of power and provide a resident-orientated style of policing in residential housing. They use their powers to maintain the order within the estate perimeter. This chapter will examine the reasons private security officers need to tactically exercise or refrain from using their powers in handling incidents, which occurred in the communal spaces within the residential estates they police. It will examine the rationales and the mentality of the security officers when adopting these tactics. The issues in using the citizen's power of arrest and minimum use of force will be inspected in respect of the security officers' situations. It argues that the 'universal legal tools' are not useful for security officers. 'Delegated legal tools' are able to provide the necessary powers, but their employee status prevents full utilization within the course of their duties.

The findings do not indicate that security personnel find their powers wanting. Where legitimate powers have failed to gain authority, private security officers turn to alternative strategies. However, their employee status constrained their powers from their perspective. The findings have shown that they have the capacity to produce intended effects (Wrong, 1979), such as stopping a violation of the 'parochial rules' inside the nodes. They are also able to use non-violent form of force, rather than direct force on the body of the other (Wrong, 1979), such as using their bodies to physically prevent or restrict the actions of a suspect or offender. It indicates that it may not be necessary to increase the legal powers of security officers as some industry professionals in mature economies suggest.

7.2 The Exercise of Powers

In general, the Hong Kong Ordinances underpin the powers of private security personnel. Similar to what other scholars have found in other jurisdictions (Sarre, 1994; Wakefield, 2002; Jason-Lloyd, 2003 & 2005; Button, 2007) private security personnel generally possess no greater powers than ordinary citizens do. As outlined in chapter five, the study found that private security officers in residential housing do not only possess the universal legal powers (Button, 2007) but also the delegated legal powers. Universal legal powers are the powers of the ordinary citizens such as citizen arrest and the use of minimum force in making an arrest. Delegated legal powers are transferred from the powers of property owners' rights as stipulated by the laws. This includes stopping and questioning suspicious persons, traffic control inside their perimeters, stopping misbehaviours of the residents or visitors, and intervening when people cause nuisances to the neighbourhoods.

Security officers found it difficult to exercise their citizen's power of arrest because people do not submit to their powers, and police do not show conspicuous support of such manoeuvres, especially when the use of minimum force is concerned. During enforcement of rules and regulations, private security personnel often felt frustrated that they could not achieve what they want because their powers were constrained by their employment relationships with the policed in an economic capacity. Moreover, their authority was frequently not recognized by some of the residents and visitors. As a result, security officers had to exercise their powers selectively. In some situations, they were still reluctant to use their powers such as make a citizen arrest. The following discussions will show how security officers are able to achieve their policing goals by adopting different strategic methods in handling these matters.

7.3 Arresting of Criminal Suspects

7.3.1 *Crime Against Property*

Security officers frequently needed to attend a scene of crime or incident. Berge (2010) found that private security is evolving in its application of diverse policing mentalities in its management and interpretation of public 'space'; in its ability to wield power both symbolically and actually and; in its tendency to adopt a variety of

crime control and social ordering techniques. The study found that they had no great intention of making citizen arrests even if there was solid evidence proving that a perpetrator had committed an arrestable offence. Arrest in this discussion means a legal arrest that involves informing the arrested person that s/he is under arrest and the reason behind the act of arrest. Security personnel would apprehend or restrain a person, but they would not say to the person who had committed an offence that s/he is being arrested and for what reason. It is common to find that security officers would not make a formal citizen arrest (Adu-Boakye, 2002; Button, 2007). This did not mean that they did not know how to use their powers, or that they would rather the culprits walk free. The tactic they used was to monitor when the crime was still in action, restrain or delay the person at the scene if s/he wanted to leave, and let the police to take legal action.

A shoplifting case happened in Rees Garden Waycome supermarket, which was discovered by the cashier. The cashier pursued the thief and the security officers nearby apprehended the thief. The thief was restrained at the spot and was later handed over to the state police for further action. The security officer (RGSO26) who 'made the arrest' did not admit or declare that he had made a citizen arrest. He considered what he did was just 'restraining the suspect at the scene'. This seemingly paradoxical mind-set of 'restrain, not arrest' existed in the security officers interviewed who had made an 'arrest' using their citizen's arrest power. This is evidenced by two theft cases that occurred in Rees Garden and one theft case in Langstone Village apprehended by security personnel were disclosed to the researcher by the interviewees. The theft case in Langstone Village described by LVSO18 in the interview shows he operated under this 'restrain not arrest' mind-set. Such strategies of avoiding the use of legal powers have been found to be used by police and private security in other studies (Dixon, 1997; Button, 2007).

Q: *Have you ever arrested someone before?*

LVSO18: *No. But there was an incident before. I saw a man stealing the metal plate attached to the fire exit door. I reported the incident to the control. So they informed the police and came to assist me. We found that the thief was hiding at a spot. We told the police and the police arrested him.*

Q: *Did you arrest him?*

LVSO18: *We passed it on to the police.*

Q: *What do you mean by that?*

LVSO18: *We kept an eye on him from a distance. He was on the 35th floor. He came down and he was supposed to go home. But he didn't and hid in one of the empty spaces in the corridor.*

Q: *Did you physically arrest him?*

LVSO18: *No. The police arrested him.*

The study found that security officers in Rees Garden adopted similar strategies. RGSO21 had two experiences, and the only two he knew during his seven-year tenure in Rees Garden. In the first case, RGSO21 had tried to 'catch', not to arrest, the culprit but he had failed and the culprit fled. It was revealed that 'catch' does not mean arrest in any sense in RGSO21's mind. 'Catch' only means to stop and restrain the culprit at the scene, just as a child would be caught stealing candies, without policing connotations.

RGSO21: *I came across a theft before. You know those recycling bins. Those the Salvation Army or Tung Wah Group Hospital, or sometimes the recycling companies, put there to collect clothes. People steal the clothes and sell them on. We have caught one before.*

Q: *Can you describe the incident?*

RGSO21: *It was about 6 o'clock in the evening in winter between November and December. We were patrolling near block 19. We saw a man about 30 or so. There were two big bags of clothes donated by other people. The man even brought a trolley to move them away. I bumped into him right away. I knew all the people working in the recycle companies who come to collect the donations. So I approached him*

and tried to question him. He was scared so he began to run away. I was not quick enough and he fled away. I saved the two bags of clothes.

Q: *Did you try to arrest the guy?*

RGSO21: *No, I tried to catch him and pass him on to the police. He started running when I shouted at him and fled the estates.*

The fact that private officers did not exercise their citizen's arrest power as they were supposed to do in theory as a policing agent does not mean that they have failed to carry out their duties. They will use alternative methods to get the perpetrators arrested. LVSO02, similar to other officers interviewed, explained that security guards in Langstone Village were not making arrests because nobody submits to the power of a security guard.

Q: *Do you feel that there are lots of things you cannot do because you do not have enough power?*

LVSO02: *It doesn't matter if there is enough power or not. We have got the police. At least at this stage, people do not submit to the power of a security officer. And if you arrested someone, where can you take the suspect to? For instance, you have the power to arrest, what will you do with the arrestee?*

Q: *Pass him on to the police after the arrest?*

LVSO02: *Correct. That's how it ends up anyway, so why don't I call the police in the first place?*

Q: *Will it be too late?*

LVSO02: *Depending on the incident. If the situation is really bad, we will surround him with many people and we won't let him leave the scene. I have not experienced that so far.*

Q: *Then?*

LVSO02: *Wait for the police: we rely on them, we will not really arrest him, and even if we had arrested him, we would still need all the people there to watch him. It is better to restrain him at the scene so that at least the situation will not get worse.*

The second incident in Rees Garden verified LVSO02's rationale in not making a citizen's arrest. RGSO21 saw a crime in action but he did not make a citizen arrest; instead, he followed the perpetrator and helped the police arrest the culprit successfully.

RGSO21: *There was another one that was arrested by the police. We saw a case of theft in action and called the police. It was not the first time the thief has stolen. Surely he has done it many time but he was only seen by us and arrested by the police for that one time. We told the police he brought along a goods vehicle and parked it outside. The police found it and arrested him later.*

Q: *Why didn't you arrest him?*

RGSO21: *It is better for the police do it. For us, keep tracking him is enough.*

Q: *But he might have run away!*

RGSO21: *If we tried to approach him like the last case I have mentioned, the thief will run anyway. It is better to wait for the police. Even if he escaped the estate, the police could continue chasing after him/her.*

For property crimes, these strategies might be acceptable because there was usually no immediate threat to human lives: burglars and thieves in Hong Kong are not known for being heavily armed in the 21st century. The only threat was to the officer's safety; therefore, the strategies adopted by the security officers are based on

safety considerations. It is found that private security officers in the retails businesses, such as supermarket, will chase after a shoplifter only if there is no threat to their personal safety. When a suspect is apprehended, they will usually escort the suspect to the security office and wait for the police to make the formal arrest at the office (Adu-Boakye, 2002). Button (2007) also found what he called 'common sense' approaches by security officers to deal with difficult situation when such powers could be utilised.

7.3.2 *Crime Against the Person*

Physical assaults on security officers and other persons were rare in the nodes, but exceptions persist. A fight occurred in Rees Garden and was handled by the security officers. There had been two physical assaults, one in each node, committed on the security officers. Both victims left their jobs afterwards. The assaults had been disclosed to the researcher by other personnel who witnessed the events. The assault on the security officer in Rees Garden was described by RGSO26 as a parking dispute, involving a woman who handed an infant to a man before assaulting security personnel:

They were arguing and I was the first one who'd arrived at the scene. It was a parking dispute. The couple was fiery when I arrived. The woman grasped the arm of my colleague and kept hitting him. I told my colleague to go back into Kiosk C. We surrounded the kiosk so they could not go near him. The woman was holding a baby and she handed the baby to her husband. She then went to Kiosk, yanked my colleague's arm out of the kiosk and hit him. So we called the police and the police arrested them.

In Langstone Village, an assault took place when the then night shift Supervisor was handling a drunkard on the communal space in a building. The incident was described by LVSO11: the staff had a bloodied nose, and the police did not arrest the drunkard.

LVSO11: *Last time, a drunk at LangC hit the former IC. He sustained a nosebleed. We called the police. They wouldn't dare to hit the police. They aren't afraid of us.*

Q: *What happened then?*

LVSO11: *Both were taken to the hospital and treated. The IC rested for three days.*

Q: *Did the police arrest the drunkard?*

LVSO11: *No.*

Q: *How did they explain it to the company?*

LVSO11: *I don't know. We took a photo and reported to our Company that the IC was hit by a drunk. Our Company later gave out instructions that when we saw a drunkard we should call the police. We should not deal with them. Once you have reported it to the police, they will deal (confront)with it. They can call the ambulance. We will only keep an eye on them.*

The assault on security officers indicated that sometimes they become a victim during the course of their duties. Security officers were employed to protect the residents inside the nodes. Their very vulnerability in the face of danger makes residents sceptical about the ability of security officers in protecting their personal safety. The limits of the law notwithstanding, security officers were successful in protecting other people. An incident in Rees Garden described by RGSO29 has shown the laws do not provide security officers any extra powers to protect people. Indeed their position may come as a disadvantage in the eyes of the law if physical confrontation ensued.

Q: *How many times did you witness a fight?*

RGSO29: *A few times.*

Q: *Did you try to stop them?*

RGSO29: *We asked them to stop loudly, and called the police. We will try to get a move on with body language. We will try to stand between them to stop the fighting, but we will not have any physical contact with them.*

Q: *Will you use force to stop them?*

RGSO29: *There isn't any golden rule: improvise! It all depends on the situation.*

Q: *Can you describe the incident?*

RGSO29: *It was outside the Jockey Club Off-course Betting Branch in the shopping centre. There is a guard from another company there. That guard is only responsible for checking and stopping underage people from going into the Branch.*

Q: *So they fight outside the shop and it became your job?*

RGSO29: *They started fighting inside the shopping centre and ended up in our area so I called the police. I stopped them. One of them had fallen down on the floor.*

Q: *Why didn't the guy run away?*

RGSO29: *I asked them not to go away because I have called the police. Later it was found that they know each other! Fighting is not a serious offence so I think that is why he didn't run.*

Summoning the police is one resort, but security personnel will also avoid physical contacts with the assailant, and use their body as an obstacle to separate the victim and assailant. The CSO RGSO33 explained the reasons for their actions and described a practical method for security officers in protecting themselves: announce their presence, separate the crowds, and flee when attacked.

Q: *Have you ever used force to make an arrest before?*

RGSO33: *Use of force! We absolutely will not use force.*

Q: *Why?*

RGSO33: *There is no such necessity. Some colleagues asked me that what they should do if someone tried to hit or hit them. I said, 'Just let him hit you'.*

Q: *Why?*

RGSO33: *If you fight back, you are committing affray or even assault. Security officer is in a disadvantaged position! We will not and cannot fight back. All we can do is run away and that's the best way to go by it.*

Q: *What if someone had hit them?*

RGSO33: *Call the police and let the police arrest him. If you fight back, police would consider it a fight.*

Q: *How can you protect yourself?*

RGSO33: *Run! Run! Usually when there is an argument or a confrontation, we will separate the parties at once, so the situation and the atmosphere won't heat up.*

There is no specific offence of assaulting a security officer, as opposed to a serious offence, which results when a public police officer is assaulted. Assault on security personnel will be treated as any common assault. In order to avoid such an outcome, security officers adopt a protective strategy when an arrest might be needed. LVSO02 earlier had explained, "*If the situation is really bad, we will surround him with many people and not let him leave the scene*."

Moreover, it was found that residents would not usually report witnessing crime to the security officers, and the chance of a security officer discovering a crime in action was rare. Based on this mentality, security officers will avoid making a formal

arrest but restrain the suspect and hand over to the police. Moreover, making an arrest was also not encouraged during their training.

When questioned about how Security Trainers teach security officer to make an arrest, Security Trainer PB11 explained the reasons why they do not encourage security officers to make a citizen arrest and the use of force: charges of excessive use of force and civil litigation are serious impediments to any exercise of force.

I explain the citizen's arrest power (101) to them. We will try to tell them implicitly not use it, because if they were to make the arrest, force was quite possibly involved. We also don't want a wrongful arrest. The use of force complicates the situation. Secondly, the suspect might accuse the security officer had used excessive force during the arrest and make a complaint of assault to the police. Thirdly, if the suspect was found not guilty in court, the suspect might sue the arresting officer through criminal or civil litigations. Security companies are running a business. They don't want litigation. Litigation costs money and time. When a guard is needed in court, the company has to pay the guard and his/her substitute. (PB11, Interview record, 2011)

Furthermore, in the Security Officer Manual issued by the SGSIA it emphasized that the personal safety of the security officer is paramount. It states, "Personal safety should not be put at risk when exercising the citizen's arrest power and arrest may be affected under possible and safe circumstances but priority should be given to calling the police for assistance."

This suggests that the personal safety of the security officers has overridden the necessity of an arrest. This phenomenon is more prominent in security officers who frequently encounter aggressive people or dangerous situation. Hobbs *et al*. (2003) point out that the environment within which bouncers (Door supervisors) work is often saturated with violent potential. They give priority to their personal safety above all else. Les, a bouncer, said in the interview what he would do when a fight breaks out:

You defend yourself. I mean fuck the job, you know what I mean? These bastards are doing you harm, you can't just lying in a ball saying it's is wrong to hit people. (As cited in Hobbs *et al*., 2003).

Likewise, Rigakos (2002) found that Intelligarde officers are five times more likely than the Metropolitan Toronto Police officers to be assaulted in their course of their duties. When they face with resistance and threat, other Intelligarde officers will attend the scene swiftly and try to outnumber the potential assailants to protect their own officers. He found that a 'swarm or be swarmed' culture has developed in Intelligarde officers to protect their own personal safety when they are facing collective resistance by the very populations they are charged with governing (drug dealers or prostitutes, for instance).

7.3.3 *Apprehension and Eviction of Trespassers*

Private security officers perform two policing functions when they stop trespassers, namely preventing crimes and maintaining the quality of life of the residents. There were four common types of trespassers who would appear in the nodes, namely debt collectors, salesperson/vendors, leaflet (flyer) deliverers and second-hand electrical appliance dealers (the scrap man). One of the essential duties of the Tower Guards in the nodes was to stop trespassers from entering the buildings through the main entrances. Resident RGRR2 and the chairperson RGOC01 of the Owner's Committee in Rees Garden expressed similar 'basic' expectations of the security officers in the interview.

RGRR2: *I don't expect too much from (security officers). They guard the entrances well and stop strangers from entering the building. These are my basic expectations.*

RGOC01: *I expect them to manage the estate, help residents to solve disputes, control or stop disturbances from outsiders, and report to us defects*

found inside the estate. Mainly it is to stop outsiders from going into the block disturbing our residents.

There were three major reasons that residents did not want any strangers or trespassers entering their buildings as given by the interviewees. Firstly, thieves or burglars could be disguised as scrap men or door-to-door sellers to spot their targets. Resident LVRR1 voiced suspicion of sellers, many of whom are Mainland Chinese who could conceivably be discerned by their accents.

I always suspect the dealers. Many are Mainland Chinese. There are not many things to trade with the residents. I think they are looking for opportunities for burglary. (LVRR1, Interview record, 2011)

Secondly, debt collectors were infamous for aggressive and illegal tactics, such as graffiti on the doors of the debtor's neighbours to exert pressure and cause embarrassment to the debtors. Arson has also been recorded in some extreme cases. LVSO02 disclosed in the interview that the police are on high alert when it comes to debt collectors.

LVSO02: *The police approached the counter and told us, "Call me if you know something is happening, I will be there very quickly." They were in plain clothes hanging around (patrolling) inside the estate. What they mean is whenever any 'debt collector' appears or crime occurs, telephone them right away.*

Q: *You will let debt collectors go up to the block?*

LVSO02: *No. They will not say they are debt collectors. I asked them, 'What are you going up for?' They will usually say 'delivering documents'. Usually two people will come together. That is how we can tell. We saw a lot so we know. They will not go stag.*

Q: *So you will let debt collectors go inside?*

LVSO02: *We will let them do that. Even if we know that they are debt collectors, if they are not holding anything (dangerous), we will still let them go up. Debt collection is not illegal.*

Q: *That means…*

LVSO02: *If they do not have anything suspicious on them, that is OK. Otherwise, I will need to report back (to the control).*

Q: *For example?*

LVSO02: *That means he has something like a knife or he is holding something like a bucket. Then, I will not let him to go up. If I suspect something, I will not let them to go up even if they don't have anything with them. I will ask my colleague to escort them. I don't know what is inside the bucket. They may go to deface the walls or do something else.*

Thirdly, salespersons caused great nuisance to the residents. They sometimes arrive in swathes. Residents complained of loud noises in the corridors, or knocking on doors, especially very late at night. LVSO15 recalled her experience of receiving complaints from residents who were visited by midnight salespeople: "*Some salespersons were knocking on people's doors at midnight. We got complaints so we know. We have to find them, register them, warn them and send them away."* The dayshift security Supervisor of Langstone Villages LVSO06 had described his experiences in dealing with the salespersons as follow.

Q: *What about the salespersons?*

LVSO06: *For salespersons, when they come, they come in numbers of twenty to thirty. Five to six in each block.*

Q: *How do they get in?*

LVSO06: *Some of them are residents in the estate. They opened the rear gate for their colleagues.*

Q: *Your officers can't see the rear gate?*

LVSO06: *Sometimes we will miss that because we concentrate on the main gate most of the time. We are unable to screen everyone when we are busy.*

Q: *Do you have CCTVs at the rear gate, or security coded door?*

LVSO06: *Yes, (we have CCTVs) but no security coded door.*

Q: *So it must be opened from the inside?*

LVSO06: *That is right.*

Q: *It will be an insider who opens the gate for them. How can you catch 30 salespersons with only a few patrol officers?*

LVSO06: *We can't. No way. When there is a complaint like that we will report to the police. We will catch one or two and pass them to the police. It is always the same company - BV Broadcasting. The police will ask the salespersons to inform their colleagues to leave.*

When said trespassers refused to cooperate, or repeatedly trespassed into the buildings, private security sought the police as a last resort, rather than use force to evict the person or make an arrest. However, the police normally would not take any legal action so long as the matter was temporarily resolved, and trespassers would co-operate with the police by leaving, only to return when the police has left the building. Moreover, they cannot help much if these salespersons were determined to fulfil their sales quotas. It was considered as useless to report to the police by LVSO05 who told his experiences of dealing with cable TV subscription salespersons.

Q: *Do you need to use force to evict those salespeople?*

LVSO05: *No. Don't need to. But there has been a case where we called the police. There were some salespeople from a television broadcasting company. They refused to leave. They said they wanted to do*

businesses. They kept coming back after they left. We need to report to the police. But it didn't help.

Q: *How did the police handle that?*

LVSO05: *They will take down their HKID number. Question/talk to them for a while and send them away. They are not committing a crime. They came back when the police have gone for a while. We cannot do anything. It is a 'mouse and cat, hide and seek' game. We all understood each other. We are both making a living.*

Unfortunately, neither security officers nor the state police would not or could not arrest persons for trespassing when they were spotted inside the buildings. When an alleged trespasser was reported, security officers would be deployed to the building to locate and confirm the identity of the alleged person. A trespasser would be escorted to the foyer security counter and be requested to register his/her details in the visitor's book and leave. If the trespassers refused to release their details, security officers would inform their supervisors and they would attend the scene. The police was the last resort. Virtually any trespasser could be sued for trespassing by property owners. Yet, litigation costs money and time, so few, if any, property owners pressed the case further. Therefore, security officers were expected to evict the trespassers and keep the peace inside the buildings.

Security officers were in a passive position and could only keep playing a game of 'cat and mouse'. Stopping dangerous acts, nuisances, and disturbances caused by different kinds of trespasser in maintaining the quality of life of the residents became the major objectives in dealing with trespassers. A tranquil and safe living environment was what the security officers strove to provide. Similarly, maintaining order in the open communal spaces was another aspect where security officers need to use their powers.

7.4 Traffic Control

Security officers were delegated the powers to perform traffic control/management inside the estates area. Violations of the rules were common. The study found that there were three main types of traffic problems inside the nodes, namely illegal parking, disobeying traffic signs, and parking overtime in the unloading bay. Security officers had to use their powers to rectify the problems. However, many drivers did not recognize or submit to their powers, and disputes were frequent.

7.4.1 *Illegal Parking*

Illegal parking was the most common traffic problem that security officers had to solve in both nodes. This included parking at prohibited places, and far more problematically, obstructing emergency exits. Security officers were authorized by the owners to impound illegally parked vehicles under the Traffic Ordinance, CAP 370, Section 11. Security officers could clamp a vehicle when the warning was ineffective. However, there were no records of vehicles being clamped in Langstone Village. When questioned about this on a car park security guard LVSO03, the reply was simply that 'that's not how we do it around here'.

We don't clamp vehicles in here. We will try to find the drivers and ask them to move the vehicle. Usually they park only for a few minutes. We will advise them not to do that in the future. If they were repeatedly found to have illegally parked, we will inform the management officers and they will take action. (LVSO003, Interview record, 2011)

Clamping of vehicles was, however, carried out in Rees Garden. According to the CSO, there is an average of four to five of illegally parked vehicle being clamped every month and the figure increases during major holidays when people visit their friends and relatives. Clamping and releasing a vehicle was the duty of SOs and ranks above. The vehicle owners of the clamped vehicles needed to pay an impounding charge before the security officers would release their vehicles. The

charge would be collected by the management office and they would subsequently inform the security officers to release the vehicles.

Some violators were residents and they would challenge the powers of security officers or even that of the management office itself. In some cases, the management office capitulated by releasing a vehicle without charging any impounding fee. Enquiries about this were made by telephone to the management office and were met with a dismissive response, citing privacy concerns. However, the interviews with RGSO30 and RGSO41 revealed some useful information. RGSO30 disclosed some of the reasoning in the interview: acquired helplessness on the part of frontline personnel, concerns about keeping the contract at the managerial end, malefactors claiming to be owners, and 'OC nepotism' were all factors.

RGSO30: *We do as we are instructed. The management office knows. But if they want to let them go we cannot say no. I will not clamp him when the same guy comes back next time because it is useless and I don't want trouble. I don't want to be blamed for nothing. If I clamped a vehicle and the driver swore at me I will feel that it is worth it when the driver is punished for his act.*

Q: *Does it happen very often?*

RGSO30: *Whenever they want to park irregularly, they will claim to be a property owner.*

Q: *So most of the time is it a property owner?*

RGSO30: *Even if they are not, they will claim that they are and try to get away with it.*

The study found that there were members of the Owners' Committee who would also violate the rules of their own. Reiner (2000) points out that discretion is not an equal opportunity phenomenon, and some groups are much more likely than others to be at the receiving end of the exercise of police powers. In maintenance of 'parochial orders' in residential estate a corollary exists. It was found that there is no specific

group being targeted when enforcing parking regulation in residential housing estates.

However, the privileged group, namely the people who have control of the renewal of the management company contract, is less likely to be governed by the rules. The management office will exercise their discretion not to take action on illegal parking whenever they think it is necessary to keep the contract. Security officers sometimes feel frustrated when they exercise their delegated powers. RGSO41 blew the whistle during the interview, identifying said malefactors, and disclosed the difficulties faced by the management office and the security officers.

Q: *What will happen after you clamp a vehicle?*

RGSO41: *We will try to inform the drivers. If we cannot find them, they will know when they come back to the vehicles. They will see a notice on the windscreen that their vehicles are clamped. They will ask us why we clamped their vehicles. We will explain to them why.*

Q: *Did anyone argue with you?*

RGSO41: *Most of them will challenge us. We will show them the rules. We will tell them it is not our company but the Owners' Committee of Rees Garden who set the rules. Some of them are property owners. They will telephone the management office. They consider that they have all the rights to do anything inside the estate.*

Q: *What will the management office do?*

RGSO41: *Sometimes, the management office will give them a chance and tell us to release them.*

Q: *Sometimes they will let them go?*

RGSO41: *Most of the time. There is an OC here. If you give any of the member trouble, they will make complaints all the time so it will give the management office a hard time. The management company will be in*

big trouble because they may not renew the management contract in the future.

7.4.2 *Disobeying Traffic Signs*

Both nodes made use of the same two-lane unidirectional single carriageway at the entrance, but the internal layouts led to very different experiences. Wakefield (2003) suggests that private property owners create and maintain autonomous social orders that produce an orderly, convivial environment, catering to visitors' needs for comfort and ontological security, and suppressing behaviours that disrupt the ambience of their establishments. Langstone Village had a simple road layout, which did not have traffic signs.

It was a semi-elliptical circuit with entrances at one end and an exit at the other. The road was caged in by iron railings and fences to separate pedestrian and vehicular traffic. The entrance had a barrier and was controlled by an automatic ticket machine. Drivers needed to press a button to procure a ticket and the barrier would rise. The free staying time inside the circuit was 30 minutes. When leaving the estate, drivers needed to stop before a manned kiosk at the exit with the security officer there, who would put the ticket into a machine and it would indicate whether the driver would need to pay for the stay. There were no ways for drivers to violate the rules unless they crashed through the fence or the barriers. Unfortunately, there were loopholes in the Rees Garden traffic circuit that provided chances for drivers to violate traffic rules. Likewise, the employees in Armed Industries were frequently stopped by the security officers for disobeying the speed limits inside the compound (see Button, 2007).

Traffic signs were frequently disobeyed in Rees Garden. This could be attributed to the design of the traffic circuits. The circuit was a one-way, figure of '8' rectangular shaped circuit with some minor spurs leading to every block. There was a dual carriageway portion leading to the main road outside forming a 'Y' Junction. The vehicle entrance and exit were located at either spur of the 'Y' Junction. The entrance to the traffic circuit was situated left of the intersection about 100 meters away, likewise for the exit at the right. Moreover, the exit of the multi-storey car

park was situated between the centre point of the 'Y' Junction and the entrance to the circuit. A security officer controlled the traffic at the 'Y' junction. Their duties were to stop drivers from driving on the wrong side of the road when exiting the car park and doing a U-turn after dropping off a passenger between the entrance and the 'Y' Junction so to avoid entering the traffic circuit.

The barriers at the entrance and exit were controlled by an Octopus card reader – the Hong Kong equivalent of the Oyster Card in London. A stay of 30 minutes or less was free of charge. Drivers needed to place the card on the card readers to activate the barriers. The card readers would automatically deduct the parking/staying fee if a vehicle had overstayed. The traffic circuit in Rees Garden was large by local standards. According to the CSO RGSO33, it took about three minutes for a vehicle to go from the entrance to the exit. Therefore, there were drivers who would violate the rules and take a shortcut to the exit. These infractions happened near the Y Junction. Violation of traffic signs inside the circuit was rare. CSO RGSO33 explained how the drivers violated the traffic rules:

There were drivers coming out from the car park who didn't want to go round the circuit, so they just drove their vehicles on the wrong side of the road to reach the exit. Some taxi drivers and other drivers also did that when they had dropped off their passengers near that location.

His accounts were verified during observation: drivers doing or trying to do this were being stopped by the guard. The researcher had witnessed a serious traffic incident occurring during an observation in Rees Garden, in which a security guard was almost hit by a van, which committed the exact infraction.

It was the beginning of the night shift at about 1930 hrs. The researcher was standing outside the security office observing the security guard at the unloading bay. A van stopped near the exit of the car parks and unloaded a passenger. The driver tried to turn his vehicle around and intended to drive away in the opposite direction. The security guard tried to stop the driver but the driver continued to drive his vehicle in the opposite direction. The vehicle nearly hit the guard. However, it ran over three traffic cones and crashed one cone in the middle of the road. The

driver did not stop and drove the vehicle away. The guard radioed the Security Office and the CSO came out. After confirming the details of the vehicle, the CSO went into the security office and called the police. A police officer attended the scene about 10 minutes later and collected some information from the security guard. According to the CSO, the case was passed onto the Traffic Accident Investigation team for legal action.

CSO RGSO33 later reported that the driver was found guilty of reckless driving and fined HK$1,000. Some drivers even used their vehicle to force security officers to give way to them. At the same time, drivers will verbally assault and challenge the authority of the security officers.

Q: *Has any driver verbally abused you?*

RGSO25: *Yes, they have. Some will say they will hit me and most of them are taxi drivers. There was one taxi driver who claimed he would hit me because I was blocking him doing a U-turn (at the Y Junction) so he had to drive round the estate to return to the main road.*

Q: *Did he actually hit you?*

RGSO25: *No. They will use their vehicles to force me to back off.*

Q: *It is quite dangerous!*

RGSO25: *Not really. I only stand in front of them when they are slow.*

Q: *Will some of them insist that you move?*

RGSO25: *Some will. I will tell them again and again that they cannot do that. Some will still do the U-turn and drive away ignoring me. It is okay. At least I have done my best in stopping them. This will satisfy the requirements of the OC members when they saw us doing all that. If I do nothing they will say something.*

This behaviour may be attributed to the lack of prosecuting power of the security officers, and the fact that the state police could not prosecute drivers either on a private road in this aspect. Some drivers were aware of this loophole and would violate the traffic rules at will. The police would only prosecute drivers when the driver had acted recklessly or dangerously, as illustrated in the previous example. The incidents and attitudes of the drivers showed that the authority of the private security officers was not recognized. Moreover, many drivers and some residents would not submit to their powers even when these powers were expressly delegated to security personnel responsible for traffic control inside the node.

7.4.3 *Overtime Parking in the Unloading Bay*

The third problem was overtime parking at the unloading bay outside the shopping centre in Rees Garden. Drivers were allowed to park and unload at the unloading bay for a period of 30 minutes. A security officer was stationed permanently at the bay to record the timings of the vehicles parked at the bay. The guard was responsible for requesting the drivers to drive the vehicles away when the 30 minutes period was over. Sometimes, disputes would occur when a goods vehicle stayed longer than 30 minutes and the guard requested the driver to move away. Drivers would refuse to move their vehicles because they had not finished their unloading. Some drivers would park their vehicles and disappear for unknown reasons. In such a case, the security offices would clamp the vehicle at the bay. The experience of RGSO41 showed that the powers of the security officers were not being recognized. They sometimes received verbal threats.

Q: *Did anyone try to assault you when you clamped his/her vehicles?*

RGSO41: *Yes, but it is more serious at the unloading bay. I had an argument with someone there a few days ago. I told the driver not to park the vehicle on the roadside because he had blocked two parking spaces. That young guy said angrily: 'Why can't I park here? I will park here, whatcha gonna do about it?' I told him that can park in another space that is not blocking other vehicles.*

Q: *Did they try to hit you?*

RGSO41: *No. They would not dare to. One was coming at me with an aggressive pose. I said to him: 'You do not need to be so aggressive. You cannot beat me if we fight. You don't need to be like that. I didn't stop you from parking. I am telling you to park inside the space. There are car parking spaces for you.' We just reason. I will tell them that we are both just trying to make a living here.*

The powers of the security officers were limited to impounding illegally parked vehicles. Security officers had no power to prosecute drivers who had violated the traffic signs. Moreover, due to the legal characteristics of private roads, the state police would not prosecute drivers inside private areas short of grave offences. Without any immediate legal support, security officers could only use their persuasive powers (Wrong, 1979) to influence drivers.

7.5 Maintaining the Quality of Life of the Residents

Security officers in residential building could vary from a parapolice style to the caretaker style. At one end of a continuum is the parapolice type who is willing to engage in more 'hard-core' police-like work such as eviction of illegal occupants or intervening to stop criminal activities that risk harm (Rikagos, 2002). At the other side of the continuum is the caretaker style. They will take care of the daily matter of the residents such as foot patrol or even clearing out the rubbish as found in Korea, and are unlikely to risk engaging in activities that put them in 'harm's way' (Button, Park & Lee, 2006).

Although the Hong Kong Police pledge to respond to 999 call within an average of nine minutes in Kowloon and Hong Kong (urban area) and 15 in the New Territories (sub-urban area) in their performance pledge (Hong Kong Police, 2012), society expect more of them as a police service. Edwards (2005) points out that the first and major expectation that society has of its police is that police should be there and

available when things go wrong. Security officers may not be as powerful as a state police officer in dealing with criminal incidents, but their immediate presence can satisfy the public expectations of an emergency service. The availability of security officers at the scene is a vital factor of their existence.

Security provision is a commercial service for the security industry, and all commercial services exist to satisfy a customer's need. Another important aspect the security officers needed to concern themselves with, beyond and above 'keeping the peace', was maintaining the quality of life for the residents. It is found that most of the time the state police are dealing with non-crime matters as well. Bayley (2005) suggests that amongst the 28 police forces in five countries he studied, 60% of police personnel patrol and respond to requests for service, while only 15% are involved in investigating crime. The private industry takes up the roles that consume the majority of work force and resources of the state police, which is the preservation of the quality of life of the resident inside housing estates. This included solving noise nuisances, stopping illegal renovations and dealing with sanitary issues. Skogan and Hartnett (1997) found that noncriminal, nonemergency problems represent the most frequent concern of residents in the neighbourhood in their study on community policing in Chicago. However, unlike other public officers, private security officers were not empowered to prosecute the offenders: they still had the rights to ask the offenders to rectify the problems. When the offenders refused their requests, they could refer the incidents to relevant government departments on behalf of the property owners.

7.5.1 *The Duties of Referring Complaints to Government Departments*

Solving the quality of life problems for the residents was more demanding on the security officers compared to the two other functions. Many quality of life problems affected the lives of the residents in dense multi-storey residential buildings estates. Security offices received different kinds of complaint from the residents. The responses of LVSO04 who works in the Security Control showed that security officers dealt with quality of life issues frequently and hygiene is often high on the list.

Q: *What kinds of complaints do you usually receive?*

LVSO04: *Many kinds of complaint. Some are quite ridiculous, like a (noise complaint of a) dog barking, just now. A stink in the toilets, rubbish in the corridor, people pouring water out of windows, cigarette butts, all kinds, whatever you can name.*

7.5.2 *Noise Nuisances*

Complaints of noise were very common in the nodes. The study found that there were three common kinds of noise complaints. They were resident generated noises, like music and TV volume play too high at night or during the day, talking/shouting loudly, moving furniture or children jumping inside the flat; mysterious noises heard by residents; and renovation noises. Security officers had to attend the scene whenever residents made complaints. Unlike the police, security officers could not prosecute the residents when they were found making excessive noises after 11 p.m. or other prohibited hours. However, they had the powers to demand or request the noisemakers to lower the noise. Some violators would not submit to their powers. When the request was not effective, they would leave and inform the police. According to LVSO08, security officers would not call the police in front of the offenders because they do not want to provoke them. LVSO08 was sworn at and threatened at the scene.

LVSO08: *We received a noise nuisance complaint, so I went there and knocked on the door. Actually, he didn't close the door but closed the folding gate. I said to him: 'Sir, please keep your noise down a little bit. It is mid-night now'. He rushed to the gate and swearing in a Chiu Chow dialect, 'Motherfucker.'. I walked away when I saw his reaction. I will not confront him face to face. He continued shouting loudly in the flat so I reported to the police. I will let the police talk to him.*

Q: *So they don't listen to you?*

LVSO08: *They don't need to. What power do I have? Nothing! Some of them even want to hit us.*

Sometimes, residents would make a complaint about noise coming from 'somewhere' – that being the entirety of the complaint. This kind of complaint was very difficult to verify and handle. A thorough investigation was also a waste of manpower and money. When security officers arrived at the scene, either they could not hear anything or the noise would not be there anymore. The study found that no matter how, security officers still had to 'do something' to please the complainants. There was a noise complaint in Rees Garden that was considered by the security officers as a daunting task. The case had cost a huge amount of money and time during the investigation, because the complainant allegedly requested two officers from each shift to investigate 24/7. Eventually, the operation of security officers was terminated by the OC after a follow-up period of two years due to undisclosed reasons. RGSO43 noted that the police and the security personnel had come to the same conclusion with regard to the credibility of the complainant:

A customer was complaining that there was a noise coming from the floor above. She requested two security officers from each shift to listen (investigate) to the noise 24 hours non-stop. But the case has been reported to the police many times. When the police receive the report and know that it is she, they will just ignore her. I will say she has a mental problem from what I gather. But what I do not understand is why the management office has carried out the listening for two years. It is impossible (simply unacceptable) to spend two years like that on a case. It wasted a lot of manpower and money. [22]

[22] *About $28,000 per month for 4 security officers' wages X 24 = HK$672,000, approximately £55,000.*

7.5.3 *Renovation Noise*

Renovations of flats were common in the nodes. According to CSO RGSO32, there were three to four renovations every month, each usually taking about three weeks to complete. According to Supervisor LVSO06 in Langstone Village, there were between 15 to 20 renovations taking place every month. The majority of them were basic renovation conducted by the government in the government-owned flats. This usually takes one week to complete.

Various laws govern the prohibited times of operating construction machines in residential property, especially pneumatic drills. By law, it is prohibited to use pneumatic equipment between 7 p.m. and 7 a.m. every day, and 24 hours during public holidays. It was found that residents in both nodes would make complaints of renovation when they heard noises of construction, even if pneumatic equipment was not used. Moreover, since Rees Garden was privately owned by property owners, they had set up their own rules for renovation. According to the notice to renovation workers produced to the researcher by RGSO43, all renovations could only take place between 9 a.m. and 6 p.m., and all work must cease after 6 p.m. No construction or renovation work was allowed on public holidays. The study found that security personnel had to stop some work, whereas other involved stubborn tradespeople, which necessitated police intervention. RGSO26's experience showed how security officers were using their powers to govern renovation workers: 'solidarity amongst workers' built rapport between officers and workers.

RGSO26: *We will not allow renovation work after 6 pm or public holidays. Some renovation workers will continue drilling walls after 6 p.m. so residents will make complaints to us and we will need to stop them.*

Q: *Will they listen to you?*

RGSO26: *Most of them will listen because they know that we are also doing our job and don't want to give us a hard time. Some will want to finish off the last bit so they will try to continue. But if anyone makes a complaint, it will become a serious matter. The complainant is always right. We are in the service industry so we must stop them. We will need to call the police when they don't listen to us.*

7.5.4 *Construction Waste*

Another problem caused by renovation workers was construction waste fly tipping. Construction waste must be taken to the government's landfills, where a charge is levied. Anyone found dumping construction waste in a public place or rubbish collection points would subject to prosecution and the maximum penalty was six months of imprisonment. However, there were still renovation workers who would try to dump the waste inside private areas, since it saves time and money. Security officers had to monitor and stop such activities, as well as residents who tended to do the same. RGSO30 had experience of handling the dumping of construction waste. The incident had indicated that security officers were sometimes constrained by their 'employee' status when they use their powers in the estate. After the encounter with the tile trolley woman where he was left hanging by the management office, RGSO30 noted, "*What can I say? (The management office) wants to be the good guy. The resident is thinking that the security (staffers) is troublemakers so they become hostile to us. That is the problem*."

The incident had shown that security officers were delegated with powers to stop people dumping construction waste. In this respect, security officers were accused of abusing their powers by owner-violator, but had no trouble with exercising their powers with visitors or obliging residents.

7.5.5 *Water Seepage*

Air-conditioning dripping water is an offence in Hong Kong. It is also a source of Legionnaires' disease. The agent that causes Legionnaires' disease is transmitted via inhaling small droplets of water suspended in the air, which contain the bacteria, *Legionella pneumophila* (Health & Safety Executive, n.d.). The government has set up a Joint Office comprising of the Food and Environmental Hygiene Department and the Building Department to enforce the Public Health and Municipal Services Ordinance in abating the nuisances causing by water seepage. According to information of the Food and Environment Hygiene Department [FEHD] 2011:

> Where the source of seepage is identified, the person concerned will be issued with a Nuisance Notice requiring the abatement of nuisance within a specified period of time, failing which the person will be subject to prosecution. [23]

Air-conditioning units dripping water was a common water seepage problem in multi-storey buildings. Residents would not accept air-conditioners dripping water because it is annoying, as well as a matter of health and safety. The study found that there were over 1,430 air-conditioner dripping water complaints received in Rees Garden alone between September 2009 and September 2010. There were over 800 such complaints in Langstone Village during the same period. Security officers need to verify the locations of the water dripping. Some complainants would not let security officers enter their flats to find the sources of the dripping. Security officers would need to find the most desirable locations or plead with neighbouring residents to let them into their flats to verify the seepages and take photographs as evidences. RGSO37 described his physical efforts in verifying water dripping during the interview: "*I was like Spiderman climbing up and down to take the photos of the drip. Some residents are selfish. They won't let us into their flat to take a photo!*"

Unless expressly invited, security officers had no rights to enter a flat without the permission of the owners. Without the power of entering a flat, they could only use their persuasive skills to request residents to allow them access to their flats. RGSO37 had described his experience in gaining access to a flat:

> *I would keep telling them that I am doing my job and beg them to let me in, and promising them once the situation had been verified I will not need to bother them anymore. This way we are both out of trouble. Some will listen but some will still resist and tell us to go away.*

[23] *Upon conviction, the person concerned is liable to a maximum fine of HK$10,000 and a daily fine of HK$200. The Joint Office may also apply to the Court for a Nuisance Order requiring the person concerned to abate the nuisance. Failure to comply with the order will result in prosecution. Upon conviction, the penalty will be a maximum fine of HK$25,000 and a daily fine of HK$450.*

When the residents reluctantly let the security officers to enter their flats and no dripping was found, residents would feel vindicated and smeared. RGSO22 said that verbal abuse was common when this happened. "*No (one has made threats before), but verbal abuse is common. For example, when following up a complaint of a resident's air conditioner is dripping water, if it is not dripping, the resident will swear at me and blame me for bothering them.*"

Security officers do not have the power to prosecute the person causing seepage. However, on behalf of the complainant, who is the residents in this case, they could carry out an investigation on the complaints and verify the locations of water dripping. They would take photographs of the dripping and compile reports to the management office. The management office would issue a warning notice to the residents concerned hoping they would rectify the problems. If the dripping had not been rectified, the management office should seek the assistance of the FEHD to take legal actions against the offenders.

7.5.6 *Rubbish*

Leaving rubbish in the corridor was another common problem that affects the living conditions of the residents. In Rees Garden and Langstone Village, residents were allowed to place their rubbish at a designated collection point and were collected by cleaners every day at designated times. However, there were always residents who would throw rubbish, especially food scraps, in the corridor or lift lobby, causing sanitary problems. When receiving such complaints, security officers would need to verify the complaint and pass them to the cleaners. In order to keep the quality of life of the residents to a high standard, rubbish black spots were monitored. During the observation, RGSO21 went to one of the black spots and signed a patrol book. When questioned about the situation, RGSO21 noted that the personnel would advise violators to dispose of their refuse at the collection point.

RGSO21: *There were people dumping rubbish at the location. Usually they should dump the rubbish near the rear staircases but they dump the rubbish in the corridor. We have to monitor the location to make sure that they don't leave rubbish in the corridor. If we saw that we will*

advise them to dump it at the rear staircases (the collection point). We will put out a patrol book when we received complaints about dumping rubbish.

Q: *Will you take action proactively (before a complaint is made)?*

RGSO21: *No. because if there is a situation, the resident will have already made the complaint. Once there is a complaint we will need to take action. Leaving the leftover/rubbish will attract flies or insects and it is not hygienic. If there is someone who does not care much about the hygiene so we have to put a patrol book there to monitor the situation.*

7.5.7 *Smoking in the Communal Areas*

The Laws of Hong Kong Chapter 371-Smoking (Public Health) Ordinance Section 3 prohibited smoking in communal areas of residential building. Sometimes smokers either forgot to extinguish a cigarette when entering a building, or habitually lighted a cigarette whenever and wherever they wish. Security officers did not have the power to prosecute smokers who violated the laws. However, they were delegated with the property owners' power to stop them from continuing smoking. It was found that violators would usually submit to the powers of security officers in this aspect. The reasons could be attributed to three reasons. Firstly, extinguish a lighted cigarette requires relatively little effort. Secondly, security officers easily gain support from other residents at the scene who may object to second-hand smoke. Finally, smokers were used to a blanket public smoking ban outside the estate, and so they unconsciously submitted to the powers of the security officers. The experience of LVSO10 had shown that most smokers would submit to their powers in this respect, so long as it was requested cordially.

LVSO10: *We won't provoke them. We usually remind them nicely. For example, if I stopped someone smoking in the foyer I would say: 'Bro, sorry to bother you, it is forbidden to smoke in the foyer'. If you said, 'you can't smoke here' in a harsh tone, he will be angry.*

Q: *Will they listen to you?*

LVSO10: *Most of them will. They will usually automatically extinguish (their cigarettes) before entering the foyer.*

7.5.8 *'Improvisation' becomes the best practice to avoid the use of power*

Dixon (1997) states that police powers are simply exemptions from criminal or civil liability for what otherwise would be unlawful acts and most citizens will submit to police power and authority without questioning their legality and legitimacy. Generally, police powers can be categorized under three main types. Statute power is the major source of police power that police are employed to handle legislatively prohibited activity. The second type of police power comes from common law and judicial interpretation of codes and statutes in which judges or courts extend police powers to protect citizen rights during *ad hoc* situation, such as in a riot. The last source of police power are the codified powers when police officers enforce criminal law procedure. Dixon (1997) further points out that the police do not need to have legal powers for everything that they do. Like other ordinary people, they may do anything the law does not forbid. The public believe that the police possess draconian powers and are able to do anything they want to do. Consequently, the public will seek police assistance whenever they think an action is necessary.

Davis (1977: 4) defines discretion as follows: `A public officer has discretion whenever the effective limits on his power leave him free to make a choice among possible courses of action or inaction' (as cited in Holmberg, 2000). Skolnick (1994) has identified two types of discretion. Delegated discretion is conceived as part of police work and subject to public and organisation monitor. Unauthorized discretion is used according to individual officer's personal views. Unauthorized discretion is not uncommon and it is hard to scrutinize. It suggests that police officers are, to a large extent, free to make decisions whether to enforce the law. Reiner (2000) points out that the police inevitably have discretion in the enforcement of laws because there will not be adequate resources for full law enforcement, and even laws that are precisely worded will need interpretation in practical situations. It will eventually

exhaust police resources if the police do not respond to requests selectively. The level of discretion indicates police attitude on law enforcement and their orientation of their role in the criminal justice system. Schulenberg (2010) found that when informal mechanisms of social control weaken, the police use a higher quantity of law, be it penal, compensatory, conciliatory, or therapeutic. In other words, police are more prepared to take legal action against any who break the laws. Cockcroft (2012) suggests that discretion is one of the police organisational and occupational cultures which help understand how employments structures have come to shape the way police officers make sense of their working world and the place within it. For instance, police forces which adopts a 'crime fighting' approach will have less discretion on inaction when enforcing the law. It also informs the level of social control acceptable by government or the society at large.

By contrast, security officers, although being considered by many people as a kind of private police, do not enjoy any extra legal power. They possess the same legal powers as an ordinary citizen. More important is security officers do not have any coercive or prosecution power like the police do. Hence, security officers do not have any discretion whether to make a choice among possible courses of action or inaction, especially in crime matter. The only choice is to call the police when crime has occurred. Security officer's powers in residential housing can be considered as weak compare to the public police in this sense. However, they are delegated by property owners to exercise property owners' powers on their behalf when they are carrying out security duties. Property owners and tenants expect them to use their delegated powers to stop any irregularity. The exercise of delegated powers does not involve making arrest or prosecution of an offender or rule breaker. But, they are expected to carry out 'full enforcement' of the rules set out by the property owners. This leave security officer not many choices. And when the situation has lost control, security officers reluctantly have to call for police assistance. Since security officers are not delegated any extra legal power, they need to improvise tactics when dealing with incidents inside housing estates.

Schulenberg (2010) found that police decision-making is a dynamic process and a decision to arrest is made based situational evidence whether the incident is founded, the degree and type of formal social control (or quantity and style of law) that will be

used in the youth-related incident and if a charge is to be laid the officer must decide upon the method of compelling appearance in court. The study found that security officers can only convince young adults who have a great potential to cause nuisance to leave while they were found hanging around at night in their nodes. Likewise, when dealing with domestic cases, security officers will not arrest the suspect and handover to the police. The study found that when attending a domestic dispute/violence incident, security officers will request the victim to inform the police rather making an arrest or action, no matter there is strong evidence showing an assault has been committed. As LVSO08 said in the interview: "*I will try to smooth the situation if possible. I will not call the police but I will suggest the victim to call the police if s/he feels any danger*". Research found that police have a great discretionary power in dealing with similar cases. For example Grant and Rowe (2011) found that officers who do not agree with organisational policy will use their discretions whether to utilise the risk assessment process (meaning an arrest will be made) as required by the pro-arrest policy in domestic violence case. Decisions are made based on situations where, contrary to policy, an experienced police officer will decide not to arrest due to a variety of significant factors such as level of violence.

One common complaint is noise nuisance in the nodes. The lack of coercive and prosecution powers makes security officers face difficulties when dealing with noise nuisance complaint. For a state police officer, if the offender does not stop the nuisance police officer can make an arrest. However, security officers do not possess such power. So when dealing with this kind of complaint security officers need to utilize persuasion powers (Wrong, 1979) rather than legal powers which they do not have, to stop an offender continuing with his/her acts. When the situation cannot be rectified the last resort is to seek police assistance. Security officers will not usually call the police in front of the offender to avoid provoking them. Instead they will make the call from behind the scenes or through their control room.

The study found that it is common for security officers to avoid calling the police for assistance. There were reasons for them trying not to involve the police. The majority of the incidents are non-criminal and calling the police does not really help the matter much. If the police decide to prosecute the offender, the reporting officer will

need to be the witness if the case goes to court. The company will need to release the officer from his normal duty. It will incur extra manpower (wages) which the company considers as a loss to profit. Although most companies will not say explicitly not to make an arrest, they implicitly outline in their company instruction that 'arrest should be made by the police where possible'. Such policy can be attributed to the lack of exemptions from criminal or civil liability. The major concern is to avoid accusations of wrongful arrest through civil litigation by the arrestee. Secondly, litigation takes time and time is money for the company. As said in the previous section, security companies run a commercial business and resources (manpower-time and money) are valuable. It is also the case in the state police. Cross and Newbold (2010) found that the decision to arrest has consequences not only for an offender but also for the arresting officer and for the police as an organisation. Arrests involve time and resources, with an arrestee taken to the police station followed by several hours completing and then filing appropriate documentation and followed months later by often lengthy court procedures which require the officer to give evidence. If the case fails and/or the arrest proves unwarranted, the officer may be subjected to different watchdogs such as media, Police Authority and police superiors. Police officers are reluctant to arrest unless they are sure of their grounds. Under these circumstances, security officers have to improvise their strategies rather than using their discretion in handling complaint or irregularities.

7.6 Conclusion

This chapter revealed how the security officers exercise some of their power during their daily operations. They possess the power of citizen's arrest but they were reluctant to use this power to make a formal arrest. The study found that security officers did not usually make an arrest as a pragmatic choice:

The more people involved, the more chances the suspect could find technicalities during the arrest and be acquitted in court; If a citizen's arrest was made, there was a problem of putting the arrestee into safe custody; The police would come swiftly when an incident had occurred, and so it was not necessary for them to make the arrest in the first instance; When force was used during an arrest, the security officers

were open to accusations of using excessive force, fighting in a public place, assault or wrongful arrest.

Security officers were also delegated with the property owners' power. In the case of impounding vehicles, the property management office can levy a fee for releasing the vehicle. In other aspects, property owners do not have the powers to prosecute offenders who violate government regulations or break the laws, except where the violation involves the conditions in the Deed of Mutual Covenant in which they will take legal action by civic litigation. Security officers would need to seek police assistance when the violators or offenders would not submit to their powers. In some cases, security officers could only refer the violations to relevant government departments for taking legal actions. They will refer offences that affect the residents' quality of life, such as noise pollution and water seepages, to relevant government departments because they do not have any prosecution powers.

Although the powers of the security officers were constrained by the Laws and their status, the findings indicated that they could still protect the residents by utilizing their universal legal powers. Since their delegated legal powers are limited to estate's perimeter, their major role is to maintain the 'parochial orders' and the quality of life of the residents. Security officers have developed alternative strategies to handle the situations in the estates when they their powers are insufficient or failed to gain authority. This strategy is grounded in a pragmatic outlook which emphasized the outcome rather than the procedure or the principle, and can be used in other similar settings in which security officers' powers are limited.

8 CHAPTER EIGHT:

Security Officers in the nodes:

'*persons of versatility*'

8.1 Introduction

This chapter will examine the different roles that security officers play in their daily operation. In a residential security context, the major task of private policing was to maintain order whilst keeping the peace, especially when it comes to pursuing litigation. At the same time, the security personnel need to preserve the quality of life of the residents. The reasons they have adopted these roles and their contributions will be examined. It argues that constrains on their power, and their employee status in residential security are the major factors that has created their roles in non-crime mediation that is often the mundane staple of state policing as well.

Research suggests that security officers can be more powerful than the state police in policing private communal spaces when they adopt a parapolice orientation (Jones & Newburn, 1998; Stenning, 2000; McLeod, 2002; Rigakos, 2002; Button, 2004; Berg, 2010). The claim is based on the finding that security officers can exercise their delegated property owners' powers to refuse entry to 'unwelcome visitor' or evict undesirable people, while the state police will not be able to do so in private property settings (Winlow, 2001; Hobbs *et al*., 2003; Wakefield, 2003; Button, 2007).

However, residential settings, as opposed to a commercial entertainment venue, complicate the power of refusal; in some situations, private security personnel cannot exercise their powers effectively. The property owners and residents politically and economically control their delegated powers. The personnel are only expected to exercise the delegated powers on non-residents, but seldom residents and almost never owners despite their pivotal role in 'breaking the rules'. Moreover, there is a conflict of roles with their status as an employee on payroll, as they have to both serve and police their 'masters' inside the node.

As a result, their role as a private police cannot be sustained or is considerably diminished when they need to exercise their powers on the residents. Crime prevention, order maintenance, and governance of security are the core concerns of policing in a community. Apart from this, as a service industry, private policing in residential estates emphasizes on the residents' quality of life. Security provision became focused on neighbourhood safety because of government's regulation on the industry, the economic power relations between the security officers and the policed, the limitations on security officer's powers, and the characteristic of incidents in densely populated residential estates. Figure 4 shows how Hong Kong private security officers become a unique type of private policing agent.

Figure 4: The Forming of the Resident-oriented Service Style of Private Policing



In this context, security officers focus on providing and maintaining the condition of being without threat – the state of 'being protected from' – which may be described as avoidance or non-exposure to danger to the residents (Zedner, 2003). In residential security context, they are involved in providing quality of life police services - the kind of police services that the state police are having difficulty providing because of resource shortages. In other words, security officers fill the vacuum in state policing and provide any and all necessary services to the residents in an attempt to meet their expectations on policing their local community.

8.2 The Roles of Security Officers in Rees Garden and Langstone Village

Security officers are found working mainly as manned guards, patrol officers, customer services officers, prison escort officers, door supervisors, and bodyguards (McManus, 1995; Jones & Newburn, 1998; Christie, 2000; Noaks, 2000 & 2008; Winlow, 2001; Adu-Boakye, 2002; Button, 2002, 2004 & 2007; Button & John, 2002; McLeod, 2002; Rigakos, 2002; Jason-Lloyd, 2003; Wakefield, 2003; Avant, 2005; Crawford *et al*., 2005; Sharp *et al*., 2008). Guarding is the first and foremost role of security officers. However, there are other important roles security officers will need to play in residential security. RGSO29's description of his roles in Rees Garden had provided us information on the main duties of the security officers in residential housing estates, succinctly put as 'life, property, and order':

Our instructions in here are to protect the life and property of the residents and to keep the buildings in order in the estates. For example, vehicles should be parked properly at designated spaces, making sure that the lifts are operating normally, report water leakages or lightings for repair etc.

The findings in Rees Garden and Langstone Village indicated that security officers in private residential housing estates were wearing an assortment of hats. Some of them were similar, but not identical, to those that had been discovered in previous research conducted by other scholars.

8.3 The Different Roles Discovered amongst the Security Officers

Security officers in residential housing estates were found acting as Guardian; Executor of regulations and orders; Independent witness; Mediator; 'Scapegoat'; De facto front line police officer; and customer services officer.

8.3.1 *More than a Guardian*

Although security services in residential housing were found to cover many dimensions, guarding is still without a doubt the primary activity. The research found that the security officers in the study were expected to prevent and deter crimes inside the nodes. It is common that security provisions in preventing and deterring crimes adopted the concepts of the Routine Activity Theory [RAT] (Clarke, 1996). Routine activity approach assumed that for a predatory crime to occur, a minimum of three elements: 1. a likely offender, 2. a suitable target, and 3. absence of a capable guardian against crime, must converge in time and space. The objective of the guardian is to deter a likely offender and to protect the suitable target. The presence of a guardian may not deter a crime to occur but the absence of a guardian is surely increased the risk of criminal attack on the target. Target of crime can be a person or object in a position at risk and likely being attacked. The findings indicated that the security officers in Rees Garden and Langstone Village were acting as the guardian in respect of the RAT in protecting the residents, their properties, and the common facilities. They were deployed to patrol the estate area and guarding at stationary posts to deter criminality.

Moreover, they would also try to eliminate the chance of potential offenders from appearing within the premises in the first place. The common method adopted to deter potential criminal or refusing a malefactor from entering the building was by way of registering a stranger's personal identity details on a registry book. An alternative proof of identity to the HKID carried by all permanent residents that security officers could accept was a company staff card, as suggested by the SGSIA's Manual for Security Personnel Providing Guarding Services in Buildings (SGSIA, 2012b). The police can find a person easily by tracing his/her HKID number or through the company. People without any of these documents were either

illegal immigrants or visitors. A person who does not want to reveal his identity may do so for a variety of reasons, not least a desire to uphold the principle of privacy. However, a person who refused to produce these documents is considered as suspicious by 'guardians 'standards' and security officers would not grant access to them. LVSO11 had described her daily duties in the interview, in which visitors had to pass a shibboleth by providing the resident's name.

I am a Tower Guard in the foyer. I need to keep an eye on the main and rear entrances. I need to keep an eye on the strangers and the debt collectors and ask them to register and ask them where they are going. If they are carrying anything suspicious, like a bucket of paint or inflammable liquids, I will stop them from entering. The name of their friend must correspond to that of the flat they are visiting. I can roughly remember where most of the resident lives. If I feel that they are all right, I will let them go up; if in doubt, I will stop them and tell them it is the wrong flat. I will not let them go into the building.

This tactic was employed by LVSO09 to verify a person's capacity during the observation by the researcher when a suspicious person is spotted shadowing a resident who had entered the secured building: the person was a friend of the resident. The observation is summarized as follow:

LVSO09 was sitting at the counter desk monitoring the CCTVs and the main entrance. A female resident entered the building using the security code to open the gate and a man was following her about a metre behind. She stood up from her sitting position behind the desk and said politely to them, 'Excuse me! Are you together?' The woman replied, 'Yes, we are together. He is my friend'. She smiled and said, 'Thank you very much!' and sat down to continue her work.

Likewise, security officers would stop and request a stranger to register before allowing access to the buildings. The following observation had shown that LVSO12 was acting as a guardian in controlling the access to the property. Security officer

LVSO12 was sitting at the counter desk monitoring the CCTVs and the main entrance.

A man entered the block following a resident who used the security code to enter. She stopped him by saying: 'Excuse me Mister, are you a resident in this block?' The man replied, 'I am visiting my friend'. She requested the man to register his details by saying, 'If you are not a resident, according to our company instructions you will need to register by giving some of your details before I can let you going in'. The man walked to the front of the desk. She took out the register book and let the man fill in the required details. The man was allowed to proceed.

The researcher later learned that the register included the name, HKID number, telephone number and the flat the person is visiting. While private security personnel could not stop and search a suspected person, they could tactically use their powers delegated to them by the property owners to question the person and verify the identity of a person they perceived as a potential offender. Dixon (1997) points out that most police work entails duties that do not involve the use of coercive powers, and police do what the law does not forbid. Security officers act the same when they need to 'act'. They will request the visitor to let them 'have a look' in their possessions. When a visitor agrees, it means a concern is secured and the search can no longer be considered as illegal or forbidden. Dixon (1997) found with the New South Wales police if a person refuses to give consent for a search or answer a question, the person would be talked, bluffed or coerced into giving the information and allowing the search to take place. This strategy is also adopted by security officers when they have identified a suspected person. They could deny access to the building if their request is not accepted by any non-resident. This method was not only effective in preventing crime but it also helped to trace the possible perpetrator when a crime did happen.

Crime prevention actions taken by security officers were not limited to physical security such as the protection of property. They were also protecting vulnerable people such as the elderly being defrauded. LVSO02 had been stopping salespersons that were deemed to be using fraudulent marketing techniques to deceive residents,

especially the elderly. LVSO02 had described the incident in the interview where such sellers were stopped at the foyer 'because they are cheating the residents'.

LVSO02: *Because of the World Cup, those salespersons are trying to ask people to install satellite TV equipment to watch it. But they are using improper selling methods, so we do not let them in. They were defrauding the residents. Those salespersons went up there and tried to sell the set-top boxes. They told people if they do not buy the set-top box they would not be able to receive any TV programmes very soon[24]. At the same time, they are asking people to sign a contract to watch the extra pay channels. Once you signed the contract, you will need to buy (the package) and pay extra.*

Q: *Why do you bother?*

LVSO02: *They are cheating the residents. We have to stop them at the foyer.*

The preventive measures taken by security officers were not limited to deter crime. The 'snowflake' policy was used to inform careless clients on the potential danger of leaving their properties insecure (McManus, 2005; Button, 2007). Shearing and Shenning (1983) illustrated 'Snowflake' policy as "For each risk found, the patrolling security officer fills out and leave a courteous form, called a 'snowflake', which gives the particular insecure condition found, such as valuable property left out, unlocked doors and…." (as cited in Wood & Shearing, 2007, p. 25). They would also eliminate the potential targets for the potential offenders.

Security guards were found to be a promising technique of formal surveillance in preventing vehicle crime when implemented in car parks by Welsh & Farrington (2009). In Rees Garden, car owners are requested to register their telephone numbers and addresses at the Security Office. It could be considered as a compromised crime preventive measure between the property owners and the management office. When

[24] *Hong Kong was in the process of a digital switchover for terrestrial television – however, a free-to-view set-top box option was available without any of the cable packages and obligations.*

the security officers found a potential target such as a car window left opened, they would take more proactive actions to prevent crime. RGSO22 had explained that he needed to take informant actions when he comes across such a situation: "*I need to check on vehicles in the car park. If there is a vehicle window left open, I will need to inform the control to tell the owner to sort it out*."

The 'Polite-questioning' method enabled them to carry out the 'stop and question' task with suspect visitors. The 'Registering' method helped them to prevent unwelcome people to disturb the residents or potential offenders as they approach their potential targets. These were pragmatic techniques to exercise their powers. When knowing that potential crimes might occur, they would make use of their identity – as guardians, no less – and try to prevent the potential offenders from approaching the targets or protect the target from being attacked. In this respect, they fulfil the role of a guardian in deterring or preventing a potential offender to appear as suggested in the Routine Activity Theory. When they knew that there was criminality going on or a crime might otherwise occur, they would take more proactive and aggressive actions to eliminate the chances of these happening. In this way, they also maintained the quality of life of the residents. They were expected to prevent any undesirable incident that would cause inconvenience or affect the livelihoods of the residents. The experiences of LVSO10 and LVSO05 had shown that maintaining the quality of life of the residents in a vaguely pastoral manner was also an important aspect of their duties, especially when it comes to juvenile anti-social behaviour.

Patrol the block and check in at the electronic check points. Look around to check the lightings for failures, damages to fire hose/hydrant and report anything that went wrong, like fly tipping or building maintenance matters. Sometimes, there would be some teenagers drinking and talking at the staircases late at night. They were making noises. Sometimes they will set things on fire just for fun. So I said to them, 'It is late now. Don't make your parents worry, better go home early.' In doing so, I reduced the risk of a fire and damages to the building. (LVSO10, Interview record, 2011)

Security Guard LVSO05 had some unpleasant encounters with teenagers and alleged substance abusers fouling the environment while working as a Tower Guard.

Corridor lights failure, lift failure, someone having a dump in the corridor failure. Human, not dog! It's not just my block. Every block is like this. Usually teenagers would do that after midnight. Folks would get drunk and throw up and have a shit right on the spot. (LVSO05, Interview record, 2011)

The protection of life was also one of the security officers' prime duties. Protection of life might not involve stopping a violent act against a person, for instance: it can be stopping a person from committing suicide or keeping them away from a safety hazard. LVSO09 stated that she might have saved the life of an elderly resident from neglect by emergency responders.

I have done a super job in one incident with a paramedic. They were taking a man in his seventies home who was released from the hospital. Usually they are cured and in a good condition when released. I looked at the old man and I said to the paramedics, 'Sir, the old man is not moving. Why are you sending him back?' Then he gently slaps the old man's faces and calls him. The old man did not respond. I said, 'It is outrageous. If I didn't catch that you would have sent him upstairs. The old man would have died at home.' They took him back at once. The old man came back about two months later and died after one year. (LVSO09, Interview record, 2011)

The incident not only shows that security officers were responsible for protecting the lives of the residents, it also shows that they had a preliminary familiarity with the residents' personal circumstances, such as family relationships and health status. Therefore, it can be argued that they were acting as more than a guardian in respect of the RAT. Security officers not only protect the residents from crime but also protect the residents from danger in non-crime matters.

8.3.2 *An Executor of 'Parochial Orders'*

'Parochial orders' were usually issued by the IO/OC on behalf of the property owners, corresponding to the Deed of Mutual Covenant conditions, or on the demands of the residents. A similar phenomenon was found in Australia by Mazerolle and Ransley (2005) that local authority develop standards for sanitary and safety, animals, noise and other nuisances.

The study found that security officers have to execute the orders inside the estate perimeters frequently. For example, dog keeping was prohibited in Rees Garden and Langstone Village and the rule was laid down in the Deed of Mutual Covenant for the owners. In the case of Langstone Village, tenants were regulated by their tenancy agreements. However, many residents violate the restriction by keeping dogs inside their flats. Security officers were responsible for requesting the owners to stop the impropriety before the management office would take any legal actions. Vehicles parked in prohibited places were common problem in the nodes. Sometimes they would encounter oppositions and confrontations. Although it has been revealed that their powers were politically constrained, sometimes they can still exercise their persuasive powers when they found the situation is in their favour.

RGSO28 had described one of his experiences in maintaining the traffic order in the Rees Garden, where an assertion of dominance by a resident backfired when security personnel asked him to produce his ID.

There was a young twenty-something who was driving his girlfriend home. He stopped at a location where it you are not allowed to park. I went up and told him to move his car forward a bit. He wouldn't move because he wanted to show his girlfriend his power. I needed to call the white shirt (SO) to deal with him. He was arrogant and claimed that he would complain against us. (My SO and I) had both had lost our tempers at that time. We took him to the security office and let him make the complaint. We asked (the couple) to show his ID card so we could make a record of the complaint. He was scared and refused to show the ID. He was done and left the office. We followed him, swearing at him. He kept his mouth shut. He thought he could humiliate me. He could have when I was new to this job but not after I knew

the way it works now. I will talk reason. If you are right I will shut up, but if you don't have a reason I will fight back now. (RGSO28, Interview record, 2011)

Another problem that concerned the security officers in Langstone Village was illegal hawkers. According to the supervisor in Langstone Village, some of these hawkers would not submit to their powers because they too were residents. The researcher interviewed one hawker MF1 who was hawking in several estates in the district area who agreed to participate in the study. When questioned about the view on the power of the security officers he stated that his avoidance approach stemmed from reciprocity – give respect, get respect – and it was the IO who ordered the ban.

MF1: I am a sushi hawker. Sometimes the 'Sik Q' will intervene. But it depends on the individual officer. When they come, I will put the food inside the boxes and walk away for a while when they are walking past. They will feel that I am 'giving them face (respect)'[25]*. Recently when I was hawking in the estate I live they (the Incorporated Owners)asked security officers to bother me.*

Q: How do they trouble you?

MF1: The Company ask 5 to 6 officers to surround me and take photos. When some kids come to buy food, the officer will ask them not to buy from me. They try to take (confiscate) my food but they don't have that power. They can ask me to leave but they cannot take my food. I refused to let them take my food so the police were called.

Q: Who calls the police?

MF1: They did. Even if they took my food, I would not call the police. I consider it a waste of police time and resource.

Q: What did the police do when they came?

[25] *In this instance, the Chinese sociological concept of face is closely related to hierarchy. Unlicensed hawkers are a rung below 'rule' enforcers and defer to the latter.*

MF1: The police saw that I have covered the food inside the boxes. I was not selling and not really causing an obstruction. The police usually will request me to leave and stop wasting their time. I did not ask them to come. The security officer called them!

Q: Did they ask other department to come also?

MF1: Yes, they did. They have asked Hawker control officer from the Food, Health and Environmental department to come and catch me. If they come, all I can do is run.

Q: What happen if they catch you?

MF1: I will need to go before the court. If you are selling cooked food, it will depend on how many charges they press. If they only charge me with causing obstruction, it will be a smaller fine. A good judge will fine less and a bad one will fine more.

Q: But it is inside a private area?

MF1: The security company 'requested' the hawker control officers to come and they need to pay them a fee. They need to pay a fee to the government. (The hawker control officers) don't have the power to come into the estate. This estate is considered a private estate. They have come several times and caught me before.

Q: Did they catch you every time they come?

MF1: No. When I see them coming I will run with my stuff if possible. Otherwise, I will leave the stuff and run away.

Q: Any other methods they will use?

MF1: The IO said I have violated the Deed of Mutual Covenant. They send me a letter from a lawyer claiming to fine me $1,000 and ask me to pay. I considered going through the court. I phoned the law firm and questioned them. They admitted that the IO employed them to send me the letter. The

management company asked them to send me the letter. I asked them why I needed to pay the fine. They told me they charged the IO so the IO asked me to pay. I told them it is nonsense that I pay someone to fine myself! I asked them if I should pay the law firm and asked for their bank account number but they said no. They said that I should pay the management office. I think it is not my business. They employed the law firm to fine me and I need to pay the legal fee. It is like shooting myself in the foot! Ridiculous!

Q: *Did you pay?*

MF1: *Of course not!*

Q: *Did they take further action?*

MF1: *Until now, no.*

Q: *Do you submit to the way they have acted?*

MF1: *Of course not. They have the power to ask me to leave but they do not have the power to take my things. I asked a lawyer before and he told me I could call the police if they take my things. But I never let that happen. Why should I let them take my things if they do not have the power? Why should I submit to that? They just try to scare me.*

Order maintenance was one of the daily tasks carried out by the security officers in Rees Garden and Langstone Village. The security officers were responsible for maintaining order as instructed by the property management office, but the requests sometimes would meet opposition due to their limited powers. Confrontations were common, and security officers would need to stand firm when executing their duties. Some situations are hopeless when the violator is also the rule maker.

A similar phenomenon was found by Button (2007) in his study in the Armed Industry while security officers were carrying out identity and speed checks. In such case, it will depend on the decision of the property management office. They can take legal action if they consider necessary or worthwhile. Sometimes, security

officers will need to seek the assistance of other relevant government departments depending on the property management company's orientation in taking legal action.

8.3.3 *An Independent Witness*

It is quite common that security officers would discover an alleged crime or handle a situation that needed the assistance or investigation of the state police during their patrols. Security officers would preserve evidence, although not necessarily in a professional manner, for the victim of an alleged crime. This helped both the victim and further police investigation. RGSO23 was observed handling an alleged criminal damage on a vehicle during the observation: photographic evidence was captured at the suggestion of the personnel before state police was involved.

Security Guard RGSO41 radioed the Control and said that a resident told him in passing that the rear windscreen of a car was broken at an open-air parking lot. The Control SO radioed Security Officer RGSO23 to come to the security office. Meanwhile, the SO telephoned the car owner, informed her of the incident and requested her to attend the scene. The SO briefed SO RGSO23 on the incident and told him to get a digital camera and take some photos of the vehicles. The researcher followed SO RGSO23 to the scene. SO RGSO23 told the researcher that he would look around the vehicle and the building to check for possible causes of the damages, like any hard objects or any renovation going on in the building. He took a few photos of the damages, recorded the vehicle's details and location. Then he stayed at the scene for the police arrival. When a police officer came, he told him about the incident and let him continue his work. The car owner arrived later, the police officer asked her a few questions, and they walked away. SO RGSO23 returned to the security office and reported what had happened.

Apart from crimes, they were also involved in some trivial offences that residents knowingly or unknowingly committed. The most common offences they have to handle were residents causing excessive noise after 11 p.m. at night and residents' air-conditioners dripping water into the open spaces or onto others' air-conditioners

causing noise and nuisance. They were not empowered to prosecute the offenders like other government agents could do. Their duties were to verify the facts and try to request the offenders to rectify the situation. When the offenders would not rectify the situation, security officers would take appropriate action such as calling the police, or informing the property management officers to issue warning letters to the offenders. Although security officers could not and would not do any kind of crime investigation, their attendance at a crime scene and the immediate action taken provided valuable information for the police and the victims. They were acting as an independent witness at the scenes in this sense.

8.3.4 *A Mediator*

There were different kinds of incidents occurring inside the blocks that would disturb the livings of the residents. For instance, there were residents who were causing noise pollution from renovation or nuisance that disturbed the neighbourhood or perturbed neighbours. The security officers do not have the powers to prosecute the offenders. The incidents should formally be handled by making a complaint to government departments, such as the Police. Excessively loud noises could be handled by the state police immediately but it might lead to a hostile atmosphere within the neighbourhood. Noise pollution should be handled by the Food, Environmental and Hygiene Department [FEHD] but the process would take some time. Since the incident occurred within private property, the FEHD would require the management office to take initial steps before they would take any action leading to a prosecution in any case.

Security Trainer PB10, also working as a security manager, had described his experiences in handling a complaint of excessive noise where co-operation from private security personnel, in the form of documentation on action taken, was actively sought by the FEHD.

There was a complaint of noise pollution before. The FEHD will need a formal written complaint from us first. We will need to inform the FEHD in writing with documentary proof of what we have done in dealing with the complaint. They

will assess the situation, provide necessary assistance, like measuring the level of noise pollution, and charge the offender. (PB10, Interview record, 2011)

The residents would seek the assistance of security personnel in an attempt to avoid personal confrontation. Security officers would act as a mediator, attending the scene to request the violators to rectify the situation. Since security officers were not law enforcers, and no legal action would be taken, the interventions were usually peaceful and most violators would accept and rectify the problems. As Ericson (2007) points out that "… in many spheres of private policing, crimes are handled internally with no intention of calling the public police or of otherwise invoking the criminal process…. Private police operate within the procedural logic of their own private justice system".

Although security officers were usually dealing with noncriminal incidents where they adopted the same procedural logic, government official interventions were required when offenders did not submit to their request. In such case, either assistance of the police or the relevant government departments would be sought.

8.3.5 *A Customer Service Officer*

It was found that security officers were not solely responsible for the guarding of the property but also other physical security measures. In the SGSIA Security Officer Manual, there are guidelines of their secondary duties. This includes what to do in case of fire; when a Typhoon signal is hoisted; in case of power failure; gas leak; lift failure; and falling object. Sometimes they were responding to 'non-physical-security' related incidents. These are laid down in the 'Building Management' section inside the manual. This includes checking on the environmental hygiene of the buildings, reporting erection of unauthorized structures or other encroachment on communal areas, and noise nuisance.

These are longstanding duties in the provisions of security or guarding services. Their genealogy can be traced to early watchmen style of guarding residential

buildings. But they are usually being ignored or simply not recognized as a kind of policing services. Similar services were carried out in the UK in the 1970s by resident caretakers who were employed to maintain the buildings and grounds, assist residents with needs related to their flats, and serve as a visible presence in public housing estates (Mayhew & Clarke, 1980; Cooke, 2005). They were providing a service that was aiming to improve the quality of life of the residents.

Residents would telephone the Control and request for assistance such as a complaint of salespersons knocking on doors, venders shouting in corridors, or a noisy neighbour. Some elderly people living alone would also like to chat with the Tower Guards. The guards had perceived themselves as a service provider rather than a rule/law enforcer.

For instance, RGSO30 had given an example of what he had done in dealing with a request – 'the customer is always right' attitude saves the day.

I always treat them as customers. What they say is always correct. For example, if someone approached me and said there is a lady talking loudly, I will handle the complaint and request the lady to lower her voice even if she wasn't talking loudly. I will approach the woman and say to her, 'Miss, please, can you lower your voice a bit because someone's mood is affected by your noise?' We cannot stop her. We can only request. At least the complainant saw that I did something. (RGSO30, Interview record, 2011)

As a customer services officer, security officers would need to take care of the quality of life aspect of the residents. These kinds of incidents often would have troubled the state police because they could not really take any action on the violators. As a 'customer service officer', they were vulnerable to accusations that they could not defend in some cases. SSO RGSO34 described how he had handled a complaint against one of his subordinates at a cost to his pride as follow:

We will have to bite the bullet because the 'customer is always right' in the service industry. It is the name of the game. It is impossible for us to argue with a customer. For instance, there was an incident at kiosk B. Vehicles are only allowed

to park on the left hand side of the road. But one day a vehicle was parked on the right hand side of the road right in front of kiosk B. It was a goods vehicle and it wasn't supposed to be there. I heard a call from a colleague about it. I usually wouldn't ask another colleague to go because when a colleague did that it usually means there is a problem. I went out at once. An OC member was at the scene and said to me, 'Your colleague is sitting inside the kiosk and doing nothing about the parked vehicle. He calls on the radio only when he sees me walking around the vehicle.' He was complaining that my colleague was not proactive enough. But my colleague has claimed that he was dealing with the vehicle and didn't know why the OC member said that. I have to believe the OC member. I cannot say he was wrong. If I believed my colleague the OC member will blame me, saying that I am saying he is a liar. There is no choice. At the management level, I will need to ask my colleague "to eat the dead cat" (to take it on the chin).[26]

The employer-employee relationship between the residents and the security officers had placed them on the horns of a dilemma. On one hand, the residents were their employers. On the other hand, their employers sometimes might violate the conditions of the parochial orders laid down in the Deed of Mutual Covenant, for instance the keeping of pet dogs.

In order to overcome this dilemma, security officers had turned policing of the estate into a service and adopted the role of a customer services officer. Instead of challenging their employers, as police officers might do to citizens, they would humbly request or demand violators, as the case may be, to rectify their problems by reminding them of the rules and regulations inside the estate. This extended to any person entering the estate perimeter for different purposes.

[26]*Literally, 'being forced to eat the dead cat', with connotations of grotesque helplessness and injustice.*

8.3.6 *A De Facto Frontline State Police Officer*

Security officers were not considered a police officer in any sense either by the residents or by themselves, even if they were found doing most of the work a front line police officer would commonly need to perform. They do not conflate or equate their jobs with front line of police officers, but there are challenges, perquisites and expectation attached to them.

Usually a security officer would attend the scene when a resident had made a request or complaint. In some incidents, the actions they took were similar to those taken by the beat patrol police officers. It could be attributed to the demands of the end-users and their trainings. Security Trainer PB10 described some aspects of the trainings as heavily focused on proactivity:

Nowadays, security officers are not just guarding. We always suggest and encourage them to do more (so long as it's not over-the-top), or to be more proactive. Customers are very demanding nowadays. For example, when they are attending a scene of crime, we expect them to look around for suspicious persons because the suspect may not have left the scene yet. We expect them to be able to preserve the scene for the police. If there are victims, we expect them to comfort the victims by talking to them. They may get descriptions of the perpetrator so other officers can try to spot the suspect. If there are injuries, we don't expect them to do much because it may do more harm than good, but we tell them to keep the injured secure and comfortable. Emergency services come quickly enough nowadays so we don't have to worry about first aid. Many of them are not trained (in first aid) anyway.

Security officers sometimes attend incidents and need to handle the situation before the police arrive. An 'Acrobat' is a jargon used by the police and security officers, meaning a person who committed suicide by falling from height. According to LVSO05, this happened twice a year in Langstone Village during his tenure. LVSO09 could be considered the most experienced officer in dealing with 'Acrobats' because she had experienced six incidents in three years. Although they were not trained on the matter, they will need to act like a front line police officer

usually does. When an 'Acrobat' case had occurred, security officers would adopt similar procedures to those a trained police officer would need to perform. LVSO08 had handled such an incident while he was on duty: cordoning off the area, covering the deceased with black bin-liners, and waiting for the police and coroner to arrive.

Q: *Have you ever come across any special incidents before?*

LVSO08: *I have handled an 'acrobat'. Just outside the security office.*

Q: *How did it happen?*

LVSO08: *I just saw her flying down. I was walking out of the Control Room and she was just flying down. Nearly hit me! I heard an 'Ah…..' sound and saw her drop there.*

Q: *What happened then?*

LVSO08: *I took a walkie-talkie, two big black bin liners and went out. Hay (the Control Room security officer) called the police. She radioed the officers in the open spaces to come back and help. We used the red and white ribbon to cordon the area off and stop people from entering the area. We covered the body with the plastic bags so that nobody can see it. Then we waited for the police to arrive.*

Frequently, residents would request the assistance from the security officers for non-criminal matters. The experience of LVSO01 in a 'Discovery of dead body' incident would show that security officers were acting similar to a beat patrol police officer. The only notable differences were that security officers would wait for the police and handover the scene to them, a police officer who had found a dead body would wait for superiors and Scene of Crime Officer to take over.

Q: *What incident would you deal with on your own?*

LVSO01: *Someone died inside the flat - an old person died in his flat.*

Q: *Can you describe it?*

LVSO01: *Usually it's the neighbours who'd discover that. They reported to the police about a smell. Sometimes they will call us. We went there when we knew about it. I guarded the door and didn't let anyone go in. Burnt some joss sticks and bowed a few time (to the body, show some respect) while I am outside. The incense can cover the smell of the dead body. The smell really stinks.*

Q: *What will you do then?*

LVSO01: *Usually our supervisor or two IC will come and check first and verify it. They are more experienced. They can tell right away. Then, they will ask me to stay at the scene to wait for the police arrival. I will give the police the information I know. They will carry on dealing with the situation.*

The duties of the security officers were to attend the scene immediately to verify a situation and provide necessary assistance to the residents and the police. Security officers did not have the same powers as the police to carry out investigations. Therefore, they could only act similarly to a beat officer who attends a case requiring the attention of the Criminal Investigation Detective. Preserving the scene in a non-professional capacity and avoiding further injury were the best assistances they could provide while waiting for the police arrivals. These were what usually front line police officers did when dealing with an incident. A similar situation was found in Pleasure Southquay by Button (2007) where security officers were expected to deal with serious incidents until the police arrived and then handover.

8.3.7 *A 'Scapegoat'*

The most undesirable but most frequent role that the security officers played was the 'scapegoat'. There were different kinds of public utilities inside a multi-storey building. Sometimes, the utility services would be suspended for various reasons. For instance, lifts might need routine maintenance, or they might break down or a

pipe might burst due to age. Unlike routine maintenances, unexpected failures of the utilities – especially prolonged suspension of water or lift repairs – might cause grievances. Likewise, complaints of residents that had not been rectified would also cause grievances.

Some residents would phone or personally approach the security Control Room or the security desk in the foyer to express their disapproval. Sometimes they would insult or even verbally assault the officers or the Tower Guards who were receiving the complaints or explaining the situations to them. Security officers became the 'scapegoat' because most of the complaints were not related to security problems. They were mainly building services problems that the property management office needed to take care of. However, repairs were sometimes delayed for various reasons such as the unavailability of spare parts. Since security officers usually were the first point of contact, residents would accuse them of doing nothing. Some residents just wanted a punching bag. LVSO01 experienced a fair share of swearwords for utility maintenance.

Q: *Verbal assault?*

LVSO01: *Always, swearing all the time. We brought our mums to work, so to speak.* [27] *'Flushing water is suspended again this many times in a month, you motherfucker.'*

Q: *How often?*

LVSO01: *Depend on whom you meet. If you deal with someone who swears all the time, then they swear at you even more. Sometimes a few time per month, sometimes none.*

Q: *Why did they swear at you? What did they say?*

LVSO01: *'Repairs and stuff aren't done, motherfucking cunt'. Actually, those are building maintenance/services problems. Not our business. We*

[27] *A reference to mother insults, a staple of Cantonese swearwords preying on widespread sentiment of filial piety.*

are only responsible for taking down information and complaints. They (building services contractors) do the repairs. It is not our fault if they cannot fix them! Nothing to do with us! Sometimes I was really angry. I would shoot him if I had a gun.

Q: *Do they come to you or do you go to them?*

LVSO01: *Both. For example, a tenant complains that there is a water leakage or water dripping from the air-conditioner from the flat above, and you go to investigate or request him to fix it. That is when the swearing starts, 'You never bother when other people drip, why are you picking on me? Fuck you.'*

Q: *So even when they did something wrong?*

LVSO01: *Yes. Keep swearing and repeating why I don't sort out other people's drips as well. I need to say to them 'I am dealing with them one by one. You can make a complaint over the phone if you want'. Sometimes we are quite innocent. Now I get used to them. I don't care. If you don't offend them you will be OK. Otherwise, troubles keep following you.*

Verbal abuse and assault on security officers and door supervisors is a common phenomenon (Winlow, 2001; Hobbs *et al*., 2003; Button, 2007). Button (2007) found that nearly 80% of the security officers in his study had experienced verbal assaults on a monthly basis. Verbal assaults were common in the nodes, but not every officer had had this experience. The verbal assault experiences of the security officers were shown in Table 8.1 below.

Table 8. 1:- Verbal assault on Interviewed Security Officers in Rees Garden and Langstone Village between January and June 2010.

		Frequency							No of officer had been verbally assaulted	% of officers had been verbally assaulted
		Every shift	Once a week	Once a month	Once every 3 month	Once every 6 month	Rare (at least once)	Never		
Rees Garden	**No of officer**	0	4	5	4	1	3	7	17	70.8% n=24
Langstone Village	**No of officer**	0	5	9	0	0	3	1	17	94.4% n=18

The situations in the nodes were not as serious compared with Button's findings, which may be attributed to the distinction between a door supervisor at a pub in Glasgow and a guard at a housing estate full of elderly Chinese people in Hong Kong. However, 70.8% and 94.4% of the security officers in Rees Garden and Langstone Village respectively have experienced at least one verbal assault in the past six months. Many of the verbal assaults were considered as the result of the 'scapegoat' role they play. The management company would pass on every imaginable kind of complaint to the security officers. They were often required to assist on non-security activity or be held accountability to residents' complaints. RGSO30 had described the situation as that of a Cinderella effect.

Owners, residents, management officers, or even cleaners: they are all hostile to the security officers in here, and they will blame the security officers whenever something went wrong. Do you know why? Because we are the 'concubine son' (bastard children)[28]. We can't really have a say in front of the property owners. They can blame us for anything. We are the scapegoats. The management office will ask

[28] As subcontractors.

us to do anything. For instance, the forbidding of keeping a dog, the management office have their own Tower Guards at each foyer, they questioned us why we don't give them a warning letter when we saw them walking the dog. I questioned them the usefulness of this. They said that even if it is useless we still have to do that. I asked them why the Tower Guards (employed by the management company directly) did not stop them when they saw the dog. They couldn't answer me. Even if the dog did a poo outside the main gate, the officers will see nothing. They will call the security. We will go there to cover it with a cone and call the cleaner. They don't want to offend the residents. They don't have the guts to do that.

When there is a function, we will need to help moving furniture or stuff. It happens a few times per year. During the summer (when it is 30 plus degrees) when we are moving furniture or doing labouring work, if we took off our cap or tie, people will make a complaint. No one is on our side! No one puts in a fair word for us! Instead, when they receive a complaint they will phone and tell us there is a complaint on such and such officer. They will blame us because we are a sub-contracted (outsider) company. If we were in the same company, they need to take the blame.

Button and Park (2010) found that security officers in South Korea have a low commitment to job, long working hours, feelings of alienation, and experience of abuse and violence. Since the security officers were the first contact, residents would consider that they were responsible for following up the complaints until the source of grievances end. Residents would make complaints against them when the results were undesirable. On the other hand, the management office would also try to shift the accountability to the security officers when residents made complaints to their office. The security officers had become a scapegoat wedged in the property management business.

8.4 Conclusion

The chapter has examined the different roles security officers play in residential housing and the property management economy. They were the employees of the

residents, but they played the roles as guardians of the residents, their private properties and the common facilities. They executed parochial orders inside the estate perimeter. They were witnesses to incidents, impropriety, deviant acts and crimes. They acted as a mediator in the disputes between residents, or between residents and outsiders. They worked as de facto front line police officers and as customer service officers who provide immediate responses to residents' requests for assistance. Finally, they acted as 'scapegoats' when the management office was unable to soothe the dissatisfied residents who have lost their composure.

Private policing in residential housing estates were no simpler than public policing within the public sphere. Security officers were engaged in different kinds of criminal and non-criminal incidents. Criminal activities would need to be handled by the police, and in the process becomes a streamlined, almost automatic response. Non-criminal incidents, however, would depend on the outcomes of the intervention. The employment relationships with the residents and the management company largely determined their roles. Security officers, while largely conforming to the economic power relations, nonetheless wear other hats in residential estates. These roles had formed the foundation of a unique private policing style in the researched nodes. Private policing became focused on neighbourhood safety, and arguably, the construction of a fragmented neighbourhood itself, in which the security officer is forever seen as the first port of call.

9 CHAPTER NINE:

Concluding Chapter

9.1 Introduction

This concluding chapter outlines the extent to which the research goals and objectives of the research have been achieved. It ties up the arguments made throughout the thesis by drawing on the empirical findings in light of existing perspectives on private security and policing. The limitations will be detailed. Finally, it will draw out some of the research findings and the potential implications for further research.

The private security industry has experienced substantial growth in the last three decades in Hong Kong, in line with escalating economic development, especially with regard to security provisions in residential housing estates. This piqued the interest of the researcher to explore the contributions of the security industry to private policing in private households and their immediate environs. In the literature review, the researcher indicated that the existing scholarship on the private security industry and security officers provide a satisfactory explanation to the regulation, growth, and development of the private security industry in Hong Kong residential security, due to the industry's intensive and extensive penetration and coverage across the population spectrum. It also points out that the daily life and experience of security officers in residential security remains to be documented. Different questions were posed in order to chart and fill the knowledge gaps in the subject. The study was aimed to explore the contribution to policing of frontline private security personnel in residential housing estates in Hong Kong. The research was designed to achieve four major objectives.

The first objective was to analyse the effect of government regulation on the security industry on their operations and development. The second objective was to investigate the power and accountability of the private security officers in private and communal space. The third objective was to discover the key characteristics of the

private security industry in Hong Kong and the contribution of security officers in residential housing context, and examine the daily operation of the security officers to identify their roles, functions, image and status in their working environment. The last objective was to examine whether there is a specific security governance model for residential security in Hong Kong, which differs from Anglophone mature economies as portrayed by the bulk of the private policing literature. The study can be considered to have achieved these objectives and has generated primary knowledge to fill the research vacuum in the studies on private security in Hong Kong.

The study has uncovered some key characteristics of the private security industry in Hong Kong It has shown that private security officers frequently utilize their delegated powers in residential housing settings. They were accountable to the residents inside the nodes in an economic power relation. Government regulations contribute to the security industry in its gradual pursuit of professionalism.

Security officers are versatile policing agents and play different important roles in order to offer the police services that the state police are reluctant or unable to supply in residential security, all in the name of competitiveness. This will be outlined in the following sections.

9.2 The Key Characteristic Discovered on the Private Security Industry in Hong Kong

9.2.1 *The Hybrid Regulation Mechanism*

The study found that Hong Kong operates a hybrid regulation mechanism that amalgamated different aspects on the regulation of the private security industry. This mechanism largely parallels that of the Security Industry Authority in the UK, with the exception of the collectivised consumer, which was taken up by Owners' Corporation in Hong Kong as opposed to insurers across Europe. This mechanism has effectively controlled the quality of services of the security industry and also provided fertile ground for the growth of the industry in Hong Kong.

The first mechanism of the regulation of private security industry practitioners is mainly through licencing by under the SGSO. The SGSIA and Hong Kong police are responsible for vetting and monitoring the practitioners. The second mechanism is to control and enhance the quality of the security services, through the VTC Quality Assurance Scheme, which recognises officers' training. The third mechanism is the regulation by the property management economy. The BMO stipulated the owners to organize the management of their own security provision. The survival of the security companies depends on the satisfaction of residents. Economically, security companies are controlled by the property owners in a consumer-led market.

The findings suggest that government regulation does not necessarily translate into counterproductive meddling or outright suppression of a legitimacy usurper. Effective policy will lead the industry to growth in a constructive way and produce positive effects. It can provide the necessary conditions for the transformation of networked relations into some advanced, just and democratic outcomes (Johnston & Shearing, 2003). Secondly, citizens who are homeowners or rent private property have become the dominant stakeholder in the provision of security. The state would no longer be considered as utilizing the private sector to strengthen its legitimacy (Spitzer & Scull, 1977; Weiss, 1978; Couch, 1987).

On the contrary, the state has consolidated and legitimated the property owners' legal status and powers by empowering them to police their own community. Thirdly, the government can effectively delegate the policing responsibility to its own citizens. Security officers are employed to maintain and execute 'parochial orders' inside their estates, mainly on quality of life issues. The Hong Kong Police are not in danger of losing their legitimacy and accountability (Sklansky, 2006) since they remain integral to the regulation mechanism, and they retain the powers of prosecution in both civil and criminal offences. Lastly, the government can regulate the private security industry without regulating by 'inclusion'. The hybrid regulation mechanism is able to guarantee security practitioners' 'fit and proper' character through the police vetting process, and improve quality of the provision of security services by accreditation of security training by the VTC.

As a result, the government can rely on the private security industry to provide first-tier security, namely the guarding of property, the maintenance of parochial orders,

and protecting people from potential hazards. The hybrid regulation mechanism has included the property owners as an indispensable element in the system. Owners are paying for services directly, and defining duties of the security company under their employ. They become immediately accountable to the acts and performances of the private security officers inside their housing estates. In this sense, government retain the regulation of the industry without recognizing these personnel as a government agent. At the same time, this 'private police force' become indirectly and informally absorbed by the government as one of the policing agencies, as conduits of information, within a limited budget. The government does not need to recognize the security industry as an extended family of the police even if their officers are physically carrying out many police functions such as solving neighbourhood disputes and attending alleged crime scenes.

The study found that the private security industry initially emerged as result of insufficient services provided by the Hong Kong police since the early colonial era. However, the size of the private industry was small, and services were limited to the wealthy. With the continuous growth of high-rise private and public residential property beginning in the late 1970s, the demand of buildings security provisions has increased. This has created the basic market conditions for the private security industry to expand. The turning point was when the government enacted the BMO and SGSO, creating a hybrid regulation mechanism in the process which may have induced industry growth; provision of security has developed in a nodal (Wood & Shearing, 2007) formation. As a result, the industry experienced a multi-fold increase, both in numbers of security companies and security officers, as population, number of households, and GDP per capita all increased.

9.2.2 *Power and accountability of the security officers*

Private security officers in Hong Kong do not possess any special legal power, unless they were delegated or authorized in special circumstances. Their powers are identical to an ordinary citizen, including citizens' arrest powers as promulgated by common law. They do not enjoy any legal immunity when exercising their powers, rightly or wrongly. The study confirmed that all security officers are aware that they

possessed these universal legal tools, although it was found that security officers rarely exercised the citizen's arrest. Dixon (1997) points out that most police work entails duties that do not involve the use of coercive powers. Security officers also do not prefer to use their citizen's arrest power when someone has committed an arrestable offence. They would restrain or delay the culprits from leaving the scene and rely on the state police to make the formal arrest. They adopted a referral strategy of passing all the legal actions against a suspect to the state police. The reasons for their actions were to avoid the suspects from launching litigation against the security officers by making a wrongful arrest or accused of using excessive force.

Ericson (2007) points out that private police are subject to direct control by, and are accountable to their paying customers, in contrast to the public police who function within a structure of political and legal accountability. The study found that the security officers considered that they were accountable to their indirect employer, namely the property owners and residents who pay the management fee every month. Although they were delegated with the property owner's powers, they are not only accountable to their paying customers, as Ericson has suggested. Their actions were governed by – just as they are accountable to – the laws of Hong Kong as well. Security officers were found more frequently utilizing the delegated legal tools, especially in controlling access (Clarke & Homel, 1997) to the buildings. The IO or OC have delegated the property owner powers to the security officers to stop, question, and register any visitor entering, leaving, or found inside the communal area of a building. Security officers were found frequently to impound illegally parked vehicles inside their nodes on behalf of the property owners, as stipulated by ordinances on private roads. [29]

They also possess the power to stop people smoking in lawfully designated 'non-smoking' area such as leisure parks and inside passenger lifts by virtue of owners' delegated authority, despite not wielding prosecution powers. The economic power relations between security personnel and the policed 'employers' meant that authority was frequently not recognized by the policed. When dealing with other

[29] *Hong Kong Ordinances, Chapter 374O - Road Traffic (Parking on Private Road) Regulation, Section 8: "Designation of restricted parking areas."*

quality of life complaints such as sanitary problem or nuisance, they need to collect evidence and refer the cases to the relevant government departments for their legal actions, as they wield exclusive prosecution powers. In this sense, they can satisfy the residents who make the complaints, and at the same time avoid confronting residents who were at the other end of the complaint.

These strategies were considered as pragmatic from the personnel's point of view, in that escalated complaints are often unresolved until legal actions are taken. These strategies also enabled them to fully exercise their powers indirectly.

Security officers were policing the local, for the local people, and using many powers delegated to them by the local community. The powers of the security officers were constrained by the Laws and their employee status in residential security. They need to use their powers tactically in the execution of parochial order. The limitation of their powers has forced them to adopt a 'resident-oriented service' policing style. As an outcome, their major contribution to policing in residential security is the maintenance of the quality of life of the residents that focus on a preventative and comprehensive take on neighbourhood safety.

9.2.3 *The Security Companies*

SGSIA is a statutory body under the Security Bureau that administers the licencing of all the security companies and officers. Security companies are mainly involved in providing guarding services and the installation of security systems. There were a small number of companies that provided armoured transportation services. Property management companies, on behalf of property owners and tenants, were found to be the major employers of the private security guarding services. Security officers were either directly employed by the property management company or through a security company. The security team usually exists in three different employment models in residential housing. They were the 'in-house', 'subsidiary', and 'outsourcing' models. This relation has dictated the powers, authorities, images and status of the security officers working in this social setting. Security officers have become the employee of every property owner and resident, resulting in an economic power relation akin to the Cinderella effect.

9.2.4 *The Security Officers*

The study found that the Hong Kong security industry comprises a large number of middle to old age officers. The majority of the interviewees in the 'over 50 age group' had formerly worked in manufacturing, production, or the catering industries. Hong Kong switched from a manufacturing economy to a service-based economy in the past two decades; changes in employment market demands followed suit. Redundancies and former jobs becoming too demanding were the two major reasons that the interviewees had switched careers. Another finding is that the number of SPP holders over the age of 55 is increasing. This suggested that middle to old age people were entering the security industry.

The educational levels of the security officers interviewed are minimal because 90.4% the officers possessed the minimal compulsory education qualification of secondary three. Every security officer must attend a security-training course before he or she can apply for a SPP: the length of the training course varies from two days to 30 days. The two-day course provides the basic knowledge that a security officer will require to apply for a SPP, whereas the longer courses are designed to cover more areas in security services in the property management business. About 50% of the officers were found only to have attended the two-day course. Those who need to seek employment urgently will choose to attend the two days course, but for others, managerial aspirations will lead them to take more intensive courses if time and money were no object.

The gender of the officers was usually determined by the nature of their duties. Female officers were more likely to be working as Tower Guards. It was considered by the management that female officers might be able to communicate better with the residents, resulting in fewer confrontations. Male officers were mainly deployed on patrols and dealing with unexpected incidents since it demands more physical strength and incorporates certain levels of danger. Male officers prefer to work outdoors because most of them were smoker and they can nip out for a fag without being detected by residents.

The majority of the security officers possessed characteristics similar to the findings in some other studies, such as 'semi-retired' or retired people, aged from 50 and

close to 60, minimal education and/or former manual workers from declining industries (Kakalik & Wildhorn, 1971; Michael, 2002; South, 1988; Winlow, 2001). Some characteristics that were not reported elsewhere include empty-nest mothers seeking extra income and early-retired persons who were seeking a pastime. These characteristics were known by the resident and did not curry the personnel any favours. The 'watchman' and 'guard' images prevailed in the mind-sets of the residents. The employer-employee relationship had further eroded their social standing as a 'servant' of sorts in their workplace. This low status could also be attributed to low wages of the security officers which is common across the industry.

9.3 The Contribution of Security Officers in Residential Housing Context

The primary duties of security officers were guarding and maintaining order in the housing estates. Dixon (1997) suggests that crime fighting has never been, is not, and could not be the prime activity of the police. This phenomenon is found more prominent amongst private security officers, who are entrusted with handling both criminal and non-criminal matters. They were found mainly engaged in the resolution of non-criminal incidents, especially those that relate to the residents' quality of life. The police would deal with criminal activities in any eventuality. Illegal parking would be dealt with by the security officers, and usually took the form of impounding the vehicle. Prosecution of any kind of violation of the laws was referred to relevant government departments.

Security officers were policing the perimeter of the residential estate for their employers, and the majority of the residents were compliant. Although security officers did not enjoy a high status and favourable image in residential policing, they successfully carried out a type of nodal security governance as described by Johnston and Shearing (Johnston & Shearing, 2003). Private policing may be described as a 'residential service'. In this context, security officers were maintaining the parochial orders and keeping the peace, such that potential litigation-happy confrontations were avoided and residents felt that their living experience was improved by the presence of mediators.

9.3.1 *Preserving the 'Quality of Life' for the Residents*

Security officers in residential housing were found focusing on 'actual needs' in policing for the residents, namely the quality of life. The IO or OC have determined their duties inside the nodes. Private security personnel overcame various obstacles to successfully act as a private policing agent. They were found acting as the guardian; executor of regulations and orders; independent witness; mediator; 'scapegoat'; *de facto* front line police officer, and customer services officer when preserving the quality of life of the resident.

The refusal of entry to non-registering visitors and the rules governing the renovation timings in Rees Garden are evidence of implementing nodal governance as suggested by Johnston and Shearing (2003), in that the social construct should stipulate which activities should be permitted and which are proscribed. Government regulations can be considered as what Johnston and Shearing (2003) outline as the existence of state, corporate or communal authorities seeking to offer guarantees of security, under the assumption that institutional support is readily available. The residents' desires to enhance the security level of their neighbourhood can be regarded as the presence of a 'Yes. In My Backyard' mentality.

The state (HKSAR government) and communal authorities (IO & OC) seeks to offer guarantees of security to its citizens by implementing the BMO and employing qualified security officers to carry the security work. The BMO also created the residents' mentality in elucidating a duty to police one's own community. Homeowners were actively involved in the planning and organizing of security provision, and they stipulated the activities that should be permitted and those are proscribed in the nodes such as renovation timing and illegal parking, just as homeowner associations do in the United States. Government also provide institutional support to regulation and guarantee the services quality. Specific technologies, including public databases (the SGSIA database & the Hong Kong Police Criminal Records database) were used to assist the public to monitor the security industry practitioners. In addition, the Hong Kong police carried out 'surprise checks' – which are sting operations by any other name – on security officers to ensure that they operate as required by the regulations.

9.4 A Hong Kong Variation on the Nodal Governance Model

Earlier in this thesis the four main academic perspectives vis-à-vis the growth of private security were noted. This study has identified gaps in applying these to Hong Kong and suggests the possibility of geopolitical exceptionalism within the Nodal Governance perspective. Central to the nodal governance perspective is a concern with security inequity, which is a consequence of the dominant neo-liberal policy in the nineties. Advocates of the nodal governance perspective advocate measures to address security inequity. For example Johnston and Shearing (2003, p.144) advocate:

> One way of dealing with inequity is to enable poor people to participate in markets for security (Shearing, 1995; Bayley and Shearing, 1996). For this to happen a means has to be found to reallocate public funding towards security. One way of doing this is to provide block grants to communities, enabling them to purchase various mixtures of public and private policing.

Therefore, central to this perspective is a direct attempt to empower local communities to address gaps in security as a reaction to overt concern with security inequity. In Hong Kong, by contrast, the extraordinary population density, which led to high-rise accommodation in private spaces, combined with legislation, which has indirectly mandated the IO/OC to provide security for the residents, has also led to a policy, which addresses security deficits without an overt political concern for security inequity. The Home Affairs Department set up the Building Management Division and District Building Management Liaison Teams (DBMLTs) in June 2001 to provide comprehensive service on building management, including: visits to owners of private buildings in the district to promote the good practices of building management, advising owners on the procedures of the formation of IO/OC, and organizing training courses, seminars, talks and workshops on building management for members of the management committee (Home Affairs Department, Hong Kong,

2013). Hence, in Hong Kong there is a very large private security industry that is predominantly working in residential areas, providing the primary security services alongside many others that had a limited role within policing. The state is actively co-ordinating the formation of collectivised buyers in this market by encouraging the formation of OCs and increasing the breadth and sophistication of their managerial reach. The HAD is effectively constructing new nodes and community (Rigakos, 2002).

Nodal governance is neither necessarily democratic nor innately constructive to 'common goods'. Insofar as the case of Hong Kong is concerned, it is a stroke of serendipity that a host of state-centred approaches, each a product of historical relics, made such residential service nodes possible. Urbanisation densities in the Far East are only matched in Europe at two ends of the economic spectrum: luxury apartments and tower-block social housing. There is no doubt that a 'residential service' private police is already operational in the former, but save occasional episodes gentrification, the latter remains a focus of regeneration.

The Hong Kong variation of the nodal governance perspective, as with many things from the former colony, is a study in political contrasts. It suggests that the key to nurturing a competitive, competent and manageable private security lies in a series of political and economic regulations, which ensured that sellers met buyers' expectations. The stakes are high in this transaction, because citizens expect nothing less than security on a par with that of a well-funded state police, and a host of freebies on the side. So long as policing prerogatives remain in the hands of the state police, the Force retains its legitimacy. Policing in Hong Kong is conspicuously insulated from military undertones, and civilian law enforcement, in the American sense of the word civilian (non-militia), is often best conducted without the state police. As a result of government policy initiatives in shifting the responsibilities to the citizens for the management of their properties, residents are mandated to become the 'rower', as opposed to the 'steerer', of this private form of policing inside residential estates.

Ultimately, Maslow's Hierarchy dictates that community and a sense of belonging hinges on satiation of safety and security. The comparatively low crime rate in Hong Kong, the uniquely homogenous demographic features, and the economic power

relation that engendered security personnel into existence in the first place and deprived them of status: all these were instrumental in the shift to non-criminal policing.

In this sense, evidence for the division of labour into a 'two-gear market' is indisputable. Criminal incidents will be apprehended and reported to the state police; civil recovery is rare in Hong Kong. Private security is responsible for the prevention of crime, as well as non-criminal incidents such as violation of traffic and sanitary rules based on their delegated property owners ' power. Unresolved violations, with the minor exception of illegal parking on private roads, are referred to relevant government department for follow-up actions. Culturally, every means of dispute resolution short of litigation is exhaustively attempted, with security officers acting as mediators. This does not mean the private security officers have taken justice into their hands. The complainants will still decide the final decision. Apart from the common roles of guardian of life and property, security officers are mainly acting as an informant, witness, mediator and services officer in these situations.

9.5 The Possible Solution to Inequity of Security Provisions

The inequity issue in the provision of security is a matter of serious concern in mature economies (South, 1988; McManus, 1995; Johnston & Shearing, 2003; Button, 2008; Noaks, 2008); this strikes as a question of relative poverty, rather than absolute poverty. The findings in Western societies found that property owners are free to choose whether to purchase their 'extra' security provisions, in the form of security personnel, technology, or insurance cover. Private tenants are usually restricted to contents insurance, whereas social housing tenants may not even be able to afford it. Extra security services, such as patrol and checking on doors, are provided to people who have subscribed to the private security services (McManus, 1995; Noaks, 2000). Adversely, the existence of gated communities had entrenched and compounded the inequity because residents who cannot afford private security now find themselves ghettoized and with comparatively less protection.

In general, the implementation of BMO and the hybrid regulation mechanism have provided a minimum standard for residents in housing estates (majority of the citizen

in Hong Kong) to receive a similar quality and quantity of security services. In Hong Kong, the government has stipulated in the Building Management Ordinance explicitly that owners be required to take up the policing responsibility in some capacity; this declaration contains a vital legal doctrine on the distinction between possession and ownership, 'Possession is nine-tenths of the law'.

An owner must possess – as in use – the property if ownership is to be maintained, and in this analogy, a property cannot be truly possessed unless homesteading services are performed. The study has argued that the growth of the security industry was attributed to effective governmental initiatives that have shifted the policing responsibility to property owners and residents in residential estates, via implementation of the BMO and continuous government regulation of the private security industry by the SGSO. In addition, the government not only regulate the security industry by licencing but also extends its regulation to guarantee the good character and standard of services the practitioners through the SGSO and the VTC. This has gained the confidence and support of the residents to take up the responsibility.

This 'compulsory national system' (McManus, 1995) and 'universally accessible scheme' (South, 1988) was able to satisfy the security needs of the residents and at the same time resolved the issues of inequity in security provision. It bears some resemblance to a National Security Service, if one may, paralleling the British National Health Service that relied on direct funding as opposed to private insurance payments. These Ordinances have mandated every owner to take up responsibility of the security of their property, and at the same time guaranteed the quality of security services residents will receive. It indicates that legislation was accepted by owners and residents, and this acceptance, combined with the continuous support of government regulation was an essential factor that makes the shifting effective and successful.

Government budgets on security provision can be maintained at a lower cost since users are paying for their services they receive: the two-tiered structure also allows the state police to professionalise without being bogged down by non-criminal policing affairs. It solved the problem of inequitable distribution to a certain extent because a citizen's basic residential security needs are satisfied in buildings which

have incorporated owners, and the basic qualities of these security services are guaranteed in the hybrid regulation mechanism.

Of course, it still can be argued that those who can afford it can still purchase much higher quality security services. However, at the extreme end of the market, a high-end private security service, which does not make a statistically significant contribution to an end user's safety, is a form of conspicuous consumption beyond the scope of this thesis.

The example in Hong Kong described one possible set of conditions where security provision can be equitably provided, and suggests other possible solution to solve the inequity issue in the provision of security. It can also be used as a template to formulate security provision in similar setting in other societies, especially high-rise housing.

9.6 Contributions

The first contribution is the findings on the roles and functions of security officers in residential security. A tentative narrative account from frontline security officers was recorded. Law enforcement was found to be anything but the core function of private policing in residential security. The preservation of neighbourhood safety and harmony is the primary function in a litigation-shy low-crime-rate community. It suggested that law enforcement might not be the primary objective of private policing in residential security after all. Rather, the availability of a mediator that provides swift response to incidents of every scale is the major contribution to policing of a private police force. The unique selling proposition is not so much as having a powerful agent under your employ, but having an agent at all who is already at the scene.

The second important contribution of the study is the discovery of the 'residential service' of private policing and its focus on neighbourhood safety, which is seldom so broadly and uniformly implemented across society as it has been in Hong Kong. . The political, cultural and economic conditions that created this homogenous situation were exposed. The security provisions corresponded to the demands of the

residents, rather than the directives of the government or the police: the renovation and pet prohibitions showed that citizens often regulate amongst themselves more heavily than any government would.

9.7 A New Platform for Future Research

This exploratory research has disclosed the geopolitical influences on the emerging private security industry and the contribution to residential security of private police service. This case study-based research and the analysis of qualitative data collected have generated valuable knowledge on residential security outside OECD countries. It has argued that the Anglo-Saxon 'ethnocentrism' (van Steden, 2007) approach in understanding private policing may not able to provide an explanation to the sociological phenomenon in Far Eastern societies. The unique situation and location of Hong Kong, being an Asian metropolitan overwhelming with Western cultures and influences, has suggested geopolitical exceptionalism does exist. Due to the limited time and resources, the study was unable to cover every security officer in the nodes. Although the sample size of 'end-users' in the nodes was small by any measure they were deliberately selected after extensive consideration of their capacities to generate the greatest representativeness, despite potential risks in selection bias.

The research has built a solid platform for future scholarly study in this subject domain. For instance, there are other housing estates with closed perimeter, and there are estates that consist of other leisure facilities such as Residents' Club House and swimming pools. The duties of the security officers vary in these types of residential estate settings. Secondly, the research on the powers and operations of the local police, not to mention the local private security, can be considered as sparse compared to standard methodologies in other jurisdictions. The 'sensitivity' of the black box that is called government, as the Hong Kong police put it, will need to unveil. At the same time, the 'winning bid' conditions in the property management contract or security contract and the Hong Kong Police's views on their counterpart will need to explore for benchmarking on the security officers performances.

The study found that security officers lacked prosecution powers, especially on the quality of life aspects, which affected the residents the most. This forced them to adopt a passive approach when policing inside the nodes. Private policing can be more effective when appropriate powers are delegated to the private security officer, and support is provided (Rigakos, 2002). This was realized by providing training to the officers who needed to handle legal matters, as in the case of the Intelligarde officers in Rigakos' case study. Police officers are ordinary citizens. They can be trained to enforce the laws, and so can security officers. Given appropriate training along the lines of those given to traffic wardens, security officers should be qualified and empowered to carry out prosecution, especially on matters related to the wellbeing of residents in high-rise estates. Since the study found that security officers are mainly engaging in violations of non-criminal offences, it is worth considering 'empowering' them to handle typical offences in residential housings, such as issuing penalty tickets to fly tipping. Research on the feasibility of training and delegating prosecution power to security officers should also be conducted.

The study has found that security officers received a comparatively lower wages to the police. This creates a vicious circle whereby higher calibre officers are either constantly hunting for better-paid posts, or leaving the industry altogether. Hong Kong implemented the Minimum Wages ordinance, eight months after the completion of data collection in this study: the implications to private security will become apparent in a few years' time. Wages are only one of many factors that affect the officers' decisions, however. The criteria that may influence employee turnover in an industry that is nowhere near as bleak as it seems are worth exploring as well. The Employees Retraining Board of Hong Kong government is promoting a new 'advanced security officer' course. The course provides 156 hours of training on different aspects in security services such as human resource management and computer skills. It is valuable to examine the ramifications for this advanced training programme and the effect on the security industry and personnel.

A final word on the question of socioeconomic status: low occupational prestige is formalized in economic power relations, in Hong Kong as in places all over the world. Private security personnel work in strikingly similar conditions to carers and domestic helpers, in that they are all entrusted with the most important things – our homes, our old, and our young – and these steadfast workers gain next to nothing in

return. Regardless of the veracity of this thesis, there is much to be said about the spirit of the law – a law that metes out justice, without fear or favour, regardless of power, money, wealth, or identity.

Appendix 1

Confidential

Interview schedule for Security officer

(English Translation)

General Information:

Coded name: _____ Gender: _____

Job title:_____ Full time ☐ Part-time ☐Shift:_ ____hrs to_____hrs

1. Age: 18-29☐ 30-39☐ 40-49☐ 50-59☐ 60 & above ☐
2. Education: Below Secondary☐ HKCEE 5 subjects☐ Post-secondary& above ☐
3. Years of residence in Hong Kong: _____Years
4. How did you join the security industry?

    What was your job before?

    When did you join?

    How did you find this job?

    How long have you work here

    Did you work in other security company before? How many?

    Reasons for your leave/change?

    Have you considered changing your career?

Training and knowledge:

5. What kind of training you have attained?

    Basic and QAS?

    Any others? Why?

    Who pay? Why?

    What kind of security training certificate you possess?

    What did they teach in the course? Use of forces? Law?

    Do you think these training courses are useful to you?

    What kind of training do you consider will be more practical/helpful?

Roles and Function of security officer:

6. Can you describe your daily work?

Guarding/patrol

Check property defects

Check resident

Arrest suspect

Others

7. Can you describe your roles /status in the estates?

Daily duties: Exercise of powers and authority

8. Can you tell me your experiences in your daily work?

9. How often you come across an incident or crime?						
Every Shift	Once a week	Once a month	Once a every 3 months	Once every 6 months	Rarely	Never

10. Can you describe the incident?

What did you do first?

Call for supports?

Give a warning?

Arresting?

Where did you take them?

Call the police?

11. Did you use force for arrest before? Can you describe it?

How did you use your powers and forces?

Need to write report after? How to write?

Are they normally can be settled at the scene?

Do they submit to your power?

12. How do you decide to arrest someone?

Will you use your discretion?

What power you use?

Did you tell the reasons for the arrest?

Did they submit to your powers?

Did you need to use forces?

13. How often you need to make an arrest?						
Every Shift	Once a week	Once a month	Once a every 3 months	Once every 6 months	Rarely	Never

14. How many arrests you have make in here? _____

15. How often you need to use force?						
Every Shift	Once a week	Once a month	Once a every 3 months	Once every 6 months	Rarely	Never

16. How many times you need to use force in here?

17. How would you describe your relationships with your colleagues?

Good☐ General☐ Bad☐ Hostile☐ no contact ☐Others☐

17a. What about the other shift?

Good☐ General☐ Bad☐ Hostile☐ no contact ☐Others☐

18. When an incident had happened what are yours and your colleagues responses?

19. How often you need help from your colleague							
Every incident	Every shift	Once a week	Once a month	Once every 3 months	Once every 6 months	Rarely	Never
Could you describe one such occasion and how you went about the incident and the ultimate outcome							
20. How often you need help from your supervisor							
Every incident	Every shift	Once a week	Once a month	Once every 3 months	Once every 6 months	Rarely	Never
Could you describe one such occasion and how you went about the incident and the ultimate outcome							
21. How often you need help from the police?							
Every incident	Every shift	Once a week	Once a month	Once every 3 months	Once every 6 months	Rarely	Never
Could you describe one such occasion and how you went about the incident and the ultimate outcome							

22. Did anybody come back for revenge or give you any trouble afterwards?

Who were they?

What did they do?

22a. complaint against you? How often?							
Every incident	Every shift	Once a week	Once a month	Once every 3 months	Once every 6 months	Rarely	Never
Could you describe one such occasion and how you went about the incident and the ultimate outcome							
22b. threaten you? How often?							
Every incident	Every shift	Once a week	Once a month	Once every 3 months	Once every 6 months	Rarely	Never
How do they threaten you? Could you describe one such occasion and how you went about the incident and the ultimate outcome							
22c. How often do you get verbally assaulted at work? How often does it happen?							
Every incident	Every shift	Once a week	Once a month	Once every 3 months	Once every 6 months	Rarely	Never
How do they verbally assault you? Could you describe one such occasion and how you went about the incident and the ultimate outcome							

22d. How often do you get physically assaulted at work?							
Every incident	Every shift	Once a week	Once a month	Once every 3 months	Once every 6 months	Rarely	Never

How do they physically assault you? Could you describe one such occasion and how you went about the incident and the ultimate outcome
How many times? Fist or weapon? What weapon? Did you report to the police? Why? What did the police do? How did you cope with this? How did you feel about these reprisals working as a security officer?

22e. Did you get injury during your work before?							
Every incident	Every shift	Once a week	Once a month	Once every 3 months	Once every 6 months	Rarely	Never

Could you describe one such occasion and how you went about the incident and the ultimate outcome

23. What are your views on the powers of security officers?

Enough?

Want more?

What kinds of power?

Why not?

Perceptions on others:

24. How do you feel about the IO/OC members, landlords, residents etc?

Did they give you trouble?

Do you consider they are your boss?

Did they monitor your work? Give you difficult time?

25. How do you feel about the malefactors?

Who are they?

What did they do to you?

How did you handle them?

Did they listen to you?

Do you worry they will take revenge?

26. How do feel about the police?

Helpful?

Friendly?

Useless?

27. How would you rate their efficiency?

High☐ Good☐ Average☐ Poor☐ None☐

28. Do you agree that increasing police patrols in this estate will reduce crime?

Strongly Agreed ☐ Agreed ☐ neutral☐ Disagreed ☐ Strongly Disagreed ☐

Perceptions on the security officer from others:

29. In your experience what is the typical attitude of the landlords and tenants towards you and your colleagues. Can you describe this?

30. In your experience what is the typical attitude of the police towards you and your colleagues. Can you describe this?

31. In your experience what is the typical attitude of the public towards you and your colleagues. Can you describe this?

32. Is there anything you would like to add to this interview?

End of Interview- Thank You

Appendix 2

Confidential

Interview schedule for Chairperson of IO/OC

(English Translation)

General Information

Coded name: _____ Gender: _____

1. Landlord (member of family)☐ Resident ☐

2. Age: 20-29☐ 30-39☐ 40-49☐ 50-59☐ 60 & above ☐

3. Education: Below Secondary ☐Post-secondary ☐College & above ☐

4. Years of residence in Hong Kong: _____Years

5. Years of residence in the estate: _____Years

Perceptions on Security Officers: Roles and Function:

6. What are you expectations on the security officers in this estate?

   What are their roles?

   'Guard' or 'private police'?

   What do you want their duties are like?

7. How often do you see them on patrol?						
Every day	1-2 times a week	3-4 times a week	5-6 times a week	Once a month	Rarely	Never

8. How often do you have contact with the security officers?						
Every day	1-2 times a week	3-4 times a week	5-6 times a week	Once a month	Rarely	Never

9. Under what circumstances you had contact with the security officers?

10. How do you view the security services in this estate?

11. What do feel about increasing the security patrol?

Reduce fear of crime?

Feel safer?

The property value rise?

12. How would you rank the efficiency of the security officers?

High☐ Good☐ Average☐ Poor☐ None☐

13. Do you agree that it will reduce crime by increasing security patrols?

Strongly Agreed ☐ Agreed ☐ neutral☐ Disagreed ☐ Strongly Disagreed ☐

14. Have you consider to replace the security officers by technology? Such as electronic locks, CCTV etc.?

15. Did you install any security alarm in your flat?

Powers and authority:

16. What powers do the security officers use to protect the estate?

Police powers?

Landlord powers?

No power?

17. Do you recognize their powers and authority as legitimate?

18. What can be improved?

19. What kind(s) of people the security officers should 'police'?
20. Do you think the security officers should intervene the inappropriate acts of the landlords?
21. What are you opinions on the security services?

22. How would you describe the status of the security officers in this estate?

    Private police?

    Guard?

    Service person?

    Employee?

    Other?

Perceptions on the police:

23. How often do you see the police patrol the estate?						
Every day	1-2 times a week	3-4 times a week	5-6 times a week	Once a month	Rarely	Never

24. Do you recognize the legitimacy of the police powers and authority in private place?

Strongly recognized □ Recognized □ neutral □ Not recognized □ Strongly not recognized□

25. Do you agree that the police should intervene inappropriate behaviours in private places?

Strongly Agreed ☐ Agreed ☐ neutral ☐ Disagreed ☐ Strongly Disagreed ☐

26. What kind(s) of behaviours should the police intervene?

27. How would you rate the efficiency of the police?

    High☐ Good☐ Average☐ Poor☐ None☐

28. Do you agree that increasing police patrols in this estate will reduce crime?

Strongly Agreed ☐ Agreed ☐ neutral ☐ Disagreed ☐ Strongly Disagreed ☐

29. What do feel about increasing the security patrol?

Reduce fear of crime?

Feel safer?

The property value rise?

30. What are your views on the police services?

31. Is there anything you would like to add to this interview?

End of Interview- Thank You.

Appendix 3

Confidential

Interview schedule for District Board Member

(English Translation)

General Information:

Code name: _____ Gender: _____Capacity:_____

1. Age: 18-29□ 30-39□ 40-49□ 50-59□ 60 & above □
2. Education: Below Secondary □ Post-secondary □ College & above □
3. Years of residence in Hong Kong: _____Years
4. Years of participating in security matters: _____Years
5. Can you tell me what do you know about the security industry?
6. What area do you participate in the security matters?
7. What are your views on the security industry?
8. What do you think is the roles of the security officers? e.g. Private police?
9. How do you feel the security services in this district?
10. What do you think the government could help the security industry?
11. What would you suggest to improve the status of the security officers?

End of Interview - Thank you.

Appendix 4

Confidential

Interview schedule for Resident

(English Translation)

General Information:

Coded name: _____ Gender: _____

1. Owner□ Resident □
2. Age: 18-29□ 30-39□ 40-49□ 50-59□ 60 & above □
3. Education: Below Secondary □ Post-secondary □College & above □
4. Years of resident in Hong Kong: _____years
5. Year of resident in the estate: _____years

Perceptions on Security Officers: Roles and Function:

6. What are you expectations on the security services in this estate?

   What are their roles?

   'Guard' or 'private police'?

   What do you want their duties are?

7. How often do you see them on patrol?						
Every day	1-2 times a week	3-4 times a week	5-6 times a week	Once a month	Rarely	Never
8. How often do you have contact with the security officers?						
Every day	1-2 times a week	3-4 times a week	5-6 times a week	Once a month	Rarely	Never

9. Under what circumstances you had contact with the security officers?

10. How do you view the security services in this estate?

11. What do feel about increasing the security patrol?

    Reduce fear of crime?

    Feel safer?

    Increase your property value?

12. How would you rank the efficiency of the security officers?

    High □ Good □ Average □ Poor □ None □

13. Do you agree increasing security patrol will reduce crimes?

Strongly Agreed □ Agreed □ neutral □ Disagreed □ Strongly Disagreed □

14. Have you consider to replace the security officers by technology? Such as CCTV, security coded locks etc?

15. Have you installed any alarm in your flat?

Powers and Authority:

16. What powers do the security officers use to protect the estate?

    Police powers?

    Landlord powers?

    No power?

17. Do you recognize their powers and authority as legitimate?

Strongly recognized □Recognized□ neutral□ Not recognized □Strongly not recognized□

18. What do you think can be improved?

19. What kind(s) of people the security officers should 'police'?

20. Do you think they should intervene residents' behaviours?

21. What are your views on the security services?

22. How would you describe the status of the security officers in this estate?

Private police?

Guard?

Service person?

Employee?

Others?

Perceptions on the police:

23. How often do you see the police patrol the mall?						
Every day	1-2 times a week	3-4 times a week	5-6 times a week	Once a month	Rarely	Never

24. Do you recognize the legitimacy of the police powers in private place?

Strongly recognized □Recognized□ neutral□ Not recognized □Strongly not recognized□

25. Do you agree that the police should intervene your inappropriate behaviours?

Strongly Agreed □ Agreed □ neutral □ Disagreed □ Strongly Disagreed □

26. What kind(s) of behaviours should the police intervene?

27. How would you rate the efficiency of the police?
High □ Good □ Average □ Poor □ None □

28. Do you agree increasing police patrol will reduce crimes?

Strongly Agreed □ Agreed □ neutral □ Disagreed □ Strongly Disagreed □

29. What do feel about increasing the police patrol?

Reduce crime?

Reduce fear of crime?

Feel safer?

Increase property value?

30. What are your views on the police services?

31. Is there anything you would like to add to this interview?

End of Interview- Thank You.

Appendix 5

Confidential

Interview schedule for Shop owners/operator

(English Translation)

General Information:

Coded name: _____ Gender: _____

1. Owner□ Operator □
2. Age: 18-29□ 30-39□ 40-49□ 50-59□ 60 & above □
3. Education: Below Secondary □ Post-secondary □College & above □
4. Years of operating/working in the mall _____years
5. Opening hours: from_____to _____

Perceptions on Security Officers: Roles and Function:

6. What are you expectations on the security officers in this mall?

   What are their roles?

   'Guard' or 'private police'?

   What do you want their duties are?

7. How often do you see them on patrol?						
Every day	1-2 times a week	3-4 times a week	5-6 times a week	Once a month	Rarely	Never
8. How often do you have contact with the security officers?						
Every day	1-2 times a week	3-4 times a week	5-6 times a week	Once a month	Rarely	Never

9. Under what circumstances you had contact with the security officers?

10. How do you view the security services in this mall?

11. Have you install alarm in your shop?

12. How efficiency do the security officers response to your alarm?

High □ Good □ Average □ Poor □ None □

13. How often does it happen?						
Every day	1-2 times a week	3-4 times a week	5-6 times a week	Once a month	Rarely	Never

14. In your experiences, how do they treat the arrested?

15. What do feel about increasing the security patrol?

Reduce fear of crime?

Feel safer?

Obstructing your businesses?

16. How would you rank the efficiency of the security officers?

High □ Good □ Average □ Poor □ None □

Powers and Authority:

17. Do you feel that the security officers have enough power to protect your shop?

18. Do you recognize their powers and authority?

Strongly recognized □Recognized□ neutral□ Not recognized □Strongly not recognized□

19. What do you think can be improved?

20. What kind(s) of people the security officers should 'police'?

21. Do you think they should intervene your behaviours?

22. What will you do first when there is a trouble in your shop?

23. How would you describe the status of the security officers in this estate?

Private police?

Guard?

Service person?

Employee?Others?

24. How often do you see the police patrol the mall?						
Every day	1-2 times a week	3-4 times a week	5-6 times a week	Once a month	Rarely	Never

25. Do you think then police should patrol the mall?

Yes / No Why?_____

26. Do you recognize the legitimacy of the police powers and authority in private place?

Strongly recognized □Recognized□ neutral□ Not recognized □Strongly not recognized□

27. Do you agree that the police should intervene inappropriate behaviours in private places?

Strongly Agreed □ Agreed □ neutral □ Disagreed □ Strongly Disagreed □

28. What kind(s) of behaviours should the police intervene?

29. What do feel about increasing the police patrol?

Reduce crime?

Reduce fear of crime?

Feel safer?

Deter customers?

Obstructing your businesses?

30. How would you rate the efficiency of the police?

High □ Good □ Average □ Poor □ None □

31. What are your views on the police services?

32. Is there anything you would like to add to this interview?

End of Interview- Thank You.

Appendix 6

Confidential

Interview schedule for Citizen (alledged malefactor)

(English Translation)

General Information:

Coded name: _____ Gender: _____

1. Age: Age: 18-29□ 30-39□ 40-49□ 50-59□ 60 & above □
2. Education: Below Secondary □ Post-secondary □College & above □
3. Years of residence in Hong Kong: _____years
4. Contact telephone number (optional): _____
5. Place/date/time of interview:_____
6. Resident in this estate □ this district □ other district:_____
7. Why are you hanging around in here?
8. Did you cause any incident in here and what are they?

Perceptions on Security Officers: Roles and Function:

9. What do you think about the work of the security officers?

10. How often do you see the security officers on patrol?						
Every day	1-2 times a week	3-4 times a week	5-6 times a week	Once a month	Rarely	Never

11. How often do you have contact with the security officers?						
Every day	1-2 times a week	3-4 times a week	5-6 times a week	Once a month	Rarely	Never

12. Under what circumstances you had contact with the security officers?

13. How often do you the security officer intervene your behaviour?						
Every day	1-2 times a week	3-4 times a week	5-6 times a week	Once a month	Rarely	Never

14. Did any security ask to leave the estate before? Why? How?

15. How often do they ask you to leave?						
Every day	1-2 times a week	3-4 times a week	5-6 times a week	Once a month	Rarely	Never

16. What do feel about increasing the security patrol?

    Making you feel constraint?

    Go to other estate?

17. What are your views on the security services?

18. How would you describe the status of the security officers in this estate?

    Private police?

    Guard?

    Service person?

    Employee?

    Other?

19. What are your views on the security officers' powers?

20. Do you recognize their powers and authority as legitimate?

Strongly recognized □Recognized□ neutral□ Not recognized □Strongly not recognized□

Perceptions on the police:

21. How often do you see the police patrol the estate?						
Every day	1-2 times a week	3-4 times a week	5-6 times a week	Once a month	Rarely	Never
22. How often will the police intervene your behaviour?						
Every day	1-2 times a week	3-4 times a week	5-6 times a week	Once a month	Rarely	Never

23. What did the police do to you?

24. How do you feel about the police intervening your behaviours in a private place?

25. What do feel about increasing the security patrol?

Making you feel constraint?

Go to other estate?

26. How do you feel about the police services?

27. Is there anything you would like to add to this interview?

End of Interview- Thank You.

Appendix 7

Confidential

Interview schedule for Professional Body

(English Translation)

General Information:

Code name: _____ Gender: _____Capacity:_____

1. Age: 18-29☐ 30-39☐ 40-49☐ 50-59☐ 60 & above ☐

2. Education: Below Secondary ☐Post-secondary ☐College & above ☐

3. Years of residence in Hong Kong: _____Years

4. Years of participating in security matters: _____Years

5. Professional Qualification (optional): _____

6. Can you tell me what do you know about the security industry?

7. What area do you participate in the security matters?

8. What are your views on the security industry?

9. What do you think are the roles of the security officers? e.g. Private police?

10. What do you think the government could help the security industry?

11. What would you suggest to improve the status of the security officers?

End of Interview - Thank you.

Appendix 8

Official Response from the Hong Kong Police Force

External Application for Assistance in Academic Research in Connection with Private Studies: Mr. Kwong Yat-hung (Ref: ER 2010/023)

On behalf of this Headquarters, I regret to inform you that we cannot render assistance for your application on the grounds that

(a) The Hong Kong Police Force is not supervising *per se* the private security guards at their place of work and the security companies concerned are their supervisors or management. They and the occupants of the estates where the security guards are deployed are in a better position to give their views.

(b) Our Policy Wing has also reviewed the set of questions to be posed to the police officers. Although the information will be kept confidential, the data collected in these interviews touch upon restricted and sensitive operational matter of security, upon which the Policy Wing is not privileged to disclose to any unauthorized party.

(c) On the other hand, the information on the licensing of Security Personnel Permit (SPP) is available on the Police Public Webpage (**http://www.police.gov.hk/ppp_en/11_useful_info/licences/security.html**).

The applicant is also advised to check out more about the subject from the website of the statutory Security and Guarding Services Industry Authority (**http://www.sb.gov.hk/eng/links/sgsia/index.htm**).

2. May I wish you every success for your research in the future.

3. Should you have any queries, please feel free to call me at 2860 2772.

(Ernest SO Moon-tong)

for D HKPC (SP RC)

Appendix 9

Excerpts of Legal Ordinances

Section 17: Revocation of permit

Where any holder of a permit is convicted of any offence specified in column 2 of Schedule 2 and the penalty imposed on him for that offence is the penalty specified in relation to that offence in column 3 of that Schedule, the Commissioner shall, by notice in writing to the holder of the permit, revoke the permit.

Section 18: Application for revocation or suspension of permit

On an application under this section, the Authority may, if satisfied that the holder of the permit is no longer a fit and proper person to hold the permit or has been in breach of any condition of the permit, revoke the permit or suspend the permit for such period as it considers appropriate.

Schedule 2: Offences for which permit to be revoked:

Item	Offence	Penalty
1.	Any offence against the Societies Ordinance (Cap 151) or the Dangerous Drugs Ordinance (Cap 134)	Any penalty
2.	Any offence involving fraud or dishonesty	Any penalty
3.	Any offence involving violence	Imprisonment
4.	Any offence against Part XII of the Crimes Ordinance (Cap 200) (Amended L.N. 48 of 2003)	Any penalty

Source: Bilingual Laws Information System, Justice Department, Hong Kong

Appendix 10

Interview guide

(English Translation)

University of Portsmouth

A Study of the Functions and Powers of Private Security Officers in Private Housing Estates in Hong Kong

Interview guide

My name is Kwong Yat Hung Wilkie and I am a research student in the University of Portsmouth. I am inviting you to participate in an academic study of the power and authority of private security officer in residential housing estate in Hong Kong. I will conduct the study myself and hope to learn about the working experiences of yourself and others in handling security matters in your site.

The interview will last about 1 hour and 30 minutes. If you decide to participate, you are free to withdraw your consent and stop the interview at any time.

I guarantee your confidentiality and anonymity. If you give us your permission for the interview by signing this document, I may include material from the interview for writing up my PhD thesis and other relevant publications. Any material will be presented in such a way that you or your company could not be identified.

If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, you should ask to speak me and I will do my best to answer your questions. My contact number is 53180684 in Hong Kong or 07579652128 in the UK or email: wilkie.kwong@port.ac.uk. If you remain unhappy and wish to complain formally, you can launch your complain to the Research Ethics Committee, University of Portsmouth. Detail can be obtained from http://www.port.ac.uk

If you have any questions, please feel free to ask me. Thank you very much for giving your time for this interview. I would be grateful if you could sign two copies of this consent form. One is for you and the other is for our record.

Consents form of interviewee (English Translation)

Consent Statement of participant

Please read this form carefully. If you have any further questions, do ask please.

You have the right to change your mind at any time, including after you have signed this form.

I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet dated…… for the above study. I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and have had these answered satisfactorily.

I understand my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time

I agree to the interview and observation described on this form.

I understand that the researcher will conduct the interview and observation in person.

I understand that I will have the opportunity to discuss the interview and observation with the researcher at anytime during the research.

I understand that any procedure in addition to those described on this form will only be carried out with my further consent.

I agree to take part in the above study.

Officer's signature …… Date……

Name (PRINT)
……

Confirmation of consent

I have confirmed with the officer that s/he has no further questions and agrees the interview and observation to go ahead.

Signed:…….…… Date .. ……..…….

Researcher's Name :Mr. WILKIE YH KWONG Job title: PhD research student

Important notes: (tick if applicable)

☐ Officer has withdrawn consent (ask officer to sign /date here)……..…….

Reason(s)(if given) ……..

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UPR16 FORM

University of Portsmouth

RESEARCH ETHICS REVIEW CHECKLIST

Name of Postgraduate Research Degree Student (PGRDS) OR Professional Doctorate Student (PD)	WILKIE YAT HUNG KWONG		
Thesis Title	'PERSON OF VERSATILITY': PRIVATE SECURITY OFFICERS AND PRIVATE POLICING IN RESIDENTIAL ESTATES IN HONG KONG		
Thesis Word Count (excluding ancillary data)	79,884		
First Supervisor	DR. MARK BUTTON		
Other members of supervision team	DR. ALISON WAKEFIELD		
Faculty	FHSS		
Department / School / Institute	ICJS		
Start Date	01-10-2009	**Full time/~~Part time~~***	~~MPhil/PhD/MD/PD~~*

(* Delete as appropriate)

Please complete this form and return to the Research Section, Quality Management Division, Academic Registry, University House, with your thesis prior to examination.

If you are unsure about any of the following, please contact the local representative on your Faculty Ethics Committee for advice. Please note that it is your responsibility to follow the University's Ethics Policy and any relevant University, academic or professional guidelines in the conduct of your study

Although the Ethics Committee may have given your study a favourable opinion, the final responsibility for the ethical conduct of this work lies with the researcher(s).

I have considered the ethical dimensions of the above named research project, and have successfully obtained the necessary ethical approval(s):

Ethical review number(s) from Faculty Ethics Committee (or from NRES/SCREC): 11/12:14

Signed (PGRDS / PD Student)		**Date:** 1-5-2012

UKRIO* finished research checklist	Yes	No
(1) Have all of your research and findings been reported accurately, honestly and within a reasonable time frame?	✓	
(2) Have all contributions to knowledge been acknowledged?	✓	
(3) Have you complied with all agreements relating to intellectual property, publication and authorship?	✓	
(4) Has your research data been retained in a secure and accessible form and will it remain so for the required duration?	✓	
(5) Does your research comply with all legal, ethical, and contractual requirements?	✓	

Ethical Issue Statement

If you have ***not*** submitted your work for ethical review, and/or you have answered 'No' to one or more of questions 1 to 5, please explain why this is so:

*UKIRO checklist. If you would like to know more about the checklist, please see your Faculty or Departmental ethics committee rep or see the online version of the full checklist at: http://www.ukrio.org/resources/UKRIO%20Recommended%20Checklist%20for%20Researchers.pdf