

**European trade unions and world trade negotiations:
The struggle for fair and sustainable trade policies
1973 - 2018**

Andrew Waterman

This degree is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree
of Doctor of Philosophy of the University of Portsmouth

June 2021

Abstract

As organisations representing the collective interests of workers, trade unions have a huge interest in the direction and impact of world trade. Whilst European trade unions have traditionally supported free trade to secure jobs for their members, this position has been harder to maintain as world trade has become more neoliberal over time. European trade unions have therefore become more critical of the dominant free trade agenda, which has increasingly moved beyond tariff reduction into areas such as public service liberalisation and regulatory alignment.

By using a mixed-methods approach that draws on extensive archival research and interview data, this thesis seeks to understand how trade union strategies to influence world trade negotiations have changed over time. To achieve this, the strategies of three national trade union confederations – the UK Trades Union Congress, German Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund and French Confédération Générale du Travail – and the European level European Trade Union Confederation will be analysed during two distinct periods: the long 1970s (1973-1982) and the period since the establishment of the World Trade Organization (1995-2018).

This research reveals three key findings. First, union strategies to influence world trade negotiations have changed over time by adopting a greater openness to outsider influence and transnational mobilisation. Second, the key reasons behind this change are that union power has declined, few effective institutional avenues of influence exist, and unions' policy objectives have increasingly conflicted with the dominant trade agenda. Finally, the research highlights that European unions have been able to influence world trade negotiations by raising and fighting for defensive demands that mitigate some of the social costs of free trade, but still have limited power and capacity to bring a genuine social dimension to EU trade policies.

Table of Contents

Abstract.....	i
Table of Contents.....	ii
Declaration.....	iv
List of Figures and Tables.....	v
Abbreviations.....	vi
Acknowledgements.....	x
Dissemination.....	xi
Introduction.....	1
Research Theme.....	2
Research Questions.....	5
Literature Review.....	7
Research Design and Methods.....	22
Structure of the Thesis.....	30
Chapter 1 – European trade unions in the long 1970s:	
The beginning of the end of the ‘golden age’.....	33
TUC.....	33
DGB.....	36
CGT.....	40
ETUC.....	43
ICFTU and WFTU.....	52
Conclusion.....	54
Chapter 2 – Policy objectives and avenues of influence in the long 1970s:	
Protecting jobs in the shadow of globalization.....	58
Policy objectives.....	59
Avenues of influence.....	87
Conclusion.....	97
Chapter 3 – Influencing world trade negotiations in the long 1970s:	
‘For a new and improved Multifibre Arrangement!’.....	101
MFA 1.....	102
MFA 2.....	106
MFA 3.....	128
Conclusion.....	161

Chapter 4 - European trade unions in the contemporary period:	
Adapting to new challenges	166
TUC.....	166
DGB.....	170
CGT.....	174
ETUC.....	178
ICFTU/ITUC.....	188
Conclusion.....	191
Chapter 5 - Policy objectives and avenues of influence in the contemporary period:	
Fighting for fair and sustainable globalisation	194
Policy objectives.....	195
Avenues of influence.....	211
Conclusion.....	228
Chapter 6 – Influencing world trade negotiations in the contemporary period:	
‘For Fair Global Trade!’	232
The WTO.....	233
CETA.....	253
Conclusion.....	298
Chapter 7 – Trade union strategies to influence world trade negotiations:	
Change over time	306
The impact of structural and institutional changes.....	307
Change and continuity in unions’ policy objectives.....	318
Union strategies and their impact on world trade negotiations.....	322
Conclusion.....	335
Conclusion	339
Bibliography.....	349
Annex 1 – List of interviewees.....	400
Annex 2 – List of archives visited.....	402
Annex 3 – Consent form for interviewees.....	403
Annex 4 – Ethical Review confirmation.....	404
Annex 5 – List of funding received.....	407
Annex 6 – UPR16 Form.....	408

Declaration

Whilst registered as a candidate for the above degree, I have not been registered for any other research award. The results and conclusions embodied in this thesis are the work of the named candidate and have not been submitted for any other academic award.

Word count: 104,020

List of Figures and Tables

Figure 1: McGuire's (2014, p. 50) typology of union power resources.....	13
Table 1: Comparison of trade union strategies and resources during MFA negotiation.....	165
Table 2: Comparison of trade union strategies and resources during WTO negotiations.....	305
Table 3: Comparison of trade union strategies and resources during CETA negotiations...	305

Abbreviations

ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific
AFL-CIO	American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations
ALTER-EU	Alliance for Lobbying Transparency and Ethics Regulation
ATTAC	Association pour la Taxation des Transactions financières et pour l'Action Citoyenne
BMWi	Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft [und Energie]
BTC	British Textile Confederation
CBI	Confederation of British Industry
CDU	Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands
CEE	Central and Eastern Europe
CEO	Corporate Europe Observatory
CETA	Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement
CFDT	Confédération française démocratique du travail
CGIL	Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro
CGT	Confédération Générale du Travail
CGT-FO	Confédération Générale du Travail - Force Ouvrière
CLC	Canadian Labour Congress
COMITEXFIL	Comité de coordination des industries textiles de la Communauté européenne
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
CSD	Civil Society Dialogue
CSO	civil society organisation
CSU	Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern
CUPE	Canadian Union of Public Employees
DAG	Domestic Advisory Group
DG	Directorate General
DGB	Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund
EC	European Community

ECJ	European Court of Justice
EDC	Economic Development Council
EEC	European Economic Community
EESC	European Economic and Social Committee
EMU	Economic and Monetary Union
EP	European Parliament
EPSU	European Federation of Public Service Unions
ETUC	European Trade Union Confederation
ETUC-TCL	European Trade Union Committee of Textiles, Clothing and Leather Workers
ETUF	European Trade Union Federation
ETUI	European Trade Union Institute
EU	European Union
EWC	European Works Council
FDI	foreign direct investment
FDP	Freie Demokratische Partei
FNTHC-CGT	Fédération Nationale des Travailleurs de l'Habillement-Chapellerie
FTA	free trade agreement
FTM-CGT	Fédération des travailleurs de la métallurgie-CGT
FTT-CGT	Federation des Travailleurs du Textile-CGT
GATS	General Agreement on Trade in Services
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP	gross domestic product
Gesamttextil	Gesamtverband der deutschen Textilindustrie
GSP	Generalized Scheme of Preferences
GTB	Gewerkschaft Textil-Bekleidung
GUF	Global Union Federation
ICFTU	International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
ICS	Investment Court System
IG Metall	Industriegewerkschaft Metall
IG BCE	Industriegewerkschaft Bergbau, Chemie, Energie

ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INTA	Committee on International Trade
IPE	International Political Economy
IR	International Relations
ISDS	Investor-State Dispute Settlement
ITGLWF	International Textile, Garment and Leather Workers' Federation
ITS	International Trade Secretariat
ITUC	International Trade Union Confederation
JII	Joint Interpretative Instrument
LP	Labour Party
LTA	Long-Term Agreement on Cotton Textiles
MEDEF	Mouvement des entreprises de France
MEP	Member of European Parliament
MFA	Multifibre Arrangement
MNC	multinational corporation
MOC	mobilisation and organisational capacity
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEDC	National Economic Development Council
NGO	non-governmental organisation
NHS	National Health Service
NTB	non-tariff barrier
NUPGE	National Union of Public and General Employees
OEEC	Organisation for European Economic Co-operation
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PCF	Parti communiste français
POS	political opportunity structure
PS	Parti socialiste
PSAC	Public Service Alliance of Canada

PSI	Public Services International
S&D	Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats
SIA	Sustainability Impact Assessment
SPD	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands
SMT	social movement theory
TiSA	Trade in Services Agreement
TJN	Trade Justice Network
TWN	Third World Network
TILS	Trade, Investment and Labour Standards
TNCs	transnational corporations
TSD	Trade and Sustainable Development
TTIP	Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
TUAC	Trade Union Advisory Committee to the OECD
TUC	Trades Union Congress
TUC-TCFC	TUC Textile, Clothing and Footwear Committee
TUI	Trade Union International
UK	United Kingdom
UNCTAD	United Nations Committee on Trade and Development
UNICE	Union des industries des pays de la communauté européenne
US	United States
USW	United Steelworkers'
WFTU	World Federation of Trade Unions
WTO	World Trade Organization

Acknowledgements

I would like to express the utmost gratitude to my supervisor Professor Wolfram Kaiser for his intellectual and moral support throughout this project. He has been genuinely and consistently supportive of my research and everything that has come with it, always encouraging me to push myself and pursue new possibilities. His sharp and insightful feedback during the writing of my thesis has also been invaluable.

I would like to thank my many additional supervisors for their support and encouragement throughout this PhD as well as the numerous other colleagues and administrative staff that I have worked with in this time, particularly the university library staff. I am also thankful to all the interviewees who kindly took the time to contribute to my project and to the welcoming and dedicated staff at all the archives I have been privileged to visit during this project.

My biggest thanks obviously go to my wonderful friends and family, but especially to Claire, Rosa and Heather for their love, support, and patience over the years and for keeping me going through the hard times.

Dissemination

Journal Articles

- Supply chain solidarity as a worker-led strategy for trade: Unite the Union (UK), *New Global Studies Special Issue on Global Labor and Supply Chains* (with B. Norman, forthcoming 2021)
- The Limits of Embedded Liberalism: TUC Strategies to Influence the Multi-Fibre Arrangement and the GATT Social Clause, 1973–1994. *Labour History Review*, 83(2), 125–146. <https://doi.org/10.3828/lhr.2018.7> (2018).
- ‘Review: International conference on the history of the European Trade Union Confederation’. *Journal of European Integration History*, (1), 304-305 (2016).

Book Chapters

- Resisting globalisation? The TUC, the CBI and the politics of protectionism in the UK textile industry in the 1970s. In L. Coppolaro and L. Mechi (Eds.), *Free Trade and Social Welfare in Europe: Explorations in the Long 20th Century*, pp. 126-143. London: Routledge (2020).

Conference Presentations

- ‘Protecting jobs in the shadow of globalisation: European textile unions and international trade negotiations as a site of contestation in the long 1970s’, forthcoming paper to be presented at “Towards a Social History of European Integration” conference, Utrecht, 18-19 October 2021.
- ‘Moving beyond the social clause: Opportunities for a collective bargaining approach to trade in the post-pandemic global economy’, paper presented at “Trade unions and Free Trade in the post-pandemic environment: moving towards trade justice?” online workshop, 7 May 2021 (with B. Norman).
- ‘“Brexit on our terms”: Opportunities for British trade unions?’, paper presented at UACES Annual Conference, Krakow, 4-6 September 2017.
- ‘The struggle to influence world trade negotiations: The ETUC and the challenges of collective action at the elite level’, poster presented at the Herrenhaeuser Symposium, “Workers of the World: Exploring global perspectives on labour from the 1950s to the present”, Hannover, 28-30 June 2017.
- ‘The allure of Delors or “the logic of influence”? The 1988 “Delors conference” and how the TUC reluctantly became “good Europeans”’, paper presented to 12th Annual HEIRS Conference, Louvain-la-Neuve, 20 April 2016
- ‘The limits of embedded liberalism: the TUC, the GATT Social Clause and the Multi-Fibre Arrangement’, paper presented at “Free trade and social charges” conference, Padova, 11-12 November 2015.

Introduction

“Stop TTIP and CETA – For Fair Global Trade!”. Around 250,000 people protested in Berlin under this banner on 25 September 2015. The scale of this demonstration, initially anticipated to bring 50,000 activists onto the streets of the German capital, had confounded even the organisers’ expectations and represented the largest national demonstration in Germany since reunification. Smaller protests took place across Europe and North America in the same period. Though seasoned trade unionists, anti-globalisation activists and environmentalists were all present and played important roles in organising what turned out to be the peak event of the anti-TTIP and CETA campaigns, these criticisms also clearly resonated with the wider populations. More fundamentally, it represented a decisive break with the past: international trade agreements were no longer the sole preserve of politicians, trade lawyers and policy advisors. Now ordinary people could have their say on the trade deals that have such a profound effect on their everyday lives.

As organisations representing the collective interests of workers, trade unions have a huge interest in the direction and impact of world trade policies and agreements. Using this fact as its starting point, this thesis is a temporal, comparative, and transnational analysis of how trade union strategies to influence world trade negotiations have changed over time. To achieve this, the strategies of three national trade union confederations – the UK Trades Union Congress (TUC), German Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB) and French Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT) – and the European level European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) will be analysed during two distinct periods: the long 1970s (1973-1982) and the period since the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) (1995-2018).

Research Theme

The last three rounds of multilateral trade negotiations (the Tokyo and Uruguay rounds of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the Doha Round of the WTO) have reflected and contributed to huge social, economic, and political change, accelerating existing processes of globalisation. Despite debates over the extent to which free trade should be regulated during this era, the notion that free trade is central to economic and social progress has remained largely unquestioned among the economists, negotiators, lawyers, and politicians that have overseen such an expansion in world trade. However, since the world economic crisis of 2008 this status quo has become increasingly contested and politicised (Gheyle, 2020; Garcia-Duran, Eliasson and Costa, 2020; De Bièvre and Poletti, 2020; Young, 2019). Over the last decade in particular, the EU-US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), Brexit, and the simmering trade war between the US and China, have all lead to a questioning of free trade in different ways. As a result, after a lengthy period ‘behind closed doors’, world trade has suddenly become a very public issue.

This increased contestation of free trade has created room for a discussion on its social purpose and costs. Negotiations over TTIP and CETA in particular saw unprecedented labour and civil society mobilisations against the deal. Among the many grievances of the protesters on these mobilisations were the threat to public services, diminished regulatory standards, the controversial Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) provisions, and a lack of transparency during the negotiations of both deals (Stop TTIP!, 2018). Not since the violent anti-globalisation protests at the 1999 WTO Ministerial Conference in Seattle have trade issues generated so much public debate. As Siles-Brügge and De Ville (2017, p. 1496) note, the rise of ‘mega-regional’, ‘new generation’ trade agreements have helped move the issue of trade away from a focus on purely economic and material interests and towards an increasing focus

on normative social concerns. For example, the controversy over the expansion of legal arbitration that would potentially allow private companies to sue states (ISDS) exemplifies the feeling among a broader layer of the public that trade is infringing on the public sphere and state sovereignty. In this environment, trade issues have also increasingly been utilised by populist parties to further their policy agenda (Hays, Lim and Spoon, 2019; Rodrik, 2018).

Despite relatively recent mainstream interest in the social costs associated with world trade, the desire of societal actors like trade unions to bring a ‘social dimension’ to trade liberalisation has persisted throughout modern trade negotiations. For example, the call for maintaining ‘fair’ labour standards in relation to trade liberalisation can be traced back to the beginning of the twentieth century and the concept of a ‘social clause’ has existed in its modern form since the foundation of the GATT (Coppolaro and Mechi, 2020a). Furthermore, the trade-society nexus was to some extent institutionalised in the post-war era, albeit uneasily, in the system of embedded liberalism, which harnessed international trade liberalisation but also allowed national governments the autonomy to protect key sectors of their economies – the latter therefore (theoretically) offsetting any negative consequences stemming from the former (Ruggie, 1982).

In this environment, European trade unions, especially those based in export sectors in the Global North, have largely accepted trade liberalisation on the condition that jobs, investment and social progress would follow (Hilary, 2014; Shaev, 2018). Notably, this remains many European unions’ default position on world trade even though economic hegemony has overwhelmingly shifted from an embedded liberal to a neoliberal agenda. These contradictions have contributed to criticisms that trade unions have tacitly endorsed or accepted the same policies and processes that have ultimately weakened their ability to influence this agenda (Bieler, 2006). In the pursuance of increased influence to compensate for their diminished power in society, European trade unions’ strategies have increasingly

moved away from the local and national levels and have become more European and transnational (Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman, 2013; Erne, 2008; Martin and Ross, 2001; Visser, 1998). Within this shift, elite union influence has often tended to reflect the characteristics of EU decision- and policymaking processes (Seeliger and Wagner, 2018; Greenwood, 2011). With this in mind, and in contrast to past strategies that relied more heavily on the mobilisation of unions' power, more aggregated forms of advocacy now play a key role in trade union strategies to influence the elite level environment, such as world trade negotiations (Erne, 2008; Dølvik, 1999).

Whilst there is a wealth of scholarship on the issue of labour standards in world trade agreements, with the notable exception of McGuire (2014) – who focuses on union strategies to influence GATS (General Agreement on Trade in Services) negotiations – none of this scholarship has systematically analysed trade union strategies to influence world trade negotiations. Some, such as Van Roozendaal (2002) and Bieler, Ciccaglione, Hilary and Lindberg (2014), have made valuable contributions that outline the positions of various unions on the issue of trade and the challenges unions face in resisting the impact of the neoliberal free trade agenda. Further, reflecting the growing interest in the social costs of free trade, a recent edited volume by Coppolaro and Mechi (2020b) addresses the relationship between trade and social welfare during the twentieth century. However, no systematic analysis of the methods and strategies that trade unions have used to try and influence world trade negotiations and how they have changed over time currently exists.

The key question that stems from this large gap in the literature is what methods and strategies have trade unions used to influence world trade negotiations and have they changed over time? In attempting to answer this question, this thesis will make a number of significant contributions. First, in the field of labour studies this thesis will add to existing knowledge of the internal structure, transnational cooperation, and global scope of multiple national,

sectoral, and transnational labour organisations within a policy field of global importance by studying how their strategies have changed over time. Secondly, this thesis will contribute to European Studies and wider International Relations (IR) scholarship by studying the multilevel and transnational relationships between trade unions, civil society organisations (CSOs), national governments, the EU, and other international organisations, generating a greater understanding of the political frameworks that govern society, as well as how they are contested. Thirdly, this thesis will further contribute to debates within IR and, to a lesser extent, International Political Economy (IPE) by analysing EU trade policy and world negotiations and what impact, if any, trade unions and CSOs have had on their direction, as well as the impact that changing dynamics in world trade and the global economy have had on trade unions and CSOs.

Research Questions

Based on the research focus outlined above, the central research question of this thesis is:

have trade union strategies to influence world trade negotiations changed between the 1970s and the present and, if so, how and why?

This central research question is based on the informed, but loose, assumption that due to a decline in their power, trade unions are likely to have changed the ways in which they have attempted to influence world trade negotiations. This loose hypothesis is strengthened by the fact that many unions – and particularly union confederations – have changed their strategies in other policy areas, in no small part due to increased Europeanisation (Erne, 2008; Dølvik, 1997, 1999). Similarly, the nature of world trade itself has evolved, moving from a predominant focus on trade in goods to a far greater emphasis on non-tariff and regulatory issues which is also likely to have had an impact on union strategies.

The phrase ‘strategies *to* influence’ has been chosen so as not to imply that trade union influence over world trade negotiations is a given. Measuring the extent of trade union influence in this context would require a completely different methodology and set of research aims. As such, though this thesis does highlight examples of successful union influence, it would be impossible to trace the impact of union influence throughout trade negotiations systematically, especially given the scale of this research project. The focus of this thesis is therefore *whether* unions have changed their strategies to influence and, if so, *how* and *why* they have changed.

To attempt to answer the central research question, this thesis is framed by three interrelated research aims. The first of these aims is to account for changes in the economic, political, and institutional context and their impact on trade union influence. Though this thesis is not simply a structuralist account of how unions’ policies and strategies have changed over time, it does acknowledge that analysing the structural changes that have occurred in the last 50 years is fundamental to understanding the changing role of trade unions and, therefore, their strategies to influence. This aim therefore raises questions such as: how has neoliberal globalisation affected union membership and therefore unions’ ability to influence world trade? How has increased European integration changed the character of trade unions and the methods they draw upon? What effect have institutional changes at the national and transnational level had on unions’ ability to influence the direction of world trade? How has the character of world trade changed over the last 50 years and what impact has this had on union influence?

The second aim is to trace the national, European, and transnational actors, networks, linkages, ideas, interests and processes that form the basis of each confederation’s strategies, and their collective approach, to influence world trade negotiations. This aspect of the research will focus on the agency of actors in defining and determining how trade unions

seek to influence the direction of world trade. For example, have European trade unions held broadly similar policies on trade issues? To what extent have unions collaborated on trade issues and what factors have hindered their ability to cooperate? What factors have helped or hindered unions' ability to compete with other interests? Have unions collaborated with non-union actors to further their influence over trade negotiations?

The third and final aim of this thesis is to formulate an understanding of what constitutes trade union influence in relation to world trade negotiations. This issue deals with both the methods and strategies that trade unions use but also who they have tried to influence. For example, did the trade unions cited in this thesis have preferred avenues of influence? Did they favour working at the national, European, or international level? Has their influence been largely formal or informal? Have they focused on influencing individuals or institutions? Have rank-and-file union members been part of unions' strategies to influence or has influence been isolated at the elite level and carried out by union staff?

Literature Review

In attempting to explain how trade union strategies to influence world trade negotiations have changed over time, this thesis will draw on several broad themes in the academic literature: labour and world trade; globalisation; EU trade policy; and Europeanisation. The purpose of this brief literature review is not to provide an exhaustive list of works that address these themes, but to outline some of the most salient theoretical and analytical contributions that will be used throughout this thesis to answer the central research question as well as highlighting the gaps that this thesis seeks to address.

Labour and world trade

There is a small body of work that addresses labour attitudes to world trade as well as individual case studies. One of the most significant contributions to this literature is Bieler, Ciccaglione, Hilary, and Lindberg's (2014) special issue that brings together both aspects of this literature. In addition to important chapters that analyse, for example, European and Canadian trade union cooperation during CETA negotiations (Healy, 2014), the overall theme of the volume is to seek answers to the tensions that exist between the interests of labour and the dynamics of free trade. Furthermore, numerous chapters address the problem of divisions within the international labour movement itself over attitudes to world trade including, most significantly for this thesis, the divisions between unions within Europe and the difficulties unions face in developing transnational solidarity (Hilary, 2014).

Another key contribution to this area of the academic literature comes from Van Roozendaal (2002), who focuses on how unions have attempted to influence the debate on the inclusion of a 'social clause' into WTO trade agreements. Pertinently, since unions have no direct channels to influence the WTO, van Roozendaal – using the case studies of Indian and US trade unions – analyses this debate within other international, regional, and national decision-making bodies such as the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Another key theme that stems from this analysis is how union and governmental interests during trade negotiations can often overlap with each other, though not necessarily based on the same motives. Nonetheless, and as this thesis will reveal, due to the elite level nature of world trade negotiations, unions have often sought to align their interests with national governments or civil society actors instead of formulating a truly independent approach to trade.

Within the academic literature the issue of labour standards has, and continues to be, by far the most analysed phenomenon in relation to labour attitudes to world trade (Harrison, Barbu, Campling, Ebert, Martens, Marx, Orbie, Richardson and Smith, 2019a; Fransen and Burgoon, 2015; Hurtado and Argery, 2008; Orbie, Vos and Taverniers, 2005; Gumbrell-McCormick, 2004; Scherrer, 1998). Further, studies from within the labour movement have also informed analysis on the ‘social dimension’ of world trade in the academic literature (ILO, 2013). Though some studies have taken a historical perspective of, for example, the labour standards debate (Shaev, 2018; Huberman, 2012; Pahle, 2010), a study that temporally and comparatively analyses specific trade union strategies to influence world trade negotiations is still missing. This thesis, and articles that have developed out of the research project (Waterman, 2018; Waterman, 2020), will begin to fill this gap.

Though the above works are all vital elements of the literature on trade and labour issues, the most important contributions for this thesis, both analytically and theoretically, come from McGuire and Scherrer (2010) and McGuire (2014). McGuire and Scherrer’s (2010) work is a comparative analysis of trade union capacity to influence the trade policy process at the national level and draws on multiple case studies. Importantly, as well as highlighting key avenues and obstacles in the national policy process that unions can seek to influence or overcome, the report outlines a theoretical framework that focuses on political opportunities and unions’ capacity to mobilise as the key factors impacting union strategies concerning trade.

McGuire’s (2014) article takes this approach further, firstly by focusing on multilateral GATS negotiations, and secondly by building on the 2010 report to develop a more coherent theoretical framework to support analysis of trade union strategies to influence world trade negotiations. This valuable theoretical framework will be drawn upon throughout this thesis and is outlined briefly below. McGuire’s (2014) framework utilises, modifies, and combines

two existing strands of literature – social movement theory (SMT) and trade union power resources – to help explain trade union strategies to influence world trade negotiations. The SMT literature serves to clarify how social movements organise, mobilise and influence society and is based around the core concepts of political opportunity structure (POS), mobilisation and organisational capacity (MOC) and framing.

The notion of POS refers to the ‘openness’ of a system or organisation to external demands. This openness is not static and is often subject to a number of related variables, including the issue or policy field, the country context or the time in which attempted influence takes place (Tarrow, 2005; Sikkink, 2005). With respect to influencing trade policy, who controls the policy process, the openness of the system to societal actors, the policy legacy, receptiveness and consensus within relevant ministries, departments or organisations, and the willingness of the state to repress mobilisation versus its vulnerability to protest are all argued by McGuire and Scherrer (2010) to be key factors. Importantly, ‘situational opportunities’ for union influence can also exist at very specific points in the policy process, occasional situations like elections, or in times of increased media focus on a particular political issue (McGuire and Scherrer, 2010; McCarthy, Smith and Zald, 1996).

MOC (two strands of literature – mobilisation capacity and organisational capacity – brought together by McGuire to aid conceptual clarity) is a vital component of social movements being able to take advantage of political opportunities. This means that sufficient resources for collective action must be provided, both in terms of tangible (staff, facilities, money, communication methods) and intangible factors (skills, expertise). To mobilise these resources, effective mobilisation structures and strong organisational capacity is necessary (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, 1996; Rucht, 1996). For trade unions, MOC can include formal and informal structures and methods, the unity and coherence of the movement, the effectiveness of its mobilisation and organisational structures, or having sufficient knowledge

and expertise (Hyman, 2007; McGuire and Scherrer, 2010). These factors are especially important given that trade unions are in strong competition for access and influence with other actors on trade issues.

POS and MOC alone do not necessarily guarantee the success of social movements – movements need a common set of beliefs, a willingness to act and an ability to identify problems and, most importantly, solutions. The way in which these issues are ‘framed’ can have a major impact on their resonance with a movement’s constituents or the wider population. Benford and Snow (2000, pp. 614-615) delineate between diagnostic, prognostic, and mobilising frames: the first is the process of identifying an issue as a problem and assigning blame, the second suggests solutions and strategies to deal with the problem, and the third provides a rationale for taking action. These frames are also not static and can be subject to contestation and compromise within the movement (McAdam, 1996). This is particularly true in the case of the trade union movement which is particularly prone to internal divisions but also during campaigns which might require collaboration with non-union actors and groups.

While SMT helps political scientists understand how movements attempt to influence politics and society, one thing it does not do is explain the social basis of collective action – the contention for power between those who hold it and those who are trying to gain it (Tilly, 1978). Drawing on a wide range of existing literature on the subject, McGuire (2014) has developed her own typology of trade union power resources. Given that McGuire’s research interest is also trade union influence over trade negotiations (GATS negotiations in her case) there is a strong rationale for utilising her typology in this thesis, particularly as it is a fairly recent contribution to the union power resources literature that coalesces key existing findings whilst also adding new perspectives.

McGuire herself acknowledges that her typology is drawn from the research of Silver (2003), Chun (2005 and 2009), Webster, Lambert and Bezuidenhout (2008), Dörre, Holst and Nachtwey (2009), Frege, Heery and Turner (2004), Tattersall (2010), and Hajer (1995). Utilising this body of research, McGuire differentiates between associative, structural, institutional, and discursive power (definitions also shown in Figure 1). The final power resource – discursive power – is McGuire’s addition to existing typologies and seeks “to capture the more hidden ideological dimensions of power that enable and constrain action and agendas” by linking these dimensions to the SMT concept of framing as “the key process through which discursive power is exercised in the public domain” (2014, p. 50). Importantly, McGuire also notes that “these ‘archetypal’ forms of union power should not be seen as separate or competing but as interrelated and intertwined, rarely existing by themselves but combining in unexpected ways that can enhance or leverage each other” (2014, p. 50).




Figure 1: McGuire's (2014, p. 50) typology of union power resources

© Donna McGuire 2014

At this point it is worth briefly noting that this thesis argues that the above power resources are drawn from trade unions' role as representatives of workers' class interests (Wright, 2000). Indeed, as Hyman (2001, p. 4) points out, "Whether or not they endorse an ideology of class division and class opposition, unions cannot escape a role as agencies of class". Trade unions, as collective organisations of workers, thus have a unique power that is drawn from their members' ability to influence, disrupt and challenge capital through the threat or act of withdrawing their labour. This class dynamic is the fundamental point that separates trade unions from other CSOs such as environmental organisations and employer organisations.¹ The differentiation between trade unions, business/employer/industry organisations and CSOs is therefore made throughout this thesis. However, it is also

¹ The term 'non-governmental organisations' (NGOs) is also avoided in this thesis for the same reason.

acknowledged that trade unions are often characterised as CSOs, particularly in EU and global governance institutions and consultation mechanisms and have at times also collaborated with organisations representing business, employer, or industry interests.

Globalisation

Debates over the definition and influence of globalisation remain highly contested. Leaving aside the very broad understanding of globalisation – that all aspects of society have become increasingly interdependent and interconnected over time – this thesis primarily deals with the changing characteristics of economic and political globalisation and the ways in which labour and trade interact with these processes. Within mainstream IR theory, debates have primarily concerned the extent to which globalisation is taking place and changing the character and functions of the nation state (Martell, 2007, p. 173). Whilst the definition of globalisation remains highly contested, Dunn, (2007, p. 135) argues that a common theme running through many definitions rests on the notion that, “social relations can no longer be contained within national boundaries and states must simply obey the imperatives of the global economy”.

Central to understanding labour’s role in and attitudes to processes of globalisation is a broad understanding of the global institutions that have fostered and consolidated it. It is important to note that the same institutions that oversaw the system of embedded liberalism in the post-war era would go on to become the key drivers of globalisation after the 1971 ‘Nixon Shock’ and the collapse of the Bretton Woods system (Zeiler, 2013; Blutstein, 2016). Importantly, trade liberalisation and the GATT/WTO have played a central role in pushing globalisation forward against protectionist pressures which have arisen at certain stages (Coppolaro, 2018a; La Barca, 2016). Trade unions do not fit easily into this paradigm since

they occupy a position within an “eternal triangle... [between] market, class and society” (Hyman, 2001, pp. 4-5). As such – much like their attitudes to world trade – trade unions have rarely been simply advocates or opponents of globalisation but have instead called for its regulation and modification so that its benefits can be more evenly distributed (ILO, 2002; ETUC, 2017a).

In contrast to the embedded liberal past which allowed societal actors an element of influence over the direction of the world economy through national governments and neo-corporatist formations, the huge transfer of power from national to transnational institutions with limited mechanisms for social dialogue has increasingly undermined the ability of societal actors to ‘embed’ globalisation and global governance (Van Roozendaal, 2002; Hannah, Scott & Wilkinson, 2017). At the same time, there is a relative consensus in the literature that global problems require global solutions, but questions remain as to whether present forms of globalisation can foster social progress (O’Brien, Goetz, Scholte & Williams, 2000; Rodrik, 2012) or how global governance can manage the consequences of globalisation (Hurrell, 2007; Caporaso & Madeira, 2012).

When discussing labour and globalisation, it is broadly accepted that the dynamics of globalisation are, at best, a challenge to labour movement interests (see Huberman (2012) for an exception to this general rule). In this respect, globalisation is often characterised as a partisan process. Bieler and Morton (2001, p. 4), for example, explicitly link globalisation with neoliberalism when they claim, “globalisation can be defined as the transnationalisation of production and finance at the material level and the shift from Keynesianism to neo-liberalism on the ideological level”. At the same time, however, far from creating a world in which all states and economies interact with globalisation on an equal basis, existent conditions for uneven and combined development have in many cases been exacerbated rather than improved by processes of globalisation (Bieler and Morton, 2014).

In addition to these fundamental structural shifts, the transnationalisation of production and policies geared towards deregulation have produced ‘spatial fragmentation’ of workers on an unprecedented scale. As Lillie (2011, p. 122-123) remarks, labour mobility “reflects capital strategies to outflank organized labor by expanding markets beyond its reach” while Hammer (2013, p. 243) argues that this process is central to neoliberal globalisation and is a result of multinational corporations (MNCs) relocating production to low-wage and poorly regulated economies, fundamentally undermining union’ bargaining power. Furthermore, diminished economic regulation and social protection for workers has been combined with the increased regulation of workers’ rights (Gall, Hurd and Wilkinson, 2011, p. 7). However, it should also be pointed out that, due to deeply entrenched national organisation, trade unions have traditionally also been slow to organise on a transnational basis (Hyman, 2005, p. 142).

EU trade policy

Debates over how EU trade policy is formulated have become increasingly contested over the last ten years. This is partly a consequence of changes in EU trade policymaking as a result of the Lisbon Treaty (which allowed for greater input and oversight from the Council of Ministers and European Parliament (EP)) (Woolcock, 2010a), the EU’s ‘Global Europe’ trade agenda and it’s ever-increasing importance to international trade (Meunier and Nicolaïdis, 2011; Young and Peterson, 2014), and the failure to secure a new multilateral trade agreement through the Doha Development Round despite considerable leadership from the EU (Van den Hoven, 2004). The explicit focus on EU rather than national trade policymaking in this short literature review is justifiable on the basis that it has been a supranational competence of the EC/EU since the Treaty of Rome (1957) and is thus applicable to each

national and European case study used in this thesis. Nonetheless, a debate does exist as to whether the Commission or the Council are the key drivers of EU trade policy (see, for example, Elsig and Dupont (2012) for the former and Van den Hoven (2004, p. 272) for the latter).

Prior to a more recent flourish of scholarly work on the issue, the literature on EU trade policy was considered to be both theoretically and empirically underdeveloped (Poletti and De Bièvre, 2014). However, the intensification of debates over EU trade policy formulation has revealed a number of distinct trends within the literature (for an overview see Orbie and Kerremans's (2013) special issue). The most dominant trend has traditionally been studies that adopt a broadly rational institutionalist approach. Within this spectrum, most works either tend to focus on the inter-institutional principal-agent relationship between the Council and Commission (and, to a lesser extent, the EP (Richardson, 2012)) or the character of interest mediation through a two/three level game approach (Van Loon, 2018). In both accounts, institutional preferences are the drivers of trade policy. Further, much of this literature conforms with the 'collusive delegation' argument which posits that the delegation of trade policymaking from the national to supranational level is intertwined with a wider policy desire to "insulate the process from protectionist pressures and... promote trade liberalization" (Meunier, 2005, p. 8). This approach forms much of the institutionalist explanation for the 'liberal bias' (Hanson, 1998) of the EU's strategic orientation.

Despite the prevalence of the above approaches, others have challenged - to different degrees - the assumption that EU institutions are 'insulated' from special and organised interests and that interest groups can play a role in EU trade policy formation, including trade unions (Dür, 2008; De Bièvre and Eckhardt, 2011; Dür and Matteo, 2014). However, the rational institutionalist framework still influences this sphere of the literature to a large extent. Young and Peterson (2006, p. 806), for example, argue that the emergence of non-

traditional trade issues such as environmental protection and labour standards are a consequence of the EU's 'new trade politics'. By this logic, EU institutions control and provide the arena in which societal interests can attempt to influence its trade policy rather than societal actors changing the EU's trade agenda. As such, there is also a debate over the extent to which EU trade policy is a site for contestation (De Bievre, 2014; Strange, 2015).

The shifting trade policy agenda of the EU and increased importance assigned to the role of societal actors has also led to more constructivist literature that analyses the influence of ideas and values on the development of EU trade policy. As a starting point for explaining the basis of this strand of literature, Siles-Brügge (2014, p. 10) points out the limitations of the rational institutionalist approach in the context of the EU's shift towards its 'Global Europe' policy paradigm without any related change in its institutional architecture. Central to constructivist arguments concerning trade policy is the role of ideas in explaining the actions of actors and institutions (Parsons, 2007). This view also allows for an analysis of the influence of ideas from outside of the narrow EU trade policy 'bubble'. The best examples of this can be found in the wider public discourse around 'new generation' trade agreements like TTIP and CETA, which not only revealed widespread criticism and scrutiny of the negotiations but also challenged the 'liberal bias' of the EU's trade strategy (De Ville and Siles-Brügge, 2017; Jungherr, Mader, Schoen and Wuttke, 2018).

Despite the increasing focus on understanding the role of ideas in EU trade policy formation, constructivist contributions do not necessarily help develop an understanding of why certain ideas have prevailed over others in EU trade policy at different stages. In this respect, an analysis of EU trade policy cannot be limited simply to the agency of individuals or the structure of institutions but must include an understanding of the material basis of ideas and why certain ideas become hegemonic and others do not.

The focus of understanding questions of this kind is central to critical and neo-Gramscian approaches to EU trade policy (which overlap with a wider critical IPE/IR literature (see, for example, Bieler and Morton, 2001; 2008; Van Apeldoorn, 2002; Cox, 1981; Gamble, 2009)). Such a materialist approach argues that the arena in which EU trade policy is formulated is, by definition, an unbalanced set of power relationships in which institutions are structurally designed to favour certain ideas and interests at the expense of others; specifically, market liberalisation over social regulation (Ford, 2013). Importantly, whilst broadly characterising EU trade policy as neoliberal, neo-Gramscian analyses also acknowledge two key contradictions to this wider assessment: firstly, that the neoliberal character of EU trade policy does not preclude concessions to societal interests that seemingly contradict its wider policy orientation (Van Apeldoorn, 2002, p. 76); and secondly, that the EU's structural characteristics do not necessarily override agency, meaning that actors and organisations with ostensibly similar interests can act in completely different ways, even if they appear to go against their assumed best interests (in the case of European trade unions, see Bieler, 2006, p. 4; Hilary, 2014).

Importantly for this thesis there is also a body of literature that seeks to theorise the 'social dimension' of EU trade policy and its external relations more broadly (Orbie et al., 2005; Manners, 2009; Orbie, Tortell, Kissack, Gstöhl, Wouters, and Hachez, 2009; Orbie and Tortell, 2009; Orbie, Martens, Oehri and Van den Putte, 2016; McKenzie and Meissner, 2017). In attempting to outline the competing explanations for the social content of EU trade policy, Kerremans and Orbie (2009, p. 631) note three trends: "economic motives... (interests), the bureaucratic dynamics inside the EU bodies, including the Commission and the Council (institutions), and the Union's normative objectives (ideas)". Broadly speaking, the main focus of this literature is the tension that exists between the EU's economic and social objectives but also the issue of enforceability in relation to social standards

(Vandenberghe, 2008; Adriaensen and González-Garibay, 2013; Portella and Orbie, 2014; Bossuyt, Orbie and Drieghe, 2020). As an example of this strand of the literature, Bailey and Bossuyt (2013, p. 561) question why the EU has struggled to realise its normative trade goals as well as the conventional notion that it can be considered a ‘force for good’, instead conceptualising its trade agenda as a “site of domination” achieved through “expansive market (capitalist) exchange, the ‘Othering’ that tends to accompany such processes of expansion, and the de-politicization necessary to achieve and/or legitimate these processes”.

Europeanisation

Regardless of the criticisms levelled at trade unions’ ability to influence EU policies, there is a large body of literature addressing ongoing processes of Europeanisation within the European labour movement (Dølvik, 1997, 1999; Erne, 2008; Martin and Ross, 1999a, 2001; Visser, 1998). Given the breadth with which the term is used in the academic literature, two of Olsen’s (2002) seminal attempt to distinguish between the five ‘faces’ of the term in the academic literature will be used as a guideline to clarify its usage throughout this thesis: Europeanisation as developing institutions at the European level; and Europeanisation as exporting forms of political organisation. These definitions also overlap with Kaiser and Meyer’s (2013, p. 2) explanation of Europeanisation (with explicit reference to societal actors) as “the establishment of organizational and/or more informal cooperative structures at the level of the... EU”.

The above forms of Europeanisation have made a profound impact on how European trade unions have changed their strategies to influence trade and other policy areas. As a starting point, the most obvious way in which trade unions have engaged in Europeanisation is by establishing their own European level organisations with the explicit aim of influencing

EU institutions and policymakers. As a general process, Olsen (2002, p. 929) refers to this type of Europeanisation as “both the strengthening of an organizational capacity for collective action and the development of common ideas”. Indeed, from the 1970s onwards, European trade unions have gradually taken European integration more seriously by developing this organisational capacity at the European level (Martin and Ross, 1999; Greenwood, 2011; Tilly and Degryse, 2013; Ciampani and Tilly, 2017).

However, the literature notes that trade unions’ generalised shift towards European level organisation is a consequence of both push and pull factors - ‘pushed’ towards European level organisation as a consequence of increased economic globalisation and unfavourable domestic contexts but also ‘pulled’ by increased European integration and the potential for greater influence and increased resources (Visser, 1998; Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman, 2013). In addition, many scholars also note the increased Europeanisation of industrial relations since the mid-1990s and extensively debate the desirability, impact and success of these processes (Hyman, 2001; Hoffmann, Hoffmann, Kirton-Darling and Rampeltshammer, 2002; Sadowski, Ludewig and Turk, 2003; Hoffmann and Hoffman, 2009; Eberwein, Tholen and Schuster, 2018).

In addition to the notion of Europeanisation as institutionalisation at the European level, European trade unions have also gradually developed European methods influenced by the EU’s policymaking process. For Olsen (2002, p. 938), this form of Europeanisation centres around the concept of diffusion and the extent to which patterns of behaviour are exported and learned. As Ebbinghaus and Visser (1994) note, trade unions are structurally disadvantaged in the EU context due to the complexities and challenges of both the EU’s decision-making machinery, its system of interest intermediation, and the diffuse interests and perspectives within the European labour movement itself. In this environment, European unions face a dilemma between the ‘logic of influence’ and the ‘logic of membership’

(Dølvik, 1997) - the danger of emphasising the former over the latter is that “with too one-sided an engagement with the Brussels machine, unions can succumb to an elitist embrace” (Hyman, 2005, p. 17). This point is especially apposite considering how dependent the ETUC is on the European Commission for funding (Martin and Ross, 2001, p. 74; Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman, 2013, p. 169).

The influence-membership dichotomy mentioned above can be expressed in many different ways through the socialisation of EU norms and practices (Seeliger and Wagner, 2018). Wagner (2013, p. 193), for example, speaks of “the growing autonomy of a trade union elite, characterized by a specific culture”. On a similar theme, Hyman (2011, p. 22) notes the prevalence of ‘Eurospeak’ among the upper echelons of union structures that operate at the EU level, creating a further potential division with their members who are often unaware of the actions that are being carried out on their behalf by largely unelected officials. These examples of trade union Europeanisation are further reflected in a wider shift strategically to a far greater reliance on expertise and advocacy rather than mobilisation of power resources (Turner, 1996; Dølvik, 1997, 1999; Erne, 2008).

Research Design and Methods

To tackle the puzzle of whether and how trade union strategies to influence world trade negotiations have changed between the 1970s and the present, this thesis employs a theory-informed inductive approach in which the central research question, the existing academic literature, and the data collected during the project frames and informs the overall analysis. Furthermore, this project is guided by the lack of research on the theme of trade union influence over world trade negotiations. Though this research project is based on the hypothesis that trade unions have attempted to employ a variety of strategies to influence

world trade negotiations and that their strategies are likely to have changed over time, the purpose of this thesis is not to prove or disprove this in a deductive manner.

The key reason behind taking an inductive approach to address the central research question is to foreground the research findings and primary data – the most significant contributions of the research – over the development or application of a theoretical framework. Additionally, whilst the central research question is based on the broad hypothesis mentioned above, it would be very difficult to ‘test’ a particular theoretical framework in a more deductive manner without strong existing empirical data to work with. Nonetheless, despite making the decision to use an inductive research design, it is worth acknowledging how certain theoretical frameworks could have been employed to explore and test more specific aspects of union strategies, trade policies and institutional dynamics. For example, a neo-Gramscian framework could have been used to analyse the role of power structures in trade policy formation and global governance; a constructivist framework could have been used to explore the role of ideas and the social construction of trade issues (as opposed to, or in relation to, purely material factors); and a policy network analysis could have been used to analyse the interactions between governments and societal actors through the prism of trade politics.

However, after engaging with the academic literature and contemplating the temporal scope of the research, it was not felt that one theoretical approach could necessarily answer the research question. Likewise, the interconnection between different levels of collective action and governance is difficult to capture in one theoretical perspective. This is the primary explanation for why the theoretical approaches mentioned above have been used in an eclectic, but still coherent, manner throughout the thesis to explain, rather than test, the research findings. Importantly, there is far greater potential to use a theoretical framework in future research now that the main research gap has been fulfilled.

Though the thesis is not theory-driven, it is nevertheless theoretically informed by the key concepts, approaches and analyses introduced in the previous section. While this thesis starts from the empirical source findings, it aims to relate these to relevant theories and concepts to see how they confirm or contradict their assumptions and to the wider theoretical debate over the interplay between structure and agency. For this, the thesis draws on Cox's (1995, p. 33) historicist argument that "Structures are formed by collective human activity over time. Structures, in turn, mould the thoughts and actions of individuals. Historical change is to be thought of as the reciprocal relationship of structures and actors". In this respect, trade union strategies to influence world trade cannot simply be understood as a reflexive response to the positive or negative impact of trade agreements on workers' lives (McGuire, 2014; Munck, 2002; Webster, Lambert and Bezuidenhout, 2008). The agency of trade unions – the strategies and policies they pursue, both individually and collectively – is informed by existing structures but not decisively. Indeed, this thesis is in part a critical analysis of the strategic *choices* that unions have made to attempt to influence world trade over time, whilst at the same time placing these choices in context.

Connected to this inductive approach, this thesis utilises temporal, comparative, and transnational analytical lenses to address the central research question and aims which are outlined above. The chosen timescale of this research project allows for an analysis of how and whether union strategies to influence world trade negotiations have changed over time. By choosing a period of nearly 50 years (1970s to the present), it is possible to draw out general conclusions and specific examples in relation to this question since the likelihood of change taking place is exacerbated by the length of time studied. Furthermore, this specific period is widely regarded as a time of intense social, economic, and political change on a global scale. This is especially true when considering the fortunes of European trade unions who have in general experienced a huge decline in their strength, power, and influence during

the period of analysis chosen for this project. Given this context, it would be unusual if trade unions' strategies to influence world trade negotiations had not changed in response to this decline as well as other exogenous factors.

Linked to the temporal lens taken by this thesis, a comparative approach is also used. The central dynamic of this research project is the comparison of the strategies of three national trade union confederations – the UK Trades Union Congress, German Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, and French Confédération Générale du Travail – and, to reflect the multilevel nature of the EU and international trade negotiations, the European level European Trade Union Confederation during a historical period (the long 1970s (1972-1982)) and an established contemporary period (1995-2018). These periods have been chosen as they overlap with key rounds of international trade negotiations: the Tokyo Round of the GATT (1973-1979) and the first three rounds of negotiations of the Multifibre Arrangement (MFA) for the historical period, and the build-up to and breakdown of multilateral WTO negotiations (1995-2006) and the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (2009-2018) for the contemporary period. The above trade rounds have also been chosen to compare union strategies for bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations and how they have changed over time.

One limitation of the comparative dimension of this project is that it does not analyse directly comparable case studies. For instance, the MFA and CETA are not directly comparable because the former was a sectoral trade agreement while the latter was a much broader FTA. Also, the MFA was both a multilateral and bilateral agreement while CETA was only a bilateral agreement. Similarly, union attempts to influence the MFA largely came from the textile and clothing federations and committees, while for CETA the confederations were the leading union actors. Union influence at the multilateral WTO level was different

again with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) playing the leading role.

The ideal scenario in terms of choosing two directly comparable case studies would have been to compare union strategies to influence the GATT Tokyo Round with the WTO Doha Round. This was the initial proposal for this research project. However, it became clear in the early stages of archival research that very limited sources existed for union influence over the GATT Tokyo Round while extensive sources existed for the MFA. Likewise, after the early stages of gathering interview data for the project, it became clear that union influence over the WTO Doha was very limited and restricted to a very small period before negotiations quickly broke down. Furthermore, it was very difficult to establish and secure interviewees, both from the trade unions and the European institutions, for this period.

It was at this point that the decision was made to add a more contemporary case study in the form of CETA, which yielded far better results in terms of interviewees and data. Importantly, this decision allowed the research to address the EU's turn towards bilateralism and the increased politicisation of its trade agenda since the beginning of the twenty-first century. Similarly, though the MFA is not directly comparable with the other case studies, the archival data was incredibly rich and gave a detailed insight into union strategies to influence the agreement.

Alternative case studies for each period were also considered in the early stages of the research. For example, analysing union strategies to influence the EC/EU's Generalized Scheme of Preferences (GSP) was considered as a case study but the limited archival data available suggested that this was not a primary concern for European trade unions in the long 1970s and that influencing world trade negotiations like the MFA was a far greater focus. Additionally, CETA was chosen as a case study over comparable EU FTAs – such as with South Korea or Peru and Colombia – for two reasons: first, CETA provided greater potential

accessibility to interviewees (not least because of English language skills); second, even prior to beginning the research, it was clear that CETA and TTIP had generated a lot of controversy in Europe with notable mobilisations taking place against them. In contrast with other agreements, it was therefore assumed that CETA would generate far richer data than other agreements – an assumption which proved to be correct in hindsight.

The choices of trade union case studies are based on three factors. First, all four confederations have played a central role in European trade unionism (both nationally and confederations have the potential to influence national, European, and international/global institutions that have played a leading role in the direction of European trade interests specifically and world trade in general. Thirdly, Germany, the UK and France are the largest three European countries in terms of GDP (International Monetary Fund, 2021) and the top three largest European exporters (World Bank, 2019), meaning trade unions from these countries are more likely to have a strong interest in trade issues. In practical terms, all four unions also have well-organised archives whose documents are in languages that can be read by the researcher as well as many English-speaking staff whose role is dedicated, at least in part, to trade issues (for the purpose of conducting interviews).

The choice of trade rounds analysed in this thesis have, first and foremost, been chosen to allow for a temporal perspective. However, the need to analyse shifting union strategies to influence over time does not explain these choices alone, otherwise the Uruguay Round of the GATT (1986-1994) would also be included. Ultimately, the historical and contemporary trade rounds have been chosen to create a comparison of multilateral and bilateral trade negotiations in two significantly different economic and political periods. The temporal and comparative dimensions of this project are therefore directly linked.

In addition to temporal and comparative analytical lenses, this thesis also takes a transnational perspective. The decision to use four trade union cases studies – three national

and one European – was made to analyse the interrelation between the national and transnational spheres in different periods. In contrast with the past, the 1970s saw the beginnings of European trade unions becoming increasingly transnational in their activities and orientation. In Western Europe, two key processes contributed to this trend: first, the increasing globalisation of labour, capital, trade, and production; and second, the increased power and competences of transnational institutions such as the EU and WTO. In this environment, trade unions have sought to keep pace with changes to their sphere of influence. Nonetheless, this thesis will highlight the significant changes that unions have undergone to operate and influence transnationally. This thesis also highlights the agency of individual actors, who are both influenced by and can influence transnational processes and institutions through norms, ideas, and actions. The mapping of the transnational network of key actors also plays an important part of this thesis.

To achieve the research aims of this project and in keeping with the three analytical lenses, this research employs a qualitative, mixed-methods approach. Since the purpose of this project is not to measure the extent to which trade unions have influenced world trade negotiations but rather understand and explain how and if they have done so, this study relies on qualitative methods. The research methods used in this project are aligned to specific periods. Archival research is predominantly used for the historical period whilst semi-structured interviews are predominantly used for the contemporary period. Publicly available sources such as media and academic articles also form part of the data collection as well as providing data triangulation and methodologically uniting the two periods. The decision to use these methods for specific periods of time is a result of practical considerations such as communication and accessibility issues, but also to allow for data triangulation. Documentary and textual analysis was carried out by accessing motions, policy papers, minutes, press

releases and other sources from each union confederation's archives as well as European institutions, national governments, and the GATT and WTO.

Interviewees were selected based on their ability to offer insights into how trade unions have influenced world trade negotiations through their expert knowledge or, in most cases, actual participation in the process. An initial list of potential interviewees was developed through basic online research of the key actors involved during the temporal focus of the project. The 'snowballing method' was also used by asking each interviewee for suggestions of further people to approach for an interview to expand this list. In total, 25 interviews (see Annex 1) were carried out for this project and were primarily conducted face-to-face during research trips to London, Paris, Berlin, and Brussels or via Skype or telephone. All the interviews were conducted in English, although basic grammar corrections in the quotes used throughout the thesis have been made where necessary.

Analysing the archival and interview data followed a clear process to narrow down and utilise the vast amount of data collected during the research phase of the project. First, to keep the data focused on answering the central research question, archival visits and interview questions were closely framed by the three research aims. Second, in addition to the themes of the three research aims, sub-themes were then developed and manually coded. This was done by closely analysing the interview transcripts and archival data that had been chosen from the first part of the process. Third, these themes were then analysed still further to highlight important information and quotes that may have been missed in the previous part of the process and that exemplified the established themes and trends. Finally, this data was then integrated into a chronological analysis for each period.

Using a chronological approach made it far easier to contextualise the themes that had emanated from the archival and interview data and structure them in a logical and coherent manner. This method was also chosen because it lends itself to the complex nature of trade

negotiations which are often drawn-out, stop-start processes that are best analysed sequentially. Employing a chronological analysis made it possible to ‘narrate’ the process of negotiating world trade agreements; highlighting the ebb and flow of negotiations and the opportunities available to trade union and other actors, changes in the economic, political and institutional context, and policy and strategic changes undertaken by the trade unions and other actors, culminating in a richer and more detailed analysis of the methods used to influence world trade negotiations than by exploring key themes in isolation.

Finally, it is important to note that there are no significant ethical considerations linked to this research project. All archival research (see Annex 2) has been conducted under the rules and principles set out by each archive and interviewees signed a form to consent to being interviewed and choose whether their name and words attributed to them could be used in the final thesis (see Annex 3). The Ethical Review for this project was passed on 10 September 2015 (Ethics Committee Reference: 14/15:42) (see Annex 4).

Structure of the thesis

The thesis consists of seven chapters and reflects the comparative and temporal analytical lenses outlined in the previous section. The thesis is divided into three historical and three contemporary chapters followed by a separate seventh chapter that addresses the central research question. To aid comparative analysis the historical and contemporary chapters are broadly symmetrical and address three common themes.

Chapters 1 and 4 analyse each trade union confederation and the context influencing their strategic orientation during each period. These chapters take a multilevel approach to first analyse the three national union case studies before analysing the ETUC and, finally, relevant international confederations. Specifically, these chapters highlight each national

confederation's membership size, collective bargaining coverage, and union density within the country, their ideological orientation and links with political parties, and their attitude towards European integration during the analysed period. For the ETUC and international confederations, only their general structure and ideological orientation are analysed.

Chapters 2 and 5 are each divided into two sections. The first section of each chapter analyses the trade policies of European trade unions in each period. Particular attention is given to whether European trade unions are divided by or united in their general approaches to trade as well as their core policies. The second section of each chapter outlines the avenues of influence available for unions to attempt to influence world trade negotiations and the EC/EU trade policymaking process. By once again taking a multilevel approach, each chapter also highlights differing extents of Europeanisation during each period.

Chapters 3 and 6 are case studies of trade union strategies to influence the established multilateral and bilateral world trade negotiations. In each chapter, a chronological analysis is used for the respective trade negotiations. As well as providing context to the negotiations, chapters 3 and 6 highlight how each union confederation attempted to influence the policymaking process and the key actors involved. Chapter 3 thus primarily draws on extensive archival research while Chapter 6 utilises interview data with union and, to a lesser extent, non-union actors to examine union strategies to influence world trade negotiations. These chapters also include tables that compare the strength of the strategies and power resources used by the four European trade union case studies in each trade negotiation.

Chapter 7 directly addresses the central research question of whether and how trade union strategies to influence world trade negotiations have changed over time. The first section outlines the key structural changes that have taken place between the two time periods and their impact on trade unions' collective power and influence over world trade. This section identifies neoliberal globalisation, the widening and deepening of European

integration, the changing dynamics of world trade, and institutional changes at the European level as vital exogenous factors in understanding and explaining the decline in the collective power of European trade unions. The second section analyses how the policy preferences of trade unions in relation to world trade negotiations have changed in the above context as well as important continuities. The final section of the chapter critically analyses the strategies and impact of European trade unions' influence over world trade negotiations. Specifically, it highlights how European trade unions have predominantly favoured a broad advocacy strategy, with a particular reliance on lobbying political actors, over the mobilisation of their members. Nonetheless, a greater reliance on mobilisation has become a feature of union strategies to influence world trade negotiations since the late-1990s and in some cases has proven to be a relatively successful approach. This chapter also includes three tables (taken from chapters 3 and 6) that compare the strength of the strategies and power resources used by the European trade union case studies in the three trade negotiations analysed in this thesis to visually reaffirm how they have changed over time.

The final conclusion will summarise the key findings, discuss the limitations of the thesis, and highlight potential avenues for future research.

Chapter 1

European trade unions in the long 1970s: The beginning of the end of the ‘golden age’

Using a multilevel approach, this chapter will first analyse the three national trade union case studies that form the basis of this thesis before analysing the ETUC and finally the relevant international confederations in the long 1970s. Specifically, this chapter will highlight each national confederation’s membership size, collective bargaining coverage, and union density, ideological orientation and links with political parties, and their attitude towards European integration during the analysed period. For the ETUC and international confederations, only their general structure and their ideological orientation will be analysed.

The purpose of outlining these key issues for each trade union confederation is first to establish factors that may have helped or hindered their ability to influence world trade negotiations in the long 1970s. Secondly, by outlining these factors, it will then be possible to understand whether they also played a role in European trade unions’ specific approach to the textile and clothing sector and the MFA. Finally, this chapter will also establish a point of comparison with the contemporary section of this thesis to highlight how each trade union organisation and their attitudes have changed over time.

TUC

The TUC has been the sole confederation and peak organisation of UK labour since its foundation in 1868. With 13.3 million members in 1979 it was by far the largest labour organisation in Western Europe (Ebbinghaus and Visser, 2000, pp. 715-717). This fact was reflected by the UK’s high union density – which stood at more than 50% in 1980 (Ebbinghaus and Visser, 2000, p. 747) – and collective bargaining coverage – around 70% in

1980 (Schmitt and Mutkiewicz, 2012, p. 267). This strength meant that the TUC played a central but sometimes contradictory role in some of the UK's major political events in this period by both constraining and mobilising rank-and-file opposition to government policies at certain stages (Upchurch, Taylor and Mathers, 2009, p. 86).

The TUC's relationship with the Labour Party (LP), arguably at its strongest during key periods of the 1970s, played a huge role in its overall orientation, generally characterised as 'Labourism'. McIlroy (1995, p. 48) argues that "Labourism was built around the twin pillars of collective bargaining and parliamentary politics and embodied strong attachment to the institutions of the British state". In the case of the TUC, real economic and political change was sought through legislative rather than industrial action. In fact, as Upchurch et al. (2009, p. 81) argue, "The relationship has often been strained, but ultimately the 'political' wing of the party-union nexus has subordinated the economic 'wing' and class struggle has been suppressed".

The strength of this link between the TUC and the LP in the 1970s was reflected in the fact that the party still relied heavily on union affiliation fees for its funding. For example, a TUC-LP Liaison Committee was established in 1972 and by 1979 almost 50% of Labour MPs were sponsored by trade unions, with trade unionists also constituting nearly half of the party's National Executive Committee (Thorpe, 1999, p. 134). Indeed, the TUC's influence over LP policy was arguably at its peak in 1974-75 and was such that its *Annual Economic Review* greatly informed LP economic policy (McIlroy and Campbell, 1999, p. 101). However, despite the popular perception at the time that the TUC was one of the most powerful political actors in British politics, the TUC actually suffered from limited financial resources and only employed a total staff of less than 100 (McIlroy and Campbell, 1999, p. 100).

Overall, while the TUC had excellent access to government in the mid to late-1970s, it still possessed a limited influence over substantive policy, particularly over contentious issues (Martin, 1980, p. 338-340). Prior to the 1970s, the TUC relied on more aggregated influence via participation in the neo-corporatist National Economic Development Council (NEDC) structures that were strongly institutionalised in the 1960s, reflecting both organised labour's collective bargaining power and the joint desire of the state and capital to curb it (Panitch, 1979, pp. 133-137). The role that the TUC played in this system would change dramatically as the 1970s progressed as class antagonisms sharpened and "the last generation of conservatives who accepted the role of trade unions" was replaced by a more radical, neoliberal conservatism after Thatcher's election victory in 1979 (S. Pursey, interview).

Another key aspect behind the increase in the TUC's influence during the 1970s was the Incomes Policy it agreed to as a measure to restrain wages to curb rising inflation and seek an end to 'stop-go' economic cycles (Vickerstaff, 1989, p. 79). By helping to impose economic discipline on its own members, the TUC was offered greater input into the management of the UK economy. However, reconciling the shared desire within the TUC for Keynesian economic policies and state investment with the new period of economic crisis and high inflation in the mid-1970s became a key area of left-right division – the left arguing in favour of reflationary government policies, the right arguing to maintain wage restraint (Gourevitch, Martin, Ross, Allen, Bornstein and Markovits, 1984, pp. 43-44).

To bring these differences together in a more cohesive way, the TUC and the LP negotiated the Social Contract in 1974, before the LP came to power after two successive elections. The Social Contract was a LP-TUC pact that included party commitments on demand management, economic planning, industrial policy, welfare spending and the reversal of anti-union industrial legislation (Gourevitch et al., 1984, p.44). However, with the exception of the repeal of the 1971 Industrial Relations Act, the commitments contained in

the Social Contract were left largely unfulfilled and further wage restraint was also included in the agreement (McIlroy, 1995, p.189).

Under increasing economic and political strain – culminating in the Labour government’s acceptance of an International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan and its associated cuts to public spending in 1976 – the TUC’s economic goals of expanding the economy, selective nationalisations, planning agreements and controls over investment, prices and imports all failed to materialise (McIlroy and Campbell, 1999, p. 101). The hostile divide between union and party leaders and their members increased to the point that when the Labour government proposed a harsher pay norm in 1978 the TUC supported it, despite many Congress decisions opposing it (McIlroy and Campbell, 1999, p. 103). This provoked a huge wave of industrial conflict, now popularly known as the ‘Winter of Discontent’, which ultimately contributed to the LP’s election defeat in 1979 and left the LP in opposition for the next 18 years (Hyman, 2001, p. 102).

DGB

Despite being founded in the context of the Cold War and the aftermath of Germany’s tumultuous pre-war and wartime history, the DGB, as the main umbrella organisation of German labour, has played an important and consistent role in Germany’s post-war history. Initially developed in the British zone of occupation with the help of British unions and the Labour government, the influential social democrat Hans Böckler argued for four goals for unions in the new Germany: a single national organisation instead of the three ideologically divided groups that existed prior to 1933; nationalisation of large and medium industries; workers’ co-determination in individual factories; and national economic planning (Bark and Gress, 1989, p. 137). However, as a result of a compromise with the Western Allies, who

were keen to avoid both the ideological fragmentation of the German labour movement but also to limit the potential power of one single union in each workplace or industrial sector (Hyman, 2001, p. 116), the founding ‘basic programme’ of the DGB in 1949 reformulated its first goal to set up an umbrella organisation comprised of 16 independent industrial unions (Upchurch et al., 2009, p. 62). This compromise aside, the founding aims of Böckler’s DGB have generally remained consistent ever since.

The DGB was a strong political actor in the long 1970s. The early 1980s represented the peak of its pre-reunification membership – 9.5 million – which had grown in successive years throughout the 1970s (Ebbinghaus and Visser, 2000, pp. 322-323). Union density consistently remained at around 40% in West Germany in this era with the vast majority of union members organised by the DGB (Ebbinghaus and Visser, 2000, p. 332). Collective bargaining coverage was also strong in West Germany and remained at a comparable level to the UK in this period at around 70% (Schmitt and Mutkiewicz, 2012, p. 267). The DGB was especially well organised in heavy industry and manufacturing with the powerful metalworkers’ union IG Metall accounting for over a third of its entire membership (Otto, 1975, p. 112).

In terms of its general ideological orientation the DGB broadly fitted within the social democratic paradigm, but its party-political links were more nuanced than the TUC’s in this period. Although it has correctly been seen as having close links with the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD), the DGB has always officially been politically unaligned as its rules preclude it from openly supporting any political party (Markovits, 1986, p. 24). This is not to say that the DGB did not intervene in the political arena. During elections, for example, it produced an ‘election touchstone’ which compared the manifestos of German political parties and put forward its own ‘touchstones’ without officially backing any one party (Mittag, 2017, p. 21).

Despite officially being non-partisan, it is estimated that in the 1970s around 80% of the DGB's leading figures supported the SPD with only 10% favouring the centre-right Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (CDU) (Mielke, 1983, p. 374). There was also a strong crossover with the SPD with leading officials or Bundestag members also serving as union leaders or playing prominent roles in the DGB (Markovits, 1986, p. 23). More pertinently, in 1968 the SPD created a Union Council to facilitate greater communication between the party and the unions which included the heads of all the DGB unions who were party members (Kastendiek, 1978, p. 65). Further, the DGB's and SPD's traditional support bases in the industrial heartland of North-Rhine Westphalia also overlapped to a large degree. SPD-DGB relations peaked between the time of the former's 1959 Bad Godesberg reforms – which decisively shifted the SPD away from a more Marxist orientation – and the latter part of the 1970s when the party faced an increasing crisis of identity and alienation of its working-class base (Upchurch et al., 2009, pp. 64-65).

Though the DGB and SPD clearly shared a close relationship, West German politics also held similar consensus-based trends to other West European states in the 1960s and 70s that limited the importance of institutionalised union-party relations to a degree. In particular, 'Modell Deutschland' and the notion of the social market economy represented an accommodation between political parties, the unions and capital that also drew on elements of the CDU's conception of the welfare state and the neo-corporatist structures of co-determination, all of which helped create an economically ordered but relatively socially focused political system that provided a stable economic environment for the export-driven economic goals of ordoliberalism. As Gourevitch et al. (1984, p. 91) point out, "unions have been conflictual participants in German economic life since the war but their conflict perspectives, thus far, have remained confined within a broader consensual framework shared with other actors about basic social goals".

Despite the success of Modell Deutschland and the so-called West German ‘economic miracle’ in the post-war era, the heightening of class antagonisms and economic crisis in Europe in the 1970s brought divisions between existent ‘activist’ and ‘accommodationist’ elements within the labour movement to the surface (Markovits, 1986). The policy of ‘concerted action’ was introduced by the CDU/CSU-SPD coalition government as a counter-inflationary measure that sought to deal with the threat posed by the 1966-67 recession and the difficulties of managing a mixed economy while seeking the maintenance of full employment and economic growth and stability (Maier, 1984, p. 48). The DGB’s continued fear throughout the existence of concerted action was that it “could de facto assume the status of wage guidelines which could severely undermine – if not completely destroy – the unions’ method of collective bargaining” (Markovits, 1984, p. 109).

In this precarious situation, the DGB, despite reservations from the left, endorsed the policy due to fears over job losses and the desire to negotiate greater co-determination (Gourevitch et al., 1984, p. 134). However, as in the UK, the long 1970s was a period where militancy and conservatism competed against each other within the West German labour movement over the issue of wage restraint and new co-determination laws: the left took militant, often unofficial, action to fight for wages in line with rising inflation which simultaneously pushed their leaders into action to stave off revolt within their own ranks; the right sought compromise so as not to push the already pressurised labour market too far or damage its relationship with the government and employers (Upchurch et al., 2009, p. 64). As the 1970s progressed, the notion of wage restraint was rejected by many rank-and-file trade unionists through increasingly radical strike movements and in 1977 the DGB pulled out of the agreement altogether (Upchurch et al., 2009, p. 64). The rejection of concerted action ultimately represented an ongoing polarisation within the DGB throughout the long 1970s as unions struggled to adapt to the new economic situation.

CGT

In a labour movement characterised by significant ideological differences, the CGT, as one of France's four industrial union organisations, has always had the reputation of being the country's most militant trade union confederation. This largely stems from its relationship with the Parti communiste français (PCF) and Marxist ideological orientation that it held until the 1990s. In many ways the impact of the CGT on French politics in the long 1970s belied its limited material strength, particularly when compared to the TUC and DGB. CGT membership reached its peak in the early 1970s (1.8 million) before declining throughout the rest of the decade and the 1980s (Ebbinghaus and Visser, 2000, p. 276). Union density in France has traditionally been among the lowest in Europe and stood at around 20% even in the 1970s (Ebbinghaus and Visser, 2000, p. 270). However, reflecting the many contradictions of French industrial relations, collective bargaining coverage stood at just under 75% in this same period (Schmitt and Mutkiewicz, 2012, p. 267).

Politically, the CGT in the long 1970s was highly defined by its relationship with the PCF. Though not officially in its statutes, the CGT operated on the Leninist principles of democratic centralism which helped maintain PCF dominance within the confederation, in part through the outlawing of factions and suppression of opposition views which also allowed CGT General Secretaries to enjoy particularly long stints in power (Bell and Criddle, 1994, p. 129). Many argue that the CGT's relationship with the PCF was not simply 'close' but in fact 'subordinate' to the aims of the party, the former often being referred to as the latter's 'transmission belt' (Bell and Criddle, 1994, pp. 34-35). Although trade unions and political parties are officially strictly separate entities in France, the complicated nature of the French left has often proved this to be a myth. In the case of the CGT, from the end of the Second World War to the mid-1990s it was customary for the General Secretary of the CGT

to be a member of the Political Bureau of the PCF (Parsons, 2015, p. 68). However, neither financial links nor cross representation committees between the CGT and PCF existed in the same way as, for example, those that existed between the TUC and LP in Britain (Bridgford, 1991, p. 8). Furthermore, by the 1970s, while still clearly closely aligned to the PCF's ideological orientation, the CGT was in the process of temporarily moving from being a mere 'transmission belt' to 'relative autonomy' (Ross, 1982a, pp. 73-75).

Though radical and openly Marxist rhetoric was still common in the CGT in the 1970s, for most of the decade it actually took a less belligerent approach – though still in concert with the PCF – and worked closely with the non-communist Confédération française démocratique du travail (CFDT) union confederation, Parti socialiste (PS) and Parti radical de gauche until 1977 in the Union de la Gauche electoral coalition through its associated Common Programme (Bell and Criddle, 1994, p. 140). Whilst the PCF and CGT gave lip service to the idea that the Common Programme would create the path to socialism, its central policies could more accurately be described as radical social democracy based on its proposals for a legal minimum wage, extensive nationalisation and democratisation of the economy and a large improvement in workers' rights but without directly proposing the removal of capitalism itself (Bridgford, 1991, pp. 38-39).

The CGT's perspective in this period was that French capitalism had moved into a new stage of 'state monopoly capitalism' that could not sustain itself without provoking huge social eruptions (Ross, 1982a, pp. 29-31). To move this process to its 'inevitable' end the CGT urged broad-ranging agitation around every day labour issues, but this would also be shaped by, and secondary to, a political strategy geared towards a political movement of the left – in reality, channelling discontent away from industrial militancy and towards political mobilisation (Upchurch et al., 2009, p. 125). This shift in the CGT's approach has also been explained by Ross (1982b, pp. 72-74) as a 'hostage dilemma' that all unions face over

whether to pursue an independent strategy geared towards greater industrial influence or follow the political strategy of party-political allies to win power and implement pro-worker policies. Ultimately, due to the relative weakness of the French unions and a poorly institutionalised industrial relations system, the CGT chose to follow the PCF's electoral strategy as their own capacity to influence the labour market was limited by its own capabilities and resources. The structural weakness of the CGT also played a role in this with its membership declining from nearly 3 million members in the early 1950s to 1.8 million in 1978 (Roccati, 2017, p. 48). However, this is not to say that the CGT abandoned industrial militancy entirely in the 1970s. In fact, French workers won considerable gains in the 1970s as a result of strike action as wages increased faster than inflation and French employers were the last to restore their pre-crisis rates of profit (Kergoat, 1984, p. 281).

These broader shifts in the CGT's strategic and ideological orientated produced a wide-ranging disagreement within the confederation over whether its role should be that of a 'proposition force' or an 'opposition force' (Ross, 1982a, pp. 60-66). A large part of this debate was also informed by the fact that while the Union de la Gauche had failed to win the 1978 legislative elections, the PS had polled a greater percentage of the vote than the PCF for the first time since 1936 (Upchurch et al. 2009, p. 126). The rise of François Mitterrand's reformist socialism and the ongoing decline of the PCF raised the issue of how the CGT would orientate to the PS and evolve its own strategy (Ross, 1982b, p. 298).

Those that saw the CGT's future as that of a 'proposition force' argued that "rather than simply resisting crisis-induced processes of change in a defensive way, the Confederation should mobilise to propose industrial countersolutions [sic] pointing in the direction of social transformation" (Ross, 1982a, p. 61). In contrast, proponents in favour of the CGT remaining an 'opposition force' advocated a hardened version of its 'transmission belt' era 'workerism', leading to increasingly embittered strategic debate over 'reformist' versus 'revolutionary'

trade unionism despite both sides largely sharing the same economic analysis (Ross, 1982a, p. 62). Ultimately, the CGT adopted a ‘hedgehog position’ that further weakened its societal position throughout the 1980s and did not significantly change until it finally broke ties with the PCF in 1996 (Verberckmoes, 1996).

ETUC

The drive behind the founding of the ETUC as a European level trade union organisation in 1973 was an acknowledgement of the increasing importance of European integration, particularly in the context of the impending enlargement of the European Community (EC). Prior to the ETUC, numerous European committees and small regional trade union organisations had evolved alongside the key landmarks in early European integration. But after promising beginnings of a genuine say in the direction of European integration, trade unionists became increasingly disillusioned with the results of these efforts and their levels of influence (Degryse and Tilly, 2013, pp. 15-16).

Despite the divisions within the European labour movement that existed at the time and the sense that unions needed to be involved in the integration process, key events at the beginning of the 1970s provided the right context for a single European level trade union confederation to be formed. Specifically, it was the increasingly Community-focused Italian unions, the 1970 Werner Report on economic and monetary union which outlined the need for the consultation of social partners in the process, and the 1972 Paris Summit, which gave the Commission a mandate to adopt a Social Action Programme by 1974 to counteract increasing social problems, that encouraged other European trade unions to establish the ETUC (Martin and Ross, 1999b, p. 316).

The establishment of the ETUC was actually a compromise between the DGB's 'small solution' to unifying labour interests at the European level – supranational interest representation in Brussels for unions from EC member states only (Mittag, 2017, p. 28) – and the TUC's and Nordic union's 'big solution' – which emphasised the coordination of trade union activities in relation to multinational companies (Gläser, 2009). Ultimately, the ETUC began as a pan-European organisation with intergovernmental structures, only achieving some of the DGB's original demands many decades later (Platzer, 1991). As Martin and Ross (1999b) point out, the fact that the ETUC did not evolve out of grassroots activism in the same way as national unions meant that member unions were generally reluctant to grant the new organisation significant power and resources. This lack of human and financial resources also exacerbated the ETUC's democratic deficit in its formative years since it sometimes relied on the European Commission for support rather than its members (Degryse and Tilly, 2013, pp. 66-67).

Throughout the 1970s the membership of the ETUC consistently expanded from an initial 17 West European affiliates of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) to include 12 Christian confederations in 1974 and the Eurocommunist Italian Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (CGIL) by 1976 (Barnouin, 1986, p. 49). From the mid-1970s, the ETUC was overwhelmingly dominated by the British, German, and Italian affiliates who accounted for over 50% of its collective membership (Degryse and Tilly, 2013, p. 73). Until internal reforms and membership expansion took place after the end of the Cold War each confederation was represented by four delegates per country plus one additional representative per 500,000 members (Barnouin, 1986, pp. 55-56). This internal structure afforded the TUC and DGB significant power at the ETUC's Congresses and at executive level. In addition to the numerous standing and ad hoc working parties and committees that existed to develop the work of the new organisation, the European Trade Union Institute

(ETUI) was also founded in 1978 to assist the ETUC and set up educational and information facilities and develop a more balanced social dialogue within the Community (Köpke, 1979).

Despite generalised agreement that an independent European labour organisation would be a positive development within the European labour movement, the divergent approaches of the three national trade unions discussed in this thesis to the ETUC and European integration in general give an indication of the complex process of building such an organisation in challenging economic and political conditions.

In addition to existing divisions within the UK labour movement over domestic policy issues, major differences concerning the UK's membership of the EC also grew in the 1970s. Though official TUC policy opposed UK membership, competing pro, anti and pragmatic camps existed prior to the UK joining the EC and continued to fluctuate throughout the 1970s and 1980s. As Teague (1989) explains, prior to joining in 1972, the pro-EC faction was the most cohesive and active, but a large majority adopted a 'wait and see' approach. The 1972 TUC Congress then shifted its position decisively to opposition to EC membership based on the terms of entry negotiated by the Conservative government. This was also in line with LP policy and resulted in the TUC refusing to take their seats in the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) after EC accession, despite the opposition of the General Secretary and the General Council.

Though the TUC's opposition did not diminish decisively in the aftermath of the UK's 1975 referendum on EC membership, even ardent opponents of European integration began to soften their opposition so as not to be completely out of step with public opinion, but also because greater opportunities for influence and cooperation at the European level now existed (Teague, 1989). This included trade unions taking their seats on EC committees. As an example of the TUC's early attempts to influence European institutions, in 1976 it pushed for

an EC-wide initiative on employment and succeeded in convincing the EESC to express an opinion to the Council of Ministers on the issue (Dorfman, 1976).

The earliest days of the TUC's relationship with the ETUC saw the odd situation of the anti-EC TUC holding a leading position in the new organisation, its membership being nearly equal to the rest of the ETUC's affiliates combined (Waterman, 2018, pp. 135-136). The TUC was also sceptical of the role the ETUC could play as it lacked "the capacity to influence their affiliates' policies or mobilize industrial force and served mainly as a lobby organization vis-a-vis Community institutions" (Dølvik, 1999, p. 14). Nonetheless, despite its reservations, the strength of its membership meant that the TUC could seek to mould the new organisation in its own image. This is exemplified by the TUC's attempts to make it easier for European Trade Union Industrial Committees to affiliate to the ETUC (Teague, 1989, p. 34). Moreover, these same committees' general policies were often similar or identical to those of the TUC (Waterman, 2018, p. 136).

Though the DGB is often portrayed as a simply pro-European organisation, like any confederation it has always contained divergent views (Mittag, 2017, p. 20). With West Germany being a founding Community member, limited ideological and party 'responsibilities' and having a clear strategic interest in endorsing West Germany's pro-European stance in the context of the Cold War mean that the DGB and the German labour movement in general have largely supported greater European integration and the establishment and functioning of the ETUC. As an example of this trend, the DGB were strongly committed to the earliest moves toward European integration through their support of the Schuman Plan and successful demand for a labour representative on the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community (Mittag, 2017, pp. 25-26). This support was not shared by the SPD which at that stage had yet to shed its Marxist orientation (Paterson, 1975).

As a reflection of the importance that the leadership of the DGB ascribed to European integration in the long 1970s, it created a department dedicated to the issue between 1972 and 1975 with a separate brief from its International Department and with the aim of collecting, coordinating, and disseminating European policy information within the confederation (Mittag and Zellin, 2009). However, there is also debate over whether German trade unions saw European integration in this period as a genuine opportunity to expand their influence or as a problem that could undermine or complicate their strong national level influence and had to be solved by taking a ‘defensive’ approach (Fetzer, 2010; Niethammer, 1977). For example, Fetzer (2005, p. 304) notes that in the 1970s the DGB “took the line that Community social policy should only complement and coordinate national social policies and, above all, should not entail any transfer of competences and funds from the national to the Community level” but supported European market integration on the basis that it would benefit West Germany’s export-oriented economy.

The DGB played a decisive role in the establishment of the ETUC as the confederation with the second-largest membership after the TUC (Barnouin, 1986, p. 17). Some of its leading figures also held prominent roles in the ETUC and Community institutions. For example, DGB President Heinz Oskar Vetter was additionally elected as president of the ETUC in 1974 and Wilhelm Haferkamp was delegated as the DGB’s representative to the European Commission in 1967 and remained there for 17 years, at one point becoming Vice President (Mittag, 2017, p. 28). However, at times the DGB also found itself at the centre of Cold War conflicts over the integration of communist unions like the CGT into the ETUC and ICFTU which played a negative role in attempts to unite European unions (Seifen, 2009, p. 192). This stemmed from the influence of US unions and other anti-communist forces in the ICFTU which strongly opposed any form of cooperation with communist unions.

During its ‘transmission belt’ phase, CGT policy towards Europe mirrored the PCF’s and resulted in regular denunciations of the EC as “the economic component of the imperialist alliance that is NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization]” (Benoît Frachon, former CGT General Secretary (1962), cited in Pernot, 2001, p. 156). Apart from a very brief flirtation with Eurocommunism in the mid-1970s, the PCF essentially saw itself as a Western European outpost of the Soviet Union’s foreign policy until 1989 (Bell and Criddle, 1994, pp. 149-150). In contrast with other European communist unions who did not hold such direct political links with the Soviet Union, this created many obstacles to European trade union cooperation for the CGT, despite attempts to foster it, and as a result did not join the ETUC until 1999.

In the 1970s, though it had begun to accept the reality that European integration was an ongoing process that it needed to try and influence, its ideological orientation meant that it still retained a highly critical attitude towards changes at the European level. Indeed, as Roccati (2017, p. 50) notes, the CGT “refused to encourage a process that could sideline the Soviet world and in its view, as it took shape, Europe seemed to be primarily a weapon aimed at the countries offering ‘real socialism’”. This left the CGT in an isolated position as the only Western European member of the Soviet-backed World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), which held a pro-Moscow, anti-Brussels line (Kirchner, 1980, p. 125). This led it towards taking increasingly nationalist and protectionist positions that were ideologically justified through communist rhetoric.

Despite its broader anti-Brussels position and the context of the Cold War, the CGT understood the need to participate in or at least try and work with the new ETUC. However, the Confédération Générale du Travail - Force Ouvrière (CGT-FO), an anti-communist union, an unconditional supporter of the US formed out of a split with the CGT in 1948 and an affiliate of the strongly anti-communist ICFTU, was the first

French union to join the ETUC and thereafter worked to reject the application of the CGT (Roccati, 2017, p. 55). In the atmosphere of the Cold War and the deep suspicions among some founding members of its membership of the WFTU, the CGT remained outcast from the ETUC, despite its attempts to form a collaborative relationship. The CGT's official position was that it wished to be affiliated to the ETUC but under 'normal conditions' which should not restrict it from also being a member of the WFTU and "respected the sovereignty and freedom of orientation of its members" (Roccati, 2017, p. 57). However, despite the introduction of the Eurocommunist Italian CGIL into the ETUC in 1976 as a result of having downgraded their membership status of the WFTU, it was clear that the CGT was ultimately not prepared to compromise to the extent that the ETUC desired (Degryse and Tilly, 2013, p. 23).

Alongside the questions of membership criteria and actual membership, one other important aspect of the ETUC's complex beginnings was the status of its industry committees. These industry committees mimicked the International Trade Secretariats (ITSS) of the ICFTU but varied in their autonomy, territorial remit, and approach to non-ICFTU affiliated unions. As such, some industry committees excluded Christian unions, communist unions, or both and some remained within the territorial limits of the EC while others did not. The ETUC Executive Committee did develop some criteria for affiliation (such as the need to have relative independence from the ITSS, including organisational and budgetary structures) but the narrow ideological parameters of the ICFTU and many of its members ultimately undermined the unity necessary to help establish a coherent and effective industry committee system (Barnouin, 1986, pp. 50-51).

As a result of the above, just over half of the European industry committees were affiliates of the ETUC by the end of the 1970s (Visser and Ebbinghaus, 1992, pp. 226). This was the case with the European Trade Union Committee of Textile, Clothing and Leather

Workers (ETUC-TCL) which was created in 1975 from a research centre set up under the ICFTU's European Regional Organisation to help textile and clothing unions deal with changes in the EC (Buschak, 2003). However, because the ETUC-TCL lacked independence from the ICFTU and refused to accept the Italian textile and clothing federation of the CGIL until 1987 it was not recognised by the ETUC until 1988. As will be highlighted in chapters 2 and 3, the fact that the ETUC-TCL was still in a developmental stage during the long 1970s is one reason behind it playing an auxiliary role to national unions during MFA negotiations.

According to former ETUC General Secretary Emilio Gabbaglio, this system essentially meant that many committees were only informally tied to the ETUC (due to their overlapping membership of the ICFTU), putting them in the position of 'satellites' rather than central components which failed to replicate the successful links between industry committees and federations with the centralised structures of national confederations (Degryse and Tilly, 2013, p. 86). This is especially puzzling considering that both affiliated and unaffiliated committees largely had the same structures and decision-making processes as the ETUC itself (Buschak, 2003). However, despite their structural similarities, the European industry committees were also hugely underfunded in comparison with their national equivalents with even the largest having only a handful of permanent staff (Visser and Ebbinghaus, 1992, p. 228). Likewise, the ETUC itself has been described as a 'family-sized' and 'fragile' organisation in this period which relied on around 20 staff and severely limited financial resources from members prior to the mid-1980s (Degryse and Tilly, 2013, p. 66). For example, Kirchner (1978, p. 165) points out that in the late-1970s the TUC had nearly three-times the budget of the ETUC for its headquarters' activities despite representing only a quarter of the European organisation's total membership.

Whilst predominantly focused on developing its internal structures and coherence in the long 1970s, the ETUC did produce two 'action programmes' that were approved by its 1975

and 1979 congresses that laid the basis for its political and economic views in this period. However, given the ideological balancing act the ETUC was trying to achieve in the same period as well as the overwhelming dominance of the TUC and DGB, it largely focused on “broad issues on which it could pronounce, but not affect, such as employment, reduction of working time, training and information and consultation in multinationals” (Martin and Ross, 1999b, pp. 322-323). These policy proposals reflected Keynesian economic policies and called for labour involvement in European level neo-corporatist structures to develop the ‘social dimension’ of European integration. At this stage of its development the ETUC was keen to both reflect its national constituents and avoid interfering in issues of national controversy (Goetschy, 1996, p. 255).

In terms of trying to bring these policies to life through the European institutions, despite an economic environment that was relatively open to the kind of social and economic policies it espoused, the ETUC still found it difficult to influence substantive policies at this stage of its development. On this issue, Bulmer (1986, p. 148) notes that in the 1970s the ETUC was still largely focused on highly visible political issues rather than day-to-day discussions on Community policy, even after regular tripartite dialogue with the Commission and business representatives began in 1976. Furthermore, and not by coincidence, its two key policy priorities of the 1970s - macroeconomic coordination to combat unemployment and shorter working time – depended more on national institutions than those of the EC (Warlouzet, 2018, p. 50). In this respect, and generally reflective of the attitude of its most prominent member unions, the TUC and DGB, “the ETUC considered the EEC [European Economic Community], and particularly the tripartite dialogue, to be a forum for coordinating national economic and social policies, rather than an appropriate arena for launching EEC action” (Warlouzet, 2018, p. 50).

ICFTU and WFTU

In a similar vein to the ETUC, international labour organisations, were also ideologically divided in the long 1970s which had an impact on the four unions analysed in this thesis. The largest and most important international organisations in this period were the ICFTU and WFTU. In the immediate post-war period, it appeared that the elusive unity of European trade unions would be achieved by the founding of the WFTU in 1945. However, the increase in Cold War tensions caused a rift between the Western trade unions and the communist-led federations in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), France, Italy, South America and Asia over support for the Marshall Plan and concerns among the ITSs about a loss of autonomy (Degryse and Tilly, 2013, p. 11). The ICFTU was formed out of this split and immediately adopted a virulently anti-communist stance (Devinatz, 2013). This left European trade unionism in a strange situation as by 1978 only the French CGT remained as a Western European member of the WFTU (but not the ETUC) while 24 other unions were affiliates of the ICFTU, representing around 57% of its total membership (over 58.6 million) (Kirchner, 1980, p. 125). The composition of its membership and the extent to which the ICFTU was shaped by Cold War considerations resulted in it being heavily Eurocentric despite formally being an international organisation.

By the 1970s the ICFTU's fixation with communism and totalitarianism (Devinatz, 2013, p. 350) had diminished and it gradually turned its attention to the issues of regulating MNCs, trade and development (Gumbrell-McCormick, 2004). On these issues, the ICFTU, reflecting its predominantly social democratic European membership by taking a Keynesian economic approach and pushing for a firm multilateral legal framework of binding rules. This was based on the notion that it was in the interests of national governments to regulate the

world economy in order to protect national sovereignty and avoid a global race to the bottom (Gumbrell-McCormick, 2004, p. 38).

Structurally, the ICFTU and affiliated ITSs maintained a centralised, top-down leadership that were predominantly led by representatives from industrialised countries (Jakobsen, 2001, p. 369). That said, the ITSs' relationship with the ICFTU was officially autonomous, to the point that no formal body existed within the ICFTU structure that regulated or coordinated their work (Gumbrell-McCormick, 2013a, p. 185). However, a general division of labour did exist within the organisation: the ICFTU focused on making pronouncements on broader political issues and representing their affiliates on various international bodies; the ITSs concentrated on practical and solidarity work within their sectors (Gumbrell-McCormick, 2013a, p. 185). Although there were ideological links between the ITSs and the ICFTU and several joint strategic meetings took place annually, the level of collaboration varied greatly in this period (Kirchner, 1980, pp. 130-131).

The WFTU kept tighter control of its Trade Union Internationals (TUIs) compared to the ICFTU's relationship with the ITSs and reflected the highly centralised organisational model practiced by its national affiliates (Jakobsen, 2001, p. 369). TUIs could elaborate their own programme and strategy within WFTU guidelines but ultimately the WFTU Secretariat held administrative control and provided part of the TUIs' budget (Kirchner, 1980, p. 130). For those that view the WFTU of this era as simply a trade union vessel of Soviet foreign policy, this fits with the portrayal of the organisation as monolithic and inflexible (Gallin, 2013, p. 79). However, Devinatz (2013) also points out that whilst the WFTU was without doubt a communist trade union international with direct links with Moscow, its overall structure was not significantly different from other union organisations of the time and that it was actually far more polycentric than it is often perceived.

The CGT's relationship with the WFTU in the long 1970s was complex. Despite being its only Western European member by 1978 and representing just over 1% of the WFTU's huge 180 million membership (Kirchner, 1980, p. 125), it was still the international's third-largest member union and dominated the leaderships of the majority of its 11 sectoral TUIs (Bell and Criddle, 1994, p. 146). As another example of the close ties between the CGT, WFTU and PCF, Pierre Gensous, Alain Stern and Henri Krasucki all held top positions in all three organisations in this era (Bell and Criddle, 1994, p. 146). However, despite this closeness, the CGT was one of the most autonomous union confederations within the WFTU which it grew increasingly critical of in the 1970s. This reached its peak in 1978 when the CGT's General Secretary, Georges Séguéy, criticised the organisation and the Eastern European delegates from the podium of the 1978 WFTU congress for avoiding objective and critical discussion of the situation faced by 'pseudo-union organisations' in CEE, particularly over their right to strike (Schain, 1984, p. 264). Notably, the CGT also withdrew Pierre Gensous from his position of WFTU General Secretary and openly held discussions with dissident trade unionists from CEE around this time (Schain, 1984, p. 264). These acts are representative of the CGT softening its world view in the 1970s as well as seeking greater international collaboration with the ICFTU and the ETUC as frustration over its isolation increased.

Conclusion

This chapter has provided a multilevel analysis of the TUC, DGB, CGT and ETUC in the long 1970s. It has specifically focused on the strength of each national confederation – by analysing membership size and national collective bargaining coverage and union density – their ideological orientation and links with political parties, and their attitudes towards

European integration during the analysed period. The chapter has also outlined the development of the ETUC and the situation facing the relevant international confederations in this period, the ICFTU and WFTU, by analysing their general structure and ideological orientation.

The TUC, DGB and CGT were all powerful and influential actors in different ways in the long 1970s, a time which represented the last peak of European labour's power before a long period of decline. The TUC and DGB were the two strongest labour organisations in Western Europe and the CGT was the largest union confederation in France in this period. This provided the basis for all three confederations' strong associative power, both through their strength as collective organisations and, consequently, their political links. For the TUC and DGB, this was reflected in close links with the social democratic LP and SPD respectively with the TUC having a particularly strong influence over party policy. These political links also provided both confederations with important institutional power through the UK's and West Germany's neo-corporatist structures. The CGT also had a very close relationship with the PCF, though ultimately as a 'transmission belt' rather than having an active influence over party policy and strategy. Nonetheless, while this link would become more problematic as the decade went on, it did mean that the CGT played an active role in French industrial and electoral politics in this period.

The strength of the three confederations at the national level largely meant that Europeanisation and a greater international orientation were not seen as key priorities at this time. This was reflected by the limited resources afforded by national unions to the newly established ETUC and European level influence in general. While the foundation of the ETUC in 1973 was clearly significant and a reflection of the growing importance of European integration, the European left in the long 1970s was not yet characterised by a genuinely pro-European and transnational dynamic. Indeed, all three national confederations

had attitudes to European integration that ranged from scepticism towards institutional design and policy issues to outright hostility to the EC in this period. Nonetheless, the TUC and DGB did become more active at the European level throughout the 1970s. However, due to unions' overwhelming focus on the national level, even these mild examples of their European activism were often a way of supplementing union power at the national level instead of transferring it to the European level.

Another key factor behind this trend was that ideological and strategic divisions were common within the European trade union movement and genuine cooperation, let alone a broader transnational perspective, was still limited as a result. The dilemma over the CGT's membership of the ETUC, the complex divisions between competing international labour organisations, and the status of their sectoral committees stand as clear examples of this trend. However, though it can be argued that European trade unions were slow to adapt to the importance of the EC as a site of contestation, this importance was not necessarily clear in the 1970s given that the POS provided very few avenues for union influence in comparison with the national level. These combined factors resulted in unions having very weak institutional power and MOC at the European and international levels in the long 1970s.

Importantly, both the strengths and weaknesses mentioned in this conclusion were in a process of transformation throughout the 1970s due to the major political and economic changes that were also taking place. In the crisis-ridden context of the 1970s external factors were beginning to place greater strain on party-union relationships and intra- and inter-union unity. This can be seen in the intense debates over the issue of wage restraint in the case of the TUC and DGB but also in the strategic debate that took place within the CGT towards the end of the 1970s. At their root, these debates reflected the changing situation at the national, European, and global levels and disagreements over how unions should approach the new economic and political reality. As will be discussed in chapters 2 and 3, these debates had

important implications for the structural and institutional context that trade unions would operate in and the policies and strategies they utilised to seek to influence world trade negotiations in this period.

Chapter 2

Policy objectives and avenues of influence in the long 1970s: Protecting jobs in the shadow of globalisation

World trade in textiles in the long 1970s was predominantly governed by the Multifibre Arrangement, an agreement between GATT members that ran in parallel with the Tokyo Round but also diverged from some of the GATT's fundamental rules. The MFA was created to establish an orderly system of trade in textiles and clothing and limit the huge increase in imports from developing economies which placed many national sectors in developed economies under severe threat. This trend was exacerbated further by the economic crises of the period. European governments, employers and trade unions responded with their own industrial, trade and development policies that sought to defend and modernise their sectors to different degrees.

Though trade policy was an EC competence in the 1970s, member states still maintained very clearly defined national industrial policies that heavily informed their trade preferences. As such, the UK, West Germany, and France each held very distinctive trade and industrial policies that were not necessarily conducive to a unified European approach to trade negotiations. This was especially the case in the textiles and clothing sectors where intense arguments over protectionism and liberalisation between member states were a feature of this period. As significant and powerful actors, trade unions played a key role in these discussions and held their own independent trade and industrial policies. This power, as well as close relations with parties and political actors at the national and European level, gave some European trade unions a degree of influence over EC trade policy during the 1970s, particularly in MFA negotiations.

This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section takes a multilevel approach to analyse the trade policies of the established national, European and international trade

unions with specific reference to the textile and clothing sector, the social clause and the MFA. The second section will highlight the avenues of influence available for trade unions to attempt to influence world trade negotiations and trade policy at the national, European and international level.

Policy objectives

Trade and industrial policies

In the 1970s the world economy was not only beset with deep structural issues and uncertainty but was also in the process of becoming increasingly global in nature. Economic crises and processes of globalisation ultimately challenged the already precarious European textile and clothing sectors which faced increasing threats from unrestricted competition from developing economies which often held a competitive advantage in terms of labour costs. These processes were further exacerbated by the recession of 1973-74. Though the depth of the crisis in the European textile and clothing sector made it something of a special case, it was far from alone as a traditional industry threatened by globalisation and greater competition in this period (Toyne, Arpan, Barnett, Ricks and Shimp. 1984, p. 1). Indeed, discussions concerning strategies to manage and coordinate structural adjustment in other traditional industries like steel and shipbuilding were high on the agenda of national, European, and international organisations throughout the 1970s (Warlouzet, 2018, pp. 99-120).

Though already in decline prior to the 1970s, the European textiles and clothing industry was far from a minor industrial sector and even in the late-1970s contributed between 5-7% of value added to manufacturing in Germany, the US, Japan, and the UK, with textile workers also representing between 8-13% of the total manufacturing workforce in

these countries (OECD, 1983, p. 15). Archival sources from the beginning of the 1970s highlight that although the European textile and clothing sector was already facing structural problems, the extent of these problems increased dramatically from 1974 onwards. The key driver behind this acceleration was the 1973 oil crisis and its associated impact on inflation, rising energy prices, monetary instability, unemployment, and the costs of raw materials. As Warlouzet (2018, pp. 137-142) also notes, in response to the crises of the early 1970s, “Western European leaders gradually shifted their economic policies away from a Keynesian-inspired management style to a stability-oriented one”. Each country experienced this economic transition with different degrees of turmoil. This shift would severely impact European trade unions whose Keynesian economic hinterland was increasingly challenged in these rapidly changing circumstances.

For the three national level unions discussed in this thesis the extent of the crisis in their respective national sectors and their trade and industrial policies geared towards protecting their members’ jobs addressed very similar themes. Nonetheless, increased competition and processes of globalisation impacted each national industry differently due to their different stages of development. Thus, European trade unions struggled to develop a coherent and unified approach in this period. This is partly attributable to the fact that the ETUC was in its infancy in this period and union power and capacity were almost entirely focused on the national level. Furthermore, despite often having a shared perspective on the issues facing their respective sectors, national textile and clothing industries within Europe were in a period of intense competition with each other. These factors alone presented huge obstacles to developing transnational cooperation and solidarity within the European labour movement and internationally.

For the TUC's textile, clothing and footwear committee,² which represented dozens of small unions borne from the days of craft unionism in the UK, the overlap between the UK's industrial and trade policies was of central importance to the future of the textile sector, both nationally and internationally. Though the TUC remained consistently in favour of trade liberalisation in principle throughout the 1970s it also argued that liberalisation "can only be acceptable when steps are taken to alleviate the hardships which it can cause".³ The fact that the UK textile and clothing sectors fared the worst out of the EC countries during the 1970s goes some way to explaining how the TUC's approach to trade became more protectionist as the decade progressed (Underhill, 1998, p. 46). Of central concern for the TUC was the decline in employment in the UK's textile, clothing and footwear industries which had fallen by 30% between 1959 and 1975 and by nearly 50% in the wool textile industry between 1968 and 1978.⁴ Severe balance of payments issues also persisted with the share of imports in domestic UK consumption more than doubling between 1970 and 1980 (Cline, 1987, pp. 123-125). Likewise, by 1979 the value of exports only represented 79% of imports in textiles while production in UK textile activities fell by 37% between 1973 and 1983 (Cline, 1987, pp. 116-117).

Given the crisis facing the UK textiles and clothing sector by the 1970s, one of the TUC's key policies was to call for industrial aid to the sector to improve its performance. Nationally, the TUC's model policy was the 1972 Industry Act which intended to strengthen the UK's industrial capacity to take advantage of upcoming EC membership by providing regional investment grants to areas with high unemployment. Though the policy was

² TUC Textile, Clothing and Footwear Committee (TUC-TCFC), hereafter referred to as TUC unless stated otherwise.

³ 'GATT multilateral trade negotiations: note on memoranda by the Department of Trade and Industry and the CBI', NEDC, 5 December 1973; Modern Records Centre (hereafter MRC), Warwick, TUC Archive, (MSS.292D/522/1A)

⁴ 'Trade Policy', TUC-TCFC, 15 May 1975; MRC, Warwick, TUC Archive, (MSS.292D/631/4); 'Progress Report', NEDC Wool Textile EDC, 1978; MRC, Warwick, TUC Archive, (MSS.292D/567.22/627/4)

introduced under a Conservative government, it also received the support of the LP, even being declared by left-wingers such as Tony Benn as “Heath’s spadework for socialism” (Benn, 1973, p. 61). On the basis on the Industry Act, the Wool Textile Industry Economic Development Council (EDC, part of the UK’s neo-corporatist architecture at the time) proposed a reorganisation scheme that enabled companies to bid for £15 million of government assistance to modernise the sector (*Hansard*, 19 July 1973 col 715-724). As a result of this policy minimal redundancies were negotiated in the early 1970s.⁵

It is notable that the Confederation of British Industry (CBI, the UK’s main employer organisation) also held similar views to the TUC during this period. Though their public and private pronouncements often spoke more favourably of trade liberalisation than their trade union counterparts,⁶ on the issue of industry aid they were broadly in agreement. As further evidence of this policy overlap, five TUC textile unions were also members of the British Textile Confederation (BTC), an industry organisation that played an important role in advocating for the UK textile sector during MFA negotiations in the long 1970s. Three key reasons help to explain this policy alignment. First, the participation of both sides of industry in the UK’s neo-corporatist structures helped to foster a relative sense of cooperation in the face of an increasingly gloomy economic picture (Waterman, 2020). Secondly, though changing quickly throughout the 1970s, the generation of business leaders of this era were arguably the last to accept the role of trade unions’ input into industrial policy having come through parallel experiences to their trade union counterparts in the pre-war, wartime and post-war period (S. Pursey, interview). Finally, many UK textile and clothing companies

⁵ ‘Wool Textile Industry Reorganisation Scheme: A scheme for assistance under the Industry Act, 1972’, NEDC Wool Textile EDC, April 1973; MRC, Warwick, TUC Archive, (MSS.292D/567.22/627/1)

⁶ ‘Multilateral Trade Negotiations: CBI Preparations’, CBI, November 1973; MRC, Warwick, CBI Archive, (MSS.200/C/3/INT/1/51)

were still solely British owned, and the sector was far less multinational than elsewhere in Europe in general.⁷

Throughout the 1970s UK governments broadly shared the views of the TUC on trade and industrial policy for the textiles and clothing industry in alignment with the UK's 'activist' approach to industrial policy of the time (Warlouzet, 2018, p. 101). This was exemplified by estimates in 1979 that public subsidies devoted to regional aid were double the Western European average (Hall, 1986, pp. 52-76). Furthermore, not only was the Labour Party's economic policy greatly influenced by the TUC's *Annual Economic Review* in this era (McIlroy and Campbell, 1999, p. 101), but the Labour government's reorganisation strategy for the textiles and clothing sectors directly emanated from the industry's EDCs.⁸ This led to a relatively shared policy analysis that investment and industry assistance geared towards modernisation were needed to secure the medium to long-term future of the sector if the UK was to avoid the "socially and economically disastrous 'solutions' of blanket protectionism or withdrawing UK textiles altogether".⁹

Nonetheless, whilst there was a broad level of agreement and overlap in policy on the way forward for the textiles industry between the unions, industry, and the Labour governments of the 1970s, there were occasions when the TUC clashed with the government over the level of assistance it believed the industry required. For example, in 1975 the TUC noted with dismay that the government was only prepared to offer £10 million in direct industry aid to certain sectors of the industry.¹⁰ In contrast, the TUC had hoped for £40 million which could be spread throughout the whole industry. A similar disagreement

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ 'Trade Policy', TUC-TCFC, 15 May 1975; MRC, Warwick, TUC Archive, (MSS.292D/631/4)

⁹ 'TUC Policy Statement: The textile, clothing and footwear industries', 22 October 1979; TUC Archive, MRC, University of Warwick (MSS.292D/631/8)

¹⁰ 'Report of meeting with H Lever MP on trade policy', TUC TCFC, 25 September 1975; TUC Archive, MRC, University of Warwick (MSS.292D/631/5)

occurred in 1978 over the issue of extending Temporary Employment Subsidies for the sector from six to twelve months. Under pressure from the European Commission, who opposed its extension on the basis that it would “further distort competition”, the Labour government modified and reduced the scheme (TUC, 1978, p. 363). Unsurprisingly, the approach to trade and industrial policy that the TUC had largely supported under the Labour governments of the 1970s were swiftly rejected by the Thatcher government who only months after its election victory announced that regional aid was to be cut by £233m a year, heralding a completely new set of economic and strategic challenges for the TUC in the textiles and clothing sectors.¹¹

In contrast to the UK, West German governments, employers and unions all held a more liberal approach to trade and industrial policy in the long 1970s. As an example of this tendency, Coppolaro (2018a, p. 752) highlights the position of SPD Chancellor Helmut Schmidt at the first G6 Summit in 1975 who argued that industries such as textiles, steel and shipbuilding would eventually have to vanish in the face of competition from cheaper producers. This pro-competition dynamic in the Federal Republic’s industrial policy was strongly influenced by its status as the leading exporter in Europe. However, as Warlouzet (2018, p. 105) notes, though West German industrial policy was arguably more ‘discreet’ and deeply embedded within a broader macroeconomic and structural framework, in terms of the number of state-owned companies and the availability of aid for industry it was comparable with both the UK and France in the same period. Likewise, industrial aid to the sector was more indirect than in France and the UK and was often supplied by regional governments and banks under the guise of tax breaks and guarantees for loans rather than direct state aid (Warlouzet, 2018, p. 105; Neu, 1976, p. 165).

¹¹ ‘TUC Policy Statement: The textile, clothing and footwear industries’, 22 October 1979; TUC Archive, MRC, University of Warwick (MSS.292D/631/8)

As a partial consequence of these factors, the DGB's single textile and clothing workers' federation, Gewerkschaft Textil-Bekleidung (GTB), had a more liberal approach to trade and industrial policy than other unions in Western Europe in the first half of the 1970s. However, to attribute this more liberal attitude to the Federal Republic's favourable export performance alone is too one-dimensional. The sector had enjoyed heavy investment in productivity improvements and capital-intensive technologies that shifted the industry's specialisation towards the production of high-value and high-quality products prior to the 1970s (Underhill, 1998, p.41). In conjunction with this shift, much of the sector's more labour-intensive production activities had also already been outsourced to East Germany and other Eastern Bloc countries, allowing West German companies to procure cheaper materials from abroad (Cline, 1987, p. 135). As such, prior to the deeper crises of the mid-1970s onwards, the decline in textile and clothing employment was at that time largely the result of productivity improvements rather than the pressures of open competition and resulted in West German governments, employers and unions generally taking a more liberal approach to trade than their equivalents elsewhere in Europe (Underhill, 1998, p. 41).

As a result of these policies, up until the mid-1970s the GTB's concerns about rising imports were less explicit than their UK and French counterparts since the sector's trade balance was consistently offset by its high export volumes.¹² GTB executive committee minutes from this period clearly show how it broadly approved of the trade liberalisation position put forward by the European Commission at the time, even as its own industry faced greater uncertainty after the 1973 oil crisis and the rising value of the Deutsche Mark.¹³ For

¹² 'Ergebnisprotokoll von der 18. Sitzung des Hauptvorstandes nach dem 11. Ordentlichen Gewerkschaftstag am 19. und 20. September 1974 - Bericht über die wirtschaftliche Lage in der Textil-Bekleidungsindustrie', GTB Hauptvorstand, 19-20 September 1974; Archiv der GTB, Archiv an der sozialen Demokratie, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (5/GTBA020015a)

¹³ 'Ergebnisprotokoll von der 12. Sitzung des Hauptvorstandes nach dem 11. Ordentlichen Gewerkschaftstag am 6. und 7. September 1973 - Bericht über die Lage in der Textilwirtschaft', GTB Hauptvorstand, 6-7 September 1973; Archiv der GTB, Archiv an der sozialen Demokratie, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (5/GTBA020014)

example, in a September 1978 policy document prepared for its Executive Committee, the federation strongly opposed ongoing protectionist trends such as import restrictions, safeguard measures, export subsidies and state aid within other EC countries on the basis that it would “distort free competition”, also declaring that “The workers in our textile industry must not be the victims of such disregard for the Treaty of Rome”.¹⁴ However, the GTB did also call for protective measures for the West German sector to allow it to compete on a level playing field within Europe on the basis that there was “no prospect of abolishing subsidies and grants in other EC countries”.¹⁵

Though it favoured trade liberalisation in general, the GTB did not take this approach as far as the main textile employers’ organisation, Gesamttextil (Gesamtverband der deutschen Textilindustrie), or the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft (BMWi)). However, while the GTB favoured competition within the world textile and clothing market being left relatively unfettered, it simultaneously supported the targeted use of public funds to protect German textile jobs through restructuring.¹⁶ In this respect, within the European labour movement the GTB was arguably one of keener advocates of the idea of a ‘positive’ industrial policy which prioritised the promotion of new jobs and economic activities through modernisation and development over protectionism geared towards shutting off foreign competition (Pinder, 1982; OECD, 1979).

Though the GTB’s attitude to liberalisation was consistently more open than the TUC and CGT textile federations, this position began to change towards the end of the 1970s. The social and economic effects of a dramatic and belated rise in the number of job losses in the West German textile and clothing sector was the primary reason behind this shift in approach

¹⁴ ‘Anträge für die Sitzung des Hauptvorstandes am 30.9.1978 – Außenwirtschaft’, GTB Hauptvorstand, 30 September 1978; Archiv der GTB, Archiv an der sozialen Demokratie, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (5/GTBA020018)

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

(Shepherd, 1981, p. 7). However, the beginning of a deeper decline in the textile sector also coincided with some important political changes that helped push the GTB towards a more protectionist position: the appointment of the more aggressively pro-liberalisation Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP) Economics Minister Otto Graf Lambsdorff in 1977; the replacement of Karl Buschmann with Berthold Keller as GTB Chairman in 1978; and increasing divisions within the EC concerning the alignment of Community trade policy ahead of the renewal of the MFA.

In the context of rapidly rising unemployment in the sector and the increasingly protectionist attitude of other European trade unions and governments it is perhaps unsurprising that the GTB hardened its attitude to the liberal-minded policies of its own government and the European Commission. For example, in a letter addressed to members of the Bundestag ahead of a 1980 protest action by the GTB and other European textile unions, Berthold Keller wrote:

With this action, workers in the textile and clothing industry will protest against the inadequate representation of their legitimate concerns by the European Commission. But the protest is also directed against the completely unrealistic and also anti-social policy of the Federal Minister of Economics, Count Lambsdorff, who in Brussels would like to realise his classic liberalisation ideology without considering the losses... This incomprehensible attitude of our Minister of Economics endangers the social climate in our country and will lead to a further political loss of confidence. The political and social consequences in the textile and clothing industry will be especially devastating.¹⁷

Despite this shift towards a more confrontational approach in the late-1970s, the GTB's 'accommodationist' stance under both Buschmann and Keller and its acceptance of previous government and employer modernisation policies left it poorly prepared to address the further loss of textile jobs (Swenson, 1989, p. 181). Nonetheless, the GTB also recognised the need

¹⁷ 'Letter from Berthold Keller to all members of the Bundestag', 13 November 1980; Archiv des BMWi (Außenwirtschaftspolitik und Entwicklungshilfe), Bundesarchiv (B102/207487)

to strengthen its work at company level by expanding co-determination and recruit and retain more members to be able to face further challenges in the 1980s (Keller, 1982).

Compared to the TUC and the GTB, the CGT's textile and clothing unions¹⁸ advanced an explicitly anti-capitalist analysis of the problems facing the sector. However, in large part due to their political strategy at the time, the CGT did not seek to influence the French government's trade and industrial policies. In terms of their general trade policy, the CGT essentially rejected the notion that trade liberalisation was a natural good for workers and pointed to the massive decline in employment in the textile and clothing sector even prior to the crisis of 1973-74. This trend worsened in the 1970s with the French industry losing around 100,000 workers between 1973 and 1980 alone (Shepherd, 1981, p. 7). In particular, the CGT blamed successive national economic plans that accepted huge job losses as a price worth paying for the restructuring of the sector that took "no account of the real possibilities existing to ensure a greater vitality of the profession accompanied by social measures corresponding to our times".¹⁹ In fact, rather than simply being an expression of the deeper crisis of capitalism that the CGT regularly referred to in the 1970s, it was argued that employers and successive governments had abandoned industries such as textiles to open competition on the international markets.²⁰

The notion that French employers and governments during the Pompidou and Giscard presidencies had deliberately run down or, at best, radically streamlined the textile and clothing industry in the 1970s ran strongly through the CGT's analysis in this period. For example, in a 1978 pamphlet titled *Halte au massacre des industries!*, the CGT denounced,

¹⁸ Fédération des Travailleurs du Textile-CGT (FTT-CGT) and Fédération Nationale des Travailleurs de l'Habillement-Chapellerie (FNTHC-CGT), hereafter referred to as CGT unless stated otherwise

¹⁹ 'Déclaration de la délégation de notre Fédération au Communauté', *Le travailleur du textile*, 25 January 1972 ; Archives de la CGT, Archives départementales de la Seine-Saint-Denis (242J/13)

²⁰ 'Textile-Habillement : construire une industrie française d'avenir', Centre Confédéral d'Etudes Economiques de la CGT, 1987 ; L'IHS CGT (1D2/40-74)

the scandalous campaign developed by the bosses and the government in the name of 'competitiveness' and supposedly to fight unemployment to make workers accept a permanent policy of low wages, the acceleration of work rates, the reduction of staff for the same volume of production, the deterioration of working conditions, the extension of shift work... [and] the maintenance, despite unemployment, of an average working week of more than 41 hours for those in employment.²¹

These aspects were of particular importance in the French textile and clothing sector where the labour force was quite deliberately segmented between core male workers protected by a 1953 collective agreement (Reynaud, 1966, pp. 178-180) and low-paid female and immigrant workers acutely vulnerable to lay-offs determined by the business cycle (Mytelka, 1982, pp. 138-139). Naturally, this policy allowed employment numbers to dwindle in correlation with the declining fortunes of the sector. However, one reason behind why this policy persisted was that union organisation in the French textile and clothing sector was particularly weak with collective agreements only existing in less than a quarter of all small and medium-sized companies (Bunel and Saglio, 1976, p. 391). Further, the CGT itself largely rejected tripartite consultation and the industrial relations arena in this period, instead placing all its focus on political and national solutions in the form of an electoral victory for the Union de la Gauche (Ancelevici, 2008, p. 209).

Given the divisions within the French labour movement and the difficulties in organising textile and clothing workers, the CGT was often reduced to agitational demands that had little impact on the overall direction of the industry itself and immediate demands over wages and protecting jobs, a feature of the French labour movement in general (Erbès-Seguin, 1984, p. 299). A central reason behind this approach was the fact that the CGT and other unions were opposed to participation in the Commissariat Général du Plan and other state planning bodies based on the argument that they were simply an instrument of capital

²¹ 'Halte au massacre des industries ! Nous voulons travailler', CGT, 21 February 1978 ; L'IHS CGT (24CFD14)

(Mytelka, 1982, p. 133). Though the CGT participated more vigorously in the company level Comités d'Entreprises, French labour was also deliberately marginalised from top level concertation in the textile and clothing sector, meaning that employers could often speak for workers relatively unopposed (Underhill, 1998, p. 120).

The CGT naturally supported assistance to struggling companies that were haemorrhaging jobs throughout the 1970s – a position it shared with employer associations²² – but argued that workers were not the true beneficiaries of such a strategy. In its material from the time, consistent reference was made by the CGT to the need to reinvigorate the purchasing power of workers as a strategy to overcome the crisis in the sector.²³ Furthermore, in 1977 former General Secretary of the CGT's textile federation used the PCF's journal – *Economique et politique - revue marxiste d'économie* – to criticise successive government policies for the textile sector and the specific strategy of state assistance to large MNCs based in France who were increasingly moving their activities abroad to seek greater profits.²⁴ For these reasons, the CGT and other unions would occasionally show rare glimpses of unity to issue joint calls denouncing the situation in the sector and arguing for the nationalisation of MNCs like the chemical textiles giant Rhône-Poulenc to stop the flow of jobs and capital out of France.²⁵

²² 'Quatre mesures proposées par le CNPF pour préserver la liberté des échanges', CNPF, 30 June 1977 ; L'IHS CGT (7CFD133); 'Assemblée Permanente – Procès-verbal de la réunion de 19/7/1977', CNPF, 19 July 1977 ; L'IHS CGT (7CFD133)

²³ 'La grande braderie de l'industrie textile', Jean Trioux (*Economique et politique revue marxiste d'économie*), March 1977 ; Archives de la CGT, Archives départementales de la Seine-Saint-Denis (242J/13) ; 'Courrier No 4', l'UIS du Textile, Habillement, Cuirs et Peaux, May 1979 ; Archives de la CGT, Archives départementales de la Seine-Saint-Denis (450J/777)

²⁴ 'La grande braderie de l'industrie textile', Jean Trioux (*Economique et politique revue marxiste d'économie*), March 1977 ; Archives de la CGT, Archives départementales de la Seine-Saint-Denis (242J/13)

²⁵ 'Courrier No 4', l'UIS du Textile, Habillement, Cuirs et Peaux, May 1979 ; Archives de la CGT, Archives départementales de la Seine-Saint-Denis (450J/777)

At the European level, the ETUC-TCL,²⁶ at this stage an ICFTU industry committee that was not yet affiliated to the ETUC, broadly reflected the perspectives of its member organisations in its overall position on the sector. By the late-1970s the committee therefore generally reflected the more protectionist attitudes of the UK, French, Italian and, to an increasing extent, German unions over the more liberal attitudes of Dutch and Scandinavian unions. In a 1978 position paper on the future of the sector, for example, the paper referred to the “cult of liberalisation” which had contributed to the unemployment of European textile workers and spoke favourably of aids to industry as a temporary means of ensuring the sector’s survival.²⁷ In general, the ETUC-TCL, along with other affiliated and non-affiliated committees, broadly reflected the Keynesian economic outlook of both the ETUC²⁸ and the ICFTU.²⁹ In its conclusion, the paper criticised the inadequate measures taken at both national and Community level, arguing that,

For all our industries, the worsening of the economic, industrial and social situation has reached such an extent that effective intervention is required urgently unless we wish to find ourselves compelled to sign our sectors’ death warrant in the very near future... It is indispensable that a drastic policy be put into effect in the short-term so as to bring about a recovery.³⁰

Also contained in the ETUC’s 1978 position paper was the suggestion that a common Community industrial policy might be preferable to competing national industrial policies, a

²⁶ European Trade Union Committee of Textiles, Clothing and Leather Workers

²⁷ ‘L’avenir des industries du textile et de l’habillement : la position des organisations syndicales’, ETUC-TCL, 25 January 1979 ; Archive of the EEC and EAEC Commissions, HAEU (BAC-48/1984-1151b)

²⁸ ‘Minutes from the meeting of the ETUC Executive Committee - Brussels, 21-22 April 1977’; ETUC Archive, IISH (584); ‘Minutes from the meeting of the ETUC Executive Committee, Vienna, 22-23 June 1978’; ETUC Archive, IISH (596)

²⁹ ‘Working Group on International Monetary Questions – Brussels, 21-22 September 1977’, ICFTU; ICFTU Archive, IISH (1399); ‘ICFTU - Working Group on International Monetary Questions - Brussels, 30-31 October 1978’; ICFTU, ICFTU Archive, IISH (1400)

³⁰ ‘L’avenir des industries du textile et de l’habillement : la position des organisations syndicales’, ETUC-TCL, 25 January 1979 ; Archive of the EEC and EAEC Commissions, HAEU (BAC-48/1984-1151b)

position also taken by the German government, albeit for different reasons.³¹ In a broad sense, all the textile and clothing unions analysed in this section of the thesis were ostensibly in favour of greater European cooperation towards an industrial policy for the textiles and clothing sectors, predominantly on the basis of aiding research within the sector to assist adjustment. This debate was highly prevalent both before and during the 1970s in the EC as member states sought to augment their national industrial policies with greater European-wide cooperation and coordination in support of growing future industries and declining traditional industries (Hodges, 1977; Pinder, 1982; Warlouzet, 2014).

However, the two major reports on the future of the European textiles industry published by the Commissioners for Industrial Affairs – Spinelli in 1972 and Davignon in 1978 – raised serious concerns among European trade unions (Commission of the European Communities, 1972; Commission of the European Communities, 1978a). Their main anxieties stemmed from the Commission’s openly pro-liberalisation agenda and the potential for national industrial aids to be restricted, something the Commission was legally capable of opposing if assistance affected intra-Community trade (Woolcock, 1982, p. 45). The combined effect of the Commission’s attitude to the textile and clothing sectors meant that European unions were broadly in agreement that their policies would ultimately lead to further sectoral decline and limited union consultation.³²

³¹ ‘Textilhandelspolitik der EG während der deutschen Präsidentschaft im 2. Halbjahr 1978’, BMWi (Abteilungsleiterin V), 4 January 1979; Archiv des BMWi (Außenwirtschaftspolitik und Entwicklungshilfe), Bundesarchiv (B102/207477)

³² ‘EEC industrial policy for textiles and clothing - a TUC comment’, TUC TCFC, 1 February 1979; TUC Archive, MRC, University of Warwick (MSS.292D/631/565/2); ‘The future of the textile and clothing industries, a trade union position’, ETUC-TCL, 18 December 1978; TUC Archive, MRC, University of Warwick (MSS.292D/631/565/2); ‘EEC industrial policy for textiles and clothing’, TUC TCFC, 21 March 1979; TUC Archive, MRC, University of Warwick (MSS.292D/631/565/2); ‘Rapport d’activité au 35e Congrès Fédéral’, CGT Fédération nationale des travailleurs de l’Habillement-Chapellerie, 16-18 November 1976; Archives de la CGT, Archives départementales de la Seine-Saint-Denis (200J/250)

The social clause

In the academic literature the 1970s is widely regarded as a turning point in the establishment of a new international division of labour (Fröbel, Heinrichs and Kreye, 1980; Turner, 1982; Dolan, 1983). The role that MNCs and developing economies played in this new economic order was naturally of concern to European trade unions. This was especially the case in the textile sector. The key problem facing European trade unions, employers and governments was that the rapid development of countries such as Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan, in some cases entirely through textiles and clothing production, had begun to profoundly impact European markets, drastically affecting trade balances and therefore jobs.

This phenomenon did not develop simply as a reaction to the crises of the 1970s since the process had begun earlier as economic growth in industrialised countries slowed after the post-war economic boom (Arrighi, 2008; La Barca, 2016, pp. 28-31). However, the effects were undoubtedly exacerbated by them. As the OECD outlined at the time, the decisive reaction to increased export competition from developing economies only occurred after the 1974-75 recession “when slow growth, high unemployment and balance of payments difficulties combined to inhibit the process of industrial adjustment and to revive protectionist pressures” (OECD, 1979, p. 6). As such, the latter half of the 1970s was a time of great debate over the future direction of world trade and what role developing economies would play within it.

At the same time, since the key variable driving this shift in the balance of the world economy was the low labour costs of workers in developing countries, MNCs also sought to exploit this fact by moving production abroad in the face of worsening economic conditions in developed economies. As such, the regulation of multinationals was a fixture on the agenda of unions, governments, and international organisations throughout the 1970s and 80s

(Petrini, 2013). These policy concerns can also be placed in the context of debates taking place at the time over the 'new international economic order'. Cox (1979), taking a critical overview of the debate that had developed throughout the 1970s, argues that the new international economic order could be defined by the following: the official documents adopted by international conferences; a negotiation process between the Global North and South; a debate about the real and desirable basic structure of world economic relations; and a debate over the form of knowledge appropriate to understanding these issues, including a questioning of liberal economic hegemony.

European textile and clothing unions, facing a major threat to their members' livelihoods, were caught between their own self-interest and broader notions of international solidarity, a problem that has always faced trade unions in export-oriented sectors (Hilary, 2014). The rapid economic development of newly industrialised countries and their competitive advantage in textile and clothing production had a devastating effect on employment in Europe with textile and clothing employment falling by 4.5% each year between 1973 and 1979 (GATT Textiles Committee, 1980). This amounted to over one million jobs by the end of the decade, representing a fall in the share of manufacturing employment from 10% to 8.5% (GATT Textiles Committee, 1980). After years of gradual decline, 1975 represented the point at which the EEC had its first net textile and clothing trade deficit which continued to decline throughout the rest of the decade (Farrands, 1979). In this environment, the issue was not necessarily whether the trend of developing textile economies out-competing developed economies could be reversed, but whether the speed and scale of this shift and the subsequent impact on jobs could be limited to allow for structural adjustment. This attitude was not only a feature of European textile unions at the time but

was also shared, with different degrees of emphasis, by UK, French and German employers' organisations who were under pressure to defend the interests of domestic firms.³³

The national trade unions analysed in this part of the thesis generally agreed on their approach to the issue of developing countries and their impact on European textile jobs. However, by definition, trade unions had to seek a balance between safeguarding their members' jobs on the one hand and supporting the development both of new markets for European textile products and the living standards and rights of workers in the developing economies. In a speech to the SPD's 1977 Development Policy Conference, GTB Chairman and International Textile, Garment and Leather Workers' Federation (ITGLWF, affiliate of the ICFTU) President, Karl Buschmann, outlined the key issues facing European trade unions at the time:

There is no other economic sector where the international process of industrialisation and liberalisation has demanded more sacrifices from the workers than the textile and clothing industry. The demand to industrialise the developing countries is therefore not particularly popular among our employees as a development policy option... The question as to whether the developing countries should be industrialised should in principle be answered in the affirmative... But how should the industrialisation of developing countries take place in the interests of both sides? My opinion is this: like any other economy, developing countries also need a balanced, differentiated infrastructure... But if industrialisation does not also create adequate wage, working and social conditions for people in developing countries, then the claim that this is development aid is empty talk.³⁴

In a similar vein, the TUC argued that the "the benefits of increased investment, output and exports have not 'trickled down' to working people in the form of improved conditions

³³ 'TUC/CBI Memorandum on imports and related overseas trade matters - memorandum by the Secretary of State for Trade', 2 November 1976; CBI Archive, MRC, University of Warwick (MSS.200/C/3/INT/7/36); 'Assemblée Permanente – Procès-verbal de la réunion de 19/7/1977', CNPF, 19 July 1977; L'IHS CGT (7CFD133)

³⁴ 'Gefährdung oder Sicherung der Arbeitsplätze in den Industrieländern in den Entwicklungsländern', GTB Hauptvorstand, 8-9 September 1977; Archiv der GTB, Archiv an der sozialen Demokratie, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (5/GTBA020018)

of work and enhanced social standards. The dividends of economic growth have in many countries accrued almost entirely to small, privileged elites of foreign investors”.³⁵ In keeping with the CGT’s anti-capitalist ideology, on the issue of development it placed particular emphasis on the role of MNCs investing capital abroad to exploit cheap labour: “These groups do not allow developing countries to move away from underdevelopment and access to cutting-edge technologies to build a new economy that meets their needs. Monoplist groups pursue the policy of grabbing raw materials, maintaining exploitation and neo-colonialist domination”.³⁶

The attitudes of the TUC and GTB (and by extension the ETUC-TCL) on one hand and the CGT on the other were greatly informed by their respective international organisations and the composition of their memberships. The ICFTU - to which the TUC and GTB were affiliated - was overwhelmingly composed of unions from developed economies while the CGT was by 1978 the sole Western European member of the WFTU (Kirchner, 1980, p. 125). Because of their respective membership composition and ideological orientation, the ICFTU arguably placed greater emphasis on the impact that industrialisation in developing economies would have on workers in developed economies while the WFTU emphasised the exploitation of developing countries by MNCs and ‘imperialist governments’.

The ETUC-TCL also took a particularly negative view of the situation facing the European textile sector in the context of a new international division of labour and reserved particular criticism for the EC for perpetuating it:

Its free exchange attitude – praiseworthy in theory but disastrous in practice – has let it grant the developing countries a package of advantages which is far in excess of its

³⁵ ‘Social clause’, TUC TCFC, 17 January 1980; TUC Archive, MRC, University of Warwick (MSS.292D/522/1)

³⁶ ‘Rapport d’activité au 35e Congrès Fédéral’, CGT Fédération Nationale des Travailleurs de l’Habillement-Chapellerie, 16-18 November 1976 ; Archives de la CGT, Archives départementales de la Seine-Saint-Denis (200J/250)

capabilities. It is quite obvious that the Community's liberalism had some powerful incentives from the outset, and, in particular, a desire to create ideal conditions for the export of its own industrial products. Thus, the Community's policy has proved extremely profitable for a number of sectors whilst the textile and clothing industries have had to put up with imports from the Third World for 20 years. They have been the victims of a 'barter system', the bill for which has been paid in terms of employment. When the trade unions have protested, they have immediately been accused of protectionism.³⁷

Despite differences in emphasis, all the trade unions cited in this thesis broadly agreed on the need for a 'social clause' to be included in world trade agreements to improve the living standards of workers in developing countries and mitigate the impact of their rapid industrialisation on their own members. The CGT and the WFTU, presumably because the policy was so closely tied to the ICFTU, did not specifically use the term 'social clause' in this period but nevertheless made reference in their own documents to the need for world trade policies that mutually benefitted workers in developed and developing economies, including the insertion of ILO Conventions on the right to organise and collective bargaining.³⁸

Though the notion of including reference to labour standards in world trade agreements had existed since the foundation of the GATT - and in broader terms since the beginning of the twentieth century (Coppolaro and Mechi, 2020a) - the Tokyo Round of the GATT marked the advent of the issue generating more serious discussion (Orbie et al., 2005, p. 160). The main architect and proponent of the social clause from its inception has been the ICFTU. The centrepiece of the social clause has always revolved around the inclusion of core ILO

³⁷ 'L'avenir des industries du textile et de l'habillement : la position des organisations syndicales', ETUC-TCL, 25 January 1979 ; Archive of the EEC and EAEC Commissions, HAEU (BAC-48/1984-1151b)

³⁸ 'La grande braderie de l'industrie textile', Jean Trioux (*Economique et politique revue marxiste d'économie*), March 1977 ; Archives de la CGT, Archives départementales de la Seine-Saint-Denis (242J/13) ; 'Projet Programme revendicatif et d'action face aux sociétés transnationales du Textile, Habillement, Cuirs et Peaux', Bureau Exécutif de l'UIS du textile, 24-25 May 1978 ; Archives de la CGT, Archives départementales de la Seine-Saint-Denis (450J/731)

Conventions on Labour Standards which cover freedom of association and collective bargaining, child labour, forced labour and equality, a focus which remains to this day (Van Roozendaal, 2002, p. 2). However, at the beginning of the Tokyo Round in 1973, in addition to fair labour standards the ICFTU's conception of a social clause called for all Contracting Parties to the GATT to commit to policies ensuring full employment, full income and social benefits for all workers displaced by restructuring, public control of social and economic re-adaptation, anticipatory structural adjustment measures, and the creation of an International Commission on Trade and Employment, a tripartite body composed of government representatives, trade unions and employers' organisations.³⁹

The idea of a social clause has proved controversial to both developing countries and some Western trade unions, particularly during economically challenging periods. To its critics, the social clause is seen as a measure designed to protect developed nations from developing economies that often hold a comparative advantage in labour and production costs. To its supporters, an international agreement on basic labour standards is argued to be a measure that would cut across protectionism as economies facing competition would not be tempted to try and implement protectionist measures since minimum labour standards would offset the competitive advantage of developing economies leading to a more equal playing field (van Roozendaal, 2002, p. 57).

The puzzle of how to protect domestic industries from developing economies without resorting to outright protectionism was the most important issue for European textile unions throughout the 1970s. Stephen Pursey, an economist who played a key role in developing an approach to the social clause in both the TUC and ICFTU, explained the political economy of the policy as follows:

³⁹ 'ICFTU statement on opening of GATT world trade negotiations', September 1973; MRC, Warwick, TUC Archive, (MSS.292D/522/1)

The idea is that if you're going to have sustained and sustainable growth then it's consumers in developing countries who are going to be the drivers of the global economy and that means that somehow you have to have labour market mechanisms which support a process in which as productivity improves wages improve and thus consuming power improves. In addition, this would result in the tax base for government spending broadening, so you can finance social protection systems. Basically, you have to try to have a more equitable and thus more sustainable development path which is less dependent on foreign investment, that is more self-sustaining. But, again, that idea of getting a virtuous upward spiral of consumption, savings, investment – very old-fashioned Keynesian ideas... is hard to achieve if too many countries are trying to free ride. Hence, the issue of the social underpinning of trade is not a purely national one... it is one of international collective action (S. Pursey, interview).

As the above quote highlights, the general logic of the social clause is closely tied to the embedded liberal concept of 'Smith abroad, Keynes at home' and aims to mitigate the relentless and intensive competition between states and, ultimately, workers that is inherent in free trade policies (Waterman, 2020). However, the issues of controlling imports from developing countries and the social clause were often conflated by European trade unions, leading to accusations that the assumed solidarity of the social clause disguised an underlying self-interest and protectionist tendencies (Waterman, 2018). This is one explanation why the social clause has often received a mixed reception from governments and trade unions in the Global South.

The MFA

The combination of structural adjustment in the sector, the rise of developing economies, and the economic crises of the 1970s resulted in the European textile and clothing sectors facing severe import penetration throughout the decade. This issue would ultimately become the central concern not just for European trade unions in the sector, but for governments and employers as well. Some key statistics exemplify the extent of the problem that faced the

European textile and clothing sectors: import penetration (imports as a percentage of consumption) increased from 23% in 1973 to 44% by 1980, 72% of which was attributable to the exports of developing economies by the end of the decade; the European textile and clothing workforce decreased by 27% between 1973 and 1980; and 15% of all European textile and clothing firms went bankrupt in this same period (Commission of the European Communities, 1981a). Estimates at the time suggested that between 25-50% of unemployment in the industry could be indirectly attributed to low-cost imports (Dolan, 1983, pp. 588-589). Furthermore, the nature of the industry meant that unemployment disproportionately affected relatively unskilled female workers from some of the poorest regions of Europe where alternative employment was often unavailable (Dolan, 1983, pp. 588-589).

Though every country was affected in different ways and extents by the issue of import penetration, the international nature of the problem pushed GATT members towards the creation of a multilateral agreement that could establish a stable framework in which developed and developing economies could trade textile and clothing products without suffering significant injury to their respective trade balances. The international instrument of the MFA (1974-2005) became the central mechanism with which the structural decline of Western textile industries was resisted by many governments, trade unions, and employers' organisations in the long 1970s and beyond.

The MFA developed out of previous multilateral agreements for cotton textiles – the 1961 Short-Term Cotton Agreement and then, in 1962, the Long-Term Agreement on Cotton Textiles (LTA) – which allowed developed economies the right to protect their textile and clothing industries from market disruption through the selective and discriminatory application of restraints (Choi, Chung and Marian, 1985, p. 15). However, despite the introduction of the LTA, textile imports from developing countries remained stable at around

13-15% for the next 15 years while clothing imports doubled over the same period (Underhill, 1998, p. 55). Since the LTA was due to expire in autumn 1973, a GATT working party was set up in 1972 to make a fact-finding study of “the economic, technical, social and commercial elements which influence world trade in textiles, distinguishing the various textile sectors, both according to the fibres used and according to the degree of processing” with the aim of creating a multilateral solution, leading to the eventual establishment of the MFA on 1 January 1974 (GATT, 1974, p. 37).

The stated aim of the MFA was to,

achieve the expansion of trade, the reduction of barriers to such trade and the progressive liberalization of world trade in textile products, while at the same time ensuring the orderly and equitable development of this trade and avoidance of disruptive effects in individual markets and on individual lines of production in both importing and exporting countries (GATT, 1974, p. 38).

An additional aim of the MFA was “to further the economic and social development of developing countries and secure a substantial increase in their export earnings from textile products and to provide scope for a greater share of them in the world trade of these products” (GATT, 1974, p. 38). However, whilst these aims seemed to fit with the general tenor of GATT liberalisation policies, the reality was that it held “openly discriminatory characteristics which clearly violated the rules and norms of the trade regime” (Underhill, 1998, p. 3). Nonetheless, when it was first established the MFA was heralded as a mutually beneficial liberal agreement. This would change as Europe’s economic situation grew worse over the course of the decade, however, with the MFA evolving into what Aggarwal (1985) describes as a form of ‘liberal protectionism’.

The European trade unions discussed in this section of the thesis all supported the MFA and the broader policy of selective import controls to different degrees at different stages of the long 1970s. Though perspectives for their own national sectors may have differed on

broader matters of economic, industrial and trade policy, their approaches to the multilateral MFA and to a lesser extent the need for certain bilateral and unilateral measures, particularly in the second half of the 1970s, were relatively closely aligned. The TUC, GTB and CGT all considered the MFA as a vitally important mechanism to protect jobs their respective domestic sectors on the basis that it was necessary to regulate and stabilise the flow of imports as a temporary measure to allow for national sectors to adjust and modernise. This approach was part of a broader formula that called for a planned and coordinated trade, industry, and employment policy. Strategically, the TUC and GTB believed this could be achieved through their established neo-corporatist frameworks while the CGT believed this could only be accomplished with the election of a socialist government.

For the TUC, a particular area of concern stemmed from its forthcoming accession to the EC. Since the UK had tariffs on most textile products prior to accession, the TUC was concerned that these tariffs would not only be reduced to bring the UK into line with the EC's more liberal tariff preferences, but also that the UK government's position would also be diluted as a consequence of the requirement for a unified EC position in negotiations.⁴⁰ As the crisis in the sector increased and attention turned to negotiating the second MFA, the TUC was particularly concerned about whether its existing import restraints for clothing exports from the Far East would be absorbed into the Community's mandate. Furthermore, the TUC also claimed that the MFA should go further since the first MFA did not cover the eventuality of a major decline in trade, arguing that "a system of temporary across-the-board restraints which can be selectively relaxed would both improve the balance of payments and help to prevent damage to the productive capacity of the industry and the livelihood of its

⁴⁰ 'Textiles and Clothing Trade Issues', TUC TCC, 15 March 1972; 12 July 1990; TUC Archive, MRC, University of Warwick (MSS.292D/631/2)

workers”.⁴¹ However, it also consistently pointed out that the MFA should be seen as a temporary measure that was only justifiable to stop the whole UK industry from disappearing (S. Pursey, interview).

On the issue of stricter import controls, the TUC actively pursued the issue as a means of correcting the weaknesses of the original MFA. Specifically, the TUC hoped to address six major concerns: fixed-rate growth quotas; the level of the growth quota (6%, well above the average growth in UK consumption of 2.3%); the coverage of bilateral restraints (which focused on major exporters but ignored a large number of smaller suppliers); the role of the first MFA in reinforcing the dynamic of import penetration from the Far East to developed economies rather than spreading imports and exports more evenly; the lack of provisions to protect and improve the living standards of both importing and exporting countries; and a more representative base period for the calculation of import quotas was required (TUC, 1977, p. 298). The social clause was also raised regularly by the TUC but was rarely included in its demands when meeting with trade ministers (Waterman, 2018).

Though it generally advanced a more pro-liberalisation approach, the GTB’s demands concerning the MFA grew closer to the TUC’s and CGT’s as the decade progressed. This largely stemmed from the loss of 25% of the West German sector’s employment between 1973 and 1977, which was impossible to ignore and sharpened its approach.⁴² As such, the demand for a new and improved MFA and action in defence of textile jobs was a feature of the GTB’s approach from the mid-1970s onwards. In particular, the GTB believed the inadequate impact of the first MFA was a result of its control mechanisms not being strong enough to restrict non-compliance which consequently precipitated a sharper rise in

⁴¹ ‘TUC Policy Statement: The textile, clothing and footwear industries’, 22 October 1979; TUC Archive, MRC, University of Warwick (MSS.292D/631/8)

⁴² ‘Welttextilabkommen muss verbessert werden’, GTB Hauptvorstand, 21 April 1977; Archiv der GTB, Archiv an der sozialen Demokratie, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (5/GTBA020018)

imports.⁴³ Much like the TUC, the GTB ultimately saw the MFA not as a form of protectionism but as the only feasible mechanism available at the time to reclaim an “orderly” world trading system combined with a “meaningful” development policy.⁴⁴ With this in mind the GTB became more critical of the European Commission on the basis that it believed the textile sector had simply been left to market forces while sectors such as steel had received support aimed at safeguarding employment.⁴⁵

In terms of the major issues that the GTB believed needed to be renewed and improved in the second MFA, the union called for: a reduction in the annual growth rate of imports from 6%; the inclusion of a ‘recession clause’, allowing a reduction in imports to a level lower than the general limit at times of recession; no further increase in imports from “highly-industrialised developing countries” (Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan and Macao); the maintenance of the principle of burden sharing between EC Member States; improved rules on certificates of origin with violations to be punished as a criminal rather than an administrative offence; and the inclusion of a social clause.⁴⁶

Archival sources detailing the CGT’s position on the MFA are almost entirely absent until the early 1980s. The central reason behind this is their previously mentioned ‘dual strategy’ (Ross, 1982a, pp. 29-31). From an ideological perspective, the CGT and other French unions held no interest in being associated with the policies of conservative governments (Wilson, 1985, p. 263). As such, state level influence was not considered a priority until a socialist government took power. As Bridgford (1990, p. 133) points out, by

⁴³ ‘Anträge für die Sitzung des Hauptvorstandes am 30.9.1978 – Außenwirtschaft’, GTB Hauptvorstand, 30 September 1978; Archiv der GTB, Archiv an der sozialen Demokratie, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (5/GTBA020018)

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ ‘Welttextilabkommen muss verbessert werden’, GTB Hauptvorstand, 21 April 1977; Archiv der GTB, Archiv an der sozialen Demokratie, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (5/GTBA020018)

⁴⁶ Ibid.

the end of the 1970s the CGT's relationship with the PCF had led it down the path of 'splendid isolation' and its membership was in severe decline.

However, with the election of a Mitterrand government, the CGT fleetingly felt that "The new conditions created by the arrival of the left to power offer opportunities for intervention in the regulation of international trade. Measures can be proposed in the current negotiations and can be taken by the French government".⁴⁷ As such, the fact that only one document that directly outlines the CGT's position on the MFA in the long 1970s from their archives exists is testament to their approach in this period and the extent to which they wished to influence the French government's negotiating position. Up until this point, the CGT's pronouncements on trade "were framed in the terms of class struggle and civic nationalism" (Andelovici, 2008, p. 209) and centred around demands relating to the nationalisation of MNCs and public control of inward and outward foreign direct investment (FDI) flows.

Despite the lack of archival sources on the CGT's position on the MFA, the one policy document dedicated to trade and the MFA that does exist from this period from 1981 is both detailed and revealing. In essence, the CGT's position was not dissimilar to the TUC's in that it firmly supported the arrangement but argued that the first two agreements had not gone far enough and had not halted import penetration into the French textile market. In particular it noted that the share of imports in the French textile market had risen from 40% in 1976/77 to 51% in 1980, between 1976-1980 imports into France of textile products from third countries into the Community had increased by 43% (an average annual rate of almost 9%), 68% of which had come from third countries covered by the low-price import control and

⁴⁷ 'Commerce International et l'AMF', CGT Fédération des Travailleurs du Textile et des Industries rattachées, n/d. ; Archives de la CGT, Archives départementales de la Seine-Saint-Denis (200J/250)

surveillance system set up in France and in the other member states of the EEC, under the application of the second MFA.⁴⁸

To address the issue of rising imports the CGT believed the key issues that needed resolving in the negotiation of the third MFA were: the lengthening of the arrangement to provide a stimulus for investment and tighten the restrictions on sensitive textile products; the creation of a global import penetration threshold of around 30% for the EEC and France with stricter consequences if this quota was exceeded; a reduction in the growth allowance of 6% already contained in the MFA; a role for trade unions at national and Community level in the strict regulation of big business operations relating to selling imported goods; the setting up of a price commission to counteract and police the dumping prices of Eastern Bloc countries, the USA and Italy; the introduction of binding clauses relating to minimum labour standards; and the extension of voluntary export restraint agreements.⁴⁹

The ETUC-TCL's position on the renewal of the MFA was generally reflective of the main issues covered by the national trade union federations.⁵⁰ Though it outlined key policy issues such as the recession clause and the length of the agreement, in contrast to national unions it did not explicitly outline specific rates or formulas but instead spoke in far broader terms of the "orderly regulation of international trade in textile and clothing products" and relations between developed and developing economies.⁵¹ This would suggest that the European level organisation had yet to truly establish itself as the de facto representative of European textile unions in world trade negotiations and that influence and policy expertise resided primarily at the national level in this period. Furthermore, it reveals the difficulties

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ 'Renegotiation of the MFA - ETUC-TCL position paper', TUC TCFC, 6 January 1977; TUC Archive, MRC, University of Warwick (MSS.292D/631/6)

⁵¹ Ibid.

the ETUC-TCL would have faced in creating a coherent policy approach to the MFA given the different economic situations of its members. Throughout the 1980s however, this would gradually change, and the ETUC-TCL would develop far more detailed positions on the MFA that were not merely compositions of disparate national positions, but a genuinely unified mandate from member unions that the committee could use to attempt to influence European officials.⁵²

Avenues of influence

The MFA first came into existence on 1 January 1974. Though it was not initially envisaged that the MFA would last longer than the term of the first agreement, during the temporal focus of the historical section of the thesis it was renewed as follows:

- MFA I: 1 January 1974 to 31 December 1977
- MFA II: 1 January 1978 to 31 December 1981
- MFA III: 1 January 1982 to 31 July 1986 (Choi et al., 1985).

Though the broad intention of the MFA was to provide a multilateral framework for the world textile trade, bilateral agreements were also permitted and became an increasingly important feature after the first MFA as they allowed the Contracting Parties the opportunity to regulate textile and clothing trade more precisely (Farrands, 1979, p. 24). Articles 3 and 4 of the MFA also allowed unilateral measures to be taken by importing countries for certain products on the grounds of market disruption under GATT Article 19, otherwise known as the Safeguard Clause (Choi et al., 1985, pp. 17-18).

⁵² 'Draft statement by ETUC-TCL on MFA', TUC TCFC, 2 May 1980; TUC Archive, MRC, University of Warwick (MSS.292D/631/9); 'Renewal of the MFA and bilateral agreements', ETUC-TCL, 5 October 1981; TUC Archive, MRC, University of Warwick (MSS.292D/631/565/4); 'Common Position on the Uruguay Round of the Largest European Manufacturers and the European Unions – Textile and Clothing', ETUC-TCL, 12 July 1990; TUC Archive, MRC, University of Warwick (MSS.292D/522/3)

Due to the relatively short term of the MFA, negotiations took place in a very intense period of around 12 months prior to the renewal of each agreement. This was a particular challenge for the EC since it acted under a common commercial policy – derived from Article 113 of the Treaty of Rome – that was theoretically a composite of the often-competing interests of the member states, not to mention those of labour, business, and industry (Farrands, 1979, p. 24). In terms of the policy process emanating from the Treaties, the Commission produced a draft mandate that was supposed to reflect member states' positions but was also framed by the Community's own rules concerning commercial policy (Woolcock, 2010b, p. 387-388). The draft mandate was then discussed in the Article 113 Committee, which was composed of senior trade officials from each member state and chaired by the rotating Council presidency (Johnson, 1998). This ultimately gave the member states the final say on the negotiating mandate for each MFA. Once this process was completed the mandate could be formally adopted, allowing the Commission to conduct negotiations.

The question of whether the Commission or the Council of Ministers has generally held a decisive or equal role in the EC/EU's trade policy is a matter of debate in the academic literature (see Dür and Zimmerman (2007) for a more in-depth review). As Coppolaro (2013, p. 5) summarises, some argue that the fact that member states can nominate the trade Commissioner, set the Commission's negotiating mandate, monitor it during negotiations, and ratify the final agreement makes the Council of Ministers the driving force; others point to the relative autonomy of the Commission based on its right of initiative for trade policy and access to expertise, its right to choose its negotiating team, as well as the fact that it conducts negotiations on behalf of the member states, offering opportunities for it to advocate its own preferences. This final point is something that European textile unions were particularly aware of given the fact that the Commission, despite it representing the collective

interests of the member states, often advocated a more liberal position, sometimes even when such a view was in a minority within the Council.

Regardless of whether the Commission or the member states objectively held the most sway over EC trade policy and its actions in negotiations, the European unions analysed in this section of the thesis focused most of their strategies to influence on their own national governments, with European influence – predominantly aimed at the Commission – playing a secondary role. However, the focus of union strategies to influence gradually began to change as the decade progressed and became more Europeanised over time.

As an unelected executive the Commission faced far less political pressure than elected national executives whose decisions were more influenced by electoral politics and societal actors. On the one hand, this made the Commission a difficult institution for unions to influence since very few mechanisms for direct influence existed. As pointed out in Chapter 1, genuine EC level union influence was weak in the 1970s and the ETUC itself was heavily reliant on Commission funding as even the most pro-European national affiliates were unwilling to transfer resources to Brussels, not least because their strategies to influence were better served through domestic routes (Visser and Ebbinghaus, 1992, p. 228; Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman, 2013, p. 169). Nonetheless, as a social partner the ETUC did have a certain level of institutionalised access to the Commission on certain sectoral and social policy matters and the extent of its official lobbying of the Commission President and Commission members was equal to that of UNICE (Union des industries des pays de la communauté européenne), the EC's peak business organisation (Kirchner and Schwaiger, 1981, p. 44). However, national trade unions and their European level organisations in this period were united in the view that the European institutions lacked transparency, democratic control, and effective trade union input (Stöckl, 1986, p. 43).

Notwithstanding the unions' criticisms and the limitations of institutionalised dialogue in this period, other methods of influencing the Commission did exist that proved to be important during negotiation of the MFA. In his analysis of Community lobbying strategies, Hull (1993, p. 83) estimates that 80% of a Commissioner's initial draft legislation or mandate was contained in the final proposal adopted by the Council. Stakeholder organisations held a participatory role in the Commission's proposal and consultation phase of the policymaking process, making influence during these phases important, particularly as expertise played a key role in informing Commission proposals. Stöckl (1986, p. 44) argues that the sectoral European Trade Union Committees often used this mechanism, both formally and informally, to provide valuable information and expertise for the Commission in the preparation and implementation of Community measures. Depending on the policy in question, this kind of input was potentially mutually advantageous for both the unions and the Commission as "within the transnational groupings of associations, different national views are already pooled and harmonised, which helps the Commission in its search for Community solutions. Similarly, Commission proposals are easier to enforce vis-à-vis the Council if they are also supported by the main associations and communicated to the public through them" (Stöckl, 1986, p. 44).

As the above suggests, if union interests aligned with the preferences of sections of the Commission and a significant number of member states, this could open an avenue of influence for European trade unions if the Commission sought their input or expertise. This was a resource that European textile unions, in collaboration with industry actors, held in abundance in this period (S. Pursey, interview). The other thing to consider is that Community trade policy affected multiple DGs, some of which were more sympathetic to trade union views and influence than others. Of particular importance during the drafting of the Community's MFA mandate was the role of DG Industrial Affairs which had a strong

interest in supporting the European textile industry, even if this clashed with the broader commercial strategy of the Community in general or more liberal-minded DGs such as DG External Affairs or DG Competition. Also, the fact that the MFA was not a traditional trade deal in the sense that it contradicted some of the GATT's basic principles gave protectionist views more credence. In this environment trade unions at least had the opportunity to influence the EC's negotiating mandate, particularly as they were closely aligned with key industry interests and some national governments.

The political composition of the European Commission also appeared to be relatively conducive to trade union interests in this period. Left-wing and social democratic politicians constituted six out of fourteen Commissioners in the Ortolí Commission (1973-77), six out of thirteen in the Jenkins Commission (1977-81), before declining to four out of 17 in the Thorn Commission (1981-1985). Many of these same Commissioners also held important roles within the Commission that influenced Community trade policy. For example, the Italian Eurocommunist Altiero Spinelli was the Commissioner for Industry and Technology during the Ortolí Commission, Labour politician Roy Jenkins was appointed as Commission President in 1977, and Wilhelm Haferkamp, an SPD politician with close links to the DGB, was Vice-President of the Commission in the Ortolí, Jenkins and Thorn Commissions as well as Commissioner for External Relations in the latter.

However, as will be highlighted further in Chapter 3, the above actors' political backgrounds only offered limited avenues for trade union influence during MFA negotiations. One explanation for this is that the likes of Spinelli, Jenkins and Haferkamp were all firmly based on the right of their respective parties and were arguably more ideologically committed to European integration than they were to trade union interests. By contrast, Etienne Davignon, the Belgian Commissioner for Industrial Affairs during the Jenkins and Thorn Commissions who held no party affiliation, arguably proved himself to be

more open to union views on the textile industry and the MFA than some of his left-of-centre colleagues.

Political pressure could also be put on the Commission through the EP and the EESC, even though these bodies only held advisory powers at the time. In addition to the institutionalised voice of the Workers' Group in the EESC, the political composition of the EP was also conducive to trade unions' views being raised by MEPs from communist, socialist, and Christian-democratic parties. For example, the Socialist Group were the largest group by 1975 and in the first directly elected EP in 1979 (European Parliament, 2009, p. 54). Furthermore, it has been estimated that 7.1% of the Socialist Group and 10.3% of the Christian-Democratic Parliamentary Group were active trade unionists (not including union members without an official union role) (Stöckl, 1986, p. 82).

So, though the powers of the EP were limited to little more than an advisory role in the long 1970s, the strong left-wing presence in the parliament did offer an opportunity for sympathetic MEPs to raise questions and motions in support of a strong MFA mandate as well as to discuss the issue of the social clause. Though marginal compared to European trade unions' efforts to influence national governments and the European Commission, the support of actors within the EP for policies conducive to the aims of the union movement can be seen as important – but not decisive – factors in developing a coherent union 'voice' at the European level, but also part of the establishment of a wider transnational network of trade unionists that would grow in importance in later decades (Stöckl, 1986, p. 81).

Similarly, the EESC could be used as a forum in which trade union views could be synchronised on key topics to try and put pressure on the Commission and the Council. It was also an avenue of influence that the ETUC took seriously and worked hard to develop. For example, by 1980, 48 of the 54 members of the Workers' Group were directly or indirectly affiliated to the ETUC, enabling it to take the leading role in coordinating union views within

the EESC (Stöckl, 1986, p. 87). In addition to the mandatory consultations enshrined in the Treaty of Rome (ten by the Council and two by the Commission), from 1974 onwards the EESC held the right of self-interest, enabling it to select and give opinions on topics through its own initiative, including issues related to trade, development and the textiles and clothing sector. However, though the ETUC considered the EESC an essential body for social and economic dialogue at Community level, it also consistently called for the body to take on greater powers to embed it more directly in the policy process (Economic and Social Committee of the European Communities, 1980, pp. 180-181).

While the ETUC had minor opportunities to influence the Council President in a meeting on the eve of summit conferences, it would have been impossible for the more technical nature of trade policies to be discussed in such a meeting or in the ETUC's statement prior to the meeting. For example, in its statement ahead of the 1978 Bremen European Council the ETUC briefly outlined its position on free trade and the need for such policies to be in the interest of workers, including the need for a social clause, but did not make a specific reference to any industry.⁵³

Given the limited avenues of influence at the European level outlined so far, national level lobbying of relevant government departments and actors was overwhelmingly the most utilised avenue that the unions sought. The aim of this lobbying was to incorporate a trade union perspective in each member state's demands which would then be discussed in the Council of Ministers and integrated into the Commission's negotiating mandate. The strength of each state's demands and other intra-Community political pressures would ultimately go a long way towards determining the Commission's final collective mandate and the likelihood of the Council accepting the final mandate and eventually the negotiated terms of the MFA.

⁵³ 'Minutes from the meeting of the ETUC Executive Committee, Vienna, 22-23 June 1978'; ETUC Archive, IISH (596)

As will be explained in detail in Chapter 3, the fact that the Commission were forced to adopt a more protectionist mandate for the second and third MFAs, despite the protestations of more liberal-minded states, highlights the strength of protectionist views within the Community during the long 1970s. Nonetheless, trade union influence at the national level was also greatly determined by institutional and political factors specific to each member state.

As explained earlier in this chapter, there existed a strong policy alignment between the TUC, employers' organisations and successive national governments which was embedded in and fostered by the UK's deep-rooted neo-corporatist structures in the UK textile and clothing sector in the long 1970s. These structures played a key role in how the TUC sought to influence the MFA negotiations at the national level. Though other avenues began to play a more prominent role for other unions as the decade progressed, the success of the TUC's national level strategy to influence negotiations meant that it overwhelmingly remained its focus during this period. Throughout the long 1970s there was understandably a broad level of agreement between the TUC and the Labour government with any differences stemming from issues of emphasis rather than overall policy. The closeness of the party-union nexus at the top of both organisations was therefore highly productive for the TUC in diffusing its policy choices at the national level.

Importantly, influential industry and business organisations such as the BTC (who also represented some textile trade unions) and CBI also advocated similarly protectionist policies for the textile sector. This created a strong protectionist lobby throughout the 1970s that broadly chimed with the views of the Labour government. However, prior to the mid-1970s UK trade policy had always maintained a liberal approach and though labour, industry and elements of the government collaborated to shift trade policy towards protectionism in the 1970s, the tension between protecting certain traditional industries and seeking liberalisation

for the benefit of the wider UK economy also existed in this period, particularly on the right of the LP.

Though the GTB used similar strategies to the TUC to try and influence the MFA during the Tokyo Round it ultimately did not enjoy the same political opportunities and levels of influence. As outlined in previous chapters, liberal attitudes dominated West German approaches to trade after the Second World War and was relatively undisputed between the major political parties. This was exemplified in the long 1970s by the fact that even in coalitions where the SPD held a majority and the GTB could potentially hope for greater influence, economics ministers were appointed from the liberal FDP minority (Hayes, 1993, p. 76). For SPD Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, this not only helped to mitigate the power of the SPD left, but also chimed with the Federal Republic's export-focused economic and trade policy. Institutional factors also played a role in the prevalence of pro-liberal policies. For example, Article 65 of the West German constitution stipulated that ministers could conduct the business of their departments 'autonomously', handing ministries with large briefs such as the BMWi a great deal of control over large parts of trade and industrial policy (Hayes, 1993, p. 78). Not only did this limit opposition to the sanctity of liberal trade policies, but arguably helped reduce external pressure on government departments.

Another contrast between the GTB's and TUC's strategies to influence the MFA was that party-political links were not as close in Germany as in the UK (Markovits, 1986, p. 24). Furthermore, the SPD's links with DGB unions in the long 1970s were more distant and its economic and trade policies were more to the right of the LP's. In addition, the SPD's own commitment to the social market economy, a "reasonably liberal world trade system", and governmental responsibilities created some tensions in certain instances when the GTB felt

the party could be more proactive in supporting its demands.⁵⁴ In this respect, the SPD's broader economic and trade strategy held a far stronger sway over the party than the support of unions like the GTB, particularly as the GTB was a small union based in a declining industry.

As highlighted in Chapter 3, in contrast with the TUC and DGB, the CGT did not take any sort of detailed position on the MFA until 1981 with the election of the socialist Mitterrand to the presidency. This was almost entirely the result of a political strategy and ideological orientation that permeated much of the French labour movement in the long 1970s. This strategy was based on the notion that conservative governments were class enemies whose economic and social policies represented an accommodation with the capitalist system and were therefore to be opposed. Since the unions did not expect the class enemy to take their demands seriously either, "union leaders did not feel any need to draft realistic alternative economic policies to those of the government. Nor were the most important unions dissatisfied with such a situation since they did not want to become too involved with a government and system they wished to overthrow" (Wilson, 1985, p. 263). This strategy was especially true for the CGT given its relationship with the PCF. Ultimately, the CGT fundamentally rejected social democratic notions of influence in favour of a political struggle for a left government which could provide genuine opportunities to define rather than simply influence government policy. The CGT's general political strategy changed in 1981 with the arrival of a left government and thus also changed its approach to the MFA as it now believed that the union had a role to play in influencing French trade policy.

⁵⁴ 'Letter from Karl Buschmann to Herbert Wehner', 28 August 1975; Archiv der SPD, Archiv an der sozialen Demokratie, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (2/BTFG000320)

Regardless of the CGT's political strategy during the long 1970s, France's policymaking structures were also not conducive to providing the CGT with opportunities to influence the MFA during the Tokyo Round. Hayes (1993, pp. 87-104) argues that the dirigiste tradition to French policymaking, which still held firm in the 1970s even under consecutive liberal-conservative coalition governments, was embedded in an institutional arrangement that relied on an extremely powerful executive, limited parliamentary influence, and a pluralistic rather than corporatist approach to civil society influence. However, despite the liberal rhetoric of leaders such as Giscard and Barre, strong protectionist tendencies, in part due to a deep concern for national independence, and a foregrounding of industrial policy over trade policy, continued to exist in the 1970s (Hayes, 1993, pp. 87-104).

These factors, combined with a general lack of emphasis on the importance of trade in French economic and political culture (Hayes, 1993, pp. 87-104), fed into the CGT's disinterest in seeking to influence the trade agenda of the governments of the time. Though union influence over trade policy was virtually non-existent, the strongly protectionist French industry organisations were some of the most organised and influential in Europe, both domestically and at the EC level (Underhill, 1998). As a result, France was arguably the most protectionist EC member in the 1970s, which ironically resulted in many of the CGT's views becoming policy despite it playing no part in influencing their government's position.

Conclusion

The first part of this chapter analysed the trade policy objectives of the textile and clothing unions of the TUC, DGB and CGT as well as the ETUC-TCL in the long 1970s. The policy objectives of all four unions in this period were fundamentally concerned with one central issue: how to protect their members' jobs in the face of intense and rapidly increasing

competition from developing economies. The policy objectives of each union were also broadly aligned around three key themes: trade and industrial policies geared towards the protection and development of national industries and the European sector as a whole; the value of a social clause and minimum labour standards in international trade agreements; and the need for an international mechanism to limit imports from developing economies in the form of the MFA.

However, while European trade unions may have broadly agreed on the problems facing the textile and clothing sector as well as potential solutions, their trade policy objectives were strongly geared towards national industrial priorities. This not only reflected the intensity of competition within the EC itself but also the rapid increase in imports from developing economies. Though all four trade unions and their international confederations supported the notion of a social clause and minimum labour standards in world trade relations, this played a secondary role to the policy of import controls through the MFA. By calling for a social clause to be integrated into the MFA, European trade unions attempted to navigate the complex context of the new international economic order and the associated threat to their members' jobs. Nonetheless, as Chapter 3 will show in more detail, national concerns were the primary focus of European trade unions in the long 1970s rather than international solidarity and cooperation.

The second section of the chapter outlined the avenues of influence available for trade unions to attempt to influence world trade negotiations and trade policy at the national, European and international levels. The fact that union power and capacity were overwhelmingly concentrated at the national level in the long 1970s meant that influencing social democratic politicians was the key priority for both the TUC and GTB. The TUC's closeness to the LP meant that this national political avenue was particularly fruitful. In contrast, though the West German policymaking process sought the advice of 'associations'

like the GTB, the union found this approach less successful due to the fact the BMWi was controlled by the FDP who put forward a particularly pro-liberalisation agenda. The CGT's strategic orientation in this period precluded it from engaging with the French government on trade issues and the confederation instead put all its energy into achieving an electoral victory for the Union de la Gauche. However, with the election of the Mitterrand government in 1981 this approach was softened, and it began to engage with the government and put forward demands relating to the MFA.

Another key reason for trade unions' overtly national focus was the fact that avenues of influence at the European level were very limited, even though the European Commission played a central role in developing the Community's mandate and conducting negotiations. As will be shown in Chapter 3, European trade unions became far better at pursuing European strategies to influence EC trade policy towards the latter part of the 1970s, in part because the movement's own processes of Europeanisation were beginning to have more impact, including the growing capacity of the ETUC. The presence of important social democratic politicians in key European positions as well as the strength of social democratic and trade union actors in institutions like the EP and EESC also played a supporting role in helping to coordinate and develop EC level union networks, though these institutions had no direct influence over trade policy.

In a situation where the European POS was largely closed to trade unions, it is understandable that they primarily sought to influence their national governments who could in turn influence the Commission's negotiating mandate through the Council. Importantly, the political context of the period meant that the policy interests of trade unions and some industry organisations and national governments were closely aligned around an agenda of protecting their national textile and clothing sectors from intense international competition and import penetration. As Chapter 3 will show in detail, this context provided some

European trade unions with a situational opportunity to inform the negotiating positions of some national governments but also, by extension, the EC's approach to the MFA itself.

Chapter 3

Influencing world trade negotiations in the long 1970s: 'For a new and improved Multifibre Arrangement!'

This chapter is an empirical and chronological analysis of the methods and strategies unions adopted to try and influence MFA negotiations between 1973 and 1982, as well as the economic and political context that framed them. As outlined in the previous chapter, European textile and clothing unions faced an uphill political struggle to defend their members' jobs in the long 1970s. National industrial policies struggled to reverse the process of ongoing decline in the sector, particularly after the economic crises of the early 1970s. Trade liberalisation, the rapid expansion of MNCs and rise of developing economies exacerbated the crisis.

These combined factors resulted in a huge increase in textile imports to European markets which had a disastrous impact on employment. To combat this impact, the European trade unions analysed in this section of the thesis predominantly supported protectionist trade policies geared towards restricting the flow of imports into European markets to allow the sector to stabilise, gradually become more competitive, and limit job losses. It is for this reason that from 1973 onwards trade unions adopted a series of strategies to influence the MFA, the agreement designed to allow for an orderly and equitable distribution of textile trade for GATT members.

Despite the challenging and complex economic situation facing European textile and clothing unions, the political environment appeared to offer some opportunities to push negotiators to adopt their policies. This period saw the LP, SPD and PS in power at different stages, neo-corporatist structures were still important mechanisms for union influence in the UK and West Germany, and trade union and social democratic interests were relatively well represented at the European level, including the European Commission. Most importantly,

trade unions were still powerful organisations that were very capable of mobilising large sections of the working class in support of, or opposition to, economic and political objectives. However, despite their strength and access to policymakers in this period, the new economic reality that was simultaneously evolving would play a key role in limiting the impact of union influence and made union strategies to influence the MFA more complex as a result.

MFA 1

Though the first MFA was negotiated in the shadow of the 1973 oil crisis, the tone of the agreement did not drastically differ from the general objectives of the GATT Tokyo Round. Both sought to expand trade and further economic and social development by reducing barriers to its growth through progressive liberalisation (GATT, 1974). Though the general trend in world trade at the beginning of the 1970s was progressive liberalisation, the slowdown in the world economy and the rise of developing economies as genuine competitors with developed economies in certain industries created significant tension between protectionism and liberalisation which would grow throughout the decade and beyond. The very existence of the MFA as an agreement that deviated from key GATT norms was testament to this tension.

In the context of the above, the first MFA was negotiated on a fairly liberal basis by the EC. Aggarwal (1985, pp. 126-128) argues that the Community adopted this position for three reasons: first, it took a less aggressive stance with developing economies in general due to the fact that it was a big exporter to these countries; secondly, though it could technically pursue unilateral protectionist policies against any diversion of products from developing nations, it was also concerned about the diversion of other products outside of textiles and did not want

to impair its overall trading interests and strategy; and thirdly, a unified approach to textiles was lacking within the EC and so it wished to treat cases in a piecemeal fashion, albeit on a liberal basis.

Trade union and industry attitudes to the first MFA reflected their ongoing concerns about rising imports from developing countries but outright protectionism was not in evidence at this stage. The TUC, CBI and BTC were particularly active in this period due to their added concern of what impact joining the EC would have on the textile and clothing sector. For example, in a meeting with the Minister for Industrial Development and the Under Secretary for the Department of Trade on 21 September 1972, the TUC called on the Conservative government to support the replacement of the LTA with the MFA and argued that the committee should be consulted by the government's representatives in the GATT Working Party.⁵⁵ This demand was agreed to by the government who suggested that the TUC could be represented among the government's special advisors in the GATT Working Party which already included an advisor from the CBI and the BTC.⁵⁶ The TUC took advantage of this opportunity for the Working Party's session in November 1973, which the trade minister argued would be the most relevant for the TUC's concerns.⁵⁷ This example of such a collaborative relationship between the Conservative government and the TUC can be seen as a product of the UK's neo-corporatist structures in this period.

The GTB also actively sought to influence the West German government's liberal approach to negotiations which the union were concerned could undermine the development

⁵⁵ 'Textiles and Clothing trade policy meeting with Minister for Trade and Industry', TUC TCC, 15 November 1972; TUC Archive, MRC, University of Warwick (MSS.292D/631/2)

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ 'TUC Inter-departmental correspondence: TUC representation at GATT textiles meeting', 10 October 1973; TUC Archive, MRC, University of Warwick (MSS.292D/522/1A)

of the MFA which was necessary to “eliminate the unrest that has gripped textile workers”.⁵⁸ In Economics Minister Friedrich’s report of his February 1973 meeting with GTB Chairman Karl Buschmann, the union leader showed his surprise that the government was apparently still blocking a quick solution to the issue of rising imports from the Far East.⁵⁹ Buschmann, identifying the existing tension between liberalisation and protectionist pressures, argued that “if a textile solution could not be found before the GATT negotiations and if this question was even to be brought into the GATT negotiations, then one would take away with the left hand what one had given with the right hand”.⁶⁰

The ICFTU also used the occasion of the opening of the Tokyo Round negotiations on 12 September 1973 to call on its affiliates to raise the organisation’s key demands, most notably the demand for a GATT social clause.⁶¹ The ICFTU’s main method of raising its demands in this period was to ask all members of its Economic and Social Committee – predominantly the General Secretaries of affiliated unions – to send a copy of the ICFTU’s statement to their national governments and release it to their national press.

In addition to debate within the EC over the type of regime the MFA should be, there were also issues with the Commission’s specific negotiating mandate. This issue stemmed from the short period in which it could conduct negotiations and the fact that the LTA was due to end in September 1973. This meant that the GATT Council had to agree to an extension of three months so that the MFA could be negotiated by the end of the same year (GATT, 1974, p. 37). The Working Party set up in 1972 had been instructed by the GATT Council in February 1973 to produce a report for June of the same year on the problems

⁵⁸ ‘Aussprache mit dem Vorstand der Gewerkschaft Textil-Bekleidung’, BMWi (Abteilungsleiter IV), 7 February 1973; Archiv des BMWi (Außenwirtschaftspolitik und Entwicklungshilfe), Bundesarchiv (B102/176365)

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ ‘Statement on opening of GATT world trade negotiations in Tokyo’, ICFTU, 12 September 1973; TUC Archive, MRC, University of Warwick (MSS.292D/522/1A)

facing trade in textile goods as well as alternative solutions.⁶² A further report was submitted in July consisting of a list of points for inclusion in the final agreement. A Negotiating Group was then formed and met in Geneva over three sessions totalling a mere 11 days in October, November and December of 1973.⁶³ The November session was also adjourned for two days on the insistence of the Hong Kong delegation to allow for more time to assess the Draft Agreement.⁶⁴ At this point the European Commission was still waiting to receive its mandate from a meeting of the Council of Ministers and only did so on 6 November.⁶⁵

One reason behind this delay was that the EC was yet to develop a coherent textile and clothing policy because of the differing economic outlooks and situations facing its member states (Woolcock, 1982, p. 34). Moreover, there was little enthusiasm for the MFA in the more economically liberal member states as well as the Commission, whose main focus at the time was adjusting to enlargement and the wider GATT negotiations (Farrands, 1979, pp. 25-27). In the end, agreement between the member states was based on the proviso that stricter bilateral agreements could be negotiated with developing economies, though the Commission was slow to undertake this task (Farrands, 1979, pp. 24-25). Once the Community's mandate had been approved, the Commission was quickly able to negotiate the first MFA on a liberal basis because, although "lip service was paid to the demands of business and labor... national and European officials generally thought that adjustment to the changing international division of labor necessitated little trade protection" (Dolan, 1983, p. 589).

The negotiation of a liberal MFA would soon come back to haunt the European textile and clothing industry after the global recession in 1974. Though the MFA was ultimately an

⁶² 'World Trade and Subsequent Developments', TUC Economic Committee, 14 November 1973; TUC Archive, MRC, University of Warwick (MSS.292D/522/1A)

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ 'Summary Report of Second Negotiation Group Meeting in Geneva, 5-9 November 1973', Commission of the European Communities, 12 November 1973; Archive of the EEC and EAEC Commissions, HAEU (BAC-48/1984-1152)

⁶⁵ Ibid.

arrangement to protect Western textile industries from rising imports, it did not foresee the scale of the crisis that would arrive so soon after the new regime had been enacted. Older textile industries that were yet to fully go through the process of modernisation and restructuring such as France and the UK were particularly affected. As Farrands (1979, p. 25) points out, “the 1973 MFA made sense on the assumption that the size of the European market would continue to expand, so that there would be room both for domestic sales expansion and for growing NIC [newly industrialised country] imports to the Nine”. In the new economic reality however, the negotiation of a minimum annual import growth rate of 6% for items under restraint now seemed very generous to the developing economies since it was well above the European average after 1974. This allowed even greater import penetration and therefore undermined the central purpose of the agreement. It was from this point onwards that European trade unions began taking a more active approach to the MFA.

MFA 2

1974 was an important turning point in the economic and political situation that would help define the rest of the decade. In addition to the fallout from the world recession, the UK, West Germany, and France faced changes in their governments. First, in March 1974 a minority Labour government was elected under Harold Wilson, replacing the Conservative Heath government who had struggled to contain the rising militancy of the trade unions. In May, though the SPD-FDP coalition remained in power in West Germany, Helmut Schmidt replaced Willy Brandt as Chancellor after his resignation in the wake of an espionage scandal. Then, 12 days later, after the death of Georges Pompidou, the centre-right Valéry Giscard d’Estaing was elected as French President. These governmental changes would all have an impact on domestic, European, and international economic and political dynamics

and thus the conditions that influenced trade union strategies. A crucial factor in this respect was how each government dealt with the new economic reality they faced at the start of their time in power.

In the case of the Wilson government, UK unions enjoyed greater input into the government's broadly Keynesian policies, but this input was predicated on and offset by a stricter incomes policy to combat rising inflation that would create further tension within the labour movement and the LP (Taylor, 2004). Helmut Schmidt's first cabinet was notable for its absence of left-wing ministers and its increasingly pragmatic economic policy to deal with the recession (Braunthal, 1983, p. 228). Though the Keynesian paradigm retained strong support within the membership, the SPD leadership under Schmidt became more receptive to supply-side arguments (Nachtwey, 2013, p. 238). There was also an ongoing conflict between the SPD and the more militant DGB unions over the issues of wage restraint and new co-determination laws (Upchurch et al., 2009, p. 64). Finally, the narrow margin by which Giscard had beaten Mitterrand in the Presidential elections meant that he had to both be wary of the strong support that existed for left-wing ideas and also of alienating the 'Gaullist and centrist barons' that had helped to elect him (Gaffney, 2012, pp. 113-137). Within a month of becoming President however, Giscard introduced a tight deflationary budget that attacked inflation but also increased unemployment and resulted in France's first year of negative economic growth since the war (Derbyshire, 1990, pp. 41-42). In this environment the unions and parties involved in the Union de la Gauche continued their struggle to elect a left government.

As a reflection of the changed economic circumstances and impact of the recession, Tokyo Round talks had already begun to stall by 1975. By this stage, OECD countries as a whole had moved from a trade surplus to a trade deficit which continued until 1977 (Coppolaro, 2018a, p. 756; Aldcroft, 2014, pp. 194-196). As a result, the protectionist

pressures that already existed in the European textile and clothing sector became more pronounced as states began to protect their industries more openly.

The first state to act in this respect was the UK. In fact, it was the TUC that was the first to push for selective import controls of 20% for the textiles, clothing, and footwear industries in 1975, breaking the broadly liberal consensus on trade policy that had defined previous post-war governments (Cable, 1983, p. 12). Again, the close relationship between the TUC and the government played a key role. TUC General Secretary Lionel Murray had sent a letter to the Secretary of State for Industry, Tony Benn, on 23 December 1974 on behalf of the TUC Textile and Clothing Committee to ask for the government's assurance that it was ready to act quickly, in accordance with the MFA, where market disruption was occurring, or a tangible future threat existed.⁶⁶ In response to industry and TUC pressure, on 25 December 1974 the government imposed restrictions on cotton yarn from Turkey and Greece and also informed Community members that the UK was prepared to join in Community restraints on certain products from Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan.⁶⁷ The Minister, referring to a recent trade memorandum by the TUC, acknowledged that "In most respects there is little or no difference between us".⁶⁸ Further, Benn noted the need for continued joint industry and union discussions to address the current and future problems facing the industry.

Pressure on the Department of Industry also came from the BTC in March 1975 through a series of memoranda and press releases. In a meeting with the Secretary of State, the BTC specifically called on the government to restrain imports of manufactured textile

⁶⁶ 'Letter from Tony Benn to Len Murray', 23 January 1975; TUC Archive, MRC, University of Warwick (MSS.292D/631/4)

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

products from all sources to a level of 20% below that of 1974 for a minimum of one year.⁶⁹

The TUC and others also petitioned the Prime Minister with the same demand calling for import controls in other sectors (Cable, 1983, p. 12). When the government did not respond to this demand, the TUC Economic Committee then released a memorandum calling on the government to “fundamentally modify [its] free trade philosophy on trade and follow a co-ordinated trade and industry policy designed to prevent the further erosion of the UK manufacturing industry base” (TUC, 1975).

This series of interactions between the Labour government and the TUC in 1975 shows that, although a great deal of policy overlap existed, the government, even in departments controlled by left-wingers such as Tony Benn, were less keen to adopt openly protectionist measures due to the UK’s treaty obligations and their own interest in the liberalisation of other industrial sectors.⁷⁰ These disputes should also be seen in the context of the Labour government beginning to go against its own manifesto commitment to avoid spending cuts, which began in 1975, placing further strain on union-party relations (Hickson, 2004, p. 41).

The influence of the BTC over European textile and clothing policy was also bolstered by the election of its President, Alan Clough, to President of COMITEXTIL (Comité de coordination des industries textiles de la Communauté européenne) on 25 April 1975.⁷¹ This had an important impact on moving this important industry actor towards a more protectionist agenda that often chimed with trade union views. Indeed, Farrands (1979, p. 27) argues that one of the most important effects of UK membership of the EC had been its invigoration of pressure groups.

⁶⁹ ‘Meeting note for discussion with Secretary of State for Industry’, TUC TCFC, 20 March 1975; TUC Archive, MRC, University of Warwick (MSS.292D/631/4)

⁷⁰ ‘Report of meeting with H Lever MP on trade policy’, TUC TCFC, 25 September 1975; TUC Archive, MRC, University of Warwick (MSS.292D/631/5)

⁷¹ ‘Sir C. Soames speech to COMITEXTIL’, Commission of the European Communities, 9 April 1975; Archive of the EEC and EAEC Commissions, HAEU (BAC-48/1984-1152)

An example of how the BTC and TUC were able to exert dual influence on the UK government and the European level through COMITEXTIL in this period can be seen in the pressure it put on both to conclude bilateral agreements with developing countries, which by April 1975 had still not been achieved. For example, in addition to continued meetings with the UK government, in a lunch hosted for Christopher Soames, then Vice-President of the Commission and Commissioner for External Relations, COMITEXTIL made it clear to their guest that they deplored “the lack of energy within the Commission” and that if bilateral agreements had not been made by the end of May they would press for unilateral action to be taken.⁷² This pressure contributed to the new Secretary of State for Industry, Eric Varley, outlining the Labour government’s positive action in the textile industry to the House of Commons on 23 July 1975, claiming that as well as providing a further £20 million of funding for the textile sector through the 1972 Industry Act the government would also propose that the Community use MFA provisions allowing unilateral measures against increased imports.⁷³

The success of their influence, combined with the decisive referendum result in June 1975 in favour of the UK’s continued membership of the EC, would also help encourage the TUC and BTC to explore further European level influence in the lead up to the negotiation of the second MFA. Though the TUC had actively campaigned against remaining in the Community in the referendum, it accepted the result and, in contrast to its pre-referendum policy of refusing to take its seats in, for example, the EESC, now planned to fully participate in all available aspects of European level decision-making (Teague, 1989). However, it

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ ‘Press Release: Statement in House of Commons by E Varley (Secretary of State for Industry)’, Department of Industry, 23 July 1975; TUC Archive, MRC, University of Warwick (MSS.292D/631/4)

remained sceptical of the ETUC's effectiveness as an EC level organisation and the value of the European Commission as an avenue of influence.⁷⁴

Despite the TUC's scepticism towards the ETUC and its affiliated and non-affiliated industry committees at this stage, the newly reorganised ETUC-TCL produced its first significant memorandum on world trade in June 1975. The position paper itself addressed the issue of the international division of labour and its impact on European jobs and is notable for its advocacy of social development in developing countries as a method of creating an "orderly expansion of world trade".⁷⁵ The memorandum was subsequently used by national affiliates to notify their respective governments of their position.

One important example of this kind of influence comes from correspondence between GTB Chairman Karl Buschmann and the SPD's Parliamentary Group. Buschmann had been highly unimpressed with the response of the speaker of the SPD group when he accused the GTB of using development policy as a cloak for its own protectionist interests.⁷⁶ Buschmann responded to this accusation in the following way:

It feels peculiar to us when purely selfish motives are imputed to the GTB, even though 180,000 jobs have been irretrievably lost in the textile and clothing industry in the last three years under the Social Democrat-led government. At the same time, 1,120 factories have been closed. If the textile and clothing trade union had advocated narrow-minded protectionism, this development would not have been so smooth.⁷⁷

The GTB Chairman also denounced the SPD's "relocation ideology" for the industry.⁷⁸

Though the SPD group rejected this accusation, its following argument is endemic of the

⁷⁴ 'TUC internal memo - The European Community', TUC, 7 July 1975; TGWU Archive, MRC, University of Warwick (MSS.126/TG/385/G/2)

⁷⁵ 'Memorandum über den Internationalen Handel', ETUC-TCL, 14 June 1975; Archiv der GTB, Archiv an der sozialen Demokratie, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (5/GTBA400066)

⁷⁶ 'Letter from Karl Buschmann to Herbert Wehner', 28 August 1975; Archiv der SPD, Archiv an der sozialen Demokratie, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (2/BTFG00032)

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

economic crossroads facing European economies in the mid-1970s which saw whole industries effectively traded off against each other:

The [decrease in German textile employment] is a market-based process on a global scale. Triggered by the efforts of the Third World to catch up with industrial development in our country, it was only made possible in the first place by a reasonably liberal world trade policy and the opening of markets. Liberal world trade and the economic advancement of the developing countries are, however, entirely in our own well-understood interest. In this respect we are simply forced to adapt our national economy to the changed conditions. In this respect, economic policy must be limited to facilitating the adjustment process, softening personal hardship, and distributing the burden more evenly.⁷⁹

As a small union in a declining industry, the GTB thus faced an uphill struggle to win the backing of the coalition government and, to some extent, the DGB, both of whom felt their own interests were better served by orienting to sectors - such as steel and automotive - that were far more important to West Germany's export economy.

The issues of rising unemployment and inflation and governments' attempts to deal with them dominated 1976. However, these attempts, which predominantly took the form of austerity measures, would bring increasing strain on the relationship between governments, trade unions and voters. This context also raised specific questions over the potential to achieve the trade liberalisation agenda set out in the GATT Tokyo Round and first MFA. In the case of the MFA, 1976 would be an important year as member states and societal actors sought to influence the EC's mandate for the next MFA agreement which was due to be renegotiated in December 1977. As such, trade unions increased their efforts to impose their agenda throughout the year.

⁷⁹ 'Letter from Herbert Ehrenburg to Karl Buschmann', 9 September 1975; Archiv der SPD, Archiv an der sozialen Demokratie, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (2/BTFG00032)

Important political changes in the UK occurred throughout 1976 that would impact on the TUC's ability to influence the MFA. In March Harold Wilson unexpectedly resigned as Labour Prime Minister after his white paper on public expenditure was defeated in parliament by the left of his own party (National Archives, n.d.). James Callaghan, who Wilson had unofficially endorsed as his successor, replaced him a few weeks later and inherited an economic situation in which the value of the pound was decreasing rapidly. As Coppolaro (2017, p. 337) argues, in terms of the relationship between its domestic economic policy and its trade policy, the LP was at a crossroads: it could either pursue further budgetary restraint and a tighter monetary policy, which would likely have serious domestic consequences and threaten its already slim parliamentary majority; or it could adopt further protectionist measures to cure its trade deficit, increase profit and investment and allow greater planning of the economy, which would affect its relations with other GATT members.

This situation produced a heated debate in the Labour cabinet over import controls with the left in favour and the right vehemently against (Hayes, 1993, p. 110). At the 1976 party conference Callaghan bluntly informed stunned delegates that "the cosy world we were told would go on forever, where full employment would be guaranteed by a stroke of the Chancellor's pen, cutting taxes, deficit spending, that cosy world is gone" (Fielding, 2004, p. 288; Labour Party, 1976, p. 188). To attempt to deal with rapidly increasing inflation the LP was forced to apply for an emergency IMF loan of \$3.9 billion which came with associated deep cuts in public expenditure and the budget deficit as a precondition (National Archives, n.d). This turn of events not only held implications for the TUC's influence over UK trade policy but also meant that its broader economic goals all failed to materialise (McIlroy and Campbell, 1999, p. 101). In this respect, though TUC access to government remained very strong under Callaghan, this was increasingly offset by the economic situation and a government economic policy that was increasingly at odds with many TUC affiliates.

In the context of this increasingly poor economic climate, the Contracting Parties to the MFA were duty bound to under Article 10(5) of the agreement to “meet not later than one year before the expiry of this Arrangement in order to consider whether the Arrangement should be extended, modified or discontinued”.⁸⁰ Given the scale of the crisis in the European textile and clothing sector, governments, unions and industry interests all called for the MFA to be extended and/or modified to different degrees. In the environment of increasing tension between liberalisation, protectionism and the wider issue of unemployment, trade unions, often in collaboration with industry organisations at the national, European, and international levels, became increasingly vocal ahead of the decision by the Contracting Parties over whether to extend, modify or discontinue the MFA in December 1976.

At the international level, the ITGLWF also had its first major input into the MFA debate in June 1976 when its Congress endorsed a declaration on international trade.⁸¹ The detail of the international organisation’s call for a social clause in all GATT agreements remained the same as a motion passed at its 1973 Congress but was once again used by affiliates to pressure national and regional organisations. Interestingly, the Congress also invited Paul Wurth, Chairman of the Textiles Monitoring Body of the GATT, to speak at its Congress.⁸² This is reflective of the ITGLWF’s (and ICFTU’s) dual strategy of encouraging its affiliates to conduct their own national and regional level influence but focusing its own resources on influencing international level actors within the GATT, United Nations Committee on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and ILO (S. Pursey, personal correspondence).

⁸⁰ ‘Working Paper by the Services of the Commission: Renewal of the MFA’, Commission of the EC, 8 July 1976; Archiv des BMWi (Außenwirtschaftspolitik und Entwicklungshilfe), Bundesarchiv (B102/210312)

⁸¹ ‘Erklärung über den Internationalen Handel’, ITGLWF, 1976; Archiv der GTB, Archiv an der sozialen Demokratie, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (5/GTBA020013)

⁸² ‘Protokoll Zweiter Weltkongress - Internationaler Handel in Textil, Bekleidung und Leder mit Besonderem Hinweis auf das Internationale Handelsabkommen für Textil (MFA)’, ITGLWF, 22-26 March 1976; Archiv der GTB, Archiv an der sozialen Demokratie, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (5/GTBA020013)

Indicative of its importance in influencing the future direction of the MFA towards a more protectionist agreement (Farrands, 1979), COMITEXTIL produced a substantial position paper in October 1976 on a strategy for the European textile and clothing industries and the renewal of the MFA (COMITEXTIL, 1976). According to COMITEXTIL's analysis, the measures taken in the application of the first MFA were "too late", "too timid" and "insufficiently coordinated".⁸³ The industry group bemoaned the fact that "the growth rate forecast by the MFA and the absence of a recession clause, which had nevertheless been requested by the industry, contributed to aggravating a situation that should have been favourably influenced by the MFA".⁸⁴

COMITEXTIL's support for a far stricter MFA was declared in a letter to Commission President, François-Xavier Ortoli, on 4 October 1976, stating that "The textile and clothing industries demand that the Community authorities take all measures necessary to recreate the economic conditions required for their security".⁸⁵ Another notable element of COMITEXTIL's position paper is that it also included the ETUC-TCL's own document on the renewal of the MFA as an annex. This is indicative of the shared analysis between the two organisations and sections of the European textile industry and labour movement in general in this period. Indeed, there was little substantive difference between the COMITEXTIL and ETUC-TCL positions other than the fact that the latter placed significant emphasis on the social clause.⁸⁶

At the national level, the TUC and GTB were also active in pursuing a stricter MFA throughout 1976. In addition to repeating its call from 1975 for temporary and selective

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ 'Strategie der europäischen Textil- und Bekleidungs- Industrien: Stellungnahme COMITEXTIL zur Verlängerung des WTA', Gesamttextil e.V., 7 October 1976; Archiv des BMWi (Außenwirtschaftspolitik und Entwicklungshilfe), Bundesarchiv (B102/210312)

⁸⁶ 'Renegotiation of the MFA - ETUC-TCL position paper', TUC TCFC, 6 January 1977; TUC Archive, MRC, University of Warwick (MSS.292D/631/6)

import restraints of 10-20%, in its April meeting with the Secretaries of State for Trade and Industry, Edmund Dell and Eric Varley respectively, the TUC also argued that a stricter MFA would have to be complemented by increased government investment so as to “shift the structural imbalance in trade toward increased exports and import substitution thus ensuring the long term survival of the industries and preventing further job loss” (TUC, 1976, p. 380).

Throughout 1976 the TUC was also concerned that the new MFA may not go far enough in restricting imports and so was also keen to explore whether the GATT Article 19 Safeguard Clause could be used over and above MFA provisions. Reform of Article 19 was something that both the UK and French government also considered in the mid-1970s since its existing form meant that restrictions would have to be implemented against all GATT members, even if they did not face the same threat, due to the principle of non-discrimination (Coppolaro, 2020, p. 150). As such, in a meeting with the Department of Industry on 23 September 1976, though the department accepted the core of the TUC’s arguments they were also keen to curb the ambitions of the TUC in pursuing an overly protectionist trade policy and consistently pointed out the difficulties with implementing their demands due to treaty obligations, practical issues, and getting other GATT members to agree.⁸⁷ This was precisely the case with the issue of the social clause, which the TUC pressed the government more strongly on in the lead up to the decisive December meeting of the GATT Textiles Committee.⁸⁸

As well as its own independent lobbying for stricter import controls, the TUC also collaborated with the CBI in a joint memorandum on imports and other trade matters in October 1976. The memorandum highlighted both organisations’ belief that temporary and

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Ibid.; ‘TUC-Labour Party Liaison Committee - Unemployment, growth and import policy’, 20 September 1976; CBI Archive, MRC, University of Warwick (MSS.200/C/3/INT/7/36); ‘TUC/CBI Memorandum on imports and related overseas trade matters - memorandum by the Secretary of State for Trade’, 2 November 1976; CBI Archive, MRC, University of Warwick (MSS.200/C/3/INT/7/36)

selective import controls were necessary in several industries, including textiles and footwear, in what TUC General Secretary Len Murray described as an example of “extraordinary cooperation” between the TUC and CBI.⁸⁹ This cooperation culminated in a series of joint documents focusing on the need to boost UK exports in addition to a renewed and modified MFA. In December 1976, for example, the CBI and TUC released a joint statement hailing 1977 as ‘Export Year’ and committing both sides to a fruitful relationship in pursuit of improving the competitiveness of UK textile products.⁹⁰

The re-election of the SPD-FDP coalition on 3 October 1976 allowed the established pattern of consultation between the government, labour and industry continue. Though regular meetings between the BMWi and the ‘associations’ (Verbände) took place in the lead up to the deadline for an EC mandate for the renewal of the MFA, it was clear that the BMWi was unwilling to water down its own position to the extent the GTB and the industry organisations desired. In bilateral correspondence and consultation meetings, the department would listen to the concerns about the rapid increase imports but would respond with a strong defence of its own actions which it believed already offered enough protection to allow the sector to adjust over time.⁹¹

At this stage the GTB’s demands for the MFA did not radically differ from Gesamttextil, who favoured a longer agreement and reduced import growth rates, and the Bundesverband Bekleidungsindustrie, who believed a recession clause was indispensable.⁹²

⁸⁹ ‘Tough imports line CBI-TUC’, John Carvel (*Financial Guardian*), 14 November 1976; CBI Archive, MRC, University of Warwick (MSS.200/C/3/INT/7/36)

⁹⁰ ‘Joint New Year Statement by CBI and TUC’, CBI, 29 December 1976; MRC, Warwick, CBI Archive, (MSS.200/C/3/INT/7/36)

⁹¹ ‘Letter from Otto Graf Lambsdorff to Karl Buschmann’, 8 April 1976; Archiv des BMWi (Außenwirtschaftspolitik und Entwicklungshilfe), Bundesarchiv (B102/189728); ‘Verlängerung des WTA’, BMWi (Abteilungsleiterin V), 9 September 1976; Archiv des BMWi (Außenwirtschaftspolitik und Entwicklungshilfe), Bundesarchiv (B102/210312)

⁹² ‘Verlängerung des WTA: Überblick über die Forderungen der Verbände’, BMWi (Abteilungsleiterin V), 18 October 1976; Archiv des BMWi (Außenwirtschaftspolitik und Entwicklungshilfe), Bundesarchiv (B102/210312)

In a similar vein to the TUC's relationship with industry organisations, the only significant difference in the West German case was the GTB's general support for a social clause and its call for future MFAs to be extended to between six and ten years.⁹³ However, perhaps under the assumption that the BMWi would not support the policy, the GTB made no reference to the social clause in consultation meetings, instead focusing on the technical aspects of its position that it shared with the industry organisations.

The EC's Article 113 Committee sat on 13 and 14 October to review the first MFA and discuss whether to extend, modify or discontinue it after 1977. The divisions between the more liberal and protectionist member states were clear at this meeting and influenced the overall character of the Community's mandate. The UK, France, and others, backed by European trade unions and industry organisations, while supportive of the 'spirit' of the MFA, criticised its application and its failure to protect the sector and called for a stricter agreement. Only West Germany and Denmark felt that the agreement had proven itself and offered sufficient opportunities to expand trade and protect the industry.⁹⁴ In this situation the more liberal member states were given little choice but to accept the extension and modification of the agreement. The focus of the committee's final declaration and the discussions leading up to it would have given trade unions and industry organisations confidence that a significant number of their demands would be integrated into the final Community mandate in 1977:

The Community accepts the importance of the MFA as a means of regulating international trade in textiles and seeks its renewal with amendment. Such amendment should provide for a strengthening of the safeguard provisions of the MFA for the Community clothing and textile industry consistent with the objectives of the MFA, in particular the "orderly development of trade"... Such provisions must be related in

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ 'Verlängerung WTA: Sitzung Arbeitsgruppe Textil, Besonderer Ausschuss nach Art. 113 am 13-14.10.1976'; BMWi (Abteilungsleiterin V), 15 October 1976; Archiv des BMWi (Außenwirtschaftspolitik und Entwicklungshilfe), Bundesarchiv (B102/210312)

particular to conditions of high import penetration, cumulative disruption or declining consumption levels... In certain circumstances the Community may seek a reduction in the minimum growth rate presently established in the MFA.⁹⁵

The next stage of the process of extending and modifying the MFA was for the GATT Textiles Committee to meet over two weeks in early December 1976. In a report supplied to the TUC by Stuart Douglas, Director of the UK Man-Made Fibres Federation, particular mention was made of the performance of the EC's Chief Negotiator, Ben Meynell, who "referred to the social and economic consequences, particularly on employment, of the EEC's experience of the MFA" by utilising the arguments and data supplied by COMITEXTIL.⁹⁶ The report also noted that the EC was under pressure from the US and GATT Director-General Olivier Long, who Douglas claims sought to isolate the EC in negotiations and on the Textiles Surveillance Body to force it into renewing the MFA without modifications, the position taken by the majority of GATT members.⁹⁷ These attempts were strongly rebuked by Meynell on the grounds that the Community represented 45% of world trade in textiles and reminded the Director-General that the Community were entitled to three of the eight seats on the GATT Council, the body that would ultimately decide the future of the MFA.⁹⁸ Overall, Douglas' report concluded that,

It is probably true to say that the UK and the EEC could not have hoped for a better situation to have been reached at this stage. To sum up: i) no country has opposed the renewal of the MFA; ii) the Americans went away angry and frustrated that they had not succeeded in bull-dozing a decision through the meeting that the MFA should be renewed without modification.⁹⁹

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ 'MFA - Meeting of Textiles Committee, 30.11 - 03.12 and 07.12 - 10.12.1976, Stuart Douglas, 23 December 1976; TUC Archive, MRC, University of Warwick (MSS.292D/631/6)

⁹⁷ 'MFA - Meeting of Textiles Committee, 30.11 - 03.12 and 07.12 - 10.12.1976, Stuart Douglas, 23 December 1976; TUC Archive, MRC, University of Warwick (MSS.292D/631/6)

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

The results of these negotiations would lay the basis for intense formal and informal discussions throughout 1977. In addition, the discussions over the renewal of the MFA within the EC had finally led to the Community adopting a common commercial policy for textiles which would allow it to take a far more coherent and efficient approach to multilateral and bilateral MFA negotiations.¹⁰⁰

The central focus of European textile and clothing trade unions throughout 1977 was influencing the EC mandate ahead of MFA negotiations towards the end of the year. The issue of the social clause is an example of the mixed level of influence European unions had over trade negotiations in this period which saw the issue discussed at the national and European levels but ultimately did not come close to being realised. As part of its own strategy of attempting to influence international organisations, on 7 February 1977 a delegation of the ICFTU met with Olivier Long to discuss the social clause being implemented in the GATT. Whilst the GATT Secretariat welcomed the opportunity to establish contacts with the ICFTU and showed an interest in the idea, they also made it clear such a proposal would have to come from national governments in negotiations on safeguards or technical barriers to trade.¹⁰¹ On this basis, the ICFTU also made a particular effort throughout 1977 to encourage affiliates to push the demand onto their national governments. However, many affiliates, including the TUC, were sceptical that any government would call for it to be included in the renewed MFA.¹⁰²

Despite the above, the theme of the social clause was discussed at the highest levels of government in 1977. Discussions were broadly framed within the paradigm of the 'new

¹⁰⁰ 'Recommendation for a Decision authorising the Commission to negotiate the renewal of the MFA', Commission of the European Communities, 23 December 1976; Archive of the EEC and EAEC Commissions, HAEU (BAC-48/1984-1157)

¹⁰¹ 'ICFTU Executive Board - Agenda Item 8', ICFTU, 18-20 May 1977; TUC Archive, MRC, University of Warwick (MSS.292D/522/1A)

¹⁰² 'Letter from Steve Pursey to Bengt Save-Sonderbergh', 22 February 1977; TUC Archive, MRC, University of Warwick (MSS.292D/522/1A)

international division of labour' and the attitudes of governments to the issue broadly reflected their own attitudes to trade in general. As was also often the case with European trade unions, the social clause was to a large extent conflated with technical mechanisms that defined the trading relations between developed and developing economies, such as import controls and the GATT Safeguard Clause.

Helmut Schmidt, despite his social democratic background, did not support a social clause, instead arguing that developed economies should focus on improving the competitiveness of their own industries rather than impose restrictions on low-cost exporters (Coppolaro, 2020, pp. 149-150). In contrast, Giscard and Callaghan favoured a solution to the employment situation in their own countries caused in part by, as they saw it, lower wages and labour standards in developing countries (Coppolaro, 2020, p. 150). However, due to the finely balanced situation in the Tokyo Round negotiations at the time – which after a lull of several years had picked up again in 1977 – and the complex nature of developing economies' trade policies, there was little desire to complicate negotiations further by introducing the potentially divisive issue of the social clause. Despite their efforts, this was also sensed by European trade unions who put more emphasis on import controls as the way to manage trade between developed and developing economies at this stage (S. Pursey, personal correspondence).

By March discussions within the Community concerning its negotiating mandate for the second MFA were beginning to gather pace. The Commission's first working paper was initially a compromise between the more liberal and protectionist member states. For example, the Commission paper proposed maintaining the 6% minimum import growth rate but also lengthening the agreement to five years.¹⁰³ In reality, this ceded more to the German

¹⁰³ 'European Communities Commission Background Report – TEXTILES AND CLOTHING: The Community and the MFA', 30 March 1977; TUC Archive, MRC, University of Warwick (MSS.292D/631/6)

and Danish position than to the French and UK who saw growth rates as the key issue. Indeed, on 21 February Labour's Under-Secretary for Trade, Michael Meacher, had spoken in the House of Commons of the need for the MFA to permit protection for British firms, advocating the introduction of a single global quota (or 'ceiling') to deal with all disruptive and potentially disruptive imports of a sensitive product when import penetration was very high.¹⁰⁴ This was opposed by the liberal member states at the March Council of Ministers and the extent of the disagreements between the two sides actually led to the Community calling for a suspension of negotiations at the March meeting of the GATT Textiles Committee until their differences could be resolved.¹⁰⁵

The Commission's next draft mandate, drafted with the aim of providing a united Community mandate at the next meeting of the GATT Textiles Committee on 18 April, included a detailed outline of the global ceilings approach for sensitive textile products in bilateral agreements, meaning that "in the case of these [sensitive] products, no suppliers can expect as much as 6 per cent annual growth and this growth might be less than 1 per cent".¹⁰⁶ However, the shift towards a more protectionist mandate still did not result in all the member states agreeing on a common position before the April meeting.

Several scholars (Farrands, 1979, pp. 27-28; Woolcock, 1982, p. 35; Dolan, 1983, p. 590) partly attribute this shift towards protectionism in the EC's negotiating mandate to the fact that labour and industry organisations were far more active and organised in 1977 than they were before the first MFA. The role of COMITEXTIL in demanding a stricter MFA is frequently mentioned, which during 1977 was chaired by Alan Clough, Chairman of the BTC. Protectionist elements in the French textile and clothing industry also dominated

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

COMITEXIL. According to Underhill (1998, p. 166), French industry organisations were particularly adept at developing links with the EC textile and clothing associations and pressurising the French government to appropriate the EC's textile policy, helping to forge a transnational protectionist coalition.

From the TUC's perspective, its close relationship with the Labour government "had greatly influenced the Government's position and a strong EEC mandate was now likely".¹⁰⁷ The basis of this position was that the UK government would press for stricter bilateral agreements – operated under a global ceiling approach – in exchange for supporting the renewal of the MFA multilateral framework (TUC, 1978, p. 362). As the TUC noted at the time, "The UK Government approach, and now the EEC approach, is very similar to the TUC policy summarised in paras 63-68 of the 1977 TUC Economic Review".¹⁰⁸ However, the TUC had also sought to push the government's position further but had been advised by the Secretary of State for Trade that it would be unwise to press for further protective measures at a time when the UK was seeking an easing of restrictions on world trade in its overall approach to the GATT Tokyo Round negotiations (TUC, 1978, p. 363). This reveals how the Labour government tried to strike a balance between its broader trade interests and the risk of alienating not only a core funder of the party in the case of the TUC, but also its working-class support base. As the TUC's Stephen Pursey recalls,

Although already reduced in membership, textile unions had a strong level of unionisation in their sectors... So, I would say that [the unions] did have a certain power influence in the UK, and I think other countries also. In part this was also due to their role in local politics in several textile regions like East Lancashire and West Riding [of Yorkshire] with marginal constituencies. Governments, both ministers and civil servants, were genuinely worried about the social, economic, and political costs of a

¹⁰⁷ 'Report of meeting between Secretary of State for Trade and Industry and TUC TCFC', 25 May 1977; TUC Archive, MRC, University of Warwick (MSS.292D/631/6)

¹⁰⁸ 'NEDC Report - GATT: MTNs and Renegotiation of the MFA', TUC, 1 June 1977; TUC Archive, MRC, University of Warwick (MSS.292D/522/1A)

rapid decline of the sectors... My recollection of the TUC Textile, Clothing and Footwear Industry Committee lobbying was that civil servants and ministers respected their expertise both of the industry and the details of the MFA negotiations. Relations with the British Textile Federation were close but most of the lobbying was done separately. So, as the old adage goes, unions used the argument of their strength and the strength of their argument (S. Pursey, personal correspondence).

Though the GTB did not have the same direct influence over policy as the TUC, not least because of the BMWi's strongly liberal stance, the weight of protectionist pressure from other Community member states and within the West German textile and clothing industry did result in the BMWi making some concessions on its preferred stance. For example, in a meeting with the GTB and other textile organisations on 24 January 1977 the department expressed its concern that significant changes in the MFA could result in retaliation from developing countries, opposed the inclusion of a recession clause, and outlined its tendency to not change growth quotas drastically (both of which were key union and industry demands).¹⁰⁹ However, the BMWi also understood the consequences of high import rates and was willing to accept the GTB's argument that "Limiting the position of the extremely competitive supplier countries and making some concessions to the weak developing countries would appear to be a viable way forward".¹¹⁰ The issue of differentiating between 'genuine' developing economies and semi-developed economies (e.g. Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea) was a key plank of the GTB's approach to the MFA in 1977.¹¹¹ Further, the department also hinted that renewing the MFA was the key priority so as to avoid "the risk of

¹⁰⁹ 'Verlängerung des WTA', GTB Hauptvorstand, 25 January 1977; Archiv der GTB, Archiv an der sozialen Demokratie, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (5/GTBA400064)

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ 'Gefährdung oder Sicherung der Arbeitsplätze in den Industrieländern in den Entwicklungsländern', GTB Hauptvorstand, 8-9 September 1977; Archiv der GTB, Archiv an der sozialen Demokratie, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (5/GTBA020018)

international cooperation being called into question” and protectionist trends increasing further.¹¹²

Following a last-minute delay by France, the Council of Ministers approved the revised and more protectionist mandate for the Commission to commence re-negotiation of the MFA. The final decision on the Commission’s mandate had been delayed due to France holding out for ‘external global ceilings’ (i.e. fixed limits for disruptive imports from all sources) as opposed to the ‘internal global ceilings’ (i.e. fixed limits for certain imports entering the Community negotiated bilaterally with specific low-cost suppliers) that had become the Community’s position.¹¹³ The BTC and TUC supported the French position in theory but understood that in practice it was unrealistic and threatened to jeopardise the internal ceilings approach it had fought hard to win support for.¹¹⁴ Though France eventually agreed not to stand in the way of the consensus view, it still argued that the Community’s position was not strong enough and underlined this by taking unilateral action to invoke Article 19 of the GATT in early July on a number of textile and clothing products (Pearce and Sutton, 1986, p. 107). This forced the Commission to include even stricter restraints in its bilateral negotiations against the countries causing the biggest difficulties for the French industry.¹¹⁵

At the July meeting of the GATT Textiles Committee the US and Japan proposed a formula to the Community to renew rather than strongly modify the MFA with the only significant change being a recognition of ‘reasonable departures’ from the agreement (i.e. the right to restrain imports).¹¹⁶ Whilst the Commission and the EC negotiator, the French

¹¹² ‘Verlängerung des WTA’, GTB Hauptvorstand, 25 January 1977; Archiv der GTB, Archiv an der sozialen Demokratie, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (5/GTBA400064)

¹¹³ ‘BTC Newsletter No.32 - Renewal of the MFA’, 16 September 1977; TUC Archive, MRC, University of Warwick (MSS.292D/631/6)

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ ‘The MFA and UK import controls’, TUC TCFC, 1 November 1977; TUC Archive, MRC, University of Warwick (MSS.292D/631/6)

diplomat Paul Tran Van Thinh, formally stated that they would be prepared to accept this formula, in an unprecedented move the French delegate intervened to state that his government would not.¹¹⁷ Though the UK were not prepared to act as boldly as the French delegation, they too did not support the compromise formula which was eventually removed when a further alternative proposal was made by Brazil and India calling for the abandonment of the right to use GATT Article 19, effectively ending any possibility of a compromise formula.¹¹⁸ These disagreements led to the Textile Committee being suspended until the Contracting Parties were closer to coming to a conclusion on what the new MFA should look like.

By autumn of 1977, the main concern of European trade unions and industry organisations was that the Commission's negotiating mandate was not weakened and that bilateral negotiations could be concluded so that the MFA could be renewed. Final agreement on the EC's mandate was given by the Council in September and set the successful conclusion of bilateral agreements as a precondition for accepting an extension of the MFA (Woolcock, 1982, p. 35). As the Commission made clear at the time, failure to complete bilateral negotiations meant that unilateral restrictions on textile imports and the unravelling of the MFA could become a real possibility and the Commission instructed its departments to prepare for such an eventuality to avoid a legal vacuum.¹¹⁹ Bilateral negotiations were therefore rushed through in October and November.

Both the TUC and the BTC were concerned that the Commission was taking a weak approach to these talks in spite of its strong negotiating mandate.¹²⁰ From the UK and

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ 'ECC Press Release: Textiles Crisis - The EEC to act', 14 October 1977; TUC Archive, MRC, University of Warwick (MSS.292D/631/6)

¹²⁰ 'BTC Press Release - MFA Negotiations: there can be no backsliding now', 14 October 1977; TUC Archive, MRC, University of Warwick (MSS.292D/631/6); 'TUC Press Release: TUC concern over textile import talks', 1 November 1977; TUC Archive, MRC, University of Warwick (MSS.292D/631/6)

France's perspective, this concern stemmed from the fact that Hong Kong had walked away from bilateral discussions at one stage, but also because the Commission had been unable to reach an agreement with Pakistan, India, Egypt and Brazil, which eventually led to it agreeing terms that were more liberal than its negotiating mandate dictated (Farrands, 1979, p. 31). As such, the TUC arranged an urgent meeting with the Secretaries of State for Trade and Industry on 10 November to make sure the government did not allow the Commission to deviate from its line.¹²¹ This was followed up in an ETUC-TCL meeting with Chief Negotiator Tran Think on 16 November who stressed that the EC "had very limited flexibility within its mandate"¹²² and gave the ambassador a policy paper on the bilateral negotiations which stated:

The fact that these negotiations are gradually getting bogged down gives rise to very grave concern on the part of the trade unions. The opposition which the negotiators are coming up against could lead the Commission into making further concessions to the exporting countries and this would definitely mean the end of the European textile and clothing industries... It is therefore inconceivable that the Community gives way to outside pressures and departs from her initial position by accepting, with regards to imports, new concessions... If the exporting countries maintain their attitude of refusing to compromise, their intransigence should be remedied by unilateral measures on the part of the EEC as of the beginning of next year.¹²³

This policy paper was also used by the GTB to put pressure on the BMWi to support the strict application of the EC mandate, but the department responded by arguing that the essential demands of the trade unions were already being met by the Commission.¹²⁴ This is unsurprising given that the BMWi had previously criticised the UK for seeking to push the

¹²¹ 'Report of meeting with Secretary of State for Trade', TUC TCFC, 26 January 1978; TUC Archive, MRC, University of Warwick (MSS.292D/631/7)

¹²² 'Report of meeting with EEC and UK officials', TUC TCFC, 26 January 1978; TUC Archive, MRC, University of Warwick (MSS.292D/631/7)

¹²³ 'Declaration concerning bilateral negotiations within the "MFA"', ETUC-TCL, 1977; TUC Archive, MRC, University of Warwick (MSS.292D/631/6)

¹²⁴ 'Letter from Otto Graf Lambsdorff to Karl Buschmann', 28 December 1977; Archiv des BMWi (Außenwirtschaftspolitik und Entwicklungshilfe), Bundesarchiv (B102/207474)

Commission beyond its mandate towards further protectionism and thereby threatening the outcome of the bilateral negotiations for the opposite reasons to what the unions feared.¹²⁵ However, despite their concerns, the unions and industry organisations were generally satisfied with the overall results of negotiations which provided significant protection for the European industry in line with many of their key demands (Farrands, 1979; Dolan, 1983).¹²⁶ Once the majority of EC bilateral agreements had been completed a report of the results was submitted by the Commission to the Council of Ministers which ratified its decision to renew the MFA for another four years.¹²⁷

MFA 3

After the introduction of the second MFA on 1 January 1978 European textile and clothing unions hoped for a period of relative stability in the industry as the effects of the new arrangement took effect. The TUC, for example, confident that the worst of the sector's crisis had been addressed now that 98% of the UK's low-cost textile imports were covered by MFA restraints, proclaimed that "The Government have achieved most of what we asked them to do, now we will be asking the industry to match this achievement by increasing investment, output and employment".¹²⁸

¹²⁵ 'Deutsch-britische Konsultationen am 18. Oktober 1977', BMWi (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft), 14 October 1977; Archiv des BMWi (Außenwirtschaftspolitik und Entwicklungshilfe), Bundesarchiv (B102/210316)

¹²⁶ 'TUC Press Release: TUC meets Dell on textiles trade', 26 January 1978; TUC Archive, MRC, University of Warwick (MSS.292D/631/7); 'Ergebnisprotokoll von der 20. Sitzung des Hauptvorstandes nach dem 12. Ordentlichen Gewerkschaftstag am 14. und 15. März 1978 - Bericht über das neue Welttextilabkommen', GTB Hauptvorstand, 14-15 März 1978; Archiv der GTB, Archiv an der sozialen Demokratie, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (5/GTBA020018)

¹²⁷ 'Prorogation pour quatre ans de l'AMF', EESC, 31 January 1978; Archive of the EEC and EAEC Commissions, HAEU (BAC-48/1984-1158)

¹²⁸ 'TUC Press Release: TUC meets Dell on textiles trade', 26 January 1978; TUC Archive, MRC, University of Warwick (MSS.292D/631/7)

1978 also saw a newfound level of discussion on the social clause within the EC. After the EESC had called for a social clause to be included in GATT negotiations and the Community's GSP regime in 1977, the Commission, thanks to the advocacy of DG Development, increased their pressure to incorporate a social clause in the EC's trade policy (Coppolaro, 2020, p. 151). This pressure occurred within the context of negotiations leading up to the second Lomé Convention, a trade agreement between the EC and 71 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. The Commission issued a communication calling for the linking of trade benefits to compliance with four ILO standards, but this was later rejected by the ACP countries due to suspicions of hidden protectionism (Orbie et al., 2005, p. 161; Edgren, 1979, p. 532).

In November 1978, the Commission issued a further communication dedicated to the relationship between foreign aid, trade and labour standards and called for trade benefits to be linked to compliance with key ILO Conventions (Commission of the European Communities, 1978b). In the communication the Commission was keen to state that the Community's development policy was as concerned with social progress in developing countries as it was with economic growth and that a social clause could be used as a weapon against protectionism, a very similar line to that taken by European trade unions (Commission of the European Communities, 1978b, p. 2; Waterman, 2018; van Roozendaal, 2002). Despite the Commission requesting that the Council approve the general outline of the policy, the proposal was never discussed by Member States, largely because labour standards were considered to be an ILO competence rather than an EC concern (Charnovitz, 1987). These concerns over competences occurred even though the ILO held no power to apply actual sanctions to states contravening labour standards (Commission of the European Communities, 1978b, p. 5). However, in addition to the work of DG Development, the

Commissioner for Social Affairs, Hans Vredeling, also set up a working group at this time to consider how a social clause could be integrated into the EC's trade agenda.¹²⁹

Contrasting attitudes to the social clause were also evident in a meeting on 13 March 1978 between the ETUC-TCL and the Commissioner for External Relations, Wilhelm Haferkamp. The meeting also highlighted how union influence over the MFA did not necessarily align with predictable ideological cleavages. In the 13 March meeting – chaired by GTB Chairman Karl Buschmann – the Commissioner revealed that he agreed with the idea that the EC needed to “give up some of its traditional industries and that there had to be a programme of restructuring and development of other industries” as well as declaring that “[t]he world situation was a process that could not be stopped”.¹³⁰ A similar attitude also extended to the issue of the social clause where the Commissioner argued that it should not be seen as a “panacea for the industry's problems” and encouraged the unions present to raise living standards in producer countries through the ILO and other international organisations rather than through the Community's trade agreements.¹³¹

Despite Haferkamp's trade union and social democratic background, his attitude to the textile industry was entirely predicated on an economic calculation that placed liberalisation above the concerns of, from his perspective, inefficient industries as the following extract made clear:

Vice President Haferkamp stated that as an ex-trade union leader he understood the Committee's attitude on the numbers of jobs lost in the past. Nevertheless, it was necessary to see the textile and clothing situation against the background of the global trading situation. The EEC had had a 5 billion dollar surplus in its balance of trade last year and would have an 8 billion dollar surplus this year. Since 50% of all jobs were

¹²⁹ ‘ATWU notes taken at ETUC-TCL committee, Brussels 13/03/1978’, 20 March 1978; TUC Archive, MRC, University of Warwick (MSS.292D/631/7)

¹³⁰ ‘Notes taken at meeting between ETUC-TCL committee and Wilhelm Haferkamp, Brussels, 13/03/1978, 20 March 1978; TUC Archive, MRC, University of Warwick (MSS.292D/631/7)

¹³¹ Ibid.

closely connected to the export business, there was no way in which protectionist measures could be taken to safeguard some industries without other jobs being jeopardised through retaliation.¹³²

The trade unions present at the meeting were shocked and incensed by the Commissioner's attitude which essentially put trade liberalisation ahead of the jobs of workers in European textile industries. In this respect, the differences between the trade unions and Haferkamp highlighted in this meeting were of a fundamental political nature and indicative of the growing tension, especially within social democratic parties, over the extent to which markets should be regulated, both within the EC and internationally. This tension was also reflected in the GATT Tokyo Round negotiations, which intensified throughout 1978, which were conducted "in the shadow of globalisation", as Coppolaro (2018a) aptly describes.

March 1978 marked a key turning point in the strategy of the CGT that would eventually lead to it engaging more seriously in the debate on world trade and taking a position on the MFA. The beginning of this process came with the defeat of the Union de la Gauche in the French legislative elections, elections which the left were widely expected to win (Wright, 1978). By 1977 the PCF had secured a record number of mayoral positions while the PS topped opinion polls throughout the mid-1970s (Frears, 1981, p. 63). However, due to major political differences and manoeuvring, the Union de la Gauche was left barely intact on the eve of the 1978 elections (Johnson, 1981, pp. 188-189). This fact, combined with the obstacles provided by the French electoral system and a myriad of social and political problems facing the left, meant that it narrowly lost out, not least because the PCF's Parisian working class vote collapsed (Johnson, 1981, p. 203). To add to the PCF's woes the PS won more votes for the first time since the war (Frears, 1981, p. 63). This electoral defeat

¹³² Ibid.

ultimately led to the disintegration of the left unity project and with it the strategy of the previous six years.

The CGT leadership immediately reverted to an exaggerated form of its 'transmission belt' position that sought to further the political aims of the PCF (Ross, 1987, p. 109). Additionally, its leadership's open support of the PCF in the election came at a cost and the union's large non-communist membership left in droves – 300,000, around a quarter of its active membership, left between 1978 and 1981, for example (Ebbinghaus and Visser, 2000, p. 276). Overall, the failure of the left to win the 1978 legislative elections put the Giscard presidency in a far stronger position than even he could have hoped for, allowing him to focus on France's still formidable economic problems (Gaffney, 2012, pp. 134-135). However, under pressure from French industry to pursue protectionism for the textile and clothing sector, Giscard was still largely unable to pursue his favoured trade strategy of liberal market-led adjustment (Underhill, 1998, p. 166).

With the focus of states predominantly on the revived Tokyo Round negotiations, the MFA took a back seat for the majority of 1978. Nonetheless, in July, the same month as a Framework of Understanding between the main Tokyo Round negotiators was adopted, the Commission released a policy document detailing its vision for the European textiles and clothing industry. Having negotiated a stricter MFA 2, the Commission felt that it would be unlikely and undesirable to achieve similar results for MFA 3 or even whether it would be possible to renew it at all, particularly as many of its bilateral agreements had been predicated on the condition that the Community would launch or speed up its efforts to adapt to the conditions of international competition (Commission of the European Communities, 1978a).

European trade unions were concerned about the position the Commission was likely to take towards future negotiations for two reasons. First, the Commission's document was openly pro-liberalisation and threatened to undermine national industrial aid schemes. An

ETUC-TCL position paper on world trade, written because it did not accept the Commission's paper as a basis for discussion, understood the need for the sector to modernise but was highly sceptical of the pace at which this could or should be achieved and pointed to the fact that modernisation had already begun to take place, resulting in a considerable number of job losses (TUC, 1979, p. 342). As the ETUC-TCL made clear, "it is lacking in intelligence to wish to define policies for the future of the textile/clothing industry without taking into account their social implications – or without simultaneously putting forward realistic and efficient measures".¹³³

The second major concern of the textile unions was the inference from the Commission that the MFA may not be renewed beyond 1981. The TUC, GTB and ETUC-TCL all made the point that this would be unacceptable in the strongest possible terms and reaffirmed their commitment to supporting the strict implementation of the MFA in the present and the future.¹³⁴ Though the unions and the Commission both saw the MFA as a temporary measure to allow the European industry to adjust, it was clear that both had very different definitions of what 'temporary' meant in practice.¹³⁵ While the Commission's proposal also clarified that it would be seeking ongoing consultation with industry and labour organisations, rather than assuring trade unions about the future of the European sector it actually heightened their concerns. As such, the Commission's document can be seen as the starting point of the unions' efforts to influence the third MFA which they did with renewed vigour over the next three years.

¹³³ 'The future of the textile and clothing industries, a trade union position', ETUC-TCL, 18 December 1978; TUC Archive, MRC, University of Warwick (MSS.292D/631/565/2)

¹³⁴ Ibid.; 'Anträge für die Sitzung des Hauptvorstandes am 30.9.1978 – Außenwirtschaft', GTB Hauptvorstand, 30 September 1978; Archiv der GTB, Archiv an der sozialen Demokratie, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (5/GTBA020018); 'EEC industry policy for textiles and clothing', TUC TCFC, 19 October 1978; TUC Archive, MRC, University of Warwick (MSS.292D/631/565/1)

¹³⁵ 'EEC industry policy for textiles and clothing', TUC TCFC, 19 October 1978; TUC Archive, MRC, University of Warwick (MSS.292D/631/565/1)

A further example of the differences that would continue to arise between the European unions and the Commission over the third MFA can be seen in correspondence concerning the GTB Executive Committee's 1978 policy document on world trade between the new GTB Chairman, Berthold Keller, Commission President Roy Jenkins, and Vice-President Wilhelm Haferkamp. It is notable that the tone of the correspondence between Keller and Haferkamp was friendly and indicative their shared background – such as referring to each other as 'Kollege' rather than the formal 'Herr'.¹³⁶ Both Commissioners also argued that they agreed with the vast majority of the GTB's policies including the social clause, which Haferkamp pointed out the Commission had recently taken a position on.¹³⁷ However, Jenkins was especially cautious about how such a policy could “provoke outright suspicion among developing countries at a time when we, almost alone, are taking considerable pains to justify the idea of partnership on an equal footing with the Third World”.¹³⁸

The Commission President also took the opportunity to reiterate the temporary nature of the MFA as a means of restructuring the European textile sector: “Only if this can be achieved can we hope to preserve the free movement of goods, services and capital, implied in the notion of the Common Market”. This last comment goes some way to highlight the dividing line between the Commission's commitment to liberalism and the trade union's commitment to social democracy. Indeed, the MFA is a key example of how this division grew over time within the EC.

Another important figure within the Commission was Etienne Davignon, the Commissioner for Industrial Affairs, who played a key role in integrating union views into

¹³⁶ 'Letter from Wilhelm Haferkamp to Berthold Keller', 5 December 1978, Archive of the EEC and EAEC Commissions, HAEU (BAC-48/1984-1151b)

¹³⁷ 'Letter from Wilhelm Haferkamp to Berthold Keller', 21 December 1978, Archive of the EEC and EAEC Commissions, HAEU (BAC-48/1984-1151b); 'Letter from Roy Jenkins to Berthold Keller', 22 December 1978, Archive of the EEC and EAEC Commissions, HAEU (BAC-48/1984-1151b)

¹³⁸ Ibid.

the Commission's perspective despite not coming from a trade union or social democratic background. Though European trade unions had been unimpressed with Davignon's 1978 report on the future of the textile industry, he was in fact a supporter of the French and UK positions on the MFA and helped to dampen calls for liberalisation from the West German-led coalition during negotiations (Dolan, 1983, p. 590). Though it would be an overstatement to describe Davignon as an ally of the textile and clothing unions, he proved himself to be receptive to their concerns about the pace of restructuring in the sector in the time leading up to the third MFA and made a concerted effort to make sure that the unions' views were diffused within the Commission.¹³⁹

Commission consultation with the ETUC-TCL over the issue of a European textile and clothing industry policy continued in three meetings in November 1978 and February and March 1979. Deputy Director-General for Internal Market and Industrial Affairs, Paolo Cecchini, exacerbated the unions' existing concerns. The TUC's notes of the February meeting summarised the Commissioner's views as follows:

The industry and workers in textiles, shipbuilding and steel have a responsibility to 'adjust' themselves to the new international division of labour, even if this meant that jobs were lost. The EEC would have to concentrate on high added value industries. Textiles and clothing were more appropriate to less developed countries. This did not mean that the EEC industry would disappear... However, the Commission could make no guarantees on job security for textile and clothing workers. The unions were taking a parochial view in seeking job security.¹⁴⁰

Furthermore, it was argued that the Commission could not take any of the ETUC-TCL's views on board as their diagnosis and recommendations were incompatible with those of the Commission's.¹⁴¹ The ETUC-TCL considered Cecchini's statement to be "the most

¹³⁹ 'L'avenir des industries du textile et de l'habillement : la position des organisations syndicales', ETUC-TCL, 25 January 1979; Archive of the EEC and EAEC Commissions, HAEU (BAC-48/1984-1151b)

¹⁴⁰ 'EEC industrial policy for textiles and clothing - report of meeting with EEC Commission', TUC TCFC, 21 March 1979; TUC Archive, MRC, University of Warwick (MSS.292D/631/565/2)

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

unconstructive statement... they had heard from the Commission in many years".¹⁴² On this basis the committee adjourned the meeting early and instead resolved to form a small working party of Commission and union officials to see if the ground could be prepared for useful consultation but also that pressure should be put on the Commission through national governments in the Council of Ministers.¹⁴³

It is important to place the Commission's views in the context of the end of the GATT Tokyo Round negotiations which were concluded in April 1979. Due to the challenging economic circumstances throughout, the overall results of the round were disappointing for states who had hoped for greater liberalisation (Coppolaro, 2017). In addition to technical changes in some GATT codes, tariffs were reduced but by far less than originally hoped for (Lanoszka, 2009, pp. 32-33). For example, average protection in the EC reduced from 6.3% to 4.5% while US protection went from 6.2% to 4.2% (Coppolaro, 2018a, p. 766). Ultimately, the Tokyo Round's mixed results reflected the tension between liberal and protectionist trends. However, the world economic crisis played a huge role in framing the negotiations and strengthening protectionist arguments. Once the economic crisis receded, trade unions would find it increasingly difficult to challenge the rising forces of globalisation and neoliberalism that had been tempered throughout the 1970s.

The political event that was arguably the most emblematic of this emerging paradigm shift away from social democracy, embedded liberalism and the post-war consensus was the election of Margaret Thatcher in 1979. Though it would have been impossible to implement the radical changes now associated with Thatcherism overnight, not least due to the existent power of UK labour, Thatcher's election would eventually have a huge impact on how the TUC attempted to influence government policies.

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

In the early days of the Conservative government the TUC and the new Secretary of State for Trade, John Nott, both spoke of their desire to continue the productive relationship fostered during the previous Labour government.¹⁴⁴ The TUC sought to reaffirm its position on the textile industry with the new government in a policy paper released in October 1979.¹⁴⁵ This was backed up by a meeting with the Secretaries of State for Trade and Industry at the end of the same month. However, it was immediately clear that the Conservative government would take a different approach to the industry. For example, on the issue of direct investment in the industry, the Department of Industry considered such decisions to be a matter for companies rather than the government and claimed that corporation tax relief would be a better incentive for textile employers.¹⁴⁶

The TUC also expressed concern that while the government accepted that the MFA would need to continue beyond 1981, it had yet to make a commitment on what terms it would seek to negotiate. The TUC believed that an early statement on the next MFA was vital to restore confidence in the sector. However, the Secretary of State for Trade believed it was too early to form a concrete position on the MFA but would seek to consult the TUC in detail from this point onwards. This highlights how, despite a clear divergence of opinion on some key issues, the TUC was still considered an important and influential societal actor at this stage that could not be ostracised, particularly as many of its views were still shared by industry organisations like the BTC. Nonetheless, this period can be seen as the starting point of the TUC's influence over the UK's textile and clothing policy beginning to decline.

¹⁴⁴ 'Conservative Party Press Release: Textile Policy', 9 January 1979; TUC Archive, MRC, University of Warwick (MSS.292D/631/8); 'Letter from TUC General Secretary to Secretaries of State for Trade and Industry', 2 August 1979; TUC Archive, MRC, University of Warwick (MSS.292D/631/8)

¹⁴⁵ 'TUC Policy Statement: The textile, clothing and footwear industries', 22 October 1979; TUC Archive, MRC, University of Warwick (MSS.292D/631/8)

¹⁴⁶ 'Meeting with Secretaries of State for Trade and Industry', TUC TCFC, 17 January 1980; TUC Archive, MRC, University of Warwick (MSS.292D/631/9)

The most intensive lobbying campaign waged by the European textile trade unions during the long 1970s took place in 1980. As the political environment gradually became more challenging for trade unions, new strategies were developed to make sure their views were heard by national governments and the European Commission in particular. In addition to the TUC consistently pushing the UK Trade and Industry Ministers to take a strong position on MFA ahead of the likely beginning of negotiations in the autumn,¹⁴⁷ the ETUC-TCL continued to meet with the Commission to attempt to achieve similar aims.

The ETUC-TCL's work around the MFA had undoubtedly increased in scope and importance since its renewal in 1978. It produced regular and in-depth position papers that were discussed at Commission level, worked in two working parties with the Commission on the operation of the MFA and EC aids to industry, and was capable of initiating meetings with Commissioner Davignon and other Commission staff.¹⁴⁸ As a further example of the ETUC-TCL's growing significance, in a meeting with Davignon on 17 March 1980, the Commissioner outlined how the Commission were actively consulting the views of the committee on the renewal of the MFA which would be conducted through the working party and fuller consultative meetings.¹⁴⁹

The Commission side of the meeting also confirmed that they would be seeking to renew the MFA. The ETUC-TCL were naturally concerned by the form this renewal would take, however, particularly given the Commission's pro-liberalisation statements in the aftermath of the second MFA. A specific point of contention was the 6% import growth quota embedded in the multilateral MFA which the unions argued should be reduced to a maximum of 1.5%. In response to this argument, Davignon argued that the Commission hoped to pursue

¹⁴⁷ 'Meeting with trade ministers', TUC TCFC, 2 May 1980; TUC Archive, MRC, University of Warwick (MSS.292D/631/9)

¹⁴⁸ 'EEC textiles policy', TUC TCFC, 2 May 1980; TUC Archive, MRC, University of Warwick (MSS.292D/631/565/2)

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

“creative protection” of the sector in negotiations and would also aid with restructuring.¹⁵⁰

Strategically, his suggestion was that a similar approach be taken to the previous negotiations where a more liberal multilateral agreement was complemented by stricter bilateral agreements with low-cost exporters that set growth limits at a far lower percentage, a strategy which had won the support of the ETUC-TCL before.¹⁵¹

The issue of the social clause was also discussed in the 17 March meeting. The minutes of the meeting reveal that the Commission were open to the idea and spoke favourably of Development Commissioner Cheysson’s (subsequently unsuccessful) proposal for the inclusion of a social clause in the Lomé Convention and intended to seek its inclusion in the Community’s GSP for 1981.¹⁵² However, the trade unions were aware that pressure would also have to be put onto individual governments given the Council of Minister’s unwillingness to discuss the proposal in 1978.

To facilitate the positive discussion held between the Commission and the ETUC-TCL in March, the committee produced a policy paper ahead of its scheduled meeting on 24 July 1980 further detailing its position on the renewal of the MFA. This paper argued that the MFA had “somewhat curbed the growth of imports, but the statistics stop us from taking the further step of considering that the instrument which is still governing international trade is a success”.¹⁵³ While the MFA had slowed down the decline of the European textile and clothing sector to some extent, increasing unemployment and trade deficits were still a fixture, albeit less so than if the second MFA and its bilateral agreements had not been

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ ‘Draft statement by ETUC-TCL on MFA’, TUC TCFC, 2 May 1980; TUC Archive, MRC, University of Warwick (MSS.292D/631/9)

negotiated on the terms agreed between the EC and developing countries. As such, the main feature of the ETUC-TCL's policy paper was the social clause.

In its July meeting with the Commission, the ETUC-TCL called for a stricter and better applied MFA, including, *inter alia*, a social clause, the negotiation of a ten year agreement, and growth quotas linked to demand.¹⁵⁴ The Commission, this time represented by Deputy Director-General of External Relations, Paul Luyten, former Head of the Commission's Permanent Delegation in Geneva, was less open to the ETUC-TCL's approach than Davignon had been in the previous meeting and was keen to stress that while normal GATT rules had been waived in the previous MFA this was only on the proviso that the Commission fulfilled its pledge to rationalise the industry, gradually lift import restrictions, and act against unfair competition.¹⁵⁵ Nonetheless, Luyten did concede that the Commission were considering linking imports to demand as requested by the unions.¹⁵⁶ As had been the case in previous discussions with Haferkamp, the ETUC-TCL's call for a social clause was dismissed by Luyten, who argued that the ILO was the appropriate body to discuss such matters but also that it was opposed by the vast majority of governments.¹⁵⁷

The extent of the trade unions' opposition to the Commission's view of world trade and globalisation would be exposed most vividly in the autumn of 1980. The ETUC-TCL's disappointment with the outcome of its previous meeting with the Commission coloured its next meeting on 30 October. As the TUC's report of the meeting made clear, the ETUC-TCL were angered by the Commission's unwillingness to seek a tougher agreement and make any kind of positive response to the committee's position paper.¹⁵⁸ In the preliminary meeting

¹⁵⁴ 'MFA: ETUC-TCL meeting with EEC Commission officials', TUC TCFC, 17 October 1980; TUC Archive, MRC, University of Warwick (MSS.292D/631/565/3)

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁸ 'ETUC-TCL meeting with EEC Commission officials', TUC TCFC, 15 January 1981; TUC Archive, MRC, University of Warwick (MSS.292D/631/11)

between the ETUC-TCL's representatives, the committee expected the previous attitude of the Commission to continue:

The view was generally expressed that the ETUC-TCL should make known its concern at the attitude and approach of the Commission to these consultative meetings. If the Commission failed to respond positively, the ETUC-TCL should consider what direct action they could take to publicise their views more widely. This action might include writing an open letter to the President of the Commission, organising a demonstration in Brussels, and organising co-ordinated trade union action in each country.¹⁵⁹

The meeting with the Commission officials played out exactly as the ETUC-TCL had expected. The Commission were prepared to discuss the ETUC-TCL's position paper but not to indicate their own specific preferences for the next MFA on the basis that the member states had yet to finalise their own positions. At this stage, the ETUC-TCL declared their dissatisfaction with this approach and walked out of the meeting. During the adjournment it was agreed that "there was no purpose to be served in continuing the meeting with such low-ranking Commission officials".¹⁶⁰ Instead, the ETUC-TCL demanded a direct meeting with Davignon and informed the officials of their intention to mount a public campaign in defence of the textile industry and for a stricter MFA. As a result, the ETUC-TCL called on its member unions to back a one-hour protest action on 2 December 1980 in an open letter to Commission President Roy Jenkins.¹⁶¹

The ETUC-TCL's call to action was most enthusiastically backed by the GTB who themselves had struggled to get their own government to take their demands seriously. Fundamentally, as had been the case in the previous MFA, the BMWi favoured a return to the liberal orientation of the first MFA and had "accepted the current textile trade policy only with great caution in order to avoid a breakdown of international cooperation in this

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ 'Letter from Karl Buschmann and Sylvan Baeck to Roy Jenkins', 10 November 1980; Archiv des BMWi (Außenwirtschaftspolitik und Entwicklungshilfe), Bundesarchiv (B102/207486)

important sector. Failure would certainly have resulted in considerably more restrictive national protective measures, with negative effects in other sectors as well”.¹⁶² In contrast, the GTB, in line with the ETUC-TCL’s position, demanded greater protection and a stricter application of the MFA to avoid further job losses.

In an analysis of the ETUC-TCL’s May position paper, the BMWi opposed all of its key policies on the grounds that they would either restrict trade, be rejected during negotiations, or create tension between the developed and developing economies, leading to the potential breakdown of MFA negotiations.¹⁶³ The BMWi was more open to the idea of the social clause and supported the ILO’s efforts to establish minimum labour standards in developing countries. Furthermore, aware that the idea did enjoy some support within the EC, if it were forced to compromise on the issue during negotiations the BMWi admitted it would accept the “possible inclusion of a social policy formula as a general objective in the preamble of the MFA, but under no circumstances should [social clauses] be an operational condition for the implementation of trade policy agreements”.¹⁶⁴

The GTB’s frustration with the BMWi’s intransigence had contributed to a notable change in the tone of correspondence between the GTB and the BMWi after 1978 which became more combative and coincided with the appointment of Otto Graf Lambsdorff as Economics Minister and Berthold Keller as GTB Chairman. Tensions between the GTB and BMWi increased towards the end of 1980. For example, Berthold Keller signed off one particular letter to the Lambsdorff on 11 November 1980 as follows:

We sometimes get the impression that the Ministry of Economics in Bonn does not know or does not want to know what is actually going on in the world. We are afraid that the

¹⁶² ‘Deutsche Position zur Zukunft des WTA nach 1981’, BMWi, 3 November 1980; Archiv des BMWi (Außenwirtschaftspolitik und Entwicklungshilfe), Bundesarchiv (B102/207486)

¹⁶³ ‘Aufzeichnung: Zukunft des WTA’, BMWi, 28 November 1980; Archiv des BMWi (Außenwirtschaftspolitik und Entwicklungshilfe), Bundesarchiv (B102/207487)

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

German Ministry of Economics will enter into an ideological isolation which would have devastating effects on German interests. We therefore urge you and the Federal Ministry of Economics once again to extend and improve the MFA in good time, in accordance with our ideas as known to you.¹⁶⁵

By 1980, former GTB Chairman Karl Buschmann was Chairman of the ETUC-TCL and the outgoing President of the ITGLWF. The GTB's strong support for the ETUC-TCL-initiated protest can therefore be explained both by its simultaneous lack of national level influence and by its strong international orientation.

The GTB's lobbying strategy in the lead-up to the protest action was to bombard the BMWi with letters and motions from its Executive Committee and union branches. This was a source of great frustration to the department who believed there was no reason for such "dramatic action".¹⁶⁶ The GTB encouraged supporters in the SPD to submit questions to the BMWi and through the Bundestag to increase pressure on the government.¹⁶⁷ Indeed, the SPD's Parliamentary Leader, Herbert Wehner, spoke at a meeting of over 200 delegates of the Hannover representatives' assembly of the GTB in support of a motion noting the union's outrage "about the behaviour of the Economics Minister Graf Lambsdorff and his ministry during the negotiations on a new MFA in Brussels" and committed himself to speak to Lambsdorff personally about the status of negotiations.¹⁶⁸ The GTB also attempted to put

¹⁶⁵ 'Letter from Berthold Keller to Helga Steeg', 11 November 1980; Archiv des BMWi (Außenwirtschaftspolitik und Entwicklungshilfe), Bundesarchiv (B102/207487)

¹⁶⁶ 'Aufzeichnung: Zukunft des WTA', BMWi, 28 November 1980; Archiv des BMWi (Außenwirtschaftspolitik und Entwicklungshilfe), Bundesarchiv (B102/207487)

¹⁶⁷ 'Fragestunde am 10.11. Dezember 1980 - SPD Fragen über dem WTA', BMWi (Minister auf dem Dienstweg), 5 December 1980; Archiv des BMWi (Außenwirtschaftspolitik und Entwicklungshilfe), Bundesarchiv (B102/207488); 'Brief zu allen Mitgliedern des Deutschen Bundestags', GTB Hauptvorstand, 13 November 1980; Archiv des BMWi (Außenwirtschaftspolitik und Entwicklungshilfe), Bundesarchiv (B102/207486)

¹⁶⁸ 'Verhandlungen über ein neues Welttextilabkommen', GTB Verwaltungsstelle Hannover, 12 November 1980; Archiv des BMWi (Außenwirtschaftspolitik und Entwicklungshilfe), Bundesarchiv (B102/207486)

pressure on the FDP nationally by writing to Vice-Chancellor Hans-Friedrich Genscher¹⁶⁹ and regionally by attacking Lambsdorff and the BMWi in the press.

In public, both the West German government and the Commission attempted to play down the protest action. They also sought to reassure the GTB and the ETUC-TCL respectively that they would continue to consult with the unions but were also perplexed by the “dramatic” action they had taken given that the key period of the MFA negotiations would not take place until mid-1981.¹⁷⁰ While irritated by the GTB’s approach, the union’s action had done little to shake the BMWi’s perspective for the textile and clothing industry and its position in the wider economy. For example, in a meeting one day before the protest action it declared that it would not support any regulation that would lead to unjustifiable burdens for textile workers but “At the same time... it must take account of the interests of the export-oriented economy as a whole. In the textile and clothing industry too, every fourth job now depends on exports”.¹⁷¹

Regardless of the BMWi’s criticisms, the West German unions were the strongest supporters of the protest action with 90% of their workforce joining the mobilisation, compared to 75% in Belgium, 60% in the UK, 30-50% in France and 20% in the Netherlands (Dolan, 1983, p. 604). The GTB’s national leaflet calling for textile workers to join the protest action declared that “We must now join to forces to oppose the policy of targeted job losses” and accused the Commission of reneging on promises to extend and improve the

¹⁶⁹ ‘Letter to Hans-Dietrich Genscher from Heinz Kemper’, GTB Verwaltungsstelle Emsdetten-Borghorst, 20 November 1980; Archiv des BMWi (Außenwirtschaftspolitik und Entwicklungshilfe), Bundesarchiv (B102/207488)

¹⁷⁰ ‘Gespräche mit Gewerkschaft und Textilindustrie am 1. bzw. 2. Dezember 1980 (Welttextilabkommen, Beihilfen)’, BMWi, 2 December 1980; Archiv des BMWi (Außenwirtschaftspolitik und Entwicklungshilfe), Bundesarchiv (B102/207487); ‘Commission Statement on the Protest Action organized by the European Trade Union Committee for Textiles, Clothing and Leather on 2 December 1980’, Commission of the EC, 1 December 1980; Archiv des BMWi (Außenwirtschaftspolitik und Entwicklungshilfe), Bundesarchiv (B102/207487)

¹⁷¹ ‘Gespräche mit Gewerkschaft und Textilindustrie am 1. bzw. 2. Dezember 1980 (Welttextilabkommen, Beihilfen)’, BMWi, 2 December 1980; Archiv des BMWi (Außenwirtschaftspolitik und Entwicklungshilfe), Bundesarchiv (B102/207487)

MFA.¹⁷² The anger of union members was directed at Lambsdorff in particular. For example, at a local rally in Albstadt, Baden-Württemberg, workers lifted a home-made banner with the slogan “Wir brauchen keinen Graf – Wir brauchen einen sicheren Arbeitsplatz!” (We don’t need a Count – we need a secure job!).¹⁷³ Berthold Keller declared the action a huge success. 270,000 employees from 2,100 companies in West Germany had participated.¹⁷⁴ Keller also revealed that Lambsdorff and Davignon respectively had offered both the GTB and the ETUC-TCL meetings at short notice, the latter on the day of the action which the unions refused to attend.¹⁷⁵

The action of the European textile unions was effective in securing another meeting with the Commission on 12 December 1980, this time headed by Davignon as requested by the committee. The TUC’s report of the preliminary meeting claims that the Commission had been “shaken” and “outraged” by the ETUC-TCL’s decision to walk out of the previous meeting and Davignon had personally met with committee member Sylvan Baeck “to clear up any misunderstandings created at the meeting on October 30”.¹⁷⁶ Baeck also revealed that sympathetic Commission officials had given confidential information on the Commission’s position on the next MFA which actually was a lot more developed than it was prepared to admit to the unions.

In the meeting itself the ETUC-TCL continued to press Davignon and the Commission on their overall political stance which they believed was weak and complacent. Davignon showed a conciliatory tone throughout the meeting and stressed the importance of a European

¹⁷² ‘[Leaflet] Jetzt reicht’s uns! Jetzt ist das Maß voll! Unser Geduldsfaden ist gerissen!’, GTB Hauptvorstand, November 1980; Archiv des BMWi (Außenwirtschaftspolitik und Entwicklungshilfe), Bundesarchiv (B102/207487)

¹⁷³ ‘Schläge für den Schwächsten’, SPD (*Vorwärts*), 11 December 1980; Archiv des BMWi (Außenwirtschaftspolitik und Entwicklungshilfe), Bundesarchiv (B102/207488)

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ ‘ETUC-TCL meeting with Davignon and other Commission officials’, TUC TCFC, 15 January 1981; TUC Archive, MRC, University of Warwick (MSS.292D/631/11)

industrial policy to complement the regulation of trade with non-Community members, something the ETUC-TCL was not opposed to in principle. Though the unions still held misgivings about the Commission's approach to the upcoming MFA negotiations they welcomed Davignon's suggestion that "a working party comprising representatives of the ETUC-TCL and the Commission should be established to discuss detailed questions of policy and to prepare the ground for the next full meeting in February".¹⁷⁷

The action initiated by the ETUC-TCL in autumn 1980 gives an interesting indication of European trade unions' growing confidence and influence at the European level but also their strategic limitations. First, the fact that the ETUC-TCL attached such importance to regular and productive meetings with the Commission and that member unions were prepared to follow the committee's call for collective action to secure consultation with the Commission over the important issue of the MFA highlights that member unions had an understanding that the European level was growing in importance, especially given that trade negotiations were conducted by Commission.

Secondly, the fact that the ETUC-TCL mobilised their members to gain greater access to the Commission and highlight the plight of the textile and clothing sector shows that it did not reject transnational collective action entirely, even if it overwhelmingly favoured lobbying key political actors. However, the fact that this transnational collective action was supported to very different extents by national federations can be argued to reveal that though Europeanisation was beginning to take place in the labour movement in this period, it was taking place at different speeds and national level strategies still predominated for many trade unions. Indeed, while the strategy of European action was arguably most strongly favoured by the GTB, the TUC still believed that national campaigns aimed at pressuring governments

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

to renew and strengthen the MFA were the most effective use of the European labour movement's resources and saw the ETUC-TCL's role as that of a coordinator rather than a leading body. Indeed, the TUC later declared that "Grandiose schemes on an international scale, like a mass demonstration in Brussels, should not be viewed as priorities. These schemes are expensive and are not necessarily effective".¹⁷⁸ As further evidence of this view, the TUC made no reference to the action in its official annual report.

Finally, the protest was largely symbolic and was predominantly concerned with bringing the Commission back to the table and gaining media attention. It is notable that instead of developing a strategy that drew on the power of coordinated collective bargaining, the ETUC-TCL believed that lobbying and advocacy were the best way of influencing MFA negotiations at this stage. In this respect, European textile workers were only directly mobilised in defence of their industry and trade issues to a very limited extent.

The tendency among the European textile trade unions towards greater activism and mobilisation of their membership also extended to the TUC in the spring of 1981. The TUC's strategy directly emanated from its own specific views on the ETUC-TCL-initiated action of the year before mentioned above and a 1980 Congress motion which called on the General Council to consider ways of mobilising the 750,000 workers in the textile, clothing and footwear industries to campaign for the policies put forward by the TUC to preserve their jobs (TUC, 1981, p. 344). In response, the TUC committee organised two events under the banner of 'TUC Campaign for Social and Economic Advance'. First, a lobby of Parliament was organised on 16 February 1981 which attracted 2,000 workers and gave them the opportunity to meet MPs and make representations to the All-Party Parliamentary Groups on

¹⁷⁸ 'ETUC-TCL meeting with EEC Comm officials, 12/12/1980. Briefing note for British representatives', TUC TCFC, 11 December 1980; TUC Archive, MRC, University of Warwick (MSS.292D/631/565/3)

the issues facing their industries.¹⁷⁹ This led to the LP requesting a major parliamentary debate on the sector which took place ten days later. This debate was revealing in the respect that the Conservatives did not favour drastically changing the UK position on the MFA from Labour at this stage and spoke of the need to maintain existing protection of the industry as well as the desirability of a recession clause (*Hansard*, 26 February 1981 col 986-1024). In fact, despite some shift in rhetoric from the previous Labour government, in practice a strong and effective MFA was even supported by Thatcher and remained a mainstay of Conservative trade policy well beyond the third MFA (Hayes, 1993, pp.111-112).

Despite the government's support of the MFA, given that unemployment in the sector had continued to increase at an alarming rate – 110,000, around 15% of the total textile, clothing and footwear workforce since April 1980 alone – as a result of import penetration and the Conservatives' domestic economic policies, the TUC continued to press the government throughout 1981 to strengthen rather than simply renew the new MFA.¹⁸⁰ These issues led to a second mobilisation by the TUC in spring 1981: a 10,000-strong demonstration in Bradford, Yorkshire. However, despite the scale of the crisis in the UK industry, these two demonstrations the only notable examples of mobilisation by the TUC in this period. Strike action in the sector was also virtually non-existent throughout the 1980s, further highlighting the TUC's preference for lobbying political actors (Ingram, Metcalf and Wadsworth, 1993, p. 706).

The Commission initiated the formal process of establishing the EC's negotiating mandate for the third MFA with a communication to the Council in March 1981. The most significant shift towards protectionism in the draft Community mandate was that it permitted

¹⁷⁹ 'TUC Press Release: Lobby of Parliament for the Textile, Clothing and Leather industries', 4 February 1981; TUC Archive, MRC, University of Warwick (MSS.292D/631/11)

¹⁸⁰ 'TUC Press Release: Prime Minister nagged by uncertainty', 10 April 1981; TUC Archive, MRC, University of Warwick (MSS.292D/631/11)

that import growth rates could be lower than the existing 6% and it recommended differentiation between low-cost supplier countries according to their state of development aimed at restricting competition from the likes of South Korea and Taiwan (Commission of the European Communities, 1981b). Importantly, the Commission again noted the possibility of including a social clause linked to ILO standards in the next MFA but was unspecific about which body would enforce such standards, instead speaking of the desirability of achieving the betterment of living standards and “the recognition of this principle in the context of international trade in textiles” (Commission of the European Communities, 1981b). Apart from the addition of the social clause, the Commission’s position was broadly the same as its final MFA 2 mandate, particularly in the way it emphasised the use of bilateral agreements to negotiate stricter import limits where necessary.

While satisfied that the Commission’s proposals broadly mirrored their own, industry and labour organisations were unsatisfied at their lack of specificity and willingness to go further considering the worsening situation in the sector after the second oil crisis. COMITEXTIL, no longer under the presidency of the BTC’s Alan Clough but still maintaining a protectionist position, raised these concerns with Davignon directly, arguing that,

the objectives set in 1977 have unfortunately not been met - the figures for the increase in penetration rates are proof of this - and the industry therefore considers itself entitled to demand that a number of corrective measures be introduced to remedy the shortcomings noted in the mechanisms currently in force, since the economic and social situation in the EEC has deteriorated further since 1977 and the short- and medium-term prospects are extremely gloomy.¹⁸¹

Similarly, the TUC was concerned that the Commission had not explicitly stated that it would seek a growth rate of 1% in the final agreement and feared its “unspecific and vague” stance

¹⁸¹ ‘Préparation du Conseil spécial textile des Ministres de la CEE du 25 Février’, Ministère de l’Industrie, 10 February 1982 ; Archives de la Direction générale de l’industrie, Archives Nationales (19990447/8)

could mean it would be forced to negotiate a growth rate in excess of this figure which would lead to further import penetration in the European market.¹⁸²

In May 1981 the election of the Mitterrand government led to the CGT finally engaging with the MFA, albeit separately from the majority of European textile unions within the ETUC-TCL – the GTB in particular, under pressure from the US unions, had opposed their membership on the grounds that the CGT unions were members of the WFTU.¹⁸³ As previously mentioned, up until the demise of the Union de la Gauche the CGT had essentially refused to even attempt to influence government policies – which it considered a form of ‘class collaboration’ – and instead threw most of its weight behind supporting the election of a left government. Despite its own complex attitude to the PS, Mitterrand’s election and the inclusion of four PCF representatives in the government changed the CGT’s approach to the MFA and the belief that it had a role to play in influencing French trade policy.

Despite simmering political differences, the French labour movement experienced new opportunities to influence government policies with the CGT and CFDT gaining the most access in the early days of the left government (Ross, 1987, p. 110). As such, it is no coincidence that more sources exist in the CGT archives documenting meetings with PS Minister for Industry Pierre Dreyfus from 1981 concerning the textile and clothing sector, the MFA, and other matters of trade and industrial policy. In one such meeting on 16 July 1981, the minister was keen to highlight to CGT General Secretary, Henri Krasucki, that support for the sector would continue and improve under the new government and that pressure on

¹⁸² ‘MFA Renewal - Summary of and comments on Commission proposals’, TUC TCFC, 7 May 1981; TUC Archive, MRC, University of Warwick (MSS.292D/631/11)

¹⁸³ ‘Ergebnisprotokoll von der 11. Sitzung des Hauptvorstandes nach dem 13. Ordentlichen Gewerkschaftstag am 19. und 20. Juni 1980 - Zusammenarbeit mit kommunistischen Gewerkschaften’, GTB Hauptvorstand, 19-20 June 1980; Archiv der GTB, Archiv an der sozialen Demokratie, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (5/GTBA020020)

French domestic markets from foreign exporters needed to be curbed.¹⁸⁴ As mentioned in Chapter 2, the CGT also produced its only detailed policy paper on the MFA in this period.

Though there is no direct evidence that the French government incorporated the CGT's position into their negotiating mandate for the third MFA, it retained the protectionist elements of previous governments and went further by calling for a longer agreement, smaller import quotas and a recession clause, all of which were broadly in line with the demands of the CGT.¹⁸⁵ This attitude was also shared by French industry. For example, the Union des Industries Textiles, argued that restricting import volumes in line with domestic demand, maintaining and extending the system of global ceilings, linking acceptable import growth to the market shares of supplier countries and a recession clause should be the central features of the next MFA.¹⁸⁶ In addition, while in opposition, PS deputies had called for rigid adherence to the agreement and renewal under stricter terms and this position was maintained once the PS came to power (Underhill, 1998, pp. 184-185). As such, the demands of French industry and labour largely overlapped with those of the government.

France was the strongest advocate of a more restrictive MFA within the Community, supported by the UK, Belgium and Italy, against West Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands who sought a largely unchanged renewal (Dolan, 1983, p. 605; Underhill, 1998, p. 184). The major sticking points revolved around the methods advocated by the protectionist member states to reduce imports below the levels specified in MFA 2, including 'cutbacks' - the granting of smaller import quotas for some products and from certain

¹⁸⁴ 'Document au Ministre de l'industrie : concernant programme d'actions', CGT Fédération Nationale des Travailleurs de l'Habillement-Chapellerie, December 1981 ; Archives de la CGT, Archives départementales de la Seine-Saint-Denis (200J/250)

¹⁸⁵ 'Principes proposes pour l'AMF III', Ministère de l'Industrie, 18 February 1981 ; Archives de la Direction générale de l'industrie, Archives Nationales (19990447/3)

¹⁸⁶ 'Les quatre points essentiels de la position de l'Industrie Textile française sur les conditions d'application du troisième Accord Multifibres', Union des Industries Textiles, 3 July 1981 ; Archives de la Direction générale de l'industrie, Archives Nationales (19990447/10)

countries - maintaining the same quota levels initially but subjecting them to ‘negative growth rates’ thereafter, and a recession clause (Dolan, 1983, p. 605).

This disagreement was so deep, that by July 1981 when the Commission was due to present its position to the GATT Textiles Committee it would only state that it may demand that the average annual growth rate be below 6% (Dolan, 1983, p. 606). In its report of the July GATT meeting the TUC believed that the inability to agree a strong position within the EC had meant that the initiative had been handed to the US who were seeking a more liberal agreement that was closer to the demands of the developing countries, making it far more difficult for the Community to secure greater protection.¹⁸⁷ This issue aside, the Council were able to agree that, inter alia, the new MFA should run for five years rather than four, the Community should continue to negotiate bilateral agreements with price clauses if necessary, and distinctions between suppliers should be made according to their level of development (Dolan, 1983, p. 606). There was also an acceptance that the agreements should include a social clause, though this was not actively pushed by the UK government and others and was only accepted as a general point of principle rather than a central negotiating issue.¹⁸⁸

The above split within the EC was also reflected in West Germany between the government and the GTB throughout the summer and autumn of 1981 as the deadline to negotiate the third MFA grew closer. In the extensive correspondence between Keller and Lambsdorff in this period, the tone of former was far more confrontational and reflected the outrage felt by the union at the government’s attitude to the renewal of the MFA. In a letter to the minister on 6 August 1981, for example, Keller accused the BMWi of intending “to make the new MFA a job relocation agreement for the textile and clothing industry” and the

¹⁸⁷ ‘MFA Developments’, TUC TCFC, 29 October 1981; TUC Archive, MRC, University of Warwick (MSS.292D/631/11)

¹⁸⁸ ‘MFA Developments’, TUC TCFC, 16 July 1981; TUC Archive, MRC, University of Warwick (MSS.292D/631/11)

Chancellor of making “empty promises” that an efficient industry would have a permanent place in the German economy.¹⁸⁹ Further, Keller promised Lambsdorff that “We will take up this challenge together with the affected workers and their families and fight against this policy of annihilation by all legal means”.¹⁹⁰

Lambsdorff’s response on 10 August 1981 argued that the government’s position on the MFA had remained unchanged for many years.¹⁹¹ Making clear his disdain for Keller’s previous letter, the minister went on to write:

If you speak in this context of dishonest policies, targeted job destruction and total devaluation of the Chancellor’s statements on empty promises, you are putting the patience of your interlocutor to a severe test, both in terms of the facts and the tone of your statements. I understand that the chairman of an important organisation must provide proof of his activities to his members. However, you are overstepping the boundary which, in my understanding, is set for relations between a government that is responsible for parliamentary affairs on the one hand and an interest group on the other.¹⁹²

The minister’s response escalated the dispute considerably. Keller responded to Lambsdorff’s accusations a few weeks later by arguing that,

Workers in the textile and clothing industry are in a situation in which other groups in our society have long since taken to the streets and are being treated with a great deal of understanding and consideration by a number of responsible politicians (including those in your own party). We, on the other hand, have our hands full trying to persuade the angry and embittered workers in the textile and clothing companies to behave in a way that is in line with the respect for the common good as voluntarily established in our GTB programme... I must therefore remind you once again of the constitutional obligation, confirmed by oath, of every member of the Federal Government to serve the welfare of the entire German people. The 550,000 workers still employed in the textile

¹⁸⁹ ‘Letter from Berthold Keller to Otto Graf Lambsdorff’, 6 August 1981; Archiv des BMWi (Außenwirtschaftspolitik und Entwicklungshilfe), Bundesarchiv (B102/237787)

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

¹⁹¹ ‘Letter from Otto Graf Lambsdorff to Berthold Keller’, 10 August 1981; Archiv der GTB, Archiv an der sozialen Demokratie, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (5/GTBA350189)

¹⁹² Ibid.

and clothing industry and their families belong to this German people and demand equal treatment.¹⁹³

The impetus behind the union's more confrontational stance was the fact that the government's position on the MFA remained unchanged despite enormous job losses – 350,000 in the space of the previous 12 years. A further response from Lambsdorff on 3 September 1981 reverted to defending the BMWi's stance as one that took account of the whole German export economy rather than just the textile and clothing industry alone but also suggested meeting in person in the near future to discuss their different perspectives further.¹⁹⁴

This exchange directly led to the GTB embarking on a new campaign aimed at defending jobs in the industry. Decided in an Extraordinary Meeting of its Executive Committee on 8 September 1981, the GTB resolved that “Until the conclusion of a new and improved MFA, the EC's further consultations and negotiations will be accompanied by targeted trade union measures under the slogan ‘Action for Secure Jobs’ [‘Aktion sichere Arbeitsplätze’]”.¹⁹⁵ The highly organised campaign was planned in four stages: workplace meetings in September; regional panel discussions and company visits with local and federal politicians between 1 and 23 October; localised protest actions on shift changeovers between 26 October and 6 November; and a mass protest in Bonn on 21 November, which was expected to draw 20,000 members.¹⁹⁶

Some of the finer details of the GTB's action are revealing. First, despite the extent of the crisis highlighted by Keller in his correspondence with Lambsdorff, the GTB still did not

¹⁹³ ‘Letter from Berthold Keller to Otto Graf Lambsdorff’, August 1981; Archiv der GTB, Archiv an der sozialen Demokratie, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (5/GTBA350189)

¹⁹⁴ ‘Letter from Otto Graf Lambsdorff to Berthold Keller’, 3 September 1981; Archiv der GTB, Archiv an der sozialen Demokratie, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (5/GTBA350189)

¹⁹⁵ ‘Aktion "Sichere Arbeitsplätze" der Gewerkschaft Textil-Bekleidung zur Durchsetzung eines neuen und verbesserten Welttextilabkommens’, GTB Hauptvorstand, 16 September 1981; Archiv der GTB, Archiv an der sozialen Demokratie, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (5/GTBA350189)

¹⁹⁶ Ibid.

consider industrial action to be a legitimate tactic to push the BMWi towards a more active stance. Instead, the GTB Executive Committee advised their members to request unpaid leave from management for local protest actions if they refused to release them from work to attend and made it clear that the GTB would not cover any loss of wages and the resources for the protests would have to be borne by regional offices.¹⁹⁷ The GTB also specifically cautioned against using the term ‘warning strikes’ throughout the campaign. This aversion to strike action was likely a combined product of the GTB leadership’s ‘accommodationist’ attitude, a lack of confidence in its rapidly declining membership to take decisive action, and a resolute adherence to the principles of codetermination. Notably, the GTB also negotiated with Gesamttextil and Bundesverband Bekleidungsindustrie to ensure that they would not obstruct any action taken, including the right of members to leave work to join protests. This again highlights the close cooperation between industry and labour in this period.

The discussion that took place in a meeting between Keller and Lambsdorff on 16 September clarifies the above points still further. Despite the confrontational tone of the discussion between the two in the preceding month, the most significant differences between the BMWi and the GTB were predominantly of a tactical nature. There was a shared belief that the MFA should be extended, that import growth rates should take into account reduced consumption and be less than the 6% the MFA then allowed, and that differentiation between the exporting countries should be based on, inter alia, the sensitivity of the exported product and the country’s stage of development.¹⁹⁸ However, the BMWi rejected the GTB’s approach that “accept[ed] the failure of the MFA negotiations from the outset (so-called ‘cut-backs’, negative growth rates, recession clause)”, instead arguing that bilateral agreements were the

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ ‘Ihr Gespräch mit Herrn Keller, Vorsitzender der Gewerkschaft Textil-Bekleidung am 16. September 1981’, BMWi (Bundesminister für Wirtschaft), 19 September 1981; Archiv des BMWi (Außenwirtschaftspolitik und Entwicklungshilfe), Bundesarchiv (B102/237787)

correct method by which to restrict certain products more tightly rather than bringing this method into the multilateral negotiations, as the EC had done in 1977.¹⁹⁹ The BMWi were particularly concerned that bringing further protectionism into the multilateral agreement, advocated most vigorously by France, would be resisted by the developing economies, threatening the bilateral agreements and possibly the MFA as a whole.

On the issue of growth rates, the GTB stated that the figure of 1.5% or less was decisive for them but the method of achieving it was not.²⁰⁰ As such, Keller agreed that negotiating tactics should be left to the government, but it would continue to push its own policies, including those the BMWi did not consider important such as the social clause.²⁰¹ This point signified the most fundamental difference between the two. Keller argued against the idea that “starvation wages, inhumane working conditions and the obstruction of free trade unions in developing countries should be recognised as natural locational advantages, i.e. as so-called comparative advantage”.²⁰² Further, he accused the BMWi of giving little attention to this demand and of tacitly supporting exploitation in developing countries to protect German export interests.²⁰³ While Lambsdorff rejected this notion he did nonetheless defend the BMWi’s policy by saying that “jobs at ‘starvation wages’ are still jobs” as a means of

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰⁰ ‘Gespräch mit dem Bundesminister für Wirtschaft, Dr. Otto Graf Lambsdorff, am 16. September 1981 in Bonn’, GTB Hauptvorstand, 25 September 1981; Archiv der GTB, Archiv an der sozialen Demokratie, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (5/GTBA350189)

²⁰¹ ‘Erneuerung des WTA; Gespräch Minister - GTB am 16. September 1981’, BMWi (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft), 22 September 1981; Archiv des BMWi (Außenwirtschaftspolitik und Entwicklungshilfe), Bundesarchiv (B102/237562)

²⁰² ‘Gespräch mit dem Bundesminister für Wirtschaft, Dr. Otto Graf Lambsdorff, am 16. September 1981 in Bonn’, GTB Hauptvorstand, 25 September 1981; Archiv der GTB, Archiv an der sozialen Demokratie, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (5/GTBA350189)

²⁰³ ‘Erneuerung des WTA; Gespräch Minister - GTB am 16. September 1981’, BMWi (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft), 22 September 1981; Archiv des BMWi (Außenwirtschaftspolitik und Entwicklungshilfe), Bundesarchiv (B102/237562)

pointing out that developing countries were highly unlikely to accept the idea of the social clause.²⁰⁴

During the 16 September meeting the GTB again revealed its firm belief in partnership over activism. As a justification for the more aggressive stance he had taken in recent months, Keller explained that the GTB had proved many times in the past that it did not belong to “brawlers” in its public behaviour - a thinly-veiled reference to other, more radical, unions.²⁰⁵ However, with the situation in the industry worsening, the GTB leadership faced increasing criticism from members that the union was not doing enough which was creating unrest on the factory floor. This, Keller explained, was why he had reacted with such hostility to the impression that the government was planning to maintain its liberal position on the MFA as it would lead to more job losses. To further highlight to the minister how ‘reasonable’ the GTB was, Keller also admitted that the union accepted that economic competition was desirable and that employees would have to “continue to make sacrifices in the future in order to maintain an efficient core of the textile and clothing industry”, but he also wanted to be sure that the government would support the industry and better explain the logic of such sacrifices.²⁰⁶ This last sentence alone reveals how entrenched the GTB’s strategy of cooperation and accommodation with the government was.

Though the meeting did a lot to repair relations between the GTB and the BMWi, the GTB still carried out its campaign to maintain pressure on the ministry while MFA negotiations were still ongoing. On this point the campaign was fairly successful. The BMWi was flooded with resolutions from GTB branches and industry and labour worked together to make sure the campaign ran smoothly. Further, the campaign provoked a discussion in the

²⁰⁴ Ibid.

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

Bundestag which resulted in the Parliamentary Groups passing a joint resolution calling on the government to negotiate a more restrictive MFA and for the “objective of social progress... to be put in concrete terms by calling for the improvement of working and social conditions in developing countries... in accordance with minimum ILO standards”.²⁰⁷ This motion was later passed, making the Bundestag the first parliament in the world to advocate the need for a social clause in international trade agreements.²⁰⁸ In addition to this domestic pressure, the GTB was also quite aware that much of their overall position would be supported by the more protectionist Community members in negotiations (Zeit Archiv, 11 September 1981).

Despite the relative unanimity within the Community for a new and more restrictive MFA, by November EC negotiators were concerned that the new agreement would be concluded without them as both developing countries and the US clashed with the EC over the more protectionist aspects of its still evolving position, though the US eventually shifted its position to side more with the EC under pressure from US Congress and industry (Dolan, 1983, p. 607). However, as Europe was the largest export market for textiles and clothing, this would have been a last resort. In a strained meeting of the Council of Ministers on 17 November it was eventually decided that the EC would advocate for a maximum growth rate of 1.2% in negotiations and that quotas from the four main supplier countries – Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan and Macao – would be reduced by 10% in exchange for greater access

²⁰⁷ ‘Vermerk: WTA - Debatte im Bundestag am 27. November 1981 über Entschließungsantrag der Bundestagsfraktionen von SPD und FDP’, BMWi (Abteilungsleiter IV), 24 November 1981; Archiv des BMWi (Außenwirtschaftspolitik und Entwicklungshilfe), Bundesarchiv (B102/237754); ‘Entschließungsantrag der Bundestagsfraktionen von SPD und FDP zur Verlaengerung des WTA’, BMWi (Abteilungsleiter IV), 10 November 1981; Archiv des BMWi (Außenwirtschaftspolitik und Entwicklungshilfe), Bundesarchiv (B102/237754)

²⁰⁸ ‘Einstimmiger Beschluss aller Fraktionen des Deutschen Bundestages zum Welttextilabkommen’, GTB Hauptvorstand, 17 December 1981; Archiv der GTB, Archiv an der sozialen Demokratie, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (5/GTBA350189)

to outward processing.²⁰⁹ France, the strongest advocate of protectionism within the GATT, had also softened its position slightly so as to avoid a deadlock and accepted that harsher restrictions would have to be included in the bilateral agreements rather than the multilateral regime.²¹⁰

From the trade union side, the TUC and GTB, though pleased with the decision to advocate maximum import growth rates of 1.2%, were concerned that the Commission would buckle under pressure from the developing countries. This stemmed from the fact that the Commission was leaving its overall position to the last minute and had already given concessions on negative growth rates and the social clause.²¹¹ However, the GTB believed that the attitude of the German government and the Commission – who eventually negotiated tighter restrictions on imports than it had originally agreed in November – had improved in their favour: “We see this as a success of our efforts and activities at all political levels; the march to Bonn in particular has awakened the German politicians. In particular, the textile debate in the German Bundestag and the joint resolution on the MFA adopted by all political groups had had a strong impact both nationally and internationally”.²¹²

The GATT Textiles Committee held what was meant to be the final phase of negotiations between 18 November and 22 December 1981. GATT and EC negotiations ran concurrently in the first week of December which meant that little could be decided at the

²⁰⁹ ‘Ergebnisse der EG-Ministerratssitzung vom 17. November 1981 zum Welttextilabkommen’, GTB Hauptvorstand, 23 November 1981; Archiv der GTB, Archiv an der sozialen Demokratie, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (5/GTBA350189); ‘EEC fibres negotiations in balance’, Larry Klinger (*Financial Times*), 18 November 1981; Archiv des BMWi (Außenwirtschaftspolitik und Entwicklungshilfe), Bundesarchiv (B102/237754)

²¹⁰ ‘Renouvellement de l'AMF’, Ministère des Relations Extérieures, 28 October 1981 ; Archives de la Direction générale de l'industrie, Archives Nationales (19990447/10)

²¹¹ ‘Meeting with Government ministers on the MFA’, TUC TCFC, 28 January 1982; TUC Archive, MRC, University of Warwick (MSS.292D/631/11); ‘Ergebnisse der EG-Ministerratssitzung vom 17. November 1981 zum Welttextilabkommen’, GTB Hauptvorstand, 23 November 1981; Archiv der GTB, Archiv an der sozialen Demokratie, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (5/GTBA350189)

²¹² ‘Augenblicklicher Stand der Verhandlungen um die Erneuerung und Verbesserung des WTA’, GTB Hauptvorstand, 15-16 December 1981; Archiv der GTB, Archiv an der sozialen Demokratie, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (5/GTBA020021)

former until the latter finalised its mandate. Dolan (1983, p. 608) argues that the EC's prevarication actually helped it secure the majority of its aims since the other GATT members feared that negotiations would collapse completely if it threatened the belatedly achieved EC consensus so "could only hope to eliminate or emasculate the more offensive clauses in the EEC's draft protocol" negotiated at the Council of Ministers on 7 and 8 December.

On 22 December 1981, a Draft Protocol was finally completed days before the expiry of the second MFA but still needed to be ratified by the Contracting Parties. The TUC refused to endorse the agreement, arguing that it was vague and ambiguous and would not provide a sound basis to conduct bilateral negotiations (TUC, 1982, p. 323). However, the majority opinion within the Council, as it had been during the December negotiations, was that its ratification of the Protocol should be conditional upon the satisfactory renewal of bilateral agreements (GATT Textiles Committee, 1982, p. 5). Though the Commission had sought the inclusion of the social clause in the Draft Protocol it was ultimately defeated, and it did not intend to pursue it in the bilateral agreements.²¹³

Overall, European trade unions had mixed feelings about the outcome of the third MFA. On the issue of import growth limits, the Commission had negotiated in line with its demands for a maximum limit of 1.5% for the most sensitive products. Further, while some of the unions' more protectionist demands such as cut-backs and negative growth rates had not been negotiated, Dolan (1983, p. 608) argues that the Council's mandate for the bilateral agreements was, at the time, "the most protectionist document that it had ever produced for textile negotiations". The close relationship between labour and industry was a very important factor in this respect. However, the social clause, the key policy that set the trade

²¹³ 'Draft MFA Protocol', TUC TCFC, 28 January 1982; TUC Archive, MRC, University of Warwick (MSS.292D/631/11)

unions apart from industry, had not been included. Indeed, though it was discussed more than ever before during the lead up to the third MFA, it is questionable how close it actually came to being enacted, not least because of the resolute opposition of the developing economies. In this respect, though trade unions could feel satisfied that they had helped to hold back greater liberalisation in the European textile sector, the wider question of the social purpose of world trade and the role of labour remained unanswered.

Conclusion

This chapter has analysed the strategies European trade unions adopted to try and influence MFA negotiations between 1973 and 1982. It has also highlighted the economic and political context that framed these strategies. This context was in the process of changing significantly in the long 1970s as the political and economic stability that had characterised the post-war period was replaced by multiple economic crises. At the same time, processes of globalisation were also taking place, as highlighted by the notion of the ‘new international economic order’.

The European textile and clothing sector was profoundly impacted by these combined issues and trade unions fought constantly in this period to stem the tide of rising imports from developing economies, a situation which led to huge job losses. The MFA was considered by trade unions, industry organisations and many European governments to be the best available framework to protect the sector from collapsing entirely and buy time to restructure and modernise the industry to help it adapt to the new economic reality. However, though this general perspective became the EC’s negotiating position in the negotiations for MFA 2 and 3, it was also highly contested. This contestation was not only expressed in disagreements between EC member states but also between unions and their own governments and in some

cases between unions and their party-political allies. This contestation reflected a deeper debate about the future direction of the world economy and between protectionism and liberalisation in general. Ultimately, it was the impact of world economic crises that tempered the rising forces of globalisation and neoliberalism which would become far more evident throughout the 1980s.

In terms of specific strategies to influence the MFA, European unions relied heavily on agenda setting, coalition-building, and lobbying. The agenda that European unions put forward in this period centred around job losses in the sector as a result of huge import penetration from developing economies. The core policy objectives put forward to address these issues were import controls through the application of a stricter MFA and a social clause. Importantly, these two policy objectives were not consistently raised in tandem, and priority was overwhelmingly given to the issue of import controls. The scale of the crisis facing the textile and clothing sector, which was directly attributable to competition from developing economies, meant that import controls were a key issue for governments and international organisations in this period. In this environment, the more protectionist governments, such as the UK and France, were aware of the political and economic impact of mass job losses while those who favoured greater liberalisation, such as West Germany, placed the crisis of the sector in the broader context of its overall trade strategy. Nonetheless, trade unions were vital in getting these issues on the political agenda.

Part of the reason why European unions were so successful in raising some of their key policy objectives was that many of their views were shared by national governments and industry organisations. Indeed, some attribute the shift towards protectionism in the EC's negotiating mandate to the role played by union and industry organisations (Farrands, 1979, pp. 27-28; Woolcock, 1982, p. 35; Dolan, 1983, p. 590). Notably, this took place at both the national and European level and created a powerful coalition capable of influencing both

national governments and the European Commission who ultimately had responsibility to represent the views of the member states, even if those views went against its own policy preferences. COMITEXTIL was a particularly important actor in this respect and represented the close relationship between labour and industry in this period. Importantly for the success of union strategies to influence the MFA, the BTC played a leading role in the organisation and contained trade unions in their membership. However, though labour and industry generally shared views on the need for a stricter MFA and import controls more generally, this did not extend to the issue of the social clause. This stands as an additional reason why this policy objective was less vigorously fought for by European unions compared to import controls.

The lobbying strategies trade unions adopted to try and influence MFA negotiations held several interesting and important features. The first was the interplay between national and European level influence. Given the fact that European unions' power and capacity was overwhelmingly based at the national level in this period it is unsurprising that influencing national government ministers was their central priority. The EC policymaking process also assured that member states had the ultimate power to influence the Commission's negotiating mandate through the Council of Ministers. This provided unions like the TUC, who held such close links with the LP, with a huge amount of influence. Though the GTB did not share an ideological affinity with the West German government and the CGT did not engage with the French government until 1981, both were still involved in their respective national policymaking processes to different extents and played a role in seeing some of their policy objectives achieved. Once again, the policy alignment with industry organisations was an important factor in this success.

Though national level lobbying was by far the most predominant and successful strategy used by European unions in this period, as the 1970s progressed, it is noticeable that

the ETUC-TCL became a far more important component of European unions' strategies to influence the MFA. Though ultimately composed of national unions, the ETUC-TCL was increasingly able to influence the Commission at key stages in the negotiating process. This influence was particularly important for unions like the GTB who were less able to influence their own government. As the Commission also became increasingly vocal in its preference for a more liberal MFA 2 and 3, the European level became a more important site of contestation for European unions. Figures like Etienne Davignon played a key role in bringing shared labour and industry views into the Commission's mandate. Importantly, actors such as Wilhelm Haferkamp, who on paper appeared more likely to be open to union views, were often far less reliable allies. This fact is indicative of the tension between protectionist and liberalisation trends developing within social democratic parties in this period.

While lobbying was the clear strategic preference of European unions in the long 1970s, limited examples of mobilisation also took place. The example of the ETUC-TCL's November 1980 protest action is a very rare example of unions pursuing transnational collective action as a strategy to influence world trade negotiations in this era. It is notable that the GTB were also receptive to pursuing this type of action at the national level because of the opposition they faced to their demands from their own government. However, while the ultimate point of the action – greater consultation by the Commission – was a success, the mixed levels of engagement from national unions and the symbolic rather than material character of the action shows that European unions were not entirely comfortable with this kind of approach. Indeed, the fact that industrial action over massive job losses was not pursued by these same unions is testament to their preference for lobbying for a stricter MFA over the collective mobilisation of their members.

Regardless of the limitations of some of the strategies adopted by European unions to influence the MFA in the long 1970s, taken together, their broad approach was successful in achieving their core policy objective: a stricter MFA that could limit textile and clothing imports from developing countries. While there were strong societal and governmental forces favouring greater protectionism for the industry in this period, achieving it was not a given and unions played a vital role in securing a stricter MFA which helped slow the decline of the European sector. Taken more broadly, however, greater protectionism in the long 1970s did not save the European textile and clothing industry which ultimately did succumb to the pressures of neoliberal globalisation at a later stage.

Furthermore, European trade unions' second key policy objective in this period, the social clause, was not achieved either. Although the issue being increasingly discussed by national governments, the European Commission and the GATT Textiles Committee in this period was testament to European trade unions' advocacy, it is also debatable how close the social clause ever came to being integrated into the MFA. Nonetheless, these efforts can be seen as a key contribution to the issue becoming far more prominent in the contemporary period when trade unions would again advocate the policy as a means of bringing a social dimension to globalisation and free trade at the multilateral level.

	TUC	DGB	CGT	ETUC
Agenda-setting	Strong	Mixed	Weak	Mixed
Coalition building	Strong	Mixed	Weak	Strong
Lobbying	Strong	Mixed	Weak	Strong
Mobilisation	Weak	Mixed	Weak	Mixed
Structural Power	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak
Associative Power	Strong	Mixed	Mixed	Weak
Institutional Power	Strong	Strong	Weak	Weak
Discursive Power	Strong	Mixed	Weak	Mixed
POS	Strong	Mixed	Weak	Mixed
MOC	Strong	Mixed	Weak	Weak
Framing	Strong	Mixed	Weak	Mixed

Table 1: Comparison of trade union strategies and resources during MFA negotiations

Chapter 4

European trade unions in the contemporary period: Adapting to new challenges

This chapter will analyse the three national trade union case studies that form the basis of this thesis before analysing the ETUC and finally the relevant international confederations in the contemporary period of this thesis. Specifically, this chapter will highlight each national confederation's membership size, collective bargaining coverage, and union density, their ideological orientation and links with political parties, and their attitude towards European integration during the analysed period. For the ETUC and international confederations, only their general structure and ideological orientation will be analysed.

As in Chapter 1, the purpose of outlining these key issues for each trade union confederation is firstly to establish factors that may have helped or hindered their ability to influence world trade negotiations in this period (which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6). Specifically, by analysing these factors it will be possible to assess how the four union confederations' power resources and capacity to influence have changed over time and whether this also played a role in European trade unions' specific approach to world trade negotiations in this period.

TUC

By the beginning of the twenty-first century the TUC remained the sole confederation of UK labour but was no longer the largest single union organisation in Europe having fallen behind the DGB. Between 1979 and 2003 its membership fell by around 50% to 6.6 million (Ebbinghaus and Visser, 2000, p. 746; Eurofound, 2009) and had declined by a further 8.5% by 2017 (Vandaele, 2019, pp. 11-12). Furthermore, union density in the UK had decreased

from over half of the working population to just over 20% over the same period (Ebbinghaus and Visser, 2000, p. 747; Vandaele, 2019, p. 47). This dual decline in union membership and density therefore also had a major impact on UK unions' collective bargaining coverage which also dropped from 70% to 28% (Visser, 2011; Vandaele, 2019, p. 16). This has also been reflected in a precipitous decline in the number of unions in the UK – by more than 200 between 1980 and 2005 alone – leading to a plethora of 'defensive mergers' which have seen smaller unions absorbed into large multi-sector 'general' unions like Unite the Union (Waddington, 2006).

While neoliberal policies that directly attacked unions' role in society occurred across much of Europe throughout the 1980s and 90s, the vigour with which it was pursued in the UK by both Conservative and ('New') Labour governments was a central factor in reducing union influence, not least through de-industrialisation. While structural changes played the largest part in union decline, the response of union leaderships to the onslaught against their members – particularly after the Miners' Strike of 1984-85 – was predominantly one of accommodation rather than resistance (McIlroy, 2011). Indeed, it has been argued by Darlington and Mustchin (2019, p. 643) that the TUC, almost without exception, behaved "in a cautious, if not restraining, fashion towards workers' struggles" throughout this period.

Structural economic changes and the TUC's accommodationist approach were also reflected in key organisational changes that took place during its 'relaunch' in 1994 when it took a decisive shift towards a form of 'managerial unionism' that sought to improve the confederation's effectiveness through the adoption of contemporary management techniques (Heery and Kelly, 1994). In contrast to past reforms, the purpose of these changes was not to facilitate a more balanced representation of unions within the TUC (Coates and Topham, 1988, pp. 134-135) but to place greater reliance on the confederation's staff and streamline its decision-making processes. The most important shift in this respect was the removal of the

traditional Standing Committees of the General Council and the nine Industry Committees which have been replaced by a series of committees representing marginalised workers and broader political themes (TUC, 2020a).

While the TUC is arguably now more sociologically representative and inclusive than it has ever been, its industrial power has been severely weakened as a result of structural factors and strategic choices. On this basis there has at times been an acknowledgement by the TUC itself that it now retains little power over its affiliates but still hopes that members will follow its lead by setting an example (Carter and Cooper, 2002). To try and achieve this the TUC has placed a far greater emphasis on training and educating workplace representatives since its 1994 relaunch, allowing affiliates more autonomy over collective bargaining issues (Parker, 2008; McIlroy, 2008). This shift has also been combined with greater collaboration with CSOs, which began in the 1990s but became more prominent as the UK labour movement in general sought to build coalitions with community organisations in opposition to austerity policies (Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman, 2013, p. 151; Wright, 2010).

The TUC's organisational changes also reflected a shift in its ideological orientation. TUC General Secretary John Monks (1993-2003), a major proponent of Europeanisation within the UK labour movement, sought to modernise the TUC by advocating "a politics predicated on extension to Britain of an idealised model of the social market, social partnership, social dialogue and protections for labour perceived as successful in Europe" (McIlroy, 2007, p. 90). On this basis the TUC pursued the ideology of partnership, first with the Conservative government, and then through political convergence with the LP, accepting a great deal of the anti-union legislation supported by both parties in the process (Hay, 1999). In this respect neoliberalism played a key role in pushing both the leaderships of the TUC, many of its member unions, and the LP into an accommodation with some of its core facets, a

process that also occurred across much of the European labour movement (Bieler, 2006; Upchurch et al., 2009).

The LP under the leadership of Tony Blair was a far cry from the party of the 1970s. Most significantly, the party had replaced its commitment to the public ownership of industry that had existed in its constitution since 1918 - 'Clause Four' - with a statement referring to the centrality of the market and competition (McIlroy, 2009, p. 45). Though unions broadly welcomed Labour's 1997 election victory they were by this stage far weaker actors. Blair himself, in addition to much of 'New' Labour's leadership, had no roots in the labour movement and viewed the party-union link as an electoral handicap. It therefore dealt with the union 'problem' in three ways: modernising the party by purging the left and diluting union power in the form of its block vote at party congress and in leadership elections; maintaining and extending anti-union legislation initially brought in by the Conservatives; and encouraging "an ideological shift in thinking away from traditional adversarialism towards a consensus-based system of industrial relations" (Upchurch et al., 2009, p. 96).

The LP also sought to reduce its financial dependence on the unions and alienated huge numbers of union members by adopting policies which provoked their opposition (Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman, 2013, p. 144). This led to the rise in a new generation of left-wing union leaders in the early 2000s – two of which left in the mid-2000s through disaffiliation (the Fire Brigades Union) and expulsion after supporting rival left-wing candidates to LP nominees (the Rail, Maritime and Transport union). Other unions retained their membership but drastically reduced their financial backing of the party (Hamann and Kelly, 2004, pp. 95-96). This process continued throughout the 2000s and 2010s (even after Blair left the party leadership) until the election of left-winger Jeremy Corbyn in 2015, despite the change to a 'one member, one vote' system of leadership election immediately prior to his election meaning that affiliated union members would have to register separately as party members. It

was therefore only under Corbyn's leadership that trade unions temporarily enjoyed renewed influence over LP policy, though this was tempered by deep internal divisions within the party, which still retained a strong Blairite presence, and the trade union movement over Brexit and the party's leftward turn (*Financial Times*, 2017; Watts and Bale, 2019).

DGB

By the start of the 2000s the DGB was the largest single labour confederation in Europe and had undergone some dramatic changes in its membership composition since German reunification. For example, despite reaching a new membership peak of 13.7 million in 1991 by integrating trade unions from the former German Democratic Republic - which contributed to a total increase of more than four million members (43%) virtually overnight - between 1979 and 2003 its overall membership still fell by more than two million (Ebbinghaus and Visser, 2000, p. 323; Eurofound, 2009). Taken between 1991 and 2003 this fall was even more dramatic and accounted for a loss of 6.4 million members (47%) in 12 years (Ebbinghaus and Visser, 2000, p. 323; Eurofound, 2009) and declined by further 10% by 2017 (Vandaele, 2019, pp. 11-12). Naturally, this impacted union density in Germany which also declined by over 50% since 1979 to a mere 15% in 2017 (Ebbinghaus and Visser, 2000, p. 332; Vandaele, 2019, p. 43).

Collective bargaining coverage in Germany did not drop by the same dramatic extent as the UK despite a similar membership decline but was still around 20% less than it was in the late-1970s (Visser, 2011; Vandaele, 2019, p. 16). This can in large part be attributed to the German system of co-determination which retained a key role in the country's industrial relations culture and was strengthened by the German labour movement in the 2000s despite resistance from employer organisations (Sylvia, 2013, p. 5). The major decline in the DGB's

membership was also reflected in a series of mergers that have reduced its member unions from 16 in the 1970s to eight at present (Waddington, 2006, p. 643). In this environment, much like the TUC, the DGB has also ceded a more autonomy to its member unions and instead plays a more limited role, lobbying and campaigning for labour interests and coordinating labour-focused education and research through the Hans Böckler Stiftung (Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman, 2013, p. 85).

Whilst the DGB experienced similar challenges to unions elsewhere in Europe in the 1980s in the form of deindustrialisation and neoliberal policies, these tendencies were less marked in West Germany and the Kohl government showed less hostility to the labour movement than some other conservative governments (Hyman, 2001, p. 127). However, though the entrenched rights of work councils and the culture of co-determination initially remained strong and helped stabilise union decline in the 1980s, it arguably led to a complacency among the DGB and other union leaders that left the labour movement unprepared for the far greater challenges of the 1990s (Hassel, 2007).

The Kohl government, seeking a reduction in wages and social spending and an increase in labour productivity, could not achieve these aims without attacking the core features of *Modell Deutschland* but maintained social dialogue with unions and employers to try and moderate wage growth in exchange for employment security (Upchurch et al., 2009, p. 71). In fact, the impetus for this shift did not simply stem from the government but actually came from IG Metall who called for an ‘Alliance for Jobs’, hoping to limit job losses and social security cuts (Streeck and Hassel, 2003, p. 108). This process also took place at industry and company level in this period and collective bargaining became more decentralised and increasingly took on the character of concession bargaining which has permeated German union strategies ever since (Eurofound, 1999a). These policies became more entrenched during the SPD-Green coalition of 1998-2005 and marked a shift away from

the neo-corporatism of the 1970s to “a neo-liberalized form of competitive corporatism designed to enhance the international competitiveness of German firms by seeking concessions from the unions” (Upchurch et al., 2009, p. 71). In times of economic crisis throughout the 2000s and 2010s, the DGB has found itself playing a role in ‘corporatist crisis management’ – a trend that has a long history in German politics (Esser, 1982) – and accepting pay agreements that have even been criticised as ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ policies (Flassbeck, 2010). Though this offered unions a role in decision-making processes at national, sectoral and company level, it was on very different basis to past neo-corporatist structures and ultimately came from a position of weakness rather than strength.

The DGB’s relationship with the SPD was also strained in a similar way to the TUC’s relationship with the LP, throughout the 2000s, but not to the extent that the connection lost its ‘privileged partnership’ status entirely (Schroeder, 2005). The SPD itself also underwent a process of converting to its own brand of ‘Third Way’ social democracy and led by Gerhard Schröder (in coalition with the Greens between 1998 and 2005) set about completing the social reform project started by Kohl in the 1990s (Nachtwey, 2013). Upchurch et al. (2009, p. 71) argue that since there was no alternative to the left of the SPD to which trade unionists could defect at that stage, the party initially helped to co-opt the DGB and many union members based largely on its identity as the historical defender of workers’ interests. However, this changed in 2003 with the SPD-led coalition’s launch of Agenda 2010, which was seen by the unions and the left of the SPD as an attack on the party’s fundamental principles and the ultimate abandonment of demand-led Keynesian in favour of supply side economics designed to bring Germany into line with the EU’s Lisbon Strategy (Upchurch et al., 2009, p. 72). Emblematic of the SPD leadership’s intentions to further distance the party from the unions was Schröder’s closure of the Federal Ministry of Labour – traditionally “the union stronghold inside the government machinery” (Streeck, 2003, p. 19) – and its

incorporation into a new economics ministry headed by Wolfgang Clement from the right of the SPD.

The lack of left opposition to the SPD began to change in the mid-2000s with the rise of a series of left-wing electoral formulations that eventually led to a fully-fledged political party, Die Linke (The Left), in 2007. The SPD's continued shift to the right and the rise of Die Linke also resulted in a large drop in support for the SPD among trade union members. By 2013, for example, only 36% of trade unionists voted for the SPD compared to 51% in 2002, with the main beneficiaries of this change being the CDU/CSU (33%) and Die Linke (11%) (Dribbusch and Birke, 2014, p. 2). Schroeder (2008) explains the continued fragmentation between the SPD and the DGB unions (though not necessarily their leaderships) by the fact that the former now ultimately attracts a different, far less working-class, membership than the latter. However, he also notes that this process has ultimately benefitted neither party since the DGB require a reliable political outlet for their policies and the SPD have consistently struggled to secure an electoral majority since the beginning of the 2000s (Schroeder, 2008, p. 231).

It was only in the event of the SPD suffering a major electoral defeat in 2009 that it began to orientate more strongly to the unions and begin to incorporate some of the key demands of the DGB and Die Linke such as the adoption of a national minimum wage and the option of early retirement (Dribbusch and Birke, 2014, p. 2). Overall, though the SPD-DGB relationship has clearly changed since the beginning of the 2000s and tension still exists within the party-union nexus, it is argued that as a result of German workers coming through the 2008 economic crisis and subsequent Eurocrisis "comparatively unscathed", the DGB has become more reluctant to criticise the more controversial aspects of the Grand Coalition's policies such as its approach to austerity (Dribbusch and Birke, 2014, p. 3).

CGT

The CGT's membership had already begun to decline in the late-1970s as a consequence of its political strategy and changes in France's political economy. This decline saw its membership continuously drop from over one million in 1979 to around 500,000 in the 1990s (Ebbinghaus and Visser, 2000, p. 276) and then improving to around 700,000 throughout the 2000s (Andofalto and Labbé, 2006, p. 290; de Comarmond, 15 May 2018). France's already low union density had fallen to a consistent figure of around 10% of the country's 2.5 million union members by the 2000s (Vandaele, 2019, p. 43).

In contrast to both the UK and Germany however, France's collective bargaining coverage improved at the same time as union membership declined and remained at over 95% throughout the 2000s and 2010s (Vandaele, 2019, p. 16). This trend can be explained by a marked increase in social dialogue, bargaining and worker representation at company and sectoral level and the decentralisation of the French state since the 1980s, characterised by Lallement (2006, p. 50) as "the contractualization of society". This has led to the evolution of a form of 'micro-corporatism' (Streeck, 1984) where company level worker representation is often cut off from wider labour organisations, meaning that, in the case of France, "decentralized, firm-specific collectivities of workers have a strong incentive to engage in 'wildcat cooperation' with their employers and, particularly in times of high unemployment, to engage in concessionary bargaining to safeguard jobs" (Howell, 2009, p. 236).

The CGT's relationship with the PCF, which had defined much of its post-war history, changed decisively in the 1990s and had a significant impact on the confederation's ideological and strategic orientation. As outlined in previous chapters, throughout the long 1970s CGT-PCF relations fluctuated without ever falling apart entirely. However, as the fortunes of both organisations declined markedly throughout the 1980s, critical voices within

the CGT called for greater autonomy from the PCF. As such, 1986 marked the first time in the CGT's post-war history that it did not advocate a vote for any party in either the parliamentary or presidential elections (Parsons, 2015, p. 70). At its 1995 congress the relationship changed even more dramatically when the CGT's then General Secretary, Louis Viannet, announced that he no longer needed to be an "organic liaison" between the union and the party and that he was resigning from the PCF's National Bureau (now Executive Committee). The CGT also left the communist-oriented WFTU at the same congress which decisively ended the CGT's 'transmission belt' strategy (Parsons, 2015, p. 70).

While several other PCF members remained in the CGT leadership in the late-1990s, by 2001 - when Bernard Thibault (CGT General Secretary between 1999-2013) resigned from his seat on the PCF's National Council, citing the need for greater "autonomy of thought and decision-making" within the union - the CGT had no representation on the central governing bodies of the PCF (Andolfatto and Sabot, 2004, p. 39). However, while the CGT held a more social-democratic outlook under Thibault, tensions between 'modernisers' and the pro-PCF 'orthodoxy' within the confederation still remained (Courtois and Andolfatto, 2008).

Whilst the CGT-PCF crossover no longer formally exists in the leadership of both organisations, the CGT remains the preferred union of PCF members and recent CGT general secretaries Thierry Lepaon and Philippe Martinez both have PCF backgrounds (Connolly, 2014, p. 54; de Comamond, 2015). Though its distancing from the PCF has impacted the character and strategic orientation of the CGT, it has not significantly affected its general anti-capitalist perspective and remains one of the most ideologically radical confederations both in France and Europe as a whole. In fact, due to its communist heritage and the fact that the French labour movement is already politically divided, there is arguably a far greater ideological cohesion in the CGT than in looser confederations like the TUC or DGB where

political radicalism is more likely to emanate from individual federations than from the leadership of the confederation itself.

Throughout the contemporary period the voting preferences of CGT members have also reflected a continued distancing from the PCF. In presidential elections the main beneficiaries have either been the PS or other far-left electoral coalitions (Parsons, 2015, p. 72). However, the collapse in support for the two of the traditional parties of the Fifth Republic – the PS and Les Républicains – in the 2017 election marked another shift in CGT members' voting preferences with 51% throwing their support behind the new left-wing political platform La France Insoumise ('Unbowed France') (Harris Interactive, 2017). Importantly, and perhaps reflective of the unstable and contradictory nature of working-class political representation in France over the last 20 years, support for the far-right Front National among CGT members has remained between 9-15% since 2002 (Parsons, 2015, p. 72; Harris Interactive, 2017).

The CGT's gradual distancing from the PCF has also seen a shift in its general strategy. The confederation's re-evaluation of its relationship with the PCF was only one facet of the wider changes it went through in the 1990s which were escalated by the pace of deindustrialisation in France, thus deepening the CGT's main problems of declining membership and influence. This reflected a rapid change in the class composition of its membership and by 1998 alone 27% of CGT members were white collar workers such as teachers, technicians, managers, and engineers (Andolfatto, 2004, p. 24). To attempt to reverse its ongoing decline the CGT strategically sought to re-establish its mass character by deliberately opening itself up to the newly diverse workforce and develop "a coherent strategy including unified union action around immediate demands and propositions for economic change" (Upchurch et al., 2009, p. 128).

Given the above, the CGT's renewal process of the 1990s was inextricably linked to the confederation's distancing from the PCF and ultimately meant that it no longer identified

itself as a union of class struggle, but instead as a union based on radical propositions (Connolly, 2014, p. 53). The CGT is also argued to have played a noticeably more unifying role in the French labour movement than in previous decades (Upchurch et al., 2009, pp. 130-131). Pension reform has remained the most enduring issue for the CGT and other French unions since the beginning of the twenty-first century and has intermittently provided points of contestation for the unions to mobilise in large numbers, but without ultimately being able to halt the reforms. For example, despite their low density and membership numbers, the French labour movement was able to organise days of action involving between 1 and 3.5 million people on eleven separate occasions between May and November 2010 (Ancelovici, 2011; Bérout, Dompnier and Garibay, 2011).

More recently, the CGT has also been central in resisting the controversial 2016 El Khomri laws which sought to establish even greater de-regulation and flexibilisation in French employment law. The law provoked large mobilisations from the trade unions and wider society, with the CGT using the most militant tactics such as blockading oil refineries and a series of strikes on public transport and at nuclear power plants in the hope of forcing the complete removal of the bill (de Royer 2016). This militancy has continued under the Macron government which has explicitly targeted the conditions of rail workers, arguably the CGT's greatest area of strength (Ross, 2019). These recent changes not only highlight the desire of successive French governments to further marginalise trade union power, but also that the CGT under Philippe Martinez is willing to resurrect the more militant tactics of its past.

ETUC

Changes within the ETUC towards the end of the twentieth century were primarily driven by the pace of European integration and, relatedly, the collapse of communism in CEE. Over time both processes would offer the confederation greater opportunities to influence the European institutions based on expanded competences and membership. Having struggled to establish itself as an influential actor throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, both within the European labour movement and from the perspective of the European institutions, the mid to late-1980s saw the revival of European integration through the Single European Act and, with it, a renewed impetus for the ETUC.

The confederation and its member unions were initially sceptical of the single market project, and its 1985 Congress only accepted it on the condition that it was accompanied by macroeconomic policies that could prevent regional disparities and stimulate new employment, that a 'European social dimension' was simultaneously established, and that European industrial policies were also developed (Gobin, 1996, p. 623). However, the ETUC and previously critical member unions like the TUC were gradually won over to the project by Commission President Delors who "made a strong plea for trade union support of his commitment and conviction of the need to promote a strong social dimension based on binding social dialogue and collective agreements, together with co-ordinated macro-economic policies promoting growth and employment" (Dølvik, 1997, p. 153). The fact that this message found an echo among trade unions that were increasingly being ostracised at domestic level is best exemplified by the largely unforeseen turn of the British labour movement towards firm support for European integration, thus removing a central barrier to the ETUC's own renewed impetus.

Given the above, it is no coincidence that the ETUC's 7th Statutory Congress in 1991 focused primarily on the need for greater cooperation and the desire to become a genuinely European organisation capable of EU level collective bargaining rather than merely a body of national union organisations. To achieve this, ETUC President Ernst Breit outlined the organisational changes that would be required, arguing that "the ETUC must be given more power of a 'supranational' nature which means a revision of decision-making procedures and hence, obviously, a revision of its statutes as a consequence" (ETUC, 1991, p. 30). These debates were naturally influenced by events in CEE at this time and the prospect of the gradual introduction of confederations from the east, the majority of whom joined between 1995 and 2012 (Degryse and Tilly, 2013, pp. 74-75).

The 1991 congress made several important reforms that would contribute to it becoming a more effective and democratic organisation. This included the Executive Committee becoming more representative by ending country quotas that disregarded the number of member organisations and the confederation being granted greater financial resources from its affiliates (Degryse and Tilly, 2013, pp. 76-77). These reforms and the necessary transfer of some of its affiliates' power and resources to the European level thus marked the key turning point in the Europeanisation of the ETUC and also made it harder for larger members like the TUC and DGB to dominate.

In addition to organisational changes a myriad of 'push' and 'pull' factors have also led to changes in the attitudes of the TUC, DGB and CGT to European integration and the ETUC throughout this period. The gradual softening of the TUC and many of its affiliates to European integration that had taken place since the 1975 EEC membership referendum culminated in the 1988 'Delors Congress' when the confederation decisively became a pro-European organisation after the Commission President addressed the congress and was given

a standing ovation after he had outlined his vision of the establishment of a Social Europe (Mitchell, 2012, p. 30).

The General Council backed up its enthusiasm with the policy document *Maximising the Benefits Minimising the Costs* which argued that British workers stood to benefit from the Single Market if unions actively advanced the European social dimension (TUC, 1988). As such, the 1988 congress was an important turning point in the TUC's history for two reasons: first, while the TUC had abandoned its boycott of EC committees in the mid-1970s, 1988 was the first time it embraced the idea of playing an active role in shaping the future of Europe; and secondly, it was an acknowledgement that TUC policies could be better served by Brussels than Whitehall (Mitchell, 2012, p. 31). After its historic 1988 Congress the TUC became one of the most uncritical union supporters of European integration and the ETUC.

As '1992' approached TUC congresses consistently adopted policies geared towards greater interaction with EU institutions, the ETUC and the European labour movement in general. By 1991 it had renamed its International Department the 'European Union and International Relations Department' and established a separate Committee on European Strategy and by 1993 had set up an office in Brussels (Hyman, 2017, p. 113). Rosamond (1998, p. 131) argues that the TUC's reorientation towards Brussels meant that its "resources of information, knowledge and research capacity have enabled the General Council to accumulate "European" expertise over time [and has] allowed the TUC's leadership to define the nature of the European environment within which unions operate and to act as the main agenda setter within the union movement on questions of European integration". This was exemplified by the election of former TUC General Secretary John Monks as ETUC General Secretary in 2003.

Importantly, while the UK labour movement has largely been won over to the importance of European level influence, it is the TUC that, prior to the UK leaving the EU,

has played the most active role in lobbying European institutions and representing affiliates in the ETUC. This provided the TUC with a new focus at the same time as its old rationale - that of a national coordinator of unions and representative of labour in the UK's neo-corporatist framework - has largely disappeared (Mitchell, 2012, p. 42).

In the 2000s and 2010s the TUC also took strong pro-European positions at key times. It supported EMU on the basis that remaining outside would weaken UK export markets and on the proviso that a strong social dimension be included (Bieler, 2006, p. 104), despite strong opposition from public service and transport unions (Josselin, 2001, p. 62; Mulhearn, 2004, pp. 300-301). Before, during, and after the 2016 referendum on EU membership the TUC also firmly supported remaining in the EU as a strategy to protect jobs and workers' rights (TUC, 2015). Further, since leaving the EU the TUC has also called for 'dynamic alignment' with the EU's regulatory environment (TUC, 2020b). However, the TUC leadership's support for European integration in this period has also been undermined since the global financial crisis by a deepening Euroscepticism within the UK labour movement provoked by the increasingly neoliberal stance of the European Commission and the imposition of austerity measures (Hyman, 2017, p. 104). As such, throughout this period the TUC has tried to strike a balance between supporting 'sectoral pragmatism' (Rosamond, 1993), especially in export industries, and protecting public services from the negative effects of the EU's competition policy (Hyman, 2017, p. 103).

Jacobi (1991) argued at the beginning of the 1990s that German unions were best placed to play a "pioneering role" in the development of European level trade unionism in the 1990s and beyond due to the specifics of the country's social, economic, and political system. However, a more realistic assessment of the DGB's position on deeper integration of trade union interests at the European level at this point was that it was still broadly the same as it had been in the 1970s: firmly pro-European in principle but cautious of undermining its own

national level strength and independence (Dølvik, 1997, pp. 245-246). An explanation of this position stems from the fact that German unions were almost entirely preoccupied with the difficulties they were facing as a result of unification, unemployment and economic restructuring until the mid-1990s, with a greater European focus only truly beginning to emerge with the issue of EMU (Hoffmann, 2013, cited by Mittag, 2017, p. 30). On this issue the DGB again took a favourable if cautious approach, declaring that its “approval of economic and monetary union [EMU] remains dependent on how it is organised” and demanded that “employment policy and employment goals... are enshrined in the Treaty” (DGB, 1997).

From this point onwards the DGB and its member unions continued to take a more proactive approach to the European level. For example, the DGB played a leading role in opposing the ‘Bolkestein (Services) Directive’ and supporting the ETUC’s campaign, including several demonstrations (Mittag, 2017, p. 32). Reflective of its renewed focus on education and research, the DGB’s largest contribution to European level trade unionism in the 2000s and 2010s has arguably been through the transfer of personnel from the Hans Böckler Stiftung or its wider network to the ETUC and ETUI, the latter also taking on a more explicit ‘policy advisor’ role in relation to the former (Mittag, 2017, p. 32). A key example of this was the 2009 European Works Council (EWC) Directive which achieved the goal of “transnational codetermination” and information and consultation rights for trade unions representing workers in MNCs within the EU (Hertwig, Pries and Rampeltshammer, 2009). This is particularly pertinent since there is a close overlap between the EWC system and key aspects of the German industrial relations system.

Though the DGB now orientates strongly towards the European level and the ETUC, its member unions also play a prominent role both through the ETUC and the European level sectoral federations. As the DGB’s largest federation, IG Metall has been the most active in

this respect and has developed a range of approaches to coordinated sectoral collective bargaining on an interregional basis with unions in neighbouring countries, as well as participating in a European collective bargaining committee and information network within IndustriALL (Mittag, 2017, p. 34). IG Metall and the DGB were also very proactive in organising bilateral transnational trade union cooperation with and support for CEE unions in developing collective bargaining procedures and the expansion of works councils (Mittag, 2017, p. 35).

Based on the above there is a relatively clear division of labour between the DGB and its member unions in terms of their respective European work: the confederation predominantly focuses on larger policy issues and helps coordinate German labour interests within the ETUC while the federations focus more specifically on the political economy of European integration and its problem areas at sectoral level (Platzer, 2010, p. 5). This has meant that the German sectoral unions have been more critical supporters of EU policies at different stages. Overall, however, despite the challenges posed by the global economic crisis in the 2010s the positive and proactive attitude of the DGB and its federations to European integration has not changed significantly in the last 20 years (Mittag, 2017, p. 35).

As a result of leaving the WFTU, the CGT was finally admitted to the ETUC in 1999. However, during its own strategic and ideological re-alignment in the 1990s it had also developed a more open attitude to European integration, even though it remained critical of its neoliberal character. The fact that the CGT was admitted to the ETUC with the support of the previously hostile French confederations CFDT and CGT-FO is testament to the softening of the CGT's general perspectives and a renewed openness to working with other unions (Degryse and Tilly, 2013, p. 72). From the very beginning of its integration into the ETUC it sought to encourage the organisation of Euro-demonstrations as a means of generating

grassroots activism within the confederation in line with its own traditions rather than primarily focusing on elite level trade unionism (Rocatti, 2017, p. 62).

In response to its previous isolation from the ETUC, the CGT's leadership have sought to develop the European and international strands of the confederation's work by developing extensive education and training for its activists, carrying out consultations on European and international issues at sectoral and regional levels which are then integrated into its national strategy (Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman, 2013, p. 166). However, it is also argued that the CGT has taken a top-down approach to these issues, evidenced by the fact that its leadership pushed ahead with its integration into the ETUC and the ITUC despite opposition from many of its activists (Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman, 2013, p. 166). This opposition reflects an ambivalence to European integration that has persisted amongst French workers and trade unionists for many decades (Rocatti, 2017).

Conflicting attitudes to European integration within the CGT and the French left in general is summed up by key debates on European integration throughout the 2000s. Essentially, despite softening its overall position throughout the 1990s, the CGT still opposed the general character of European integration if not the concept itself. Examples of this type of position include the referendum on the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, which the confederation advocated a 'no' vote for based on its opposition to the monetarist contents of the convergence criteria (Bieler, 2006, p. 114). This attitude also extended to EMU (Josselin, 2001, pp. 60-61). The referendum on the European Constitutional Treaty highlighted some of the deeper divisions within the confederation at the time. The CGT leadership did not take a firm position for two key reasons: politically, it was concerned with the more neoliberal aspects of the proposed treaty reform, but General Secretary Bernard Thibault argued that there were aspects such as the Charter of Fundamental Rights that were worthy of support (Crespy, 2008, p. 38); tactically, it was aware of the firm opposition of its activists but did not

want to be sidelined within the ETUC (Rocatti, 2017, p. 54). This led to its National Confederal Committee breaking ranks and calling for a position of firm opposition to the Constitutional Treaty which eventually forced the CGT leadership to adopt a fudge position that simply called for Europe to ‘change course’ (Rocatti, 2017, pp. 54-55).

Since the Eurocrisis the CGT has taken a far more critical stance on the direction of European integration whilst still supporting European mechanisms and institutions to achieve its aims. For example, on the one hand, the CGT opposed the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact in response to the European debt crisis and subsequent austerity measures based on their neoliberal character (Pernot, 2013, p. 88). On the other hand, however, the union called on the European Central Bank to finance public investment projects as well as the need for “fiscal and social harmonisation within the European Union” (CGT, 2012). Under the leadership of Philippe Martinez, the CGT’s condemnation of neoliberal austerity and the EU institutions that these policies emanate from have also become stronger and more openly internationalist, calling for “a European Union which is social, fair, united and which protects the weakest and takes care of the poorest... [and] which promotes workers' rights, employment and quality work” (CGT, 2015).

Another important element of the ETUC’s ongoing reform agenda has been changes to the status of the European industry committees (now European trade union federations (ETUFs)). In 1991 the industry committees were adopted as ETUC members and given one-third of the votes on the Executive Committee and at Congress, thus ending the ‘satellite’ status that many had held in relation to the ETUC since the 1970s (Dølvik, 2000, p. 63). Important mergers of ETUFs have also taken place since the 1990s. However, Müller and Platzer (2017, p. 296) argue that despite many improvements in terms of their organisation and transnational cooperation, the ETUFs power resources are generally still weakly

developed and suffer from being, by nature, second-order organisations behind their national affiliates.

The ETUC's patterns of representation and mobilisation have also changed at different stages in the contemporary period. Throughout the 1990s, for example, "Through the new social dialogue process, the ETUC and the peak employers' associations reached a number of social agreements in the 1990s, and it was possible to imagine that the EU was developing into a neo-corporatist system, where the ETUC would play an important role in defining social policies" (Mitchell, 2014, p. 405). Similarly, the establishment of EWCs as a mechanism of employee participation in MNCs is something the ETUC achieved in 1994 and later bolstered in 2009 (Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman, 2013, p. 186). However, the ETUC's achievements regarding both social dialogue and EWCs alone have since drawn criticism on the grounds of limited efficacy, scale, and power (Streeck, 1997, Müller, Platzer and Rüb, 2011; De Spiegelaere, 2016). The increasingly neoliberal trajectory of the EU since the turn of the twenty-first century and the Eurozone crisis has meant that tripartite agreements emanating from institutionalised social dialogue have stalled, to the extent that the Commission felt compelled to launch the 'New start for Social Dialogue' project in 2015 (European Commission, 2015a).

The stalling of social dialogue since the beginning of the 2000s has led to a wider debate – both inside and outside of the confederation – over what tactics the ETUC should employ to advance the interests of European workers. Mitchell (2014, p. 405) argues that three clear options exist: retain a primary focus on social partnership in the hope that employers' organisations are willing to negotiate over key policy issues; refocus and renew its efforts as a peak level pressure group to shape policy by lobbying the EU institutions; or place less emphasis on 'insider' influence and focus more on 'outsider' tactics such as mass demonstrations. The latter option is something the ETUC has increasingly adopted. Between

2000 and 2013, for example, the ETUC organised or helped co-ordinate 25 centralised and decentralised ‘Euro-demonstrations’ or days of action, nearly twice the number it had managed to achieve in the first 27 years of its history (Degryse and Tilly, 2013, pp. 239-241).

Likewise, the anti-Bolkestein Directive campaign serves as an example of how the ETUC has at times been able to successfully draw on insider and outsider tactics (Crespy, 2010; Leiren and Parks, 2014). On the other hand, the campaign was also emblematic of the limits of the ETUC’s overwhelming focus on advocacy, lobbying and social dialogue, as the ETUC, national trade unions and other interested societal actors were not consulted throughout the drafting process of the directive whilst business and industry interests dominated its formative stages (Parks, 2009; Leiren and Parks, 2014, p. 461). Indeed, Hyman (2013, pp. 174-174) argues that “Mass mobilisation under the auspices of the ETUC is invariably symbolic, controlled and subordinated to its ‘real’ work within the Brussels institutions”.

With regards to its overall strategic approach, Gläser (2009) argues that the ETUC has always faced two dilemmas that are an inescapable form of weakness. The first dilemma has been between its representativeness and its capacity to act, or the “logic of membership” versus the “logic of influence” in Dølvik’s (1997) formulation. Hyman (2013, p. 171) explains this dilemma in more detail:

The former requires unions to maintain their representative credentials by articulating the wishes and interests of their constituents. The latter requires them to adapt their aims and methods to the actual decision-making processes on which they wish to exert an impact. Balancing the two logics is a difficult art: neglect the logic of influence and one’s demands may be ineffectual; neglect the logic of membership, and one loses representative legitimacy.

Further, Dølvik and Visser (2001, p. 32) note that social partnership has held a seductive appeal for the ETUC and comes with the risk of being co-opted by the EU

institutions. As such, the ETUC have over time become more embedded in the EU's technocratic (Erne, 2008) and depoliticised (Goetschy, 2003) forms of decision-making which rely heavily on expert networks and comitology and not the power and input of ordinary trade unionists.

These factors are also closely related to the ETUC's second major dilemma which is between political independence and financial dependence on the European institutions, or 'the dilemma of borrowed resources' (Martin and Ross, 2001). This problem originally stemmed from the reluctance of member unions to grant the ETUC power and resources of its own and it therefore had to "seek its building materials elsewhere, from friendly, but self-interested, European institutional elites" (Martin and Ross, 2001, p. 54). Naturally, this has not only come at a cost to the confederation's political independence but has arguably had a more profound impact on its overall strategy and position within the European labour movement by allowing itself to become a part of the 'Brussels lobbying community' of 'professional Europeans' that have become entrenched in the world of 'Eurospeak' (Hyman, 2011, p. 22). As such, though the ETUC has unquestionably grown in terms of its strength, representativeness, and formal access to European institutions, it still struggles to channel these features into proportionate influence on the EU (Mitchell, 2014, p. 404).

ICFTU/ITUC

The three national trade union confederations featured in this thesis were all members of the ICFTU by the beginning of the twenty-first century due to the CGT leaving the WFTU in 1995 (though some of its federations have retained their affiliation). The end of the Cold War played a key role in the expansion of the ICFTU, which in addition to the CGT and a few other European affiliates gained many members from CEE and the former Soviet Union from

the WFTU (Bourque and Hennebert, 2011, p. 3). Furthermore, the ICFTU merged with the Christian-democratic World Confederation of Labour in 2006, leading to the formation of the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC).

As a result, the ICFTU/ITUC's membership has increased drastically from when Cold War divisions were entrenched to the present day, numbering approximately 58 million in 1978 (Kirchner, 1980, p. 125), 100 million in 1989 (Myconos, 2005, p. 197), 148 million in 2004 (ICFTU, 2004) and 207 million in 2018 (ITUC, 2018). This membership expansion has also diluted the problem of Eurocentrism that was previously a feature of the ICFTU with Western European unions now only accounting for around 25% of its total membership (Hyman, 2013, p. 162), compared to 57% of its far smaller membership in 1978, for instance (Kirchner, 1980, p. 125).

In addition to a reconfiguration of international trade unionism after the end of the Cold War, another key impetus behind the 2006 formation of the ITUC stemmed from the intensification of neoliberal globalisation. A notable response to this, which preceded the formation of the ITUC, was the establishment of Global Union Federations (GUFs), which replaced the old International Trade Secretariats (ITSs) of the ICFTU in 2002 and whose title was "no longer accurate as the dividing line between different employment categories had become blurred" (Munck, 2011, p. 298). Though Bendt (2003, p. 34) argues that the GUFs "are the most significant direct opponents of [transnational corporations, TNCs] when it comes to interventions", it is also acknowledged that they have struggled to secure binding collective agreements.

As in the past, it remains the case that the division of labour between the ITUC and the GUFs is that the former predominantly focuses on policy matters while the latter focus on economic matters such as the introduction of minimum social standards in MNCs (Munck, 2011, p. 299). They also remain varied in their ideological and political orientation,

governance arrangements, and capacity for engagement while many have retained the hierarchical vestiges of the old ITSs (Ford and Gillan, 2015, p. 489). Importantly, the GUFs have also retained their official autonomy from the ITUC but now partake in ‘structured partnership’ through the Council of Global Unions (Gumbrell-McCormick, 2013b, p. 191).

Despite an increase in their power and capabilities, much like the ETUC the ITUC and its GUFs have both been criticised for their adherence to a cautious political strategy in the face of neoliberal globalisation. Munck (2011, p. 299), for example, argues that “They produce a lot of (rather moderate) documents and statements, but they do not seem to be very eager to mobilise industrial actions or initiate solidarity movements”. Likewise, Ford and Gillan (2015, p. 489) speak of GUFs’ “avoidance of contentious political engagement and their ideological and institutional moorings in European style ‘social partnership’”. Another important issue that the ITUC has been unable to resolve throughout its history is a trend towards bureaucratism and distance from ordinary members, a problem that has been a feature of international trade union organisations for over a century (Hyman, 2005).

With these criticisms in mind, Gumbrell-McCormick (2013b, pp. 193-200) argues that the ITUC continues to face several internal and external challenges. Internally, while growth and unity has provided new opportunities for action, they may also create obstacles to it. This challenge stems from the ideological breadth of the confederation which can make consensus difficult to achieve and may also explain the moderate nature of the ITUC’s policies. Similarly, the ITUC has still not fully addressed the issue of allowing its federations autonomy while building cooperation among the GUFs and coordination with the confederal body.

Externally, though the ITUC is larger than ever, it has still struggled to challenge the WFTU in important regions like the Far and Middle East. Also, the WFTU remains a pole of attraction for more radical trade unions globally but also, to a lesser extent, within Europe in

crucial economic sectors like rail transport. This also relates to a wider challenge and criticism of the ITUC concerning its timidity in action and ideology and the argument that the confederation became institutionalised and captured by the institutions it seeks to influence a long time ago (Waterman, 1998).

Finally, a major challenge faced by all trade unions is their ability to organise unorganised and precarious workers. For the ITUC this is especially challenging as this kind of work often requires grassroots organising but also because the institutions it is most embedded in, such as the ILO and other intergovernmental organisations, “do not have anything close to the power resources of nation states; they depend heavily, if not entirely, on the willingness of member states to implement international labour and other standards in national legislation” (Gumbrell-McCormick, 2013, p. 199; Douglas, Ferguson and Klett, 2004). As such, the ITUC has found it increasingly difficult to challenge neoliberal globalisation and reform global governance institutions in workers’ favour throughout the 2000s and 2010s.

Conclusion

This chapter has provided a multilevel analysis of the TUC, DGB, CGT and ETUC in the contemporary period to help understand and provide context for their respective approaches to trade and strategies to influence world trade negotiations in chapters 5 and 6. It has specifically focused on the strength of each national confederation – by analysing membership size and national collective bargaining coverage and union density – their ideological orientation and links with political parties, and their attitudes towards European integration during the analysed period. The chapter has also outlined the development of the

ETUC and the situation facing the ICFTU/ITUC in this period by analysing their general structure and ideological orientation.

By the contemporary period the TUC, DGB and CGT were all fundamentally weaker collective organisations than in the long 1970s. Huge declines in membership and union density as well as less beneficial party-political relations were the clearest expressions of the diminished associative power felt by European trade unions in this period. While collective bargaining coverage did not decrease in Germany or France, changes in the character of collective bargaining represented a weakened form of institutional power compared to the 1970s. The primary structural reasons for these changes were the processes of neoliberal economic restructuring and globalisation that took place throughout the 1980s and 1990s in Europe and globally. Further, at the ideological level neoliberalism profoundly changed the character of social democratic parties which unions like the TUC and DGB had previously enjoyed close links with. Whilst the CGT decided to change its political strategy by breaking ties with the PCF it also struggled to find a secure political ally in this period.

Given this decline in strength at the national level, the most significant shift in this period has been a major reorientation to the European level by the TUC, DGB and CGT. This change not only reflects declining resources and opportunities at the national level, but also the increased pace and importance of European integration and broader processes of globalisation. Indeed, the change in attitudes towards European integration in all three national confederations from the long 1970s has been dramatic. In this context, European unions have sought new opportunities at the European level and have attached greater resources and strategic focus to this level accordingly. As a result, the ETUC is a profoundly different actor to what it was in the 1970s. Since the 1990s it has been emboldened by a significant increase in membership, resources, political opportunities, power, and capacity to influence. As such, in this period it truly became a genuine European trade union organisation

instead of an organisation of European trade unions. Another key factor behind this, again in contrast to the long 1970s, has been increased coherence and cooperation within the European and international labour movement since the end of the Cold War. This is exemplified by the rapid development of the ITUC since its foundation in 2006.

Nonetheless, despite this changed and seemingly positive situation, question marks still exist over unions' capacity to influence the European and international levels given their weakened power resources and a POS that still offers limited avenues of influence to trade unions. While unions have increased their MOC at the European and international levels, these changes have largely taken place within the boundaries provided by the POS rather than as a challenge to it. This has in turn led to concerns that the ETUC and ITUC can be strategically conservative, too disconnected from their members, and too embedded in the structures they seek to influence to be truly effective. These concerns have increased in volume as successful examples of influence have gradually declined since the 1990s.

The changes discussed in this chapter represent European trade unions' attempts to adapt to a new situation in which their power and capacity to influence had been fundamentally challenged by huge economic and political shifts at the national, European, and global level. While European unions had a greater capacity act at the European level compared to the long 1970s, this capacity came about through lost power at the national level. As such, while European unions were more organisationally capable of influencing world trade, neoliberal hegemony and diminished power did not appear to provide conditions that were conducive to greater influence. As will be discussed in chapters 5 and 6, these factors would have a major impact on the policies and strategies European unions sought to utilise to influence world trade negotiations in this period.

Chapter 5

Policy objectives and avenues of influence in the contemporary period:

Fighting for fair and sustainable globalisation

In contrast to the 1970s, the trade policies of EU member states have become more homogenous over time as a result of globalisation, the widening and deepening of European integration, and an expanded world trade agenda. Trade union approaches to trade have also been affected by this trend with the ETUC playing a far greater role in developing a unified approach to trade amongst its affiliates. However, the ETUC's trade policy is also a reflection of the complex interplay between competing interests and ideologies among national trade unions on trade issues.

It is in this context that European trade unions have consistently fought for the broader position of 'fair and sustainable globalisation', a position that accepts the logic of globalisation and free trade providing these processes also respect fundamental rights, sustainable development, and social dialogue (ILO, 2002). However, while this broader position remains a key aspect of European unions' trade policy agenda, the TUC, DGB, CGT and ETUC have become more critical of the EU's free trade agenda since it began pursuing more aggressively neoliberal policies through bilateral agreements.

The globalisation and the widening and deepening of EU trade policy has also impacted the avenues available for trade unions to influence trade policy which have also become more weighted to the European level. Furthermore, as explained in the previous chapter, trade union power at the national level has significantly declined, leaving national unions with far fewer avenues of influence. However, the politicisation of trade that has taken place since the late-1990s has also pressurised national, European, and international institutions to provide greater consultative mechanisms for CSOs including trade unions. More significantly, the

development of a wider transnational civil society movement that mobilises over trade issues has provided new opportunities for unions to influence trade policy at the same time as more traditional avenues of influence have receded.

This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section of this chapter analyses the trade objectives of European trade unions during the contemporary period and some of the complex issues that inform them. The second section will highlight the key avenues of influence available for trade unions to attempt to influence world trade negotiations and trade policy at the national, European, and international level during this period.

Policy objectives

As a testament to increased integration, Europeanisation and globalisation, the trade policies of European trade unions broadly overlap with the positions taken first by their national confederations, secondly, by the ETUC, and finally - and to a lesser extent since the mid-2000s - the ITUC. This is also true of national sectoral unions and their confederations, though they are more likely to have specific demands relating to industrial policy and the intricacies of their sector.

The greater cohesion in European trade unions' approach to trade is reflected in how the ETUC's general trade policy has been developed since the mid-2000s. Prior to the EU moving away from multilateralism as the Doha Development Round ground to a halt, international trade issues were mainly dealt with by the ICFTU, though the ETUC was a member of the ICFTU's Trade, Investment and Labour Standards (TILS) network (T. Jenkins, interview). During this period the International Matters, Trade and International Development Committee was set up under ETUC General Secretary John Monks and now meets three or four times a year. The committee has always been chaired by an elected

member of the confederation's Secretariat and includes one representative from each EU country and the ETUFs (Interviews with T. Jenkins and D. Basso). Final ratification of positions and disagreements that cannot be resolved within the committee are put to the Executive Committee. Importantly, the relevant regional federations and confederations of the ITUC have also been involved in these discussions for bilateral agreements with the aim of developing, if possible, a joint union position, a process that is made easier by the fact that the ETUC and ITUC are based in the same building in Brussels (D. Basso, interview).

Despite increased organisational Europeanisation within the European labour movement the process of developing a unified European trade union trade policy is still complex due to competing ideologies and interests within the ETUC. This also makes it hard for the ETUC and sometimes national confederations to develop nuanced positions. However, the four confederal unions in this thesis all take a similar approach in attempting to reach a clear and unified position on trade issues. General trade policy is naturally guided by the decisions of each national confederation's respective democratic congress. Given that the TUC is the only national confederation to hold an annual congress, the trade advisors or international officers of the national confederations play a key role in working on these general policies between congresses by developing draft position papers on trade issues based on the known attitudes of their affiliates. These draft positions are then discussed in each confederation's respective democratic structures and working groups until a consensus position can be found and validated by the confederation's executive committee (Interviews with R. Crawford, W. Jäcklein and N. Rohde).

The ETUC and the ITUC also use a similar but more aggregated method in developing a general trade union position through consultation with their affiliates (Interviews with D. Basso and Y. Altintzis, interview). The ICFTU initiated this kind of process for trade policy in the late-1990s through the founding of the TILS mailing list – which now contains around

850 contacts from trade unions across the world – to provide a more responsive forum for unions to share information and opinions on trade issues (J. Howard, interview).

The above process is now well-established given that trade union interest in trade has increased markedly over the last 10-15 years due to the number of trade deals being negotiated and the breadth of their social, economic, and political scope (Interviews with T. Jenkins and J. Howard). However, the actors involved in developing a joint approach to trade at the national, European, and international level are all keenly aware of the complexity of achieving this.

The primary divisions that exist within the labour movement in this context essentially boil down to competing attitudes to world trade that are influenced by national economic interests and/or ideology in determining whether any one union organisation is more pro- or anti-free trade than the other. For example, there have traditionally been divisions between private and public sector unions – even within the same country – on the basis that trade liberalisation is more likely to benefit the former and negatively impact the latter. This can also be applied globally, with some public sector unions in the Global South taking very radical anti-free trade positions while private sector unions with a greater interest in the economic development of their country and region sometimes wholly endorse trade liberalisation and accuse unions from the Global North of protectionism (Hilary, 2014).

Furthermore, even within export-oriented sectors of the European economy there are often differences in attitudes between unions in the East and West and North and South. The automotive sector serves as a good example of the political and industrial issues that can unite and divide European trade unions which go some way towards explaining the nuances of the TUC's, DGB's and CGT's trade policies. Indeed, the automotive sector is emblematic of the dilemmas that trade unions face regarding their trade policies when a tension between

securing employment and maintaining competitiveness clearly exists, both of which are positively and negatively impacted by trade liberalisation to different degrees.

The European automotive sector remains one of the EU's most crucial manufacturing industries. In 2013, for example, the sector employed 12.2 million workers (5.6% of total EU employment), while in 2015 it accounted for 20% of global motor vehicle production and provided a €100 billion annual trade surplus (ACEA, 2017). Given the above, Unite the Union (UK), IG Metall (Germany) and FTM-CGT (Fédération des travailleurs de la métallurgie-CGT, France) are fully aware that employment is directly linked to free trade and competitiveness. While accepting this economic logic, all three unions also call on their respective governments to adopt an interventionist industrial strategy to aid competitiveness and invest in future employment and technology (Interviews with T. Burke, H. Mund and P. Correa).

The sharpest differences between the three unions are between IG Metall and FTM-CGT. Reflecting the differing fortunes of their respective manufacturing sectors, each union has different views on the benefits of free trade and competitiveness. Horst Mund, Director of IG Metall's International Department, notes that the union's approach broadly fits with Germany's wider trade and industrial strategy in which the automotive sector is a key aspect of Germany's export economy and FDI and argues that within the ETUC and IndustriALL-Europe – the EU level organisation for manufacturing trade unions – the union is seen as being very pro-free trade (H. Mund, interview). In contrast, the FTM-CGT have a far more negative view of the notion of competitiveness, arguing that “In business and government language competitiveness means a decrease in the share of wealth accrued to employees, that is to say the stagnation of wages, pressure increased on supply chains, the reduction of investment and transfer of activities to countries with a low wage and social level” (FTM-CGT, 2015, p. 11). However, this is not to say that FTM-CGT is anti-free trade, nor that IG

Metall is blindly pro-free trade. Indeed, Unite, IG Metall and FTM-CGT, in line with their national, sectoral, and European confederations, all accept free trade on the condition that it has societal benefits and does not reduce workers' rights.

Related to the issue of free trade, a deeper underlying industrial tension between IG Metall and FTM-CGT is that their national sectors, though relatively separate, are in competition with each other. While Germany remains the largest automotive producer in Europe by some distance – producing three times as many vehicles as the UK and France in 2016, for example (ACEA, 2017) – competition between French and German automotive companies has increased in recent years as French car exports to Germany bounced back after the global financial crisis (Bay and Hanke, 2017, December 1). By contrast, the UK no longer has a British-owned volume car maker but Unite organises major assembly sites that supply German and, to a lesser extent, French automotive companies (Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders, 2020). This means that there are greater industrial links between Unite and IG Metall than between Unite and FTM-CGT (B. Norman, interview).

There are also significant political differences between IG Metall and FTM-CGT which stem from their industrial competition. Although the two unions participate in a Franco-German union working group on industrial policy and have released joint statements (IG Metall, 2011), there is a feeling within the FTM-CGT that IG Metall is very close to the German government and the employers which can make building common demands more difficult, particularly as IG Metall is such a numerically strong organisation in comparison with other European unions in the sector (P. Correa, interview). This numerical strength also means that IG Metall tends to dominate leading positions and policy issues in IndustriALL's European and global structures, both in general and for the automotive sector specifically, a fact which creates some tension among unions with different ideological approaches or national economic interests (P. Correa, interview). According to Ben Norman, Unite's

researcher for the automotive sector, the combination of industrial tensions and competing political cultures can make it harder to bridge the differences between the two unions (B. Norman, interview).

These political differences are exemplified by competing attitudes to EWCs and notions of union-employer cooperation and concertation. Whilst EWCs are deeply embedded in German industrial relations there are around half as many EWC bodies in France and the UK, both of which have very different industrial relations traditions (worker-participation.eu, n.d.). Though FTM-CGT and Unite both support EWCs as a tool for gaining information and building inter-union cooperation, Patrick Correa and Ben Norman also argue that there is a danger of unions being co-opted into employers' strategies (P. Correa, interview; B. Norman, interview). However, Patrick Correa also points out that the fact that the FTM-CGT is relatively unified in terms of its ideology, whereas IG Metall, as a unitary federation representing a wide range of political perspectives, means that political differences are more likely to arise (P. Correa, interview). Despite the above, however, Unite, IG Metall and the FTM-CGT have all been broadly united on recent trade issues. None of the three unions contradict the ETUC's core trade policy objectives and as three of the larger unions within their respective national confederations, IndustriALL and the ETUC play a key role in informing them.

Despite the kinds of differences that exist between European trade unions outlined above, the ETUC has developed a more unified approach to trade over time, particularly compared to the 1970s when national trade and industrial policies were more diverse, were often in competition with each other, and the ETUC lacked the power and capacity to harness greater coordination. Greater organisational Europeanisation of the European labour movement, the widening and deepening of European integration, and increased globalisation have all contributed to this change. This also partly explains why the trade policy of sectoral

unions closely overlaps with the ETUC's trade policy and has become far less technical than comparable unions in the 1970s.

The ETUC's default approach to trade remains that it is supportive of trade liberalisation providing that it is used to promote development and decent work and that a 'social dimension' exists to protect workers from the negative consequences of free trade policies. However, the fact that the EU's trade agenda has shifted over the last decade towards non-tariff, regulatory, and 'behind the border' issues (Bieler, Hilary and Lindberg, 2014, pp. 3-5) has generated greater criticism from European unions who believe this agenda brings increasing costs and fewer material and social benefits.

Though the wider debate concerning the 'winners and losers' of globalisation has existed for many decades, the modern understanding of the concept of 'fair globalisation' within the European labour movement is closely tied to the ILO's influential 2002 policy paper *A Fair Globalization: Creating Opportunities for All* in which all of the central features of European unions' trade objectives – respect for fundamental rights, sustainable development, social dialogue, multilateralism – are discussed in detail (ILO, 2002). Additionally, the European labour movement's notion of a progressive trade policy is largely informed by the four pillars of the ILO's Decent Work Agenda – established in 1999 – which calls for productive employment, labour standards, social dialogue, and social protection. This broad agenda fits within the ETUC's wider argument that trade and external relations should be tools for raising social standards (ILO, 1999).

Within the EU specifically this is also reflected in the ETUC's insistence on, the strict application of the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty, which lays down that the Union's external and international trade policies should seek to advance its values in the wider world. These include democracy and peace, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the

principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the European Charter of Human Rights, the UN Charter and international law (ETUC, 2015a, p. 58).

However, the ETUC has also criticised elements of the EU's trade strategy throughout the twenty-first century for undermining the above values. These criticisms first became evident during the launch of its Global Europe strategy and have only increased since (Hilary, 2014).

Daniele Basso and Yorgos Altintzis, trade advisors for the ETUC and ITUC respectively, argue that the three key issues that the ETUC and its member unions have consistently fought for at the multilateral level and in bilateral agreements are the protection of public services, transparency and the involvement of trade unions in trade negotiations, and enforceable labour standards in all of the EU's trade agreements (Interviews with D. Basso and Y. Altintzis). This is also corroborated by interviews with the three trade and international officers of the TUC, DGB and CGT and all three demands have existed to varying degrees in the ETUC's *Action Programmes* throughout the 1990s and 2000s. These demands also extend to unions such as IndustriALL who, though they represent manufacturing workers whose jobs would not necessarily be directly affected by, for example, the privatisation of public services, there is an acknowledgement that protecting public services is valuable to all workers, irrespective of whether they work in the private or public sector. These arguments have often been framed within the wider context of trade being used to attack social standards in addition to more specific trade demands relating to the manufacturing sector in specific free trade agreements (FTAs) (G. Nelissen, interview).

The issue of defending public services in European trade unions' trade policies is most directly based on the demand that they should be fully excluded from the scope of all trade agreements. The ETUC and its members have also consistently opposed new trends such as 'negative listing' and 'standstill' and 'ratchet' clauses, all of which have become more

commonplace during the EU's drive to negotiate bilateral and inter-regional trade agreements and threaten to open up public services to privatisation to various degrees. According to the ETUC (2017a), such clauses deliberately "exacerbate and lock-in one-way liberalisation" and argue that rather than promoting them, the European Commission should instead "create a 'model clause' to exclude public services from the entire scope of the agreements".

The demand for the protection of public services in FTAs put forward by European trade unions also extends further and is centred on the principle of defending the right of national governments to regulate in the public interest and a rejection of a corporate European trade and investment agenda which gives rights to corporations while simultaneously taking away control from elected institutions (ETUC, 2017b). This fits in with the broadly social-democratic political economy of most European trade unions who continue to argue that state intervention is an essential part of a progressive economic, trade and industrial policy which allows liberalisation to be socially embedded. As such, related issues such as trade defence mechanisms to protect specific industries from unfair competition and retaining states' control over public procurement procedures are also important demands for private sector unions such as Unite, IG Metall, and FTM-CGT (Interviews with T. Burke, H. Mund, and P. Correa). This is not simply a European policy focus since the ITUC link the defence of public services, the right of national governments to regulate, and tax justice as key sustainable development issues that should be included in trade agreements for the benefit of people in both developed and developing economies (ITUC, 2010, p. 3).

Based on the above, it is no surprise that the inclusion of an ISDS mechanism - a legal mechanism that arbitrates disputes between states and investors that includes the right of investors to sue elected governments for discriminatory practices - became one of the most prominent issues during the TTIP and CETA negotiations. Despite similar mechanisms currently existing in over 3,000 international investment treaties (European Parliament Think

Tank, 2015), opposition to ISDS from the ETUC, TUC, DGB and CGT was unequivocal. For instance, the TUC argued that “Inequality lies at the very foundation of ISDS as it privileges foreign investors over other economic actors – domestic investors or interest groups such as consumers or workers – by giving them the right to access special courts for pursuing claims of expropriation” (TUC, 2014a). Wolf Jäcklein, International Officer for the CGT, also raised the point that while dispute mechanisms exist for investors no such mechanism exists for trade unions to take states or employers to court for abuses of social or labour rights (W. Jäcklein, interview). This view is also shared by a wide range of prominent left-of-centre CSOs and think tanks.

European trade union and civil society criticisms of ISDS and the ‘corporate control’ of the EU’s free trade agenda is also linked to the second major issue that unions campaign on in relation to trade: transparency and the need for an institutionalised role for trade unions in EU trade negotiations. For the ETUC, transparency is such an important issue because as a social partner it feels it should have a far greater input into the EU’s negotiating position in FTAs. However, though the ETUC theoretically has good access to the European Commission, on trade matters the ETUC and other European unions often form part of the broad tapestry of civil society ‘stakeholders’ that seek to influence the EU’s negotiating objectives through DG Trade’s advisory and expert groups.

More broadly, the ETUC argues that,

Transparency is a core issue as trade and investment agreements are increasingly focussed on standard setting, rather than on lowering tariffs. Many of our standards reflect our collective preferences, as expressed through our democratic institutions and procedures including social dialogue and collective bargaining. Therefore, the ETUC insists on the need for transparency through social dialogue in all trade and investment negotiations, democratic oversight by the European and national parliaments and full consultation with and involvement of social partners and civil society organisations. (ETUC, 2017b).

As the above highlights, the ETUC not only has major concerns with how democratic the process of negotiating trade agreements is but also, by implication, its own lack of involvement in this process. The creation of Domestic Advisory Groups (DAGs) – civil society forums that mimic the EESC – for bilateral agreements has offered European unions another avenue to raise their concerns but notably these forums only come into force after the signing of the FTA.

The issue of transparency and trade unions' role in world trade is also linked to the demand for binding labour standards in all EU trade agreements. In contrast to demands concerning the protection of public service and transparency in FTAs, binding labour standards are an issue that is overwhelmingly taken up by trade unions rather than a broad coalition of CSOs (W. Jäcklein, interview; Murphy, 2010).

The European labour movement's position on labour standards is that they should be a fundamental pre-requisite of all trade agreements. As a starting point, these standards are based on the ILO's eight core minimum labour standards which are based around four key groups of rights: freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining, freedom from forced labour, freedom from child labour, and freedom from discrimination at work (TUC, n.d.). For European trade unions, the benefits of these standards being included in world trade agreements do not simply revolve around notions of 'fairness' – though this is often how the issue is framed – but is also based on a broadly Keynesian economic outlook that seeks to improve the purchasing power of workers and create a more just, balanced, and stable economic system. Yorgos Altintzis described the economic benefits of improved labour standards as follows:

Well, obviously the workers would have more income to spend, so that would lead to increased demand... for products, for services, so that's one effect right away. The other thing is that taxation would work better because if you spread the same amount of income around in a better way it means that more people will be paying taxes, more

income would go to the people that do pay taxes, so that would also be beneficial... Another would be that training and skilling of the workforce would be more of a thing because... when production is working in a way where it has to respect labour standards it definitely wouldn't be the production model that we have now, of offshoring or contracting... informality, but also, in extreme cases, slavery... So, to answer your question, it would help to create a less unequal world! (Y. Altintzis, interview)

The ETUC argues that the social and economic benefits of implementing minimum labour standards effectively centre on the notion that trade unions – through collective bargaining and social dialogue – are the most effective organisations to prevent a regulatory 'race to the bottom' by ensuring that employers respect workers' rights. Further, without such international standards, the ETUC argues that countries may be pressured to weaken labour rights to attract foreign investment (ETUC, 2017b). This is based on an understanding that trade agreements have led to increased competition between workers which consequently require stronger rights for them to be defended collectively.

The above point is something that has always proved more controversial among trade unions and governments in developing countries who have sometimes argued that minimum labour standards are a form of disguised protectionism (Van Roozendaal, 2002). This is an argument that the ETUC and ITUC in particular are keen to dispel. The ETUC's 2017 *Resolution for a Progressive EU Trade Policy*, for example, makes the following points:

We reject the idea that incorporating and enforcing labour standards through trade agreements is disguised protectionism or a way for European countries to keep their markets closed to goods from third countries. We also reject the idea that labour standards cannot be universalised because they should reflect economic and cultural circumstances. On the contrary, labour rights are universal and necessary to prevent workers being exploited both in Europe and everywhere else (ETUC, 2017b).

This analysis relates to arguably the biggest issue the international labour movement faces: developing transnational solidarity between unions that appear to have different short-term material interests. Though the basic logic of embedding core labour standards in trade

agreements is clear, it is not only the ‘hidden protectionism’ argument that has caused division within the international trade union movement. The argument that enforceable labour standards would perpetuate rather than overcome North-South divisions has been advanced by some unions in the Global South, leading them to call for alternative strategies. For example, some unions in the Global South have called for stricter non-tariff barriers (NTBs) and government procurement provisions to challenge unequal North-South power relations. However, this strategy opens up the issue of reciprocity where trade unions might “support *their* country’s right to NTBs but do not necessarily support *other* countries’ rights to NTBs [emphasis in original]”, thus further hindering the transnational cooperation necessary for trade unions to develop a genuinely progressive and united approach to trade (Park, 2014, p. 79).

Perhaps the most jarring example of this form of economic nationalism can be seen in the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations’ (AFL-CIO) and United Steelworkers’ (USW) support for Donald Trump’s announcement of a global tariff on steel and aluminium exports in 2018. This was particularly controversial as the USW had formed a transatlantic organisation – Workers Uniting – with Unite in 2008 and through international campaigns in collaboration with GUFs like IndustriALL has built strong relationships with manufacturing unions in Europe and South America (Fox-Hoddes, 2018). This led to Unite and IG Metall issuing strong anti-tariff statements and became an increasing point of concern for European trade unions in the context of rising tensions between the EU, the US and China (Unite the Union, 2018; IG Metall, 2018).

Criticisms of the efficacy of labour standards provisions also exist among certain elements of the European labour movement and CSOs who maintain close links with trade unions. For example, one CSO member interviewed for this project argued that the ETUC and the wider European labour movement has a very questionable record when it comes to

cooperating with unions in the Global South on trade issues because they are too closely wedded to the European Commission's trade agenda. For example, the interviewee claimed that,

the [European] trade union movement absolutely went into a collaboration with the European Commission in order to face down opposition from developing country representatives over the issue of social clause [during the Doha Development Round]. They were promised that the Commission would try and do its absolute best to include proper, strong social clauses within the WTO's own mechanisms, and yet it became clear that actually ... when the trade unions were all putting their hopes in the idea of a social clause at the WTO the European Commission had already dropped it and was stringing them along. And yet despite that they carried over that same strategy of supporting the free trade agreements and supporting a social chapter all the way through to the bilateral era and the Global Europe strategy from 2006 onwards, which specifically brought the European Commission behind a hard-nosed free trade policy (Anti-poverty CSO member, interview).

Whilst other interviewees did not criticise the ETUC's approach to the social clause as explicitly, there was a general acknowledgement among the trade union advisors interviewed for this thesis that, even though such clauses exist in the EU's 'new generation' of FTAs, their success is still highly debateable. The most significant element of the debate over the efficacy of labour standards is thus enforceability.

The EU's approach to including labour standards provisions within its trade policy has changed several times since the mid-1990s. With the exception of a sanctioning mechanism in its unilateral GSP between 1995 and 1999, these provisions have followed a pattern of offering tariff incentives and preferences to developing countries in exchange for complying with core ILO standards (GSP, since 1999), implementing sustainable development and good governance conventions (GSP+, since 2005), and rules and norms concerning social and labour standards and environmental protection (Trade and Sustainable Development (TSD) chapters, since 2009) (Harrison et al., 2019a, p. 639).

However, these mechanisms have been criticised by European trade unions for being inadequate in comparison to the overall drive towards liberalisation in the EU's FTAs and ineffective in respect of implementing the rules laid out in the agreements. For example, the CGT's Wolf Jäcklein notes that the TSD chapter for the EU-South Korea agreement amounted to one chapter of around ten pages covering a wide range of social issues – animal protection, environment, sustainable development, human rights, labour standards – “with one single rule for each, very badly written, obviously no experts were looking into it and it was commercial law specialists writing it... And we found out that it just doesn't work. It's not applicable, it's too poorly written, it's not thought through, and there is no follow-up. So, our conclusion was that an approach like that is completely unbalanced” (W. Jäcklein, interview). Similarly, the DGB's Nora Rohde highlights the imbalance between the rights of investors and workers in EU FTAs:

We see that, yes, we have social standards and obligations in the environmental arena, but what we also see is that if there are breaches against these obligations that are in the chapter there is no way of really sanctioning or enforcing the obligations... because we see that investors or companies are not really held accountable in case they do something wrong. And that is especially problematic if we see how far-reaching the rights for investors are on the other side. So, we always see this imbalance between the rights of investors and companies and corporate actors on the one hand and trade union and other civil society players on the other side (N. Rohde, interview).

The EU's 'promotional' approach to labour standards is largely informed by the fact that enforceable labour standards have never been supported by all EU member states and trading partners have either viewed them as hidden protectionism or have little interest or means to enforce them (Adriaensen and González-Garibay, 2013; Orbie et al., 2005; Van Roozendaal, 2002). In contrast, ETUC calls for a 'conditional' approach which includes “instruments for monitoring and dialogue, complemented by an economic sanctions

mechanism for labour rights violations, without the need to demonstrate a relation to trade... as the ultimate means of enforcement when dialogue mechanisms fail” (ETUC, 2017c).

Criticisms of the EU’s approach to labour standards are not limited to the European labour movement but have also been explored in the academic literature. For example, Harrison et al. (2019a, pp. 643-647) highlight a number of key limitations and failings of the current operation of the EU’s TSD chapters which include: the lack of knowledge and importance attributed to labour issues by the central EU actors tasked with negotiating TSD chapters; the operational failings of civil society mechanisms institutionalised in TSD chapters such as lack of resources and expertise; the lack of systematic integration with existing EU instruments; the insufficiency of the dispute resolution process; the use of TSD chapters as a blueprint that does not take account of the specific complexities of each trading partner; very limited operationalisation of monitoring the impacts of TSD chapters with trading partners and within the EU itself; and a vague approach to engaging with labour issues in global supply chains as well as between the two trading partners. These kinds of complaints were also mentioned by several interviewees in relation to the DAGs that have been set up since 2011 and will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.

Regardless of the EU and ETUC’s differing perspectives, the wider problem of enforceable labour standards can be summarised by the fact that the world’s two largest economies, the US and China, have only ratified two and four of the ILO’s eight core labour standards respectively (ILO, 2020). In the case of the US, FTAs like the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) do contain social chapters but trade unions like the AFL-CIO do not have the power or the political will to enforce labour standards in their own country and the broader economic consequences of the agreement have also helped undermine workers’ rights more generally (Park, 2014, p. 78). In this respect, though labour standards have become more common in EU FTAs, the lack of enforceability on a global scale will continue

to undermine further progress on the issue. Notably, as will be explained further in Chapter 6, even though enforceable labour standards have been the centrepiece of the ETUC's and ICFTU/ITUC's approach to trade for decades, it is arguably the issue that has provided the least success.

Avenues of influence

Though trade unions favour the multilateral level as the best way to make a lasting impact on the direction of world trade, it is conversely the most difficult level for unions and CSOs to influence. Keohane and Nye (2000), for example, describe the WTO as an example of a 'club model' of multilateral negotiations – a system which enables state negotiators representing different functional interests to negotiate in relative isolation from their national political systems. Murphy (2010, p. 56) argues that NGOs (which include trade unions in her definition) hold no hard power or formal authority in which to directly influence multilateral trade negotiations. As such, a key issue for trade unions and the wider network of trade focused CSOs in the late-1990s and early 2000s was the absence of any formal mechanism for civil society influence. This was a consequence of the WTO's organisational characteristics which, like the GATT before it, was principally an intergovernmental forum. This stands in contrast with other international organisations like the OECD (previously the OEEC) which created the TUAC in 1948, its founding year.

The main decision-making body of the WTO is the Ministerial Conference which meets every two years. Representatives of civil society can attend as observers or as part of a member's negotiating team. CSOs use these opportunities to lobby delegates, organise public meetings, and present their analyses of trade issues (Williams, 2005, p. 37). Between Ministerial Conferences the substantive work of the organisation is carried out by the General

Council – composed of representatives (usually ambassadors or their equivalents) from all member governments – which also meets, under different rules, as the Dispute Settlement Body and the Trade Policy Review Body.

Aware that the lack of civil society participation was damaging its image, the WTO introduced some limited rules for societal engagement in the 1990s. First, Article V(2) of the 1994 Marrakech Agreement, which concluded the Uruguay Round and established the WTO, noted that the new organisation should make “appropriate arrangements for consultation and cooperation with non-governmental organizations” (WTO, 1994). This rule was initially ignored until pressure from CSOs and some Western governments forced the General Council to introduce two rules in 1996, the first allowing liaison between the Secretariat and civil society and the second derestricting WTO documents. A further decision in 2002 enhanced the speed with which documents could be made available (Williams, 2005, pp. 36-37).

The WTO also created an annual Public Symposium (now Public Forum) in 2001 which gives a platform to CSOs as well as academics, business groups, the media, governments, and intergovernmental organisations (WTO, n.d.). These small changes, as well as the broader politicisation of trade which took place in this period, dramatically increased the number of CSOs attending ministerial conferences – around 100 at Singapore in 1996 compared to 800 at Hong Kong in 2005 (Steffek and Ehling, 2008, p. 98). However, despite the above, CSOs ultimately remain excluded from almost all WTO bodies.

Though not favoured by European trade unions, bilateral agreements arguably provide greater opportunities for union influence than multilateral negotiations. Woolcock (2005, pp. 243-244) argues that bilateral agreements are easier to negotiate simply because the reduced scope of negotiations and smaller number of actors involved mean there are fewer potential trade-offs and linkages. Bilateral agreements also offer European trade unions greater

opportunities to develop a common position with the EU's trading partners (Y. Altintzis, interview). This not only helps present a united front during negotiations but can also open direct channels with the partner country's government if they are sympathetic to union views on trade.

Of course, this is also true of multilateral negotiations, but the reduced scale of the negotiations and range of actors involved make it more achievable in bilateral agreements. This point is particularly important if the EU is negotiating a 'mixed' agreement (such as CETA) whereby national and sub-national parliaments must ratify the final text (Leblond and Viju-Miljusevic, 2019, p. 1839). This provides an opportunity for parliaments to derail the whole agreement and therefore provides a certain amount of leverage. As such, parliamentary dynamics can play an important role and offers a potential avenue of influence for trade unions and CSOs.

Given the very limited formal opportunities for European trade unions to influence trade negotiations directly, influencing the trade policy agenda of the EU has been their principal concern. However, until changes brought about by the 2009 Lisbon Treaty the EU's trade policy competences and policymaking process remained largely the same as the rules laid out in Article 113 (now renumbered Article 133) of the Treaty of Rome (Meunier & Nicolaidis, 1999, p. 480). Outside of the question of competences, the process for conducting negotiations broadly remained the same as the 1970s: the Commission held the right of initiative on foreign trade negotiations and produced the draft mandate for the Council to discuss; the Commissioner for Trade conducted the talks (sometimes assisted by other Commissioners responsible for specific portfolios); the Council ultimately decided on the Commission's negotiating brief; the execution of this brief was closely controlled by the Council's Article 133 Committee; and the Council had the final say on the ratification of the results of negotiations (Dür and Zimmermann, 2007, p. 4).

The fact that the EU's trade policymaking process had not significantly changed since the 1970s meant that European trade unions still faced major obstacles to influence the two primary institutions of EU trade policy, the Commission and the Council. However, though direct avenues of influence over trade policy for civil society were still absent from the EU's institutional make-up, increased social dialogue mechanisms and the wider Europeanisation of the European labour movement did at least offer greater access to the European institutions and the Commission in particular, even if this did not necessarily take place on trade issues. On the other hand, however, European unions were also facing a simultaneous decline in membership and therefore power at the national level. This meant that while the strategic focus of European unions has shifted towards the EU level since the 1990s, their ability to back this up through associative power was more limited.

Formal access to the Commission for trade unions has primarily come through social dialogue which itself is restricted to social and employment issues and is itself limited by the fact that the unions do not have any veto points (Larsson, 2015, p. 103). Whilst this provides no direct influence over trade policy it does mean that the ETUC has generally had a closer relationship with DG Employment and Social Affairs than DG Trade or other DGs because the former is more sympathetic to and focused on the policy concerns of the ETUC than the latter (Interviews with D. Basso and DG Employment and Social Affairs official). This link has become more important over time as the EU has integrated more normative values into its trade policy and labour standards have been included in EU FTAs. More broadly, social dialogue has increased the ETUC's legitimacy as a political actor in the eyes of the Commission which has given the confederation greater informal access to Commissioners (Interviews with D. Basso, DG Employment and Social Affairs official, and DG Trade official 1).

Though formal access for trade unions and CSOs to DG Trade still does not exist, the Commission has become a lot more open to societal interests during this period. This process can be traced back to greater consultation with civil society on trade policy after collapse of 1998 Multilateral Agreement on Investment (Woolcock, 2005, p. 244). This can be linked to a shift in EU trade policy under Pascal Lamy towards a policy framework of ‘managed globalisation’ (Jacoby and Meunier, 2010; Meunier, 2007). The impetus for this shift stemmed from the wider debate evolving in this period over how to allow globalisation to flourish without ignoring “the economic insecurities generated by globalization [which] may actually harm the prospects of maintaining global free trade” (Rodrik, 1998, p. 1029). Indeed, in a speech to the French-American Business Council, Lamy (2000) argued that without greater accountability, transparency and a social dimension to trade “We will not find the better market access that you and others want, we will not integrate developing countries better into the system, we will not manage to respond to the shouts and protests of civil society, and we will not manage to provide a real rule-book for international trade that tries to tackle the complex questions posed by the reality of globalization”.

To help integrate the views of civil society into its policymaking process, DG Trade established a consultative committee - the Civil Society Dialogue (CSD) - in 1998. The CSD is open to all CSOs with an interest in trade policy. Meetings are organised prior to important multilateral and bilateral negotiations, the Commission informs CSOs on negotiations on an ad hoc basis, and CSOs are invited to submit reports and position papers on specific trade issues (Van Den Hoven, 2002). The CSD has therefore helped provide the ETUC with more insight into the Commission’s trade agenda and the state of trade negotiations but has also fallen a long way short of the direct influence it desires.

Civil society engagement on the part of the Commission has improved since 2009 and the ongoing politicisation of trade, not least because pursuing sustainable development

became a legal requirement of the EU through the Lisbon Treaty. Orbie, Van den Putte and Martens (2018, p. 135) identify four distinct purposes behind Commission engagement with civil society on trade issues: “instrumental (gathering support for the FTA), functional (monitoring and information gathering on the implementation), deliberative (promoting democratic governance) and policy influence (advising the governments)”. The CSD has developed over time to include meetings with the Director-General, seminars and, importantly for trade unions, Sustainability Impact Assessment (SIA) meetings which focus on labour standards and other social issues (DG Trade, 2013a).

These forums are seen as “helpful” by the ETUC as a means of putting their views on certain trade issues across but are far from its main focus in terms of trying to influence the Commission (D. Basso, interview). This is reflected in the fact that trade unions make up a very small percentage of the participants of the CSD – less than 5%, compared to the 55% represented by ‘trade, business and professional associations (DG Trade, 2014a, p. 18). Further, the Commission has itself reported that much more could be done to engage with civil society through the CSD and has raised questions about the forum’s relevance, effectiveness, and efficiency (DG Trade, 2014b). A member of DG Trade also notes that the ETUC and ITUC regularly share their position papers in the CSD but focus their limited resources on more direct, one-to-one contact with the Commission (DG Trade official 2, interview). Despite obvious areas of disagreement, the ETUC has developed a far closer relationship with DG Trade over time and ETUC advisor Tom Jenkins claims that, in addition to meetings with successive trade Commissioners, “Practically every meeting of our trade committee has included a representative of the Commission, sometimes at Deputy Director level but usually at Head of Unit level, to discuss specific issues” (T. Jenkins, interview).

The limitations of the CSD are also reflected in trade union participation in Commission expert groups. The European Commission's reliance on expert groups as a method of 'pre-cooking' policy is well documented (Larsson, 2003; Field, 2013; Turner, 2014). Experts representing business interests and national governments dominate these groups, a bias that European trade unions and CSOs such as Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO) and the Alliance for Lobbying Transparency and Ethics Regulation (ALTER-EU) have been keen to point out, particularly as the Commission's reliance on expert groups has increased over time (ETUC, 2014a). Nonetheless, European unions have attempted to intervene in such groups, including on the TTIP Stakeholder Advisory Group (set up in 2014) and the Group of Experts on EU Trade Agreements, both of which included a representative from the ETUC and IndustriALL. The ETUC's representative in these groups, Tom Jenkins, claims that these groups can be traced back to their "discussions with the Director in charge of the TTIP negotiations [Ignacio Garcia Bercero] and with support from the French Government through its Brussels representation in particular - followed by discussions in the Council Trade Committee" (T. Jenkins, interview). This highlights the ETUC's constant desire to gain more and better access to the Commission on trade issues, particularly through forums that allow it to raise more detailed and technical issues (G. Nellisen, interview).

Though the Commission has become more open to labour and civil society views over time, the most significant change, both for EU trade policymaking and European trade union influence over it, came from the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon which gave the EP co-legislator status alongside the Council. Whilst the Lisbon Treaty also clarified and increased EU powers over trade – for example, gaining greater competences in trade in educational and social/health services as well as more autonomy over foreign direct investment – basic EU trade legislation is now obliged to pass through the EP before being adopted or amended by the Council. Most significantly, the EP must also approve all EU trade agreements and the Commission must

transmit documents and report regularly on trade negotiations to the parliament via the INTA Committee on International Trade (European Commission, 2011a).

While the changes brought about through the Lisbon Treaty have democratised trade policymaking to some extent, the fundamental process remains similar: the Commission produces the draft mandate which is then discussed in the Trade Policy Committee (formerly the 113/133 Committee) before being adopted by the Foreign Affairs Committee and then being amended or adopted by the Council. As such, despite its increased competences, the EP has no formal power over the negotiating mandate. As Woolcock (2015, p. 394) points out, “The EP can then be presented with a *fait accompli* after the Commission, the EU’s negotiating partners, as well as the member states in the Council have all agreed to an outcome. The EP can compensate for this lack of formal mandating power by seeking political commitments from the Commission or Council on negotiating aims during the course of consultations or public hearings”.

Though trade policymaking power still ultimately resides with the Council and Commission, the integration of the EP has created new avenues for union influence such as through the INTA committee. While the committee’s power does not stem from any direct influence over the Commission’s negotiating mandate, INTA is responsible for matters relating to, *inter alia*, “the opening, monitoring, conclusion and follow-up of bilateral, multilateral and plurilateral trade agreements governing economic, trade and investment relations with third countries and regional organisations... [and] measures of technical harmonisation or standardisation in fields covered by instruments of international law” (European Parliament, 2020a).

As a reflection of the growing importance of the EP’s role in EU trade policymaking, winning the position of chair of INTA has been prioritised by the S&D (Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats) group since the committee’s inception in 2009 (J. Kirton-

Darling, interview). Bernd Lange, a longstanding SPD and DGB member has been the chair of INTA for the last two parliamentary terms. Lange and fellow S&D member Javier Moreno were also the Standing Rapporteurs for TTIP and CETA respectively (European Parliament, 2020b). Though there is debate in the academic literature over how to characterise the powers that EP rapporteurs hold, it is widely accepted that they are influential and can have an impact on the parliament's agenda-setting and decision-making in a variety of ways (Thierse, 2019).

As Jude Kirton-Darling, a former Labour MEP, ETUC Confederal Secretary, and member of INTA and the Trade Union intergroup makes clear, the INTA chair is influential but also has to broadly reflect the views of the committee, meaning that their role is not decisive or a guarantor of trade union influence, regardless of their political allegiance (J. Kirton-Darling, interview). However, Kirton-Darling also notes that “the committees are the power base for the political debate, and the INTA committee is a very right-wing committee in comparison to the plenary. So, quite often things we lose in committee we scrape through in the plenary, because there are MEPs who sit in the committees who are more moderate or social in their outlook”. The ETUC also hold regular meetings with the INTA chair (made easier because of Lange's background) and is regularly invited to give evidence at INTA hearings (T. Jenkins, interview). European unions' focus on the EP is particularly notable since the other co-legislator, the Council, is considered to be “a bit of a black box” on trade issues (D. Basso, interview). As such, the ETUC instead encourage their affiliates to lobby their national governments.

In addition to the national political links enjoyed by some trade unions to the parties of the S&D group, the most institutionalised avenue of union influence in the EP is the Trade Union intergroup of the EP, with whom the ETUC arranges monthly meetings and is drawn from nearly all the political groups – with the exception of MEPs from the far-right parties –

as well as union-friendly Commission and Council officials and members of national delegations, such as social attachés in the German and Austrian embassies based in Brussels (Erne, 2008, p. 38). However, the political composition of the EP has generally become less favourable to union views over time as the strength of the S&D group has gradually declined.

As was the case in the 1970s, the EESC also offers very limited avenues for trade union influence (notwithstanding unions' ability to influence the national politicians that form the latter). The EESC is consulted by the Commission and the ETUC coordinates its Workers' Group, but Woolcock (2015, p. 397) argues that it is not taken very seriously by policymakers or other stakeholders. However, in a similar way to the Trade Union intergroup of the EP, an important function that the EESC does perform is that it helps foster and develop the European labour movement as a transnational network and 'voice' on important issues (J. McKnight, interview).

Since European unions have consistently struggled to have a direct influence over the content of EU's trade policy it has increasingly focused on issues surrounding post-agreement monitoring and implementation of TSD chapters (Interviews with D. Basso and T. Jenkins). These mechanisms, much like the TSD chapters themselves, can be seen as further evidence of the EU attempting to institutionalise a balance between free and 'fair' trade policies committed to in the Lisbon Treaty (TEU Article 3.5 (Official Journal of the European Union, 2012)).

Though there is some variation in the legal texts of each agreement, the civil society mechanisms all have recurring features: representatives of the three major interest groups (labour, environment and business) of the EU and its trading partner(s) participate in a DAG; a transnational civil society mechanism is created for members of the domestic mechanisms and/or other actors from both the EU and its trading partner(s) meet annually; finally, there is some interaction between these two mechanisms and an intergovernmental body comprising

officials of the EU and its trading partner(s) takes place on an annual basis to discuss implementation of the sustainable development chapter (Orbie et al., 2016, p. 528). Finally, there is also a panel of experts that investigates complaints made by the parties and makes recommendations on them (Harrison, Barbu, Campling, Richardson and Smith, 2019b). The first DAG was created for the EU-South Korea FTA in 2011 and eight have been established for EU trade deals and partnership agreements since.

For the ETUC, in the absence of a multilateral mechanism for ILO standards in world trade agreements, these mechanisms have become a vital component of its current approach to labour standards. The ETUC's Tom Jenkins was involved in designing the DAG system and explains the confederation's position on them as follows:

In addition to seeking to influence negotiations, the ETUC has also insisted that trade and investment agreements should be continuously monitored once they are put into effect. An important consideration is that, while the EU is relatively good at involving its social partners, the other party may not be so. As part of our general objective of helping trade unions worldwide gain a place and hopefully influence in their national polity, we therefore pressed for our sister unions to be involved in such monitoring as equal partners with employers and NGOs. Thus, we pressed for the DAGs to reflect the kind of tripartism that we find in the EESC. To be fair, the Commission has been supportive of this kind of move, which is a way of "exporting" the European Social Model (T. Jenkins, interview).

Though the establishment of DAGs is clearly seen as a positive by the ETUC, others in the European labour movement have criticisms of their efficacy and democracy, as well as alleging that business groups do not always engage with the DAGs in good faith (Interviews with W. Jäcklein and N. Rohde). These criticisms are also reflected in the academic literature which argue that DAGs lack the necessary organisation and resources to be fully effective, that the selection procedures for representatives is not always transparent (particularly in partner countries where CSOs are not always independent from government), and that there is

a lack of accountability on the part of governments in listening and implementing DAG recommendations (Orbie et al., 2016, pp. 528-529).

With the EU acquiring greater influence and competences in trade policy, national policy space has decreased leading to a simultaneous decline in trade unions' focus on the national level as an avenue of influence. This is also a direct result of their decreased power at the national level which itself is linked to European unions' own Europeanisation. Furthermore, the national trade policies of member states have been increasingly subsumed by EU trade policy. Nonetheless, the national level is still important as the Commission is in principle required to take into account the contrasting positions of member states in developing a mandate for trade policy, member states have to ratify the mandate through the Council, and member state-Commission interaction also takes place through the 133 Committee (Falke, 2005, p. 252).

Whilst the above factors do not ensure a direct avenue of influence for trade unions over government trade policy, influencing political parties and participating in tripartite or consultative mechanisms has remained a key focus of European trade unions. Indeed, as McGuire and Scherrer (2010, p. 4) argue, "despite the international nature of trade negotiations, trade agreements are ultimately negotiated and signed by national governments. Trade unions do not need to mobilize their members against remote and elusive authorities". As was the case in the 1970s, party-union relations have played a key role in the extent of this influence. However, the wider debate around trade and globalisation that has taken place since the late-1990s has also helped transform the political base of trade policymaking at the national level, with CSOs also playing a far greater role. The increased politicisation of trade coincided with union political allies' time in power at the beginning of the twenty-first century and therefore provided the TUC, DGB and CGT with a degree of influence at the national level in this period. However, these opportunities have since declined in parallel with

the EU level becoming more valuable since the Lisbon Treaty and the union political allies becoming increasingly unreliable vessels for their trade agenda.

Though New Labour's time in government was far from positive for UK trade unions, certain aspects of the party's ideology lent themselves to TUC policies on trade. For example, the loose concept of 'ethical socialism' was regularly used by New Labour as a rhetorical frame for its approach to social justice, albeit with very limited material basis (Bevir, 2005, pp. 60-63). This approach was very closely aligned with the Third Way 'renewal of social democracy' in this period. In the arena of trade and foreign policy this was reflected in the Ethical Trading Initiative, an alliance of companies, CSOs and trade unions that monitors supply chains in accordance with an ethical code and was founded with a start-up grant from the Department of International Development and the Department of Trade and Industry in 1998 (Ethical Trading Initiative, n.d.). This coalescence of ideas formed the basis of the TUC's approach to influencing the Labour government during the Doha Development Round (E. Sweeney, interview).

Decades of Conservative rule had led to the abolition of the neo-corporatist mechanisms that had given the TUC influence over policy fields such as industrial policy in the 1970s and moved the economic policy paradigm away from interventionism and towards neoliberalism. Relatedly, the shift to the right of the LP had significantly impacted union influence over policy and access to ministers. Nonetheless, the TUC was still considered to be a 'social partner' and was encouraged to facilitate partnership agreements with the CBI (Brown, 2011). Though in reality the strategy of partnership led to a greater entrenchment of conservatism and bureaucratism within the TUC leadership (Hoffrogge, 2018), it did bring the confederation closer to the government. It was this environment, combined with an adherence to a broadly 'ethical' trade and foreign policy, that led to a delegate from the TUC forming part of the UK's delegation for the first three negotiating rounds of the Doha

Development Round alongside the Director General of the CBI, Digby Jones, and a representative from Oxfam (E. Sweeney, interview).

In contrast to the 1970s, Falke (2005, p. 253) argues that by the start of the 2000s there had been a marked decline in Germany's willingness and capacity to pursue a distinctive trade policy and shape the liberal paradigm, instead deferring to Commission positions and supporting European integration over national trade preferences. However, the fundamentals of Germany's liberal economic approach and support for export sectors remained consistent. In the early 2000s the BMWi lost some of its institutional standing in trade policymaking as certain economic competences were transferred to the Finance Ministry (under SPD left-winger Oskar Lafontaine) and the Foreign Office (under Green foreign minister (Joshka Fischer) (Falke, 2005, p. 266). This also created the conditions for the Development and Environmental ministries to dominate the discussion on trade policy leading up to the Doha Round and successfully defined the thrust of the government's trade policy agenda (Wieczorek-Zeul, 2001).

This represented a shift from previous decades where the BMWi met with Germany's peak business, industrial and labour organisations individually or through the Trade Policy Committee (Howell and Hume, 1992, p. 160). McGuire and Scherrer (2010, p. 20) argue that while German trade unions have been invited to tripartite forums on macroeconomic policies from time to time, trade policies have not been part of the dialogue. Part of the reason for this is that the major German unions, often based in export-oriented sectors, and the DGB have generally supported liberal trade policies.

It is for the above reason that Scherrer, Frank and Greven (1998) argue that German unions did not address trade issues systematically until the election of the Red-Green coalition, with anti-globalisation themes only really existing in union foundations. Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (Alliance 90/The Greens) were important in bringing environmental and

development CSOs into the official policy discourse and giving them a standing in hearings and channels of informal policy input (Brunnengräber, Klein and Walk, 2001). There was thus a democratisation of trade policy input in this period as traditional non-state actors in German trade policymaking were put onto the defensive.

It was in this environment that anti-globalisation themes began to resonate strongly in the SPD and Green parliamentary caucuses which the DGB and others seized upon, particularly by helping to inform the Enquete Kommission Globalisierung, a parliamentary report which went a long way towards influencing the German government's stance during WTO negotiations (Falke, 2005, p. 267; Deutscher Bundestag, 2002). Though the German government was pushed into taking a stronger position on labour standards by the Bundestag, the nature of the debate and the fact that the SPD were in power meant that the DGB could directly influence the debate. Indeed, DGB Management Board member Heinz Putzhammer, who was also a member of the parliamentary commission, was included in the government's negotiating team alongside a representative from the Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie but without the presence of any CSOs (DGB, 2005; Forum Umwelt und Entwicklung/Gerechtigkeit Jetzt! – Die Welthandelskampagne, 2006)

The CGT faced significant political obstacles to influence French trade policy in the early 2000s. From an institutional perspective there still existed minimal avenues for trade union influence in general, let alone over trade policy, with the Economic and Social Committee remaining one of the few consultative mechanisms where unions had a formal role. Though Lionel Jospin of the PS was French Prime Minister between 1997 and 2002 and was the most strongly supported candidate by CGT members in his 2002 presidential bid (Parsons, 2015), union-party relations remained weak. The election of Jacques Chirac as President also unleashed a decade of resistance from the CGT, other unions and the nascent

anti-globalisation movement to the rapid acceleration of neoliberal austerity measures and an increase in social divisions (Jefferys, 2003).

However, the parliamentary influence of the PS did lead to the establishment of the consultative Committee for Social Dialogue on European and International Issues in 1998 which was overseen by the Ministry for Labour and Employment and contained eight employer and trade union representatives (including two from the CGT) on each side (Eurofound, 1998). Interestingly, part of the committee's mission was to fulfil France's commitment to ILO Convention 144 (Tripartite Consultation on International Labour Standards) (Légifrance, n.d.). This reflects the fact that France was one of the stronger European supporters of the social clause during this period. However, it is also notable that no CGT member interviewed for this project mentioned this committee or the Economic and Social Committee as being a useful avenue of influence for trade issues.

Given the CGT's history it is not surprising that in the above situation it orientated towards the global social justice movement rather than seek greater dialogue with the state (Labbe, 1994; W. Jäcklein, interview)). The CGT has consistently worked with ATTAC (Association pour la Taxation des Transactions financières et pour l'Action Citoyenne), initially a single-issue organisation set up in France in 1998 but which quickly morphed into a transnational left-wing social movement (Ruggiero, 2002). Some CGT federations were founding members and Pierre Tartakowsky of the Engineers, Managers and Technicians federation was Secretary General of ATTAC between 1999 and 2002 (Wintrebert, 2007). However, as a movement that evolved from discussions amongst French left-wing intellectuals rather than the working class itself, ATTAC has resisted being co-opted by the labour movement (George and Wolf, 2002, p. 164). Nonetheless, ATTAC and the wider global social justice movement provided the CGT with a vehicle to raise trade-related

demands shared by the movement – primarily opposition to the neoliberal free trade agenda of the WTO – whilst retaining its organisational and political independence.

Working with alter-globalisation organisations also provided an opportunity for the CGT and the wider movement to put demands on national institutions that they otherwise had little formal influence over. For example, Ugglá (2006, pp. 56-57) highlights how ATTAC-France primarily directed their international demands on trade to the national level during this period based on the strategic understanding that French ministers would play a key role in endorsing the mandate drafted by the European Commission. As such, though CGT influence over trade was diluted and aggregated by operating within the wider global social justice movement it nevertheless provided an important outlet for its demands.

The national level has continued to yield little influence over trade policy for the European labour movement, particularly as the European level has taken on even greater value after the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty. Political parties with traditional links to trade unions generally found themselves in limited positions of power or at odds with unions' trade demands. In the UK, Conservative or Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition governments have been in power for the last decade; in Germany, the CDU has been the dominant coalition member for the last 15 years with the SPD as a junior partner since 2013; and in France, though the PS under Francois Hollande held the presidency and controlled the National Assembly between 2012-2017, this time was bookended by conservative stints in power and the PS itself was far from a reliable ally for the CGT on trade issues.

Without exception, the trade and international officers for the TUC, DGB and CGT, claimed that their relevant national ministers, at best, listen to the arguments of trade unions and civil society but little more (Interviews with R. Crawford, N. Rohde and W. Jäcklein, interview). In fact, many union advisors interviewed for his project argued that during campaigning over CETA, Canadian politicians and ministers who were close to the Canadian

Labour Congress (CLC) (including Prime Minister Justin Trudeau) were far more open to their views than their equivalents in their own countries.

National level civil society mechanisms have remained very limited but have nonetheless improved in recent years because of the wider politicisation of trade, although they have not resulted in any significant influence for trade unions. In Germany, the Trade Policy Committee has continued while the Strategic Trade Advisory Group (2019) and the Comité de suivi de la politique commerciale (Trade Policy Monitoring Committee, 2014) were established in the UK and France, respectively. The latter mimics the DAG system to some extent and was set up by Matthias Fekl (PS), the French trade minister between 2014 and 2017 (W. Jäcklein, interview).

In this context of unfavourable insider access to national level political mechanisms, trade unions have worked within and alongside wider social movements to raise their demands and put pressure on national and European decision-makers. Union-CSO alliances over trade issues have struggled to form in the past because of the different characteristics of both types of organisations (Kryst, 2018). However, the near-unanimous opposition to TTIP and CETA from the European labour movement and the existing transnational network of social movements like ATTAC and national movements like Campact in Germany made joint work possible. As will be explained in detail in Chapter 6, this joint work had a direct impact on both negotiations.

Conclusion

The first part of this chapter analysed the trade policy objectives of European trade unions in the contemporary period. The policy objectives of European unions in this period represent a shift from an emphasis on national priorities to a more coherent and European approach. The

increased capacity of the ETUC and the organisational Europeanisation of European trade unions in general has also played a key role. As such, the ETUC now takes the lead on trade issues and plays a central role in developing and coordinating European unions' approach to trade.

Increased globalisation and economic integration since the 1970s have combined with a general shift in the world trade agenda towards non-tariff and regulatory issues to change the trade issues that European unions seek to influence. Though enforceable labour standards remain the core element of European unions' trade policy objectives, the new focus on defending public services and calls for greater transparency in trade negotiations are evidence of this change in focus. Notably, these policies also reveal an increasing opposition from European trade unions to the EU's trade policy agenda, particularly since its shift towards bilateralism after the collapse of multilateral negotiations in the WTO. In contrast with more positive views on the EU's trade agenda in the past, the ETUC and others see this new agenda as one that is likely to bring increased costs and fewer material and social benefits for workers.

This shift has taken place during a period when the EU has sought to integrate normative values into its trade agenda. This approach has addressed the issues of labour standards and greater transparency to an extent. The issue of labour standards is now a regular feature of the EU's TSD chapters that it has negotiated since 2011. Nonetheless, there are major concerns about enforceability for the trade unions given the EU's preference for a 'promotional' approach to labour standards. Similarly, the calls for greater transparency in the development, negotiation and implementation of the EU's trade agenda have been partially addressed by the Commission in the form of increased consultation with civil society during these stages. Crucially, however, European unions still struggle to influence EU trade policymaking directly. These examples highlight that the social dimension of EU

trade policy has improved over time but lacks a firm material basis and remains secondary to its economic agenda.

The second part of this chapter analysed the avenues of influence available for European unions on trade issues. These avenues of influence have decisively shifted towards the European level since the long 1970s. This has particularly been the case since the elevation of the EP to the role of co-legislator with the Council through the Lisbon Treaty. This has provided the ETUC and other European unions with greater influence over an avenue that they were already well organised in. It is also notable that MEPs sympathetic to the European unions' demands from the S&D group of the EP have successfully sought to secure the position of chair of the INTA committee since its inception, highlighting both the new importance of the EP in the EU's trade policymaking process and the increasing importance of trade as an issue for European unions. However, despite these important institutional changes and the Commission's efforts to improve its transparency providing greater opportunities for European unions to influence EU trade policy, influencing the EU POS remains difficult.

The national level has also become a less fruitful avenue of influence for the TUC, DGB and CGT. In the 1990s and early 2000s there were some instances of policy alignment between the TUC, DGB and CGT and their respective national governments that provided some limited avenues of influence. However, the weakening of these unions' associative power through their respective party-union links has also forced these same unions to place greater emphasis on the European level. Similarly, institutional opportunities in the form of consultation with unions and CSOs has also been very weak at the national level.

In this context, European unions have increasingly built coalitions with CSOs and the wider social movement against neoliberal free trade and globalisation that has developed since the late-1990s. While this movement has also lacked opportunities to directly influence

national and European level policymaking processes it has grown in strength over time and represents a challenge to these processes by developing its own methods of outsider influence. Notably, the strength of this movement has correlated with the increasing politicisation of trade by the movement itself as well as exogenous factors such as the populist backlash against trade in recent years. As Chapter 6 will show, trade politicisation and outsider influence would play a major part in how European unions attempted to influence trade negotiations in the contemporary period.

Chapter 6

Influencing world trade negotiations in the contemporary period: 'For Fair Global Trade!'

European trade unions faced several obstacles and opportunities to influence world trade negotiations in the contemporary period. On the one hand, trade unions' power resources had declined significantly since the 1970s which not only dented their ability to resist the entrenchment of neoliberal globalisation but also their available avenues of influence. However, while trade liberalisation has reflected increasing neoliberalism since the end of the 1970s, a greater focus on non-tariff and regulatory issues at the start of the twenty-first century has also meant that the social dimension of trade has been more widely considered than ever before. This environment has also been combined with a growing pressure for the WTO and EU to incorporate mechanisms for societal influence into their governance structures and policymaking processes. More broadly, the increased politicisation of trade since the 1999 'Battle of Seattle' and a questioning of the merits of globalisation has also provided a platform for trade union views within the wider global social justice movement.

The above has meant that the central trade demands of European trade unions – enforceable labour standards, greater transparency in trade negotiations, and the protection of public services in FTAs – were no longer niche, abstract, or particularly technical policy issues. In contrast with the 1970s, this has offered far more opportunities to collaborate with other societal actors. Indeed, a transnational social movement against neoliberal free trade has developed since the late-1990s in which European trade unions have played an increasingly prominent role. However, despite improvements in civil society consultation by the WTO and the EU in this period, access points for union influence have remained limited at all levels.

Additionally, influencing the multilateral and bilateral levels has also brought unique opportunities and challenges for European trade unions.

The first section of this chapter analyses trade union strategies to influence the multilateral WTO from its foundation in 1995 up to the demise of the Doha Development Agenda. Though the search for a multilateral agreement within the WTO is technically still ongoing, union strategies to influence this hoped-for multilateral agreement, particularly with respect to the issue of labour standards, were at their peak between the Singapore (1996) and Hong Kong (2005) Ministerial conferences. The first section of this chapter therefore focuses on union strategies to influence the WTO level during this period.

As the chances of negotiating a multilateral agreement faltered in the mid-2000s the EU increasingly looked towards bilateral agreements as a way of achieving its ambitious trade strategy. An agreement with Canada was one of the EU's earliest attempts to secure a bilateral agreement in the form of CETA. Meetings between the two countries began in June 2007 before negotiations were completed in 2014 and provisionally ratified in September 2017. The DAG which oversees implementation of the agreement also continues to this day. Due to the secretive nature of initial negotiations European trade unions main hope of influencing CETA was between 2014 and 2017 during the ratification process and, to a lesser extent, during the implementation process from 2017 onwards. The second section of this chapter will therefore predominantly analyse union influence between 2014 and 2018, when most of the interviews for this project had also been completed.

The WTO

While the establishment of the WTO in 1995 brought new hopes for union influence over world trade, union interest in trade issues in this era had already grown during the GATT

Uruguay Round (J. Howard, interview). During the late-1980s the ICFTU and the US American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) were the main union proponents of the social clause and US and French governments also endorsed the policy as an instrument against 'unfair' competition. This advocacy included discussions with then GATT Director Arthur Dunkel to attempt to include labour standards in the 1986 Ministerial Declaration (Van Roozendaal, 2002, p. 17).

Though the GATT Executive Council rejected the idea, Dunkel encouraged the AFL-CIO to clarify issues surrounding the social clause - such as what kind of supervisory mechanism could be used - and to emphasise the policy as an issue of human rights rather than workers' rights (Van Roozendaal, 2002, p. 17). This push was later backed up by the US delegation at the 1990 Brussels and 1994 Marrakech Ministerial meetings, who argued for the establishment of a GATT-ILO working group on the issue, this time based on a clearly defined group of rights. The US proposal received support from many European and developed economies but did not have enough support to gain a favourable decision in the Council (GATT Council, 1990).

Despite optimism from the ICFTU, the progress seen on the social clause towards the end of the Uruguay Round was immediately dealt a blow for two reasons: the appointment of former European Commissioner for Competition Policy, Peter Sutherland, as GATT/WTO Director-General, an open opponent of the policy on the grounds that it was 'protectionist'; and the Group of Fifteen developing countries taking a stand against its inclusion immediately before the 1994 Marrakech Ministerial (Van Roozendaal, 2002, p. 18).

However, support for the social clause within the EU was growing. The Belgian and French governments argued for the inclusion of core labour standards in EU trade policy at the multilateral level, a position the Commission reluctantly agreed to after pressure from the UK and Germany forced the Council into a cautious compromise position. Also, the EP's 1994

Sainjon Report called for labour standards to be included in the EU's unilateral GSP regime (Orbie et al., 2005, p. 163).

Though the EU has consistently favoured 'soft' measures that promote multilateralism, cooperation and positive incentives over 'hard' sanctions, it nonetheless supported the incorporation of labour standards in its trade policy from this period onwards (Adriaensen and González-Garibay, 2013, p. 545). The Commission's support for labour standards was considered somewhat surprising by the ICFTU, particularly when Leon Brittan (former Conservative Party MP and then the Head of the EU Delegation before becoming the Commissioner for Trade in 1995) accepted the logic of the policy (S. Pursey, interview). However, even though the Commission favoured the US position of establishing a WTO working group, the UK and Germany, both under Conservative and Christian Democratic governments at the time, remained firm opponents at this stage, making the Council's position far less clear (Orbie et al., 2005, p. 165). This meant that the EU effectively took no collective position on the social clause at the first WTO Ministerial in Singapore in 1996 despite the Commission's support for the policy.

The issue of the social clause became more controversial at the multilateral level in the lead up to Singapore, despite support from the European Commission, the US (now under the Clinton administration), and a political atmosphere that was seemingly conducive to discussing the social dimension of trade. John Evans, General Secretary of the Trade Union Advisory Committee (TUAC) to the OECD between 1985 and 2017, explains this environment further:

the then Clinton administration in the US certainly had a fairly free trade agenda, but at the multilateral level it was also keen to at least give something to the unions. Labour believed in it as well. So, they did accept the argument very much that you need free trade, but you then need the application of international labour standards in a much more binding way internationally... [Renato] Ruggiero, the first director of the WTO [sic]

made this famous speech saying what they were doing was ‘writing the constitution of the global economy’, which are probably the words he has regretted ever since, but it meant that trade then became a perspective through which a lot international policies began to be looked at. And on the positive side, from our point of view, this gave some lease of life to at least looking at or bring together trade and social issues... [TUAC] basically went through the econometric work and came to the conclusion that, broadly, there was compatibility between observing at least core labour standards in the ILO, at least procedural standards, and also good strong economic performance, strong export performance... So, it created a common standard that was accepted in the OECD that core labour standards are part of a pluralist democracy, so that was important (J. Evans, interview).

Additionally, Ruggiero, who was appointed as WTO Director-General after Sutherland in 1995, was perceived by the ICFTU as being someone who was sympathetic to the social clause. This was important as in a system with minimal avenues for civil society influence, the support of the Director-General can be an important part of setting the agenda (Van Roozendaal, 2002, p. 27).

The ICFTU was the central trade union and non-governmental actor coordinating and fostering support for the social clause at the multilateral level in the 1990s and 2000s. According to Anner (2001, p. 54), the confederation was then considered by the WTO to be among the most professional, legitimate, and pragmatic organisations that they dealt with, in part due to the broad and representative nature of the organisation but also due to the quality of its research output. This gave the confederation a far greater level of informal access to the WTO Secretariat compared to other CSOs (Murphy, 2010, p. 74). The ICFTU played the leading role in a coalition of other trade unions at the international level (the International Trade Secretariats, TUAC and the World Confederation of Labour), European level (the ETUC and its federations) and national level (most notably the AFL-CIO, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions and the DGB) as well as some development CSOs (Solidar, Christian Aid and Oxfam

International) (Murphy, 2010, p. 76). These organisations could also rely on the support of certain EU member states (Belgium, France, and Italy), Norway, the US, Canada, and South Africa (O'Brien et al., 2000, p. 89).

The aim of the ICFTU and other trade union and civil society supporters (though not necessarily all governmental supporters) was to convince the WTO to adopt a social clause that would commit states to respect basic ILO conventions with violations punishable by trade sanctions (Murphy, 2010, p. 78). Additionally, advocates called for the ILO to have responsibility for monitoring compliance with the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body, increasing its competence to that of an enforcement mechanism. To try and achieve this, the ICFTU overwhelmingly focused on lobbying governments to support the issue, either directly or by encouraging national or regional affiliates to meet with trade ministers and high-level officials (J. Howard, interview).

This strategy was essentially the same as its approach in the long 1970s (S. Pursey, interview). The important contextual difference is that there were now far fewer left-of-centre governments who were likely to support the social clause. Whilst the ICFTU was far more open to working with CSOs in the 1990s and 2000s (another difference to its approach in the 1970s), initially this was done on a casual basis until a number of its non-trade union allies urged the confederation to form a Workers' Rights Caucus to bring together supporters of the social clause ahead of the Singapore Ministerial (O'Brien et al., 2000, p. 86). This was agreed by the ICFTU who provided representatives from its Geneva office, TUAC and the ITSs.

Despite some progress in trade union and CSO coordination at the WTO, however, intense opposition from developing countries made the likelihood of achieving the ICFTU's aims slim. In the first instance, some developing countries exercised pressure to withdraw an invitation for the ILO Director-General Michel Hansenne to address the Singapore Ministerial conference (Van Roozendaal, 2002, p. 18). This was followed up by strong

declarations from developing economies (as well as some developed economies) opposing the establishment of a WTO-ILO working group on the first day of the ministerial. This discussion then moved on to whether “there should even be a mention of labour standards in the final ministerial declaration, and if so, what form this might take” (Murphy, 2010, p. 81).

For the ICFTU, building support among developing countries was essential but extremely difficult. For example, India were one of the major delegations who consistently opposed the social clause during the 1990s regardless of which party was in power, a position also shared by the country’s trade unions and employers’ organisations (Van Roozendaal, 2002, p. 113). Stephen Pursey, then Head of the Economic and Social Policy Department of the ICFTU, also recalls a meeting with Mahnomen Singh, then the Indian Finance Minister, which highlights the uphill struggle the ICFTU and European trade unions were facing in convincing developing countries to support the issue:

he basically said ‘the way to Hell is paved with good intentions’... He wasn't challenging our honesty. He saw it as something that would be good for developing countries as well as for workers in developing countries; that we weren't being protectionist; that our whole idea was that any issue of sanctions would only come after extensive efforts to help countries... But he said ‘look, you may be honest, but this is going to be exploited by people who just want to keep Indian products off the market’ (S. Pursey, interview).

This division was also prevalent between Northern and Southern CSOs during the conference itself, predominantly represented in the difference between the ICFTU and the Workers’ Rights Caucus on one side and the Third World Network (TWN) – who viewed the WTO and other global institutions such as the World Bank and IMF as institutions of post-colonial domination – on the other (O’Brien et al., 2000, p. 87). A closed-door meeting between the ICFTU and the TWN was held on the second day of the conference, each of whom brought ten representatives – the ICFTU made a particular effort to include trade unionists from Africa, Latin America and South Asia. However, the TWN’s main agenda in Singapore was ultimately to restrict the WTO’s powers and especially its attempts to expand

into the area of investment regulation. As such, whilst sympathetic to the notion of minimum labour standards, it was not willing to endorse handing greater power to the WTO in any area. As O'Brien et al. (2000, p. 88) puts it,

Whereas the ICFTU saw the prime international cleavage as being between workers and employers, the TWN saw the divide as being North/South. The ICFTU was in favour of international organisations forcing governments to live up to minimum standards, the TWN, because of its view of international organisations, preferred greater state autonomy. In the end, the ICFTU could not answer the TWN's criticism of the structural inequality of international economic institutions and the TWN could not advocate a practical policy proposal to improve workers' rights.

Despite significant promise at the beginning of the 1990s, the final Singapore Declaration essentially relegated the issue of the social clause to a purely ILO competence, consolidating the idea that the multilateral trade regime was not the correct arena for the issue (Wilkinson, 2001). The only glimmer of hope left for trade unions in favour of the social clause at the end of Singapore stemmed from the fact that the South African delegation and COSATU managed to win support from developing countries to include a mention of core labour standards in the final text (WTO, 1996; O'Brien et al., 2000, p. 100).

The ICFTU had the most optimistic interpretation of the final Singapore declaration, arguing that it represented a "small, but significant step forward. It is not the Havana Charter; but it is the first time in the fifty-year history of the GATT that a commitment to core labour standards has been made" (ICFTU, 1998). This optimism arguably stemmed from the fact that, due to the dual challenges of multilateral trade negotiations requiring near unanimous support for an issue and the strong opposition of developing countries, "what [the ICFTU] got in Singapore was about the maximum you could expect" (S. Pursey, interview). This optimism was not shared by the ETUC and some of its federations who saw the failure to move forward on creating a structural link between the WTO and ILO core labour standards in 1996 as a major setback (T. Jenkins, interview).

The mention of labour standards in the final Singapore text was interpreted by non-union opponents and supporters of the social clause differently: its opponents believed that the issue was dead at the WTO level; its supporters, including the US and EU negotiators, argued that such an important issue warranted greater discussion at the WTO and would pursue it at the next ministerial (Murphy, 2010, pp. 82-83). Significantly, according to a leading member of DG Trade who was involved in WTO negotiations during this period, the outcome in Singapore also created the general attitude among negotiators that labour issues were no longer on the table at the multilateral level (DG Trade official 3, interview).

These differing interpretations of the final Singapore text meant that the social clause would continue to be discussed at future ministerial meetings. The entrenched North-South divisions within the WTO continued and were reflected in the heated contest over selection of the organisation's next Director-General. Led by the US, most developed economies pushed for appointment of Mike Moore while most developing states argued instead that the WTO should for the first time be led by someone from the Global South and supported the candidacy of Supachai Panitchpakdi of Thailand. This lengthy and bitter dispute was only resolved by unprecedentedly deciding to split the six-year term of appointment between the two candidates (Hopewell, 2016, p. 72).

Understanding that the lack of support for the social clause from trade unions in developing countries in Singapore had severely undermined their strategy, the ICFTU made greater efforts to increase communication with their affiliates in the Global South on the basis that they could play a similar role in influencing their own governments as unions in Europe, the US, Norway, and South Africa had achieved previously. First, in 1997 the ICFTU began publicly reporting on WTO member states' adherence to core labour standards – something it had done internally since 1984 (Heinz and Luce, 2010, p. 15) – timing their reports to coincide with the WTO's own trade policy reviews of member states (Murphy, 2010, p. 84).

This is a practice that has been developed since through the ITUC's *Global Rights Index* and *Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights*.

Second, the ICFTU set up its TILS taskforce which created an email list and database in 1998 and was financially supported by the Norwegian Foreign Ministry (Anner, 2001, p. 45; ICFTU, 2004, p. 118). Though this approach was quite innovative at the time, especially within the trade union movement, ironically, unions in developing countries were initially under-represented due to a lack of email access (J. Howard, interview). Strategically, however, this process sought to “pinpoint what every government was doing, having attachments of their positions and what the unions had been saying to them. It was quite a transparent [and] comprehensive way for people in any trade union to see what was happening in another country in terms of the unions’ work there on trade issues and labour standards in particular” (J. Howard, interview). The TILS email list and database has also helped the ICFTU/ITUC develop collective positions on trade issues, particularly as the process has become more established over time (Y. Altintzis, interview).

At the 1998 WTO Ministerial in Geneva (a largely ceremonial event to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the GATT), the ICFTU sought to keep the social clause on the agenda by organising a three-day conference under the TILS banner in the lead-up to the ministerial to prepare trade unionists to lobby their governments to support the policy (Anner, 2001, p. 49). The conference was addressed by the Director-Generals of the WTO and ILO and the Secretary-General of UNCTAD (the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development), highlighting how the issue had remained on the agenda of key global institutions after Singapore. However, the limitations of the ICFTU’s top-down approach and restricted strategic orientation were again in evidence at this time. As Murphy (2010, p. 84) notes, the South African and Brazilian affiliates at the conference urged the ICFTU to broaden its engagement with the WTO to include more issues facing developing nations, environmental

issues and CSO participation in the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body. However, apart from increasing its joint work with Solidar on child labour issues, the ICFTU ignored this suggestion, in part because its limited resources precluded it from adopting a more expansive strategy (O'Brien et al., 2000, p. 101).

Though the ceremonial nature of the Geneva conference meant that little substantive discussion over policy took place, it was significant for the increased number of actors who came out in support of a social clause. The US (Clinton and US Trade Representative Barshefsky), EU Commission (Brittan), UK (Blair), Norway (Bondevik) and South Africa (Mandela) all made formal statements in support of core labour standards (Murphy, 2010, p. 84). Clinton also called for a joint WTO-ILO special meeting to be convened, which essentially represented a joint US-EU proposal (WTO, 1998). One significant effect the Geneva Ministerial had was that it arguably paved the way for the ILO's 1998 *Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work* by highlighting that the issue of labour standards was still a relative priority for several key member states (Murphy, 2010, p. 85).

Even during 1998, the ICFTU was increasingly focused on the third Ministerial conference scheduled for November 1999 in Seattle. In preparation, the confederation developed a four-part strategy at a seminar held in Geneva in December 1998: first, the ICFTU would develop the overall arguments and rationale of the campaign; second, affiliates would be informed about the campaign and discuss the goals through regional and sub-regional activities; third, national level affiliates would be urged to lobby their own governments to support linking trade with labour rights and request that they be allowed to join official government delegations; and fourth, it was hoped that these governments would then press for changes at the WTO (Anner, 2001, p. 49). At the same seminar the ICFTU presented its own background document, *Globalization, Investment and Labor Standards*, which proposed several activities, including:

(1) the organization of twelve subregional and regional activities to allow affiliates to discuss the campaign strategy to achieve the campaign goals at a national level; (2) the targeting of developed countries and regions such as Japan and the EU where governments appeared to be favouring a purely ILO-based approach to the labor standards issue; (3) the exploration of possible nongovernmental organization... alliances” (Anner, 2001, p. 50).

In trying to fulfil their own commitment to the ICFTU’s strategy, the four trade union case studies of this thesis achieved mixed success in influencing the EU and their national governments ahead of the Seattle Ministerial. The ETUC ultimately failed to convince the Commission and its lead negotiator, Pascal Lamy, to take a strong position on labour standards, despite his previous rhetorical support and PS background. The European Commission, who were primarily concerned with launching a new trade round, warned against unrealistic expectations on the social clause. As a reflection of this cautious approach, it downgraded its previous call for a separate WTO working group to the demand for a permanent joint WTO-ILO forum for the policy to be discussed (Orbie et al., 2005, p. 165). The EU’s shift towards a softer position was criticised by ETUC General Secretary Emilio Gabaglio as a “shocking retreat” on its commitment to social and environmental issues in world trade (French, 2002, p. 300).

At the national level, the TUC and DGB had relatively close access to the LP and SPD respectively and played a role in both delegations supporting a moderate version of the social clause, in both cases pushing at a relatively open door. For example, the British representative of the Blair government at Seattle, Minister of Commerce and Industry Stephen Byers said at the opening of the Ministerial conference, “Can [the WTO] stop being seen as a servant of multinationals and instead assert itself as a body which will protect and defend the interests of all its Members?” (WTO, 1999). Furthermore, the LP were keen to involve the TUC, the CBI and CSOs like Oxfam in their discussions on trade in this period (E. Sweeney, interview). The DGB also lobbied the new SPD government (elected two

months before the start of the ministerial) and made it clear in several public statements that its support for the new trade round was conditional on the inclusion of a strong mechanism for labour standards (DGB, 1999).

In France, where support for the social clause was already strong as a result of the PS' strength in the National Assembly, the CGT, which had joined the ETUC in March of the same year, supplemented this existing support by joining with the other major French union confederations to submit a joint statement to the new Committee for Social Dialogue on European and International Issues on the upcoming Seattle negotiations, calling for the EU to “promote its social and development model based on the recognition of workers' social rights and the role of trade unions, access to collective social protection and public services, Europe's cultural diversity and respect for human rights” (Eurofound, 1999b). The joint union position also called for greater transparency in WTO debates and decisions and the establishment of a formal WTO-ILO link. Indicative of the sensitivity of these issues in France at the time, “Both the MEDEF [Mouvement des entreprises de France] employers' confederation and the National Federation of Farmers' Unions... expressed their approval of the spirit of the unions' statement” (Eurofound, 1999b).

Once again, calls from affiliates in developing countries to broaden the ICFTU's focus to wider development issues were ignored even though developing countries still had more than enough support within the WTO to oppose the social clause, regardless of the power of the US and other developed economies (Anner, 2001, p. 50). This was also reflected among development CSOs where a sharp North-South divide still existed. This division led to the ICFTU softening its language on trade sanctions in its own 1999 proposal for a social clause, *Building workers' human rights into the global trading system*. This proposal focused on amending laws rather than imposing trade measures and suggested closer ILO-WTO cooperation to determine whether a country was in violation of core labour rights (ICFTU,

1999, pp. 44-46). In fact, a far stronger position was put forward by Clinton and the US on the second day of the Seattle Ministerial:

What we ought to do first of all is to adopt the United States' position on having a working group on labor within the WTO, and then that working group should develop these core labor standards, and then they ought to be a part of every trade agreement, and ultimately I would favor a system in which sanctions would come for violating any provision of a trade agreement (Paulson, 1999, 1 December in Murphy, 2010, p. 89).

Though the ICFTU supported the thrust of Clinton's intervention it completely undermined their strategy of taking a softer approach with developing countries by "talking about setting up committees, working groups, the ILO and WTO working together and so on" (J. Evans, interview). The EU's softer 'promotional' approach found far greater support among developing countries who were angered by Clinton's declaration. However, his remarks also shocked US negotiators who had agreed on a softer approach before the conference. A watered-down version of the EU's proposal was accepted in a meeting of 35 countries on the third day of the conference which proposed the establishment of a discussion group on the social clause that would not report to the WTO and for which the WTO would not be responsible for establishing (Anner, 2001, p. 54). This at least meant the debate would continue beyond the end of the conference but was far less than the US was willing to accept and a far weaker outcome than many trade unions had previously demanded (Murphy, 2010, p. 89).

The 1999 Seattle Ministerial is perhaps most notable for being the advent of the first major protests outside of the WTO conference. 30,000 protesters – a loose and eclectic alliance of trade unions, CSOs, environmentalists, human rights advocates, and anti-globalisation activists – rallied outside the conference to protest against the major goal of the conference, the launch of a 'Millenium Round' of trade negotiations, as well as wider grievances with neoliberal trade liberalisation (Murphy, 2010, p. 88). This rally, sponsored by

the AFL-CIO, was also part of a ‘global day of action against neoliberalism’ and involved 111 protests in 97 cities in 22 countries across the globe in which many national union confederations also took part (Wood, 2004, p. 86). In contrast with the ICFTU’s insider lobbying strategy, the AFL-CIO and other US unions mobilised thousands of their members and the notoriously militant International Longshore and Warehousing Union also shut down ports all along the US West Coast for eight hours (Engels, 2019, 22 November).

These peaceful protests were overshadowed by the civil disobedience from the more anarchist elements of the movement and the response of the police, leading to the ministerial conference gaining the now infamous tag of the ‘Battle of Seattle’. Whilst the protests did not shut down the conference completely, the inaugural morning session on the first day of the conference was abandoned and the afternoon plenary session was held under police protection (Murphy, 2010, p. 88). More importantly, the Seattle Ministerial marked the beginning of an era of greater trade politicisation and public debate on the merits and costs of trade liberalisation, a debate in which European unions’ central demands – enforceable labour standards, transparency, and protection of public services – would be heavily present.

However, while the protests highlighted the strength of feeling against the WTO outside of the conference, neither the protests nor the labour standards debate led to the collapse of talks and hopes of launching a new Millennium Round. Ultimately, it was the intensive support from the EU, Japan, and South Korea for the ‘Singapore issues’ – a reference to four working groups set up during the 1996 Singapore Ministerial dealing with government procurement, trade facilitation, trade and investment and trade and competition (Evenett, 2007) – agricultural tariffs, and the major disagreements between developing countries and the US that led to the collapse of talks.

Though the labour standards debate reflected this division, it was not decisive, especially as developing countries had agreed, albeit reluctantly and in a far weaker form, to

keep the issue on the multilateral agenda. From the ICFTU's perspective, James Howard argues that intense lobbying by its affiliates nearly succeeded in achieving its initial goal of a working group on labour standards: "In my view labour standards had almost been resolved at that point, so in a way it was a tragedy for the labour rights advocates that because of unrelated issues the whole thing came to a stop, because it was so close" (J. Howard, interview). In hindsight, however, Seattle can be seen as a further step backwards from the Singapore Ministerial, particularly as the ICFTU's position had softened in the face of opposition from developing countries and the hopes of achieving enforceable labour standards through the WTO seemed further away than ever.

The steadfast refusal of influential developing countries like India and Pakistan to consider further debate on the social clause meant that the EU and others had to reassess their strategy, particularly as the Commission's primary concern remained the opening of a new trade round. For example, Pascal Lamy stated at a meeting of the ETUC Executive Committee in 2000 that "After Seattle, while keeping its core idea, the EU's approach has evolved a little in order to take into consideration the preoccupations expressed by the developing countries in Seattle. We preach now the need to launch a regular dialogue covering a larger domain, and with a larger participation of international organizations and other interested parties" (European Commission, 2000). Indeed, Lamy admitted in 2002 that he stopped pursuing the inclusion of the social clause at the 2001 Doha conference due to India's threat to veto the launching of the Doha Round (European Commission, 2002), something he had even hinted to the ICFTU about at their *Making globalisation work for people* conference a few weeks prior to the Doha Ministerial in November 2001 (Orbie et al., 2005, p. 169).

Lamy's arguments reflected the EU's general position on the social clause which underwent increasing "ILO-isation" after Seattle and especially in the months before the

Doha conference (Novitz, 2002, pp. 7-8). This process is described by Orbie et al. (2005, p. 168) as:

(1) an increasing emphasis on the ILO (instead of the WTO) as the appropriate organisation to deal with labour standards, (2) a shift towards the promotion of 'soft governance', in line with the nonbinding ILO approach (instead of the 'stronger' trade regime), and (3) a growing responsibility of the private sector (instead of governmental action) for applying the principles of the ILO Conventions.

This process was backed up in practice by a Commission document released in July 2001 outlining that the ILO constituted a more appropriate forum in which to discuss the social clause (European Commission, 2001), press coverage pointing out that the EU was not willing to jeopardise attempts to launch a new trade round, and the discourse of both Lamy in the run-up to Doha and member states' interventions at Doha (Orbie et al., 2005, p. 169).

Notably, James Howard argues that "Pascal Lamy was intellectually supportive [of the social clause], but I don't know how much he did in concrete terms to help [the ICFTU]" (J. Howard, interview).

Development issues were meant to be the central policy concerns of the Doha Development Agenda. However, this rhetorical acknowledgement of issues affecting developing countries is seen by some as a cynical attempt to pacify the Global South and smooth over their ever-increasing divisions with the EU and US in the context of a WTO in crisis after Seattle (Jawara and Kwa, 2003, pp. 271-272). Indeed, Camilo (2005, p. 13) asserts that EU Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy was central to talking up the development agenda of Doha by regularly citing the mention of 'development' in each of the operating paragraphs of the Ministerial Declaration, but also that this stemmed more from fear for the future of the multilateral system and the EU's own trading interests than genuine concern for development issues - hence the EU's 'multilateralism first' agenda in this period (Lamy, 2002). Likewise, Van Den Hoven (2004, p. 258) argues that the Commission's rhetoric during the 'Doha era'

can be seen as a deliberate attempt to increase the perception of the EU as a normative and stabilising trade actor – something that Meunier and Nicolaïdis (2006) have conceptualised as a “conflicted trade power” status.

The strategy of the ICFTU and European trade unions was severely weakened by the softening of the EU’s position on the social clause as well as, more decisively, the election of the Republican Bush administration in the US who were hostile to labour issues being part of the WTO’s mandate (Murphy, 2010, p. 90; J. Evans, interview). Importantly, despite the ‘development discourse’ used by the Commission, trade liberalisation was the key objective. In this environment business organisations such as UNICE increased their lobbying of decision-makers as services became more of a focus because of the EU’s support for the Singapore issues (Siles-Brügge, 2014, p. 64; Dür, 2008, pp. 33-34).

Nonetheless, despite an ever-decreasing number of governmental allies, the ICFTU continued with the same lobbying strategy throughout the 2000s. As a result, trade unions faced an uphill struggle to even get labour standards mentioned in the final declaration of ministerial conferences during this period. The Doha Ministerial was the last time this was achieved before negotiations broke down conclusively in 2008 and simply reaffirmed the declaration made at the Singapore Ministerial in 1996 (WTO, 2001; Murphy, 2010, p. 90). Representing the decline of the issue at the multilateral level, the TUC’s report of the Doha Ministerial highlighted the key issues missing from the EU’s and WTO’s agenda:

Pascal Lamy, the European Trade Commissioner has used the term ‘Doha Development Agenda’ to refer to the outcome of the WTO Ministerial Conference. Other leading figures have also used it. For this to ring true, the positive language on development agreed in Doha must actually translate into positive action and gains for people living in the developing world. The fundamental human rights of workers also need be protected and not violated in the name of trade. As a first step, the WTO must make a commitment to collaborating with the International Labour Organisation (ILO) on its work programme on the social dimensions of globalisation (TUC, 2001).

Despite the pleas of European trade unions, the EU did not push the labour standards issue at the multilateral level after Doha – though it did strengthen labour provisions in its GSP in this period (Orbie et al., 2005, p. 167) – and the view of WTO officials was that any chance of the labour linkage being realised had been put on the backburner (Haworth and Hughes, 2005, p. 133).

With the social clause debate virtually finished at the WTO by the beginning of the 2000s (though the ICFTU continued to unsuccessfully advocate for its inclusion at future ministerial meetings and through the CSD (ICFTU, 2003; WTO, 2004; DG Trade member 3, interview), trade unions increasingly began to focus on other issues of concern. The most successful example of transnational union collaboration during the Doha era can be drawn from the anti-GATS campaign that was conducted by European trade unions and CSOs. It also serves as an example of an increasing willingness of European unions to cooperate with wider civil society.

Contestation against the GATS can be traced back to the start of the Doha Round in 2001. The campaign emerged out of the large transnational advocacy coalition (Keck and Sikkink, 1998) that had mobilised against the 1999 Seattle Ministerial with around 1500 organisations joining the ‘Our World Is Not For Sale’ platform and releasing two flagship statements against the WTO (Crespy, 2014, p. 174). The petition, ‘Stop the GATS Attack Now!’ was then launched in March 2001 and helped define the framing of the anti-GATS discourse thereafter (Strange, 2011). The campaign was supported by 596 organisations across 63 countries, including the ICFTU’s global union federations, Public Services International (PSI) and Education International, who were key in providing expertise and coordinating mobilisation transnationally (Crespy, 2014, p. 174; McGuire, 2014).

The ICFTU, ETUC and the World Confederation of Labour made regular joint statements on GATS negotiations, their central message being that public services – but

especially education, health, and essential public utilities – should not be a subject for trade negotiations (TUC, 2002). As an example of the increasing willingness of the international labour movement to define its ‘red lines’ in terms of what trade policies it was unwilling to tolerate, PSI launched an international call to “Stop the WTO negotiations! Save Jobs!” prior to the 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial. These statements were also supported by national and regional public sector unions from the Global South, the US, Canada, and Europe, including the European Federation of Public Service Unions (EPSU) (Hilary, 2014, p. 53).

This pressure led to talks between the PSI, EPSU and EU Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy in 2003 who sought to ease the concerns of the unions (EPSU, 2003). In these meetings, the ETUC, due to its participation in European social dialogue and access to EU institutions, played the role of mediator between the PSI and DG Trade (Crespy, 2014, p. 176). Notably, the height of the anti-GATS campaign took place in the same period as contestation within the EU over the Bolkestein Directive which drew on similar policy themes that European trade unions were naturally keen to link together (Crespy, 2010).

McGuire (2014, p. 59) argues that the anti-GATS campaign improved internal union capacity to intervene in broader movements by increasing the level of knowledge and expertise about trade policy and negotiations, its possible impact on members and where to intervene, honed their framing capabilities and openness to adopting new strategies of contention, built bridges with CSOs and social movement networks, and reduced levels of existing distrust between unions and CSOs (especially at the international level) which resulted in longstanding alliances.

Whilst the transnational anti-GATS campaign was able to successfully frame negotiations as an attack on public services and draw attention to the lack of democracy and transparency in WTO decision-making processes, strategically “the main call to action was for affiliates to conduct a national lobbying and awareness raising campaign designed to

persuade national governments not to make further commitments of services to the GATS and not to demand commitments from other countries” (McGuire, 2014, p. 55). Ultimately, this strategy has not halted the thrust of the GATS and services liberalisation has remained a contentious issue ever since. However, cooperation with CSOs became a key theme of the Doha era for trade unions at the national, European, and international level.

As explained in the previous chapter, cooperation with CSOs also opened new avenues and methods of influence over national trade policymaking for the TUC, DGB and CGT in this period. At the international level, the impetus for cooperation with wider civil society ultimately stemmed from unions’ own lack of opportunities to influence the multilateral arena. Nonetheless, a transnational advocacy network around trade issues was being built and unions, despite their acknowledged internal contradictions, were sometimes central and leading figures. This would have significant implications for future mobilisations over trade issues.

In general, the lack of action on the social clause after the Doha Ministerial and the consistent failure of member states to complete successive trade rounds also correlated with fewer resources being used by the ICFTU and ETUC at the multilateral level. A member of DG Trade present at WTO negotiations in this period argues that unions were correct to reduce their focus on the WTO level due to their limited channels of influence and limited leverage over labour issues (DG Trade member 3, interview). Similarly, ETUC advisor Tom Jenkins argues that “Doha’s failure isn’t to be deplored as it wasn’t going in the right direction” (T. Jenkins, interview). Ed Sweeney, who was one of the few European trade unionists to participate in negotiations during the Doha era as part of the UK delegation, also found negotiations frustrating, often based on the lowest common denominator, lacking in detail and transparency, and very apolitical (E. Sweeney, interview).

But regardless of trade union views on the WTO as an institution, multilateral negotiations lurched from crisis to crisis in the 2000s. These crises, which have resulted in the Doha Round remaining unfinished to this day, were primarily because of the huge disagreements between the US, EU, and developing countries over market access and agricultural issues but also because of the institutional problems associated with the WTO and, more broadly, multilateralism (Jones, 2010, pp. 2-5). In this environment, the EU began to seek new avenues to pursue its evolving trade agenda. These new avenues would provide challenges for European trade unions but also notable opportunities.

CETA

The impetus behind discussions between the EU and Canada about the development of a bilateral FTA were framed by the lack of progress during the Doha Round. It was therefore no coincidence that it also marked a shift in the EU's trade strategy. The overt focus on multilateralism that was a key feature of EU trade policy under Pascal Lamy continued for a short period when new Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson took over in 2004 before the Commission pivoted towards a new strategy – 'Global Europe' – in 2006. Though WTO negotiations were still ongoing at this stage, each negotiating round brought less hope of a final agreement.

Strategically, Global Europe eschewed the EU's failed multilateral strategy in favour of bilateralism, though lip service to multilateralism continued. Economically, the strategy 'renewed' its market access strategy and marked a distinct shift "from multilateralism first to competitive liberalisation", a reference to increasing competition between the EU and US for third markets (Heron and Siles-Brügge, 2012, p. 251). In combination, the EU sought to "achieve what is impossible within a multilateral setting" (Choudry, 2010), representing a

‘second wind’ of neoliberal free trade which had begun to stall during the Doha years (Bieler and Morton, 2014, p. 42). Indeed, the Commission framed this strategic shift as a necessary policy correction: “As a result of the priority the EU has given to multilateral efforts to reduce trade barriers, the Commission’s focus has to some extent shifted away from specific barrier removal. There is a strong need to correct this, both because of the growing importance and complexity of non-tariff barriers and because of the demands of stakeholders” (European Commission, 2007).

The shift towards bilateralism and more aggressive trade liberalisation forced the ETUC and European trade unions to take a more critical attitude to the Global Europe strategy. In an initial press statement reacting to the launch of the new strategy, the confederation accused the Commission of avoiding a democratic debate and for taking a “narrow vision of its responsibilities” in relation to employment and social protection in the EU and developing countries as well as for taking an “openly mercenary approach... at odds with the pro-multilateral and pro-sustainable development strategy” it had previously espoused during the Doha negotiations (ETUC, 2006a). This position was backed up by a resolution adopted by the ETUC’s Executive Committee in December 2006 that strongly opposed the Commission’s “extremely aggressive liberalisation agenda” (ETUC, 2006b) and again in its *Activity Report* passed at its 11th Congress in Seville in May 2007 when it “condemned [Global Europe] for being overtly geared towards bilateralism and omitting the development dimension of European trade policy” (ETUC, 2007, p. 21).

ETUC Senior Advisor Tom Jenkins notes that the rise of the Commission’s Global Europe strategy and the corresponding increase in trade agreements being negotiated was a key turning point in the ETUC becoming more involved in trade issues (which had previously been largely left to the ICFTU/ITUC) (T. Jenkins, interview). This was also represented by a joint ETUC-ITUC statement in 2007 outlining trade union demands relating to key social

elements of TSD chapters in EU FTA negotiations (ETUC and ITUC, 2007). The policy content of the paper was predominantly a reiteration of both organisations' known positions on the need for enforceable labour standards. What was more notable however, were the references to the need for ongoing SIAs, that TSD chapters should fall under the same standard provisions as everything else in a FTA, and that there "should be a binding mechanism whereby recognised workers' and employers' organisations on both sides of an FTA should be able to submit... requests for action... be treated within a specified time period and form part of an ongoing follow-up and review process to ensure that governments address such complaints effectively" in the event of either party breaching agreed social, labour and environmental standards (ETUC and ITUC, 2007). This document formed the core of the ETUC's approach to CETA and other bilateral agreements in this period and highlights the potential it saw for enforceable standards to become a reality despite the Commission's more aggressive trade strategy.

These debates within the ETUC also reflected the discussions taking place in this period about the implementation of the EU's Lisbon Strategy, a strategy which sought to make the European economy more competitive and dynamic whilst remaining, on paper, committed to the European Social Model. Siles-Brügge (2014, p. 86) argues that the arrival of Peter Mandelson as EU Trade Commissioner was a watershed moment for the Lisbon Strategy as "DG Trade explicitly seized upon its 'competitiveness pillar' to underwrite its arguments for a more aggressive trade policy". However, whilst acknowledging this policy shift towards a more openly neoliberal trade policy in this period, a member of DG Employment interviewed for this thesis also argues that this shift was not entirely one-dimensional and notes the EU's commitment to socially-oriented policies and agreements such as the United Nations' Millennium Development Goals, the ILO's 2008 Decent Work Agenda, and social policy and sustainable development commitments in the Treaty of Lisbon

(DG Employment and Social Affairs official, interview). Tom Jenkins also notes that tensions between DG Trade and the Employment and Development DGs were evident during this period in interdepartmental consultations and reflected ETUC concerns about the need to find a balance between free trade and sustainable development issues. Jenkins also alleges that this may have helped towards the inclusion of TSD chapters in the FTAs that followed the adoption of the Global Europe strategy (T. Jenkins, interview).

With the above in mind, Van den Putte and Orbie (2015) highlight that despite an increase in centre-right governments and a stronger liberalisation agenda, social and labour provisions in EU trade policy have actually increased since 2008. Carbone and Orbie (2014) argue that the impetus behind the expansion of the EU's "trade-development nexus" stems from several events and processes, such as the global economic crisis, the rise of emerging economic powers, the enhanced agency of developing countries, and the increasing challenges of globalisation. For Young and Peterson (2013) there has therefore been a key paradox at the heart of EU trade policy since the beginning of the twenty-first century and since 2008 in particular: on the one hand, a greater emphasis on trade as a tool for development; on the other, the conclusion of trade agreements with emerging markets that have undermined the very same development policies. It is this paradox that European trade unions have tried to influence in favour of the former.

It is in this context that the EU and Canada began examining the potential benefits of pursuing a closer economic partnership. In the first instance this stemmed from the June 2007 EU-Canada Summit in Berlin when both sides agreed to conduct a joint study. The potential trade deal was highly significant as it would represent the first bilateral agreement agreed by the EU with a G7 member and could set the parameters for the long-mooted agreement with the US. Notably, it later emerged that Canada was only considered to be a 'second tier' country in the Global Europe strategy in terms of interest for the EU to conclude a trade

agreement, leading to the perception that the agreement was a stepping-stone towards a deal with the US (DG Trade, 2011).

An online civil society consultation on closer EU-Canada trade relations was opened between February-March 2008 (European Commission and Government of Canada, 2008). By October of the same year both parties released their joint study which provided the supporting rationale for the launch of negotiations which began in May 2009 after confidential negotiating directives had been agreed. These negotiating directives were adopted by the Council before the Lisbon Treaty came into force in 2013. This meant that the EP had no formal access to them during the early stages of negotiations and only officially received them a few weeks before the end of negotiations in September 2014 (Delimatsis, 2016, p. 12). Importantly, the negotiating directives – which officially remained confidential until 15 December 2015 (European Council, 2015) – outlined that the agreement would go beyond both countries' existing WTO commitments and “should include, as a minimum, all the chapters of the most ambitious EU and Canadian bilateral economic agreements to date” including issues relating to sustainable development and labour standards (European Commission & Government of Canada, 2009, p. 3).

Despite the above, however, most of the directives reflected the EU's neoliberal trade agenda. The liberalisation of public services, an area that sub-national governments in Canada hold constitutional responsibilities for, was the EU's primary offensive negotiating interest (Healy, 2014, pp. 59-60). This immediately raised the threat of opposition to a central thrust of the potential trade deal. To reduce the EU's fears on this issue the Canadian federal government made a commitment that sub-national governments would make “binding commitments in all areas falling, wholly or in part, in their jurisdiction... to the full extent that European undertakings warrant” (European Commission and Government of Canada, 2009, p. 3). The Canadian government sought greater participation of Canada's provinces and

territories and civil society during negotiations with the chief Canadian negotiator holding post-round telephone briefings to try and ensure a smooth process (Healy, 2014, pp. 60-61). According to Trew (2013, p. 569) joint civil society consultations during negotiations had been considered by the EU and Canada but never materialised.

Despite these small acts of transparency, public sector unions were particularly concerned about the impact of the proposed deal on public services given both sides' established approach to trade liberalisation. These fears led to EPSU and three Canadian public service unions - The Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE), the National Union of Public and General Employees (NUPGE) and the Public Service Alliance of Canada (PSAC) - issuing a joint critical assessment of the proposed deal in January 2010, calling for a full evaluation of its potential social, labour and environmental impacts, protection of public services and governments' right to regulate in the public interest, and greater public scrutiny of negotiations (EPSU, CUPE, NUPGE and PSAC, 2010).

Importantly, the Canadian Trade Justice Network (TJN), a broad coalition of CSOs and trade unions (including public service unions and the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC)), was established on 5 February 2010 as civil society work around what would become CETA started to develop. The primary impetus behind TJN's formation was the feared impact of the agreement and the lack of public scrutiny and debate, which the network hoped to improve by pushing the federal and provincial governments to be more transparent and inclusive (Drew, 2013, p. 570).

The threat of ISDS was also a feature of early union concerns with the proposed trade deal. This was notable as although modern dispute settlements in investment treaties which allowed an investor to file a claim against a state date back to the late-1980s (and decades before that in different forms), such mechanisms had increased exponentially since the beginning of the twenty-first century (Krajewski, 2014, p. 6; UNCTAD, 2014, p. 124).

Though no details concerning the inclusion of ISDS in CETA existed yet, nearly half of existing ISDS clauses included EU member states and Canadian unions also had experience of the issue through the NAFTA (Ames, 2015; EPSU et al., 2010, pp. 7-8). These fears increased and were brought to the attention of the public just before the third negotiating round in April 2010, when PSI, EPSU and TJN jointly released a leaked draft copy of the prospective deal, now known publicly as the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (EPSU and PSI, 2010). This then became the basis for more detailed joint analysis and campaigning and helped frame the debate and approach to negotiations for public sector unions on both sides of the Atlantic (Healy, 2014, p. 65).

By February 2010, Karel de Gucht had taken over as EU Trade Commissioner. De Gucht's appointment ultimately marked a continuation of the EU's trade strategy, despite the launch of the Commission's 'Trade, Growth and World Affairs' communication in November 2010. This communication emphasised the need to continue the Commission's ambitious liberalisation agenda set out in 2006 "either by 'completing' the work carried out on existing initiatives... or by improving existing tools to better achieve unchanged objectives", the latter being a reference to the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon and the institutional changes associated with it (Siles-Brügge, 2014, p. 161).

As CETA gained momentum as an issue for trade unions, the priority for the ETUC and the CLC was to develop a joint statement. However, due to the CLC's longstanding opposition to FTAs, informed by its experience of agreements with the US that had brought job losses through economic restructuring and attacks on public services, this could not be achieved at this stage (Healy, 2014, pp. 60-61). The ETUC initially proposed its 2007 joint statement with the ITUC as a starting point, but this was rejected by the CLC due to its narrow emphasis on labour rights and the call for a monitoring mechanism in which unions would be involved. The latter was problematic for the CLC and Canadian civil society who

did not want to take on the role of “monitoring a bad agreement” (Healy, 2014, p. 63). The ETUC was also concerned with the CLC’s participation in the Canadian TJN and some of the associations it was making with CSOs in Europe which included several anti-free trade CSOs (Healy, 2014, p. 64). However, a CSO member interviewed for this project also notes that this suspicion flowed both ways as many CSOs did not see the ETUC as a trustworthy ally due to its perceived closeness to the Commission (Anti-poverty CSO member, interview).

While further ETUC-CLC discussions over CETA were held during the ITUC World Congress in June 2010 and some areas of mutual concern were agreed, the ETUC was still reticent to go as far as the CLC’s position, leaving the CLC to release its own Executive Council statement in October 2010 (Healy, 2014, p. 63). This statement did not explicitly oppose CETA but argued that the Canadian government were making a “grave error” by applying “neo-liberal solutions to a crisis caused by neo-liberalism” and noted that the confederation “would support an agreement between Canada and the EU embodying the most positive features of the European social model, including higher standards and protective regulation, but this is not on offer” (CLC, 2010).

On 25 November 2010 the EP, without specific mention to the ongoing CETA negotiations, unanimously passed three separate trade-related resolutions concerning human rights, social and environmental standards (European Parliament, 2010a), corporate social responsibility (European Parliament, 2010b), and climate change imperatives in international trade agreements (European Parliament, 2010c). While an EP resolution on 5 May 2010 had welcomed EU-Canada negotiations from an economic point of view (European Parliament, 2010d), the resolution on standards made clear the parliament’s support for the agreement also rested on full implementation of the ILO’s eight Core Labour Standards and Decent Work Agenda, as well as calls for strict monitoring and a dispute mechanism system on an equal footing with other parts of the agreement that had the power to impose fines in the

event of a breach in agreed standards (European Parliament, 2010a). These resolutions emanated from the INTA committee and were backed by rapporteurs for the opinion of the committees of Foreign Affairs, Development, Employment and Social Affairs, and Environment, Public Health and Food Safety as well as a number of French Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) (European Parliament, 2010e).

The above highlights how the EP not only offered an avenue for trade union views and policy positions to be raised but also, given the institution's new powers in relation to trade policy, how it could potentially force the Commission to focus more on social issues. Indeed, John Monks, then ETUC General Secretary, noted in a press release welcoming the EP's decision that "The powers extended to the Parliament by the Lisbon Treaty will also help it ensure that trade agreements negotiated by the Commission are in line with our objectives" (ETUC, 2010). However, transparency remained a point of contention between the Commission and the EP at this stage.

The draft final report of the Commission's SIA was released in March 2011 (European Commission, 2011b). In a CSD meeting held at the end of the same month. ETUC advisor Tom Jenkins asked several questions of the Commissioners in attendance. The most pressing issues for the ETUC were the need for stronger enforcement mechanisms for ILO standards – noting that this was a 'red line' for the confederation – and its opposition to ISDS (DG Trade, 2011, p. 2). On the latter issue, Jenkins called for clarification from the Commission as to its position as the SIA findings appeared to suggest that it was not a good idea to include it in the agreement. Commissioner Philipp Dupuis would not be drawn into a response on labour and environmental standards in CETA while Dan Prud'homme, a member of the SIA's study team, argued that though the SIA did not take a stand on ISDS one way or the other "if the [Commission] reaches a different conclusion and does decide to include ISDS in CETA, the

policy recommendations in the report provide at least some guidance for mitigating the negative impacts” (DG Trade, 2011, p. 3).

The final SIA – which retained the draft wording on ISDS - was released in June 2011 and prompted the first public response on CETA from the ETUC a month later. This response came in the form of a press release to highlight that new ETUC General Secretary Bernadette Ségol had written to EU Trade Commissioner De Gucht asking that the EU,

adjust its negotiating position to ensure that a strong dispute settlement mechanism, including the possibility of fines being imposed for breaches of international obligations on labour standards, is included in the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement currently being negotiated with Canada. Such a provision, which the Canadian side supports, would send a strong message also in the context of negotiations with other countries that the EU wants to ensure the full observance of standards set by the International Labour Organisation as part of its trade policy (ETUC, 2011).

The letter was also notable for the ETUC’s opposition to ISDS provisions which it argued did not have “any justification and give business powers to bring into question democratic decisions and extract huge monetary compensation” (ETUC, 2011). This point not only marked the ETUC’s first public foray into the CETA debate but also a shift towards a slightly more critical tone towards the Commission under Ségol, an experienced international trade union officer whose background included a leading role in the campaign to reform the Services (Bolkestein) Directive (ETUC, n.d.). However, the Commission’s attitude to ISDS was made clearer ten days later when the confidential CETA negotiating directives were amended to include ISDS, as many trade unions and civil society had suspected would happen (European Commission, 2015c).

Efforts between the ETUC and CLC to negotiate a joint position on CETA were still ongoing at this stage. Both organisations, along with the ITUC and EPSU, met in July 2011 and the ETUC again showed its support for the contentious issue of a labour monitoring mechanism for the agreement and included it in a draft joint statement sent to the CLC in

September for their consideration. This draft was returned by the CLC with significant edits. The main points of contention from the Canadian side were over the ETUC's proposed monitoring mechanism and its call for robust rules of origin, "which had been included to protect European economies from the liberal importation of goods manufactured in part, in the United States, but arriving through Canada" (Healy, 2014, p. 64). The ETUC's proposal would therefore have had a significant impact on Canadian manufacturing jobs given its high level of integration with the US.

Overall, though the two organisations' approach to CETA had a great deal in common, aside from the two key policy issues mentioned above, the most significant difference was over the tone of the statement. The ETUC, arguably concerned about alienating its standing with the European institutions, took a position of critical support, as highlighted by wanting to include a positive reference to the EP's declaration of support for CETA. The CLC, however, did not have the same levels of optimism for the agreement as the ETUC or MEPs and wanted to highlight its opposition the introduction of the 'Singapore Issues' in CETA and by adding further demands around, inter alia, government procurement, labour mobility, policy flexibility, and intellectual property rights (Healy, 2014, p. 64). The ETUC saw these differences as being too far apart, so a scheduled joint meeting was cancelled, and the document was shelved for nearly a year.

Cooperation between EPSU and Canadian public service unions did not suffer from the same issues in this period. This transnational cooperation stemmed from their previous links through the anti-GATS campaign and the fact that their policy concerns were not complex or divisive. EPSU had made progress throughout 2011 on developing a joint research agenda analysing the impact on public services in bilateral trade agreements (Krajewski, 2011) and in collaboration with Canadian unions and civil society was already putting pressure on EU and Canadian trade ministers (EPSU, 2011). As Healy (2014, pp. 66-67) points out, in stark

contrast to the inability of the ETUC and CLC to resolve their differences in the early stages of attempting to influence CETA, “Public sector unions took on the CETA issues as they would a campaign in their own domestic contexts but shifted it to a transnational scale”. Importantly, wider civil society and the TJN were also quick to pick up on the issue of ISDS and the threat it posed to public services in the EU and Canada, broadening the appeal and political base of the campaign at an early stage (Trew, 2013).

Contention over CETA decreased throughout 2012 despite negotiations becoming more intensive. Part of the reason for this was that union and civil society attention began to turn towards a potential EU-US trade deal which had gained a great deal of momentum, first after a November 2011 summit between EU and US leaders, and then after the subsequent establishment of the High-Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth led by EU and US trade representatives (European Commission, 2016). The working group released its final report in February 2013, concluding that “a comprehensive agreement, which addresses a broad range of bilateral trade and investment issues, including regulatory issues, and contributes to the development of global rules, would provide the most significant mutual benefit of the various options considered” (High-Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth, 2013, p. 5). By March, a draft negotiating mandate had been produced and by June the European Council had given the Commission permission to begin negotiations.

The pace of these negotiations, the lack of transparency, and concerns about the broader impact of the proposed deal meant that the ETUC, national confederations and wider civil society were far quicker to register their positions on TTIP than they had been with CETA. All the key union concerns related to CETA were also present in TTIP but were amplified both quantitatively, because of the latter’s scale, and qualitatively, due to the US’ perceived propensity towards even more aggressive liberalisation and the mooted wide-ranging and

deep commitments on regulatory cooperation and investment protection (De Ville and Siles-Brügge, 2017).

As with CETA, the position of European unions at this stage was predominantly one of critical support given the potential for positive action on jobs, investment, and regulatory cooperation, but the speed with which unions reacted to TTIP talks also emphasised the higher stakes involved. Both the ETUC and the DGB raised concerns in statements as early as April 2013 but also noted that an EU-US trade deal could be hugely positive if their three central policy issues were considered (ETUC, 2013a; DGB, 2013). Both statements also raised ISDS as a key concern, with the ETUC also making specific reference to a recent Executive Committee resolution on investment chapters in trade agreements EU (ETUC, 2015b, pp. 153-158).

Though an official joint statement with the AFL-CIO on TTIP did not materialise until July 2014, Ségol and AFL-CIO President Richard Trumka launched a “joint campaign to ensure that shared prosperity and sustainable growth are the driving principles in the upcoming talks on a United States-European Union trade agreement known as TTIP” in May 2013 (ETUC, 2013b). The fact that both organisations came together so quickly not only highlights their shared political perspectives but also the greater importance attributed to TTIP compared to CETA at the time. The ETUC also actively voiced its concerns and raised its demands in the autumn of 2013, first at an EP hearing on the regulatory dimension of TTIP (ETUC, 2013c), and second at a S&D conference on a panel specifically dedicated to TTIP (ETUC, 2013d). The intervention at the latter was made by ETUC Confederal Secretary Jude Kirton-Darling who would go on to become a LP MEP in May 2014, providing the ETUC and other European trade unions with a vital avenue of influence in the EP during a key period of contestation over both TTIP and CETA (Interviews with J. Kirton-Darling, R. Crawford, N. Rohde, C. Baker, D. Basso, and T. Jenkins).

CSOs were also quick to react to TTIP. Immediately after the start of talks in June 2013, CSOs linked to the transnational Seattle-to-Brussels Network such as CEO, Transnational Institute and various members of the ATTAC movement – links which had been built up since the 1999 ‘Battle of Seattle’ – began campaigning against TTIP (De Ville and Siles-Brügge, 2016, p. 102). The campaign immediately focused on ISDS mechanisms, using highly emotive language to portray ISDS as a “full frontal assault on democracy” allowing “rapacious companies [to] subvert... laws, rights and national sovereignty (Monbiot, 2013, November 4). This period also saw the emergence of the ‘Trojan Horse’ metaphor into the discourse surrounding TTIP (and consequently CETA) to argue that “(false) promises of ‘growth and jobs’ were used to disguise the affront to democracy and the rule of law represented by ISDS in particular” (Siles-Brügge, 2018, p. 475). This first phase of the campaign culminated in December 2013 with CEO sending an open letter signed by 200 CSOs to Karel De Gucht and US Trade Representative Michael Froman opposing the inclusion of ISDS in TTIP (CEO et al., 2013).

Though CETA remained comparatively uncontroversial at this stage, the conclusion of negotiations and the rise of TTIP led to European trade unions finally taking a clear stance on the agreement. An ETUC-CLC joint declaration had eventually been agreed in January 2013 after the ETUC agreed to drop its statement of indirect support for CETA and its position on rules of origin while the CLC dropped its references to industrial policy, intellectual property rights and labour mobility (ETUC and CLC, 2013; Healy, 2014, p. 65). The ETUC also accepted a much stronger statement on the key issues affecting public sector unions – procurement, regulation, and public service delivery – while the CLC agreed to call for a monitoring mechanism in which unions would be involved. Healy (2014, p. 65) argues that this agreement was not simply a case of either side wearing the other down but a reflection of

the transnational solidarity that had developed between their public sector affiliates and the need for each confederation to represent their positions.

CETA negotiations were concluded and agreed in principle in October 2013. Nothing had been officially made public and European trade unions had only gained limited information from leaked documents or CSD meetings. As an example of the limited extent of consultation in the latter, a January 2013 CSD meeting dedicated to the state of play in the EU's bilateral trade negotiations consisted of a 15-minute update from a Commission official on CETA and then 15 minutes for questions (DG Trade, 2013b). With the conclusion of negotiations, the ETUC immediately condemned their lack of transparency, arguing that trade unions, civil society and the public at large had had no meaningful input. As then ETUC Confederal Secretary Jude Kirton-Darling argued, "The lack of transparency only increases suspicion and will not create the climate needed to get social acceptance of the final agreement. Formal social stakeholder engagement is essential in this process – both the Commission and the Canadian government have failed this test miserably" (ETUC, 2013e).

The end of negotiations signalled the beginning of far greater contestation over CETA by European trade unions and wider civil society. Though negotiations were provisionally completed the agreement still had to be legally checked and translated, approved by the Council, and ratified by the EP and national parliaments. In this environment European trade unions went from near silence in 2013 to almost monthly public statements from the start of 2014 onwards, heralding an intense period of advocacy and mobilisation over trade issues that would last for the next four years.

National union confederations also began their campaigns on CETA. The TUC released its first public statement on CETA in March while the DGB and CGT released theirs in September and October 2014 respectively (TUC, 2014b; DGB, 2014b; CGT, 2014). Three points stand out about the positions of these three national confederations and the ETUC on

CETA. First, in policy terms they were all very closely aligned and are explicitly focused on the potential for the liberalisation of public services. Specifically, the ‘negative list’ approach (a new issue in EU trade agreements) and ‘ratchet clauses’ were opposed with the DGB instead calling for a ‘positive list’ approach which “requires justification for liberalisation itself, not exceptions” (DGB, 2014c).

Second, ISDS was clearly the central concern for European trade unions in this period. This was especially the case for the TUC who noted the potential for the UK’s National Health Service (NHS) to be further opened to privatisation, which was one of its key domestic policy issues (TUC, 2014a, pp. 21-22; R. Crawford, interview). In this respect, ISDS appeared to represent a step too far in allowing transnational capital even greater freedom, even for confederations like the ETUC, TUC and DGB who until this point had very rarely expressed such clear opposition to FTAs. Indeed, within the ETUC, opposition to ISDS is not considered to be controversial, even among its most pro-free trade affiliates (D. Basso, interview). What is possibly most notable is that opposition to ISDS rather than support for labour standards was no longer the central issue that European trade unions focused on in this period, predominantly because ‘defensive red lines’ had to take precedent over ‘offensive demands’ (W. Jäcklein, interview).

Finally, as more official union positions voted on by national congresses began to emerge, CETA and TTIP became more and more conflated. This was not simply an act of clever framing by unions and civil society alone. First, CETA, TTIP and to a lesser extent the plurilateral Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) all sought to advance the level of trade liberalisation beyond current WTO commitments by focusing on regulatory divergences as possible barriers to trade (Madner, 2017, p. 308). Second, these three negotiations were all conducted in a similar period and were at their most intensive between 2014 and 2018. Third, the US, the country arguably most associated with neoliberalism, free trade, and globalisation

by the social justice movement, was a central (TTIP and TiSA) or closely associated (CETA) actor in all the prospective agreements. All of these factors led to them all – and particularly TTIP and CETA – becoming synonymous with each other and falling within the bracket of ‘new generation trade agreements’. The negative focus on ISDS only helped to cement this perception.

Trade unions were also quick to adopt this strategy of linking the already highly controversial TTIP to CETA which by 2014 had only just begun to get more public attention. The TUC and the ETUC in particular were keen to exploit the frame of ‘CETA as a Trojan horse for TTIP’ and ‘CETA as TTIP by the back door’ in their campaigning. As TUC trade policy advisor Rosa Crawford explains:

With public services it has got that instant angle of ‘NHS under threat!’ which just has that red light with people. So, if we want to get people’s attention then that’s the key one... ISDS was nothing two or three years ago, people didn’t even know what it stood for... but, still, it has become relatively well known as a campaign issue. So, saying that it is in CETA also has resonance in a way that some of the other parts of the agreement don’t have... 80% of US companies that are investors in the EU have bases in Canada, so they can just use the ISDS mechanism in Canada to sue us anyway, so we’re saying if you get CETA then the protests against TTIP are irrelevant (R. Crawford, interview).

The effect of this kind of campaigning by trade unions and CSOs was that CETA soon became embroiled in the anti-TTIP discourse. This discourse had increased pressure on the Commission so much that in January 2014 it announced that it was suspending negotiations on ISDS in TTIP, pending the outcome of a public consultation due to “unprecedented public interest in the talks” (European Commission, 2014a). Then, just six days later, it was announced that a TTIP Advisory Group would also be established to “provide EU trade negotiators with high quality advice in the areas being negotiated” (European Commission, 2014b). Senior ETUC Policy Advisor Tom Jenkins claims that the impetus for the group came from the ETUC’s discussions with DG Trade which then gained support from the

French government's Brussels representation before being followed up by discussions in the College of Commissioners and the Council's Trade Committee (T. Jenkins, interview; ETUC, 2014b). Tom Jenkins was the ETUC's expert for the group which also included a representative from IndustriALL. This not only highlights the increased politicisation of trade and the rising impact of insider and outsider influence, but also the concerns of the Commission and member states that contestation over key elements of TTIP and the EU's trade agenda could derail the agreement and its wider economic benefits.

As an example of this concern at the national level, a similar advisory group was also set up by the German BMWi in early 2014 who were at pains to point out that its positions were informed by civil society, business, and research establishments and advocated an open and objective debate (BMWi, n.d.). Additionally, it released joint declarations with the DGB and other associations, highlighting its ongoing commitment to transparency and accountability but also areas of agreement (BMWi and DGB, 2014). In the case of the DGB and BMWi, both sides agreed on 14 points which revolved around the established argument that an EU-US deal would be welcomed if it also contributed to improved standards and sustainable development and public services were protected. Importantly, point eight of the declaration welcomed the Commission's moratorium on ISDS negotiations and noted that "The investment protection regulations laid down between the USA and EU in principle are not necessary and should not be introduced in TTIP" (BMWi and DGB, 2014, p. 2).

Strong opposition had also evolved early on in France with the French National Assembly and Senate both calling for the removal of ISDS from negotiations (Fabry, 2015). The French government was also critical. The Austrian and Dutch parliaments adopted positions of opposition to ISDS, and the May 2014 EP elections also saw parties from the Green and Left and (to a lesser extent) S&D groups take a critical stance on TTIP and ISDS (De Ville and Siles-Brügge, 2016, p. 104).

Submissions to the Commission's consultation on ISDS were made by the ETUC, European federations and national confederations. In fact, though France and Germany have been highlighted in the academic literature as 'hotbeds' of TTIP opposition (Fabry, 2015; De Ville and Siles-Brügge, 2016), the UK yielded the highest number of respondents to the consultation (over 52,000 (34.8%)) which were overwhelmingly drawn from civil society (European Commission, 2015d, p. 10). The TUC were among these respondents and took the opportunity to outline its outright opposition to ISDS (TUC, 2014a). The ETUC also used the consultation as an opportunity to again conflate TTIP and CETA by using the investment chapter of the latter as a framework for their contribution to the consultation. As Jude Kirton-Darling explained, "by using the Canada chapter we basically completely embroiled a finalised negotiated trade agreement with the whole TTIP debate, which then opened up Canada to much more scrutiny" (J. Kirton-Darling, interview). Importantly, though trade unions were at the forefront of opposition to ISDS, the social composition of this opposition was far broader than unions alone. The Commission's consultation attracted an unexpectedly high level of interest from civil society (nearly 150,000 respondents) which crashed the website and forced the Commission to extend the deadline by ten days (De Ville and Siles-Brügge, 2016, p. 104).

In this environment, opposition to ISDS was quickly evolving into opposition to TTIP (and to a lesser extent CETA) as a whole. The ETUC used this context as an opportunity to ramp up pressure on the Commission in the summer of 2014. On 25 June, for example, an open letter was sent to De Gucht by Bernadette Ségol stressing the ETUC's complete opposition to ISDS and questioning the Commission's implication that its public consultation was not open to a decisive rejection of ISDS (ETUC, 2014c). Ségol concluded the letter with the statement that "The issues of labour rights, public services and ISDS constitute essential elements for the ETUC. If the negotiators are not pursuing those goals, then the negotiations

should be suspended” (ETUC, 2014c). Then, on 10 July, the ETUC and AFL-CIO released a declaration of joint principles (ETUC and AFL-CIO, 2014). This pressure appears to have contributed to the US Ambassador to the EU, Anthony Gardner, setting up a meeting with Ségol two weeks after the ETUC-AFL-CIO declaration was released to better understand the position of European trade unions (ETUC, 2014d). This highlights how TTIP advocates were becoming increasingly concerned about the toxicity of the negotiations and that opposition was spiralling out of control.

Another important development in the summer of 2014 was the appointment of Cecilia Malmström as EU Trade Commissioner. That this change occurred at the same time as increased anti-TTIP sentiment was a coincidence but would also be significant for trade union influence over EU trade policy moving forward. Malmström, while politically little different to her predecessor De Gucht as a member of the Swedish Liberal Peoples’ Party, was argued to be a better communicator and more attuned to civil society concerns - at least for pragmatic reasons since TTIP talks had ground to a halt upon her arrival (Huet and Eliasson, 2017). Political pressure around TTIP and the practical desire for negotiations to make a ‘fresh start’ led to the new Trade Commissioner announcing a new ‘transparency initiative’ which involved greater social media engagement, the first meetings of the TTIP Advisory Group, the official declassification of the EU’s negotiating mandate, the changing of confidentiality rules for MEPs, and the publishing of several EU negotiating texts (De Ville and Siles-Brügge, 2016, pp. 106-107).

This shift not only gave confidence to unions and CSOs that their campaigning was having an impact but also that greater transparency around trade issues could be institutionalised in the future (De Ville and Siles-Brügge, 2016, p. 107). This shift has also had an impact on European trade unions’ influence over trade issue. For example, Daniele Basso, trade advisor for the ETUC, believes that the controversy around TTIP combined with

Malmström's appointment and subsequent transparency initiatives have led to a much better relationship and increased dialogue with the Commission, though not necessarily more influence (D. Basso, interview).

By September 2014, the text of the CETA agreement was completed and released by both sides. The INTA committee of the EP had received the basic text, classified as confidential, just a few weeks before the conclusion of the agreement. In hindsight, Delimatsis (2016) characterises CETA as one of the least transparently negotiated agreements by the EU in its recent history. This assessment is supported by Jude Kirton-Darling who notes that,

when I was in the ETUC we regularly asked for meetings with the CETA negotiators and we never got them, they were really quiet in the Commission about what was being negotiated. That contrasts directly with TTIP where, because of the public pressure outside, the Commission became a lot more transparent, so we had a lot more information about what was actually being negotiated, and we were able to tailor demands to the real negotiations, whereas with CETA it was a black box (J. Kirton-Darling, interview).

Ultimately, this lack of transparency solidified European trade unions' strategy of deliberately conflating TTIP with CETA - a strategy that was proving to be successful. In the days and weeks after the release of the CETA text, European trade unions at all levels went on the campaigning offensive and hardened their opposition to both agreements in their existing forms. There was also increased emphasis on the 'dual dangers' of TTIP and CETA. For example, on 13 September 2014, Owen Tudor, then Head of the TUC's EU and International Relations Department, wrote an article titled *If CETA goes through, TTIP might not matter: Say no to CETA*, noting that TUC General Council had resolved to lobby MPs and MEPs to vote against the deal (Touchstone - TUC Blogs, 2014). Similarly, on 26 September, DGB Chairman Reiner Hoffmann called for CETA to be renegotiated, arguing that "CETA must not open the back door for investor protection in TTIP" (DGB, 2014d) and

a few weeks later the CGT called for trade unionists to mobilise “against TTIP and FTAs” arguing that “These agreements are a threat to jobs, democracy and our models of society” (CGT, 2014).

Public discussion around TTIP was reaching a crescendo and the transnational ‘Stop TTIP!’ coalition used this context to organise a ‘European day of action to stop TTIP, CETA and TiSA’ on 11 October 2014. Since the release of a successful European Citizens’ Initiative earlier in the year the coalition had grown rapidly and would eventually comprise over 500 CSOs and trade unions, organising a total of 784 protest events between 2014 and 2016 (Caiani and Graziano, 2018, p. 1038). In line with the development of trade focused CSOs since the 1999 Seattle mobilisation the coalition had a very loose structure with different organisations or sub-coalitions taking the lead on organising local and national protests while still operating under the ‘Stop TTIP’ banner. The TUC, DGB and CGT all supported and participated in these demonstrations (Interviews with R. Crawford, N. Rohde, and W. Jäcklein). In October 2014, however, individual protests at this stage, though significant, at most numbered in the tens of thousands, even in countries where anti-TTIP activism was strongest (De Ville and Siles-Brügge, 2016, pp. 108-109).

Germany had one of the most active anti-TTIP/CETA campaigns for several reasons. First, opposition to TTIP and CETA did not just emanate from CSOs and trade unions but also from political parties. TTIP had already generated significant debate within the Bundestag (Dahl Martinsen, 2019) and, after local anti-TTIP groups, Bündnis90/DieGrünen and Die Linke were the second and fourth most active organisations in terms of organising events in opposition to the agreement (Campact Germany was second, the DGB was sixth) (Bauer, 2016, p. 35).

Second, the strength of German civil society played an obvious role. Campact, a transnational CSO which is most active in Germany, did not serve as the primary organiser of

anti-TTIP protests but played the key role of a ‘forces multiplier’ through its analytical approach to social media campaigning and helped generate significant ‘noise’ around ISDS (Eliasson and Huet, 2018, p. 5). More broadly, De Bièvre (2018, p. 77) argues that European-wide CSO mobilisation around TTIP and CETA was overwhelmingly “organised, financed and coordinated by a set of large, well-endowed German NGOs” leading to public opinion being swayed most drastically in Germany. Indeed, anti-TTIP/CETA mobilisations were not equally distributed across the EU and were predominantly undertaken by CSOs in Germany, Austria, Britain, France, Belgium and the Netherlands (Bauer, 2016).

The broader movement against TTIP and CETA in Germany also had an impact on the DGB’s influence - and therefore, by extension, European trade unions collectively. At the national level, Nora Rohde, trade policy advisor for the DGB, notes that the BMWi were keen to engage with the confederation to understand their position of opposition to both agreements (which had hardened over the course of 2014), particularly given that some of the DGB’s federations were situated in export sectors that were most likely to benefit from increased market access to the US and Canada (N. Rohde, interview). Perhaps more significantly, Cecilia Malmström approached the DGB for a meeting a month after the October day of action and met with DGB Chairman Reiner Hoffmann to discuss the confederation’s position (DGB, 2014a). This is notable as discussions with Commissioners are normally conducted through the ETUC rather than unilaterally (N. Rohde, interview).

Rohde surmises that the size of the movement against TTIP and CETA in Germany and possibly some confusion over why the DGB was opposed to both agreements was the key reason behind the Commission seeking out the confederation in this period (the DGB also met with the EU’s lead TTIP negotiator Ignacio Bercero during this time) since this trend did not continue thereafter. Notably, both Commission and US trade representatives also held informal discussions with IG Metall – again to understand their position on TTIP –

highlighting that German unions and civil society were considered to be powerful actors in opposing TTIP and, to a lesser extent, CETA (H. Mund, interview).

The movement against TTIP and CETA was being translated into parliamentary opposition. In Germany, anti-TTIP/CETA contestation and opposition within the Bundestag led to Economics Minister (and then SPD leader) Sigmar Gabriel making several contradictory statements on the agreements in connection with ISDS. Reflecting party policy, Gabriel had at one point been against ISDS, declaring that “It is completely clear that [Germany] reject[s] these investment protection agreements” (International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, 2014). However, following a meeting on 10 November with Malmström, the minister changed his tone, pivoting to argue that “it will not be possible to have the arbitration procedure taken out of CETA” (International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, 2014) and “if the rest of Europe wants this agreement, then Germany has no choice but to approve” (Fabry, 2015, p. 12). Though the DGB produced a joint declaration with the BMWi in this period which included opposition to ISDS, Nora Rohde feels that the DGB did not influence the ministry a great deal in this period, in part because the minister’s and ministry’s view of TTIP and CETA as economic opportunities overrode its reservations about ISDS (N. Rohde, interview). More stable support could be found from Bundestag and EP members among the left of the SPD, the Greens and Die Linke, however.

The French National Assembly had already voted for a resolution involving safeguards against the presence of ISDS in TTIP back in May 2014 and on 23 November adopted a further resolution rejecting such a mechanism in both TTIP and CETA. Four days later, the French Senate adopted a motion calling on the government to take effective action in the revision of chapters 10 and 33 of CETA to ensure that public authorities could exercise their sovereignty and the right to legislate (Fabry, 2015, p. 12). In general, lobbying national

ministries and politicians has always been something of a struggle for the CGT given its strategic traditions and the lack of openness towards labour interests by the French state, something Wolf Jäcklein, CGT International Officer, believes the confederation needs to improve (W. Jäcklein, interview). However, the more mainstream opposition to ISDS in TTIP and CETA did provide the CGT with more avenues of influence at the national level which it saw as its contribution to the wider strategy of the ETUC by ensuring that ‘progressive’ governments were not undermined by those who supported TTIP or CETA:

In the last four years [2014-2018] France has had five trade ministers. Three of them were not knowledgeable about trade, they did not understand or care about the issues and the civil service were doing most of the work. And then there was one minister, Matthias Fekl [PS], who actually put together a civil society forum where he openly discussed the issues, listened to everybody, explained the approach of the government and prepared the meetings with the other ministers at the European level... He obviously had the position of the French government, which was in favour of CETA, but he listened to civil society, took up issues and had a critical approach to ISDS. So, that was an approach where at least there was dialogue and understanding, because he really understood what the matter was, he understood what trade policy means and understood the big picture. His policy approach was not ours, but at least we could talk to him, discuss issues and we had the impression he understood what we do. So, that was a step forward because, all of a sudden, we had somebody in the government to talk to (W. Jäcklein, interview).

Though Fekl had always been sceptical about ISDS, he did not take a firm position against it until January 2015 when in a joint communique he declared that “We will never agree to private jurisdiction called into play by multinational corporations deciding governments’ sovereign policies, especially not in such areas as health or the environment” (Euractiv, 2015). Fekl’s concerns over ISDS also led to the establishment of the Trade Policy Monitoring Committee in late-2014, the civil society forum alluded to by Jäcklein above (Ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires Etrangères, 2014).

Though MPs in the UK had consistently raised concerns about TTIP and CETA, their opposition did not have the same impact as in Germany and France as the ruling

Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition were overwhelmingly in favour of the deals and ISDS. However, there is evidence that civil society and union contestation over TTIP did have an impact on the government, forcing them to respond. For example, a short, two-page briefing jointly produced by a coalition of UK unions and CSOs titled *TTIP: No public benefits, but major costs* (War on Want, 2014) prompted a detailed response from Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, Vince Cable, who downplayed concerns about ISDS and the threat to public services, characterising parts of the briefing as “misleading” (Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, 2014). The TUC also sought to put pressure on Cable during this period, both through official channels and through ‘e-actions’ organised through 38 Degrees (an online campaigning organisation that has long been associated with the UK left and civil society) but with little success (R. Crawford, interview).

By May 2015, the issue of ISDS had become so toxic that in the follow-up to its previous and highly unsuccessful public consultation the Commission submitted a concept paper to “further improve” investment protection standards and ISDS (European Commission, 2015e). This represented the beginning of the process of the Commission reformulating its investor protection proposals that would ultimately lead – after further consultations with stakeholders, member states and the EP – to the Commission formally seeking the establishment of an ‘Investment Court System’ (ICS). The Commission sought to appeal to civil society concerns about transparency by placing great emphasis on the ICS’s court-like mechanism for resolving investment disputes, including 15 publicly appointed judges (five EU nationals, five US nationals, and five third country nationals) to adjudicate on cases that were bound by a code of conduct (European Commission, 2015f).

Regardless of whether these reforms could be considered significant or not, what was notable was the shift in discourse on investor protection by the Commission itself. Chastened by civil society’s opposition to ISDS (a mechanism it had wholeheartedly defended until this

point), the Commission now not only claimed that ICS represented an entirely new system that addressed the concerns of civil society, but also sought to reclaim notions of transparency and fairness (through the lens of ‘the rule of law’) from those opposed to TTIP and CETA (European Commission, 2015g, 2015h). Indeed, part of the title of the paper included the phrase “Enhancing the right to regulate”, a demand that trade unions and some CSOs had used regularly since the beginning of the anti-ISDS campaign. Siles-Brügge (2018, p. 20) describes this discursive shift as a move away from “technocratic repression to co-opting injustice frames” whilst pointing out the irony that “The polysemic framing of ISDS by activists as a series of ‘corporate tribunals’ that ‘threaten democracy’, had provided the Commission with the discursive space to frame its reforms as a radical remaking of investor protection”.

Whilst the Commission’s change of tack on ISDS can be considered significant, the ETUC and national unions by and large remained either sceptical or dismissive of the ICS proposals. For example, the TUC’s position did not shift at all and the new proposals were regularly referred to as “diet-ISDS” or “ISDS-lite” in its public statements, with International Director Owen Tudor warning that “Claims that this new ISDS-lite isn’t ISDS at all are clearly nonsense, and while it certainly improves upon ISDS-heavy by stripping out some of the most unacceptable elements, it only gets rid of some, and it retains the most objectionable element of all: a privileged route to compensation for democratically-decided government actions for one class of citizen, foreign investors” (Touchstone – TUC Blogs, 2015).

Though the debate on ISDS reform became more complex in Germany in this period, the DGB also retained its earlier standpoint of opposition as the reforms, though an improvement, still did not go far enough (N. Rohde, interview). Though the Commission’s proposals did little to change the views of the more ardent opponents of ISDS in the European labour movement, ETUC Trade Advisor Daniele Basso notes that some of its

member unions from countries that were more open to TTIP and CETA did support the Commission's proposals (though not enough to change the ETUC's position) (D. Basso, interview).

While the Commission's proposals did not change positions of most trade unions and CSOs, they did have an impact on some important social democratic actors. The Commission had correctly identified Germany as the epicentre of the anti-TTIP campaign (YouGov, 2015) and attempted to change the position of three powerful and potentially influential SPD members – party leader Sigmar Gabriel, EP President Martin Schultz, and INTA committee Chair Bernd Lange – to back the Commission's proposed reform of ISDS so as not to lose investment protection and TTIP altogether. The Commission thus clearly identified the German SPD and the S&D group in the EP – and particularly those from the more moderate elements of both – as potential veto players in the future success of TTIP and CETA (Siles-Brügge, 2018, p. 21). This is also represented by the fact that after discussions with the Commission, both Gabriel and Lange moved from anti-ISDS positions to pro-ICS ones during the spring of 2015 (Sopinska, 2015). Siles-Brügge (2018, p. 21) explains this shift as SPD moderates being concerned that opposition to ISDS could sink TTIP altogether so framing ICS as a 'progressive' alternative potentially offered some political cover from critics.

Lange and Schultz helped guide the EP's second TTIP resolution through several contentious INTA committee sessions and eventually the 8 July 2015 plenary. This resolution recommended that the Commission replace the old ISDS system with an ICS but also called for a binding and enforceable sustainable development chapter that implemented the eight fundamental ILO conventions (European Parliament, 2015). This resolution paved the way for the Commission to propose the new system to US negotiators in September 2015.

However, the US side disparaged the Commission's suggestions, stating that "The European

debate around investment treaties – the obligations governments accept in them and the methods they provide for dispute settlement – is not grounded in the facts, and the distortions in this debate cannot be allowed to trump sound policy. If the EU still regards the TTIP as a serious objective, today’s proposal is deeply flawed” (quoted by Campaign for Trade Union Freedom, 2015). Though further negotiating rounds were held after this point, hopes of concluding an agreement began to fade before being suspended completely after the election of Donald Trump in November 2016.

The US’ rejection of the Commission’s proposals was a significant political blow considering that it came just weeks before the launch of its ‘Trade for All’ strategy. This strategy, more so than any previous efforts by the Commission, placed transparency as one of its central three pillars in addition to attempting to link economic growth through free trade, and respect for international sustainable development and human rights, domestic regulation, and public services (European Commission, 2015b). In many ways the new strategy harked back to some of the core ideas of the ‘Managed Globalisation’ era by attempting to address the challenges of globalisation in a ‘balanced’ and ‘progressive’ way (Leblond and Viju-Miljusevic, 2019). As Young (2019) argues, at its best this strategy encouraged trade partners to respect their obligations and address unfair practices whilst simultaneously focusing on defending and exporting EU norms and regulations.

However, despite the Commission’s efforts to frame ‘Trade for All’ as new and progressive, it could also be argued that the new strategy was more concerned with de-politicising trade since the Commission’s strategy differed little from others proposed in the past. Nonetheless, for the ETUC, the Commission’s attempts at de-politicisation during the peak of contestation over TTIP and CETA also resulted in increased access and consultation in this period. As ETUC advisor Daniele Basso notes, “since the TTIP negotiations many things have changed with the way the Commission is consulting us, they really make an

effort now. It's not perfect, but I can really see a difference... I cannot say that our positions are really taken into account, but at least formally there is a change" (D. Basso, interview).

Given that the US' opposition to a new ISDS system in TTIP meant that an agreement was still in jeopardy, European trade unions' argument that CETA remained "the underestimated danger" (IG Metall, 2015) was put forward with more zeal during the autumn of 2015. Importantly, in July MEPs had also requested the replacement of ISDS in other trade and investment agreements under negotiation or finalisation by the EU, including CETA (European Parliament Think Tank, 2017). But until this change became a reality, trade unions were concerned that CETA still remained an avenue for 'TTIP via the backdoor' (DGB, 2015a). European unions therefore continued with their core strategy of linking the negative elements of both agreements together.

However, a greater articulation of European unions' conception of 'fair world trade' also began to emerge in this period, particularly from German unions in the lead up to the now-annual October demonstrations against TTIP and CETA, arguably reflecting an increased confidence in their arguments and how they were being received by the wider public. The DGB released a number of their own statements as well as, notably, a joint statement with 30 CSOs demanding: "Stop TTIP and CETA! For fair world trade!" (DGB, 2015b). What is noticeable about this statement is the strength of the central message and the breadth and variety of CSOs involved. For example, statements from the DGB, the German Federation for the Environment and Nature Conservation, Bread for the World and the German Cultural Council all followed a similar theme: TTIP and CETA were a severe threat to progressive regulation and democracy. Instead, the coalition called for "an alternative trade and investment policy that is based on high ecological and social standards and promotes sustainable development in all countries" (DGB, 2015b).

DGB Trade Advisor Nora Rohde believes that the development of greater unity between unions and CSOs during the anti-TTIP/CETA campaign was an important milestone for the confederation which in the past, like many European trade unions, had been sceptical of the benefits of working with other organisations. As Rohde explains, the slogans and demands being put forward by the movement not only helped this unity, but also helped to win over more sceptical elements in the German labour movement:

when we worked together, we had to define our common goal and that was ‘stop TTIP’. This is what people read, and because of us there was this sub-heading: ‘For Fair Global Trade’. So, this sub-heading was important for our affiliates to be able to say, ‘well we’re not against TTIP, of course it says “stop TTIP”, but it also says what we are for’. So, NGO’s like ATTAC or the environmental NGO’s that are more against free trade in itself, they could say ‘it says stop TTIP’, and once it’s stopped then we can talk about what happens next, there are other differences of opinion. And that’s why especially the IG BCE [IG Bergbau, Chemie, Energie] was a little critical whether this is really something that we should do. But it turned out that at the demonstration many people from the IG BCE were there and they were interviewed and on TV and then afterwards it was really a case of ‘OK, apparently we missed something that our membership was interested in’ (N. Rohde, interview).

The extent to which the anti-TTIP and CETA movement was becoming a genuine social movement based around an alternative conception of world trade was emphasised not just through increased action and unity among unions, CSOs and other organisations, but also by the scale of the movement itself. Germany was once again the clearest example of this trend. On 7 October, three days before the Berlin demonstration, the DGB declared that over 50,000 people were expected to demonstrate (DGB, 2015c). On the day, however, between 150,000 (according to local police) and 250,000 (according to the organisers of the protest) marched (Zeit Online, 2015). By this stage, despite active campaigns in the UK, France and elsewhere, Germany and Austria were by far the biggest contributors in terms of the number of anti-TTIP/CETA events and participants (Caiani and Graziano, 2018). The strength of party-political opposition both reflected and exacerbated existing societal opposition to TTIP

and CETA and increased opportunities for the union and CSO campaign to develop and influence the general political debate in both countries. For example, according to Eurobarometer data, by autumn 2015 Germany and Austria were the only two EU member states which had a significant majority of citizens that were against an EU-US trade deal: in Germany, 59% against, 27% for; in Austria, 70% against, 22% for (Standard Eurobarometer 84, 2015).

In the immediate aftermath of the huge Berlin demonstration the party-political debate in Germany intensified. Sigmar Gabriel had published an open letter in several Germany newspapers on the day of the march promising that existing standards would remain in place and highlighting the reform of ISDS as evidence that Germans should get behind the deal, warning that “If we fail, we will have to follow others” (Politico, 2015). However, more consistent supporters of TTIP and CETA, like Christian Lindner of the FDP were also critical of Gabriel: “It is extremely regrettable that the Federal Minister of Economics missed winning the industrial unions over to TTIP. Because the criticism of TTIP is often unfounded or outdated... [criticism of TTIP is] only put forward in order to camouflage crude anti-Americanism and old-left prejudices against the market economy” (Zeit Online, 2015). Despite the increase in calls for Germany to find a solution to the TTIP impasse, the scale of public opposition, combined with a highly divided political landscape, particularly within the potentially decisive SPD, meant that the situation was unlikely to change without dramatic reform of both agreements.

By February 2016 CETA’s ‘legal scrubbing’ process had been completed. Unusually – since negotiations had concluded in August 2014 – the text on investor protection was changed from the previous ISDS model to the Commission’s new ICS model (Siles-Brügge, 2018, p. 24). This change came about through pressure from within the INTA committee and the EP more broadly. However, for trade union allies like MEP Jude Kirton-Darling this was

only considered a partial victory as the new system still held dangers, despite greater efforts towards transparency by the Commission (J. Kirton-Darling, interview).

The ETUC and CLC soon released a joint statement calling for further changes to be made to meet their notion of CETA as a ‘gold standard’ trade agreement. In particular, the joint statement raised five issues that required improvement, all of which centred on defending public services and the right of governments to regulate, arguing that: the ICS system still privileged foreign over national investors and was not subject to national judicial systems; this privileged status for investors contrasted sharply with “very mild labour standard provisions which have no enforcement mechanisms”; the continued existence of a negative list for public services; public services remaining subject to standstill and ratchet clauses; and whilst accepting the right of foreign firms to bid for procurement contracts, the agreement’s call for “unconditional” access was considered “excessive and self-defeating” and could impact local government’s ability to attach social and environmental conditions to their public tenders (ETUC and CLC, 2016).

The ETUC and CLC statement ended by declaring that:

The changes recently made to the ISDS provisions show that it is possible and legitimate for reasonable partners to improve the CETA. There will be no great loss if another year is spent getting the agreement right, but an awful lot to lose if it is rushed through in the name of short-term political expediency. Unless the text is adjusted to meet our concerns, we will have to call on our elected officials to reject the CETA (ETUC and CLC, 2016).

The TUC, DGB and CGT also released similar statements in the following months and urged their respective governments not to vote for the deal (TUC, 2016; DGB, 2016a; CGT, 2016a).

The DGB, again in concert with the ‘Stop CETA and TTIP!’ coalition, also called for major demonstrations in seven German cities in the autumn to attempt to prevent ratification of the EU-Canada deal (DGB, 2016b).

In July 2016 the Commission, under pressure from the German, French, and Austrian governments, finally confirmed that CETA would be a ‘mixed’ agreement that would require both EU and member state approval. At this time the Commission also sought the opinion of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) on the EU-Singapore FTA to clarify the division of trade policy and FDI competences between the EU and its member states – an opinion that eventually proved the ‘mixed’ approach in CETA to be correct (Siles-Brügge, 2018, p. 24). For the ETUC’s Daniele Basso, the ECJ’s opinion represented a significant turning point in how future EU FTAs could be negotiated as well as trade unions’ own ability to influence them:

the context has changed a lot since TTIP also because of the opinion of the European Court of Justice on the Singapore agreement, and the fact that after that opinion the Commission decided to split the trade and investment agreements. And this has also calmed a lot of concerns in civil society because now the trade part now will have to be ratified only by the European Parliament and the European Council... and the investment part is separate and will also have to be ratified by the member states. This means that for organisations like ours, or civil society organisations, who are much more against investment treaties than the trade part, it’s going to be a bit easier for us to try and block it rather than block the whole thing as was the case before... By the way, I think this opinion also does a favour to the Commission because before putting trade and investment together risked jeopardising the whole thing if there was any concern about investment, but now splitting the two means it’s going to be much easier for the Commission to ratify the trade part, which is to be honest the most important part because having just the investment part risking jeopardising the whole negotiation was not worth it for the Commission itself (D. Basso, interview).

Whilst the Commission hoped that most of CETA could be provisionally applied after securing EP consent, it was now the case that national and sub-national parliaments would also have to ratify the agreement. This dramatically increased the number of potential veto players and therefore complicated the Commission’s path to ratification significantly. Furthermore, member state pressure also led to the Council’s insistence that investor protection be excluded from the scope of the provisional application of the agreement

(McGregor, 2016). These last-minute changes were a major success for the union and civil society campaign against CETA and TTIP since it revealed how much pressure both the Commission and certain member states were under. Responding favourably to this news, the DGB, whilst also noting that several deficiencies still existed in the agreement, also noted the wider political implications of the decision (which came soon after the Brexit vote in the UK), arguing that,

The EU Commission has thus made an important and correct decision - excluding the nation states from the vote on such a highly controversial agreement would, in view of the current European political situation, have driven distrust not only in CETA but in the EU institutions and the EU as such to extremes and played into the hands of opponents of Europe. So, the first step has been taken. This is also a success for the European trade unions and civil society, which are closely and critically following European trade policy! (DGB, 2016c)

The decision to make CETA a mixed agreement created further opportunities for European trade unions to influence national decision makers. However, unions were also concerned by the fact that the EP could pass much of the agreement, meaning that certain elements of the deal that trade unions opposed could still get through (R. Crawford, interview). Although lobbying of national and European parliamentarians by trade unions increased during this time, the biggest impact was in Germany where the greatest divisions over TTIP and CETA existed, and politicians could still play a major role in the outcome. This was not the case in countries like the UK, for example, where the anti-TTIP/CETA opposition, both inside and outside of parliament, was in a minority.

However, the most significant aspect of European trade unions' political lobbying after July 2016 were their efforts to influence Canadian as well as European politicians. Though efforts by the ETUC and CLC to work together are unsurprising and date back to the start of CETA negotiations, it was only after the election of Justin Trudeau as Canadian Prime Minister in November 2015 that channels were opened between European trade unions and

Canadian politicians. Though Trudeau's relationship with the CLC since his election has been far from stable (National Post, 2016), he addressed the CLC's congress six days after he was elected, becoming the first Canadian President in over five decades to do so (British Columbia Teachers' Federation, 2016). The DGB, with the help of the CLC, developed important links with Trudeau's Canadian Liberal Party over the course of 2016. As Nora Rohde recalls,

the Canadian colleagues had a very close relationship with Trudeau. He had just been elected at that time and he was very keen on working closely together with the unions because the former government didn't really listen to the unions, so there was a really good exchange. So, the things that we didn't achieve at the European level and with our politicians we tried to bring into the debate from the Canadian side, and so the talks with the Canadian ambassador [Costello] were very helpful because he was very open to our points. The Canadians are not as opposed as the Europeans to talking about sanctions for breaches of labour standards; the European Commission does not listen once you mention sanctions, so it was always good to have the ally on the other side of the ocean to basically get it back into the debates. We also went to Canada shortly before CETA was ratified - we met with the trade minister Freeland at the time, and she was also good. It felt better to talk with her than the Commission because she was very open to the ideas (N. Rohde, interview).

Concretely, DGB Chairman Reiner Hoffmann and CLC President Hassan Yussuff released a joint statement outlining their firm opposition to CETA in its current form and a list of five changes that would make the agreement acceptable to them: removing all investor rights rules; protection of public services from privatisation; ending pharmaceutical patent extensions; including the precautionary principle; and creating a "real mechanism for enforcing labour rights" (CLC and DGB, 2016). Hoffmann also emphasised that,

CETA in its current form was negotiated between the right-wing government of Stephen Harper in Canada and an ultra-liberal European Commission under President Barroso. We want to work with the current leadership on both sides of the Atlantic to build a more progressive kind of trade treaty... European and Canadian leaders have expressed

willingness to consider our concrete proposals to improve the CETA. We hope they will implement our recommendations so we can build truly fair trade (CLC and DGB, 2016).

In a scenario where both Canada and the EU feared a complicated ratification process given the very public opposition from civil society on both sides of the Atlantic and key political actors in Europe, trade unions were able to leverage some influence to get these issues discussed at the highest level. The fact that the DGB were seemingly the most influential union on the European side is related to the fact that they were a key part of the most vocal opposition movement to CETA and the organisation closest to the potentially decisive SPD. This does not mean they acted unilaterally from the ETUC, but the initiative came from the DGB (N. Rohde, interview). This fact not only highlights that transnational union cooperation increased during the anti-CETA campaign, but also that this cooperation brought tangible results.

To attempt to bring some of the key points the CLC, DGB, and other European trade unions had been campaigning for from the beginning of CETA negotiations, a ‘Joint Interpretative Instrument’ (JII) was drawn up by the ETUC – based initially on a draft produced by Senior Advisor Tom Jenkins for TTIP’s proposed labour chapter – in cooperation with German and Canadian colleagues, who added more language on investor protection and regulation (Interviews with T. Jenkins and N. Rohde). The DGB’s Reiner Hoffmann then sought support from Sigmar Gabriel and Berndt Lange. The initial draft, little of which survived in the final agreement, had called for a complaint mechanism that would be independent of the political level where trade unions and other civil society players could send their complaints regarding the implementation of CETA (N. Rohde, interview). According to Nora Rohde, the Commission was not keen on these suggestions, but Canadian Trade Minister Chrystia Freeland was “very open to it”.

During this time, the CETA ratification process had begun and immediately ran into difficulties. However, rather than problems stemming from the ‘expected’ opponents of CETA, it was the regional Wallonia Parliament that blocked Belgium’s ratification of CETA for one month and therefore threatened the deal with collapse before it had even got to the EP (Novotná, 2017, p. 10). Whilst national political rivalries and strategies certainly played a role in Wallonia’s stance, it is notable that the parliament and the regional Premier’s opposition to CETA echoed many of the arguments of CSOs, arguing that the agreement would potentially be contrary to EU law and enable “US-based firms to attack European, Belgian and Walloon public decisions via their Canada-based subsidiaries” (taken from Siles-Brügge’s (2018, p. 25) translation of Parliament of Wallonia, 2016, p. 3). Eventually, “After a week full of political suspense and profiling, late-night negotiations at intra-Belgium level and informal contacts with and diplomatic pressure from the different EU institutions, Belgium’s prime minister Charles Michel could finally announce on Thursday that an agreement was reached with the Walloon government and that Belgium was able to sign CETA” (van der Loo, 2016).

Due to the uncomfortable situation the Commission and Canadian negotiators now found themselves in, trade union influence was arguably at its peak during this period because of the transnational cooperation with Canadian unions built up over the course of CETA negotiations. As then Labour MEP Jude Kirton-Darling recalls,

in that period the leader of the German DGB made several visits to Ottawa to directly negotiate with the Canadian government. So, it got to the point where the trade unions were in the room, they weren’t outside the room pushing against the door, the pressure had reached the point where actually unions were inside the room. And the Canadians were saying ‘what is it that you need?’, and with the Commission negotiators ‘what is it that you actually need to be able to support this deal?’. (J. Kirton-Darling, interview).

To help appease Wallonia and other potential veto players in the ratification process, the Commission quickly changed tack on the JII which was now used as a last-minute tool to

secure the speedy (provisional) approval of CETA, first by COREPER and then by the European Council, before CETA was officially signed at the EU-Canada Summit on 30 October 2016 (van der Loo, 2016). To achieve this the Commission also had to secure 38 statements or declarations from EU member states and institutions. The JII itself seemed to address many of the criticisms of trade unions and CSOs and contained specific details on, inter alia, the right to regulate, regulatory cooperation, public services, investment protection, and labour and environmental protection (Official Journal of the European Union, 2017).

However, for European trade unions, the final provisions on labour standards only committed the EU and Canada to improving labour protection, ratifying fundamental ILO conventions, and creating a framework for cooperation on trade-related labour issues of common interest (Official Journal of the European Union, 2017). Nonetheless, under pressure from European and Canadian unions and the Canadian government, the JII committed both sides to an early review of the TSD chapter of CETA. This feature stemmed from tension between the Canadians 'hard' sanctions-based approach to labour violations and the EU's 'soft' incentive-based method. Daniele Basso explained the mechanics of these negotiations, and the ETUC's role in them, as follows:

[the Walloon government's stand against CETA] was useful because this led to the Joint Interpretative Instrument which is now attached to CETA and it's now what we are trying to use to convince the Commission to review the [TSD] chapter. One interesting issue that is now on our table on CETA is the fact that the Canadian government is on our side. The Canadian government and the Canadian model in labour chapters that they have is really enforceable with a clear sanction mechanism in case there are violations. And they were not happy at all to give up their model and accept the TSD chapter in the first place, but that was the outcome of the negotiations. The Commission pushed not to have any sanctions, so they accepted in the end, and now that they agreed in the Joint Interpretative Instrument to review the TSD chapter the Canadian government and the unions agree to have this review, which the Commission is postponing or trying to water down. And what is interesting is that we, the European trade unions, talk to the Canadian government and we are united on this against the Commission, and the Commission is

really unhappy about this. They don't like us talking to the Canadian government and trying to put them in a corner, but what can we do? We have to use all of our channels [of influence] (D. Basso, interview).

Although some concessions had been made by the Commission this was not enough to convince European or Canadian trade unions to support the deal. Broadly speaking, European trade unions felt that progress had been made towards their demands but held major reservations about how binding and effective these changes would be (DGB, 2016d). Further, controversy remained over the introduction of ICS into the agreement. The Walloon government had called for ICS to be referred to the ECJ to assess its compatibility with EU law during Belgium's ratification crisis (Siles-Brügge, 2018), a move that was supported by critical MEPs and the ETUC, who sought to lobby the EP further before the crucial ratification period began (ETUC, 2016). The TUC and CGT also became increasingly active towards the end of 2016 and beginning of 2017 in voicing their opposition to CETA and calling on national parliamentarians not to ratify the agreement (Touchstone - TUC Blogs, 2016; CGT, 2016b).

In France, opposition to CETA was reaching its peak. The CGT began their most active phase of opposition prior to the ratification vote and sought to exploit divisions within the PS (W. Jäcklein, interview). The CGT, now an active participant in the 'Stop TTIP-CETA' movement within France, called on "all its organizations, activists and, more broadly, all citizens to participate in the planned actions and to initiate new ones", referring to the decentralised day of action planned for 21 January 2017 to place further pressure on MEPs before the vote on 15 February (CGT, 2016c). The movement also organised a protest in Paris two days before the vote, which was attended by eight Socialist, Green and Front de Gauche MEPs as well as two presidential candidates, Yannick Jadot (Les Verts) and Jean-Luc Mélenchon (La France Insoumise) (Chapelle, 2017). On the morning of the vote, as well as handing over a petition of three million signatures opposing the ratification of CETA, a

few thousand activists demonstrated in Strasbourg in front of the parliament, lying on the road to force MEPs to get out of their cars and walk past the protest in a “symbolic staging of the trampling of democracy in view of an intention to vote mainly in favour of CETA” (Chapelle, 2017).

As evidence of how controversial CETA had become, the LP and SPD were significantly divided when it came to ratifying the agreement in the EP, with voting trends generally following intra-party left-right ideological cleavages (J. Kirton-Darling, interview). This is reflected by voting patterns in the S&D group itself which saw 95 votes in favour, 66 against and 13 abstentions (VoteWatch Europe, 2016). Ideological orientation also played a role in the PS, all of whose MEPs voted against CETA, though nationally the party was completely divided on the issue. Relatedly, however, this division can be attributed to a wider split and power struggle within the PS between those around then Prime Minister Manuel Valls (who was in favour) and ‘rebel’ presidential candidate Benoît Hamon (who had called for a suspension of CETA’s implementation) (Pécout, Rescan and Folliot, November 1, 2016). Indeed, after this initial rebellion, many PS delegates agreed to abstain in the National Assembly vote to reconcile the contrasting positions within the party (Chapelle, 2017). For this reason, Wolf Jäcklein questions how much of an influence the CGT had on the voting intentions of French politicians, particularly given that “It’s not really in the French tradition to work that closely with parliamentarians. We might have meetings with individual ones. If there’s a rapporteur and there’s a specific issue we would try and meet them, but we don’t have coalitions with parliamentarians like in other countries where you have close cooperation with parties or individuals” (W. Jäcklein, interview).

Though the overall vote in the EP was decisively in favour of CETA – 408 to 254 – internal party divisions would continue to play a role at the national level where ratification would be a long, drawn out process as many parliaments were yet to vote. Though the EP

vote effectively signalled the end of the transnational movement against CETA, the agreement could only be provisionally applied until member state parliaments voted in favour. While the UK parliament and French National Assembly ratified the agreement in November 2018 and July 2019 respectively, as of May 2021, the French Senate and German Bundestag, as well as ten other member states, are still yet to ratify. Though the struggle to stop CETA was ultimately over, European trade unions used this period to develop and consolidate their progressive trade policy agenda further on the basis that the core issues and politicisation seen in the CETA and TTIP campaigns that had come so close to derailing both agreements were bound to feature in future FTAs (ETUC, 2017b; DGB, 2017; CGT, 2017).

European trade unions' focus now turned to the implementation of key elements of the agreement. Now the campaigning phase was effectively over this required a change in emphasis from the ETUC, as Daniele Basso recalls: “we put aside the trade union rhetoric and said ‘OK, let’s be practical now. The trade agreement is in place, we are not happy with the trade agreement, but now it’s in place, let’s try at least to improve what can be improved’” (D. Basso, interview). The first priority in this respect was the early review of the TSD chapter that had been promised by the Commission as part of the JII compromise. Instead of focusing on ‘negative’ issues like ISDS, European unions were once again able to focus on their central demand for enforceable labour standards.

In January 2018, the ETUC released a ‘Non-paper on introducing an Independent Labour Secretariat to CETA’ (ETUC, 2018a) as part of the Commission’s consultation on how to improve TSD implementation – the impetus behind the consultation itself had come from extensive debate in the EP throughout 2017 (European Commission, 2018). The highly detailed proposal, based on a joint AFL-CIO and ETUC draft for the TTIP TSD chapter (N. Rohde, interview), outlined a rigorous set of institutional mechanisms to address transnational labour issues, monitor and enforce the chapter and provide research on key

areas to develop best practice (ETUC, 2018a). It was also proposed that the Labour Secretariat be staffed by “Experts in labour and human rights law, including former officers and staff of the ILO” (ETUC, 2018a). Importantly, the non-paper also called for a resolute dispute settlement mechanism for labour issues whereby a panel could “authorise sanctions in the form of suspension of benefits” to specific workplaces, industries or sectors guilty of non-compliance with the level of punishment commensurate with “the number of workers affected, the severity of the non-compliance, and the potential for such non-compliance to induce a race to the bottom by motivating other employers to reduce wages and standards” (ETUC, 2018a).

This issue resurrected debates over the Commission’s long-held approach to labour standards. Though the political context had changed significantly since the 1990s when the labour standards debate was at its peak and the Malmström Commission had been forced to accommodate union and civil society views at the height of TTIP and CETA politicisation, these considerations were highly unlikely to impact on the EU’s overall trade strategy which remained resolutely against a ‘conditional’ as opposed to a ‘promotional’ approach (Harrison et al., 2019a). Indeed, as the Commission made clear in its own non-paper outlining the results of its own consultation and proposing 15 actions to “revamp” its TSD chapters, “The Commission services’ perspective, having assessed the various views, is first and foremost that the absence of consensus on a sanctions-based model makes it impossible to move to such an approach. In any case, the Commission services also assess that such an approach would not fit easily with the EU’s model” (European Commission, 2018).

It is notable that a number of the Commission’s proposals referred to closer cooperation with the ILO and facilitating a monitoring role for civil society and its Social Partners (European Commission, 2018). However, for the ETUC, while it acknowledged that,

The 15 points outlined in the paper may slightly improve the effectiveness of the current system, by enabling more trade union participation in the implementation of the agreements... The ETUC deeply regrets that Commission has brushed away the possibility of introducing an economic sanction mechanism in case of persistent breaches of labour rights within EU trade agreements, as has been proposed consistently by the ETUC over many years (ETUC, 2018b).

The ETUC was particularly unhappy that the Commission's response would seemingly have a negative impact on the TSD chapter in CETA: "We note that Canada has been committed to a sanction-based approach regarding labour rights in its free trade agreements and had understood that the review would lead to positive developments in that respect" (ETUC, 2018b). By September 2018, no progress had been made on the issue of enforceability in the CETA TSD chapter (ETUC and CLC, 2018), despite pressure from the ETUC, the CLC and the Canadian government (T. Jenkins, interview).

For both the ETUC and CLC, this raised a deeper problem: "The EU's inaction in reviewing CETA is already undermining effective enforceability of labour rights by Canada in third countries with which both the EU and Canada have free trade agreements" (ETUC and CLC, 2018). Indeed, ETUC advisor Tom Jenkins admits that "Getting CETA to include stronger enforcement on labour isn't of course really to do with Canada [which generally has high labour standards] but could be used as a precedent for other FTAs. The CETA TSD chapter is more elaborate than others in terms of commitments to ILO plus other employment issues and could still be used in the future" (T. Jenkins, interview). Though a CETA TSD Committee has been tasked with, *inter alia*, continuing the review of the TSD chapter, discussions are currently ongoing.

This view is particularly pertinent given the lack of concrete action taken by the Commission over serious labour violations in South Korea with whom the EU signed an FTA in 2011 (Harrison et al., 2019b; ETUC, 2021). In its response to the Commission's non-paper, the ETUC specifically noted that while the Commission had raised the issue politically

with the South Korean government, it had refused to launch the dispute procedure of the TSD chapter (ETUC, 2018b). It is also notable that many of the national and European trade union advisors interviewed as part of this research mentioned the example of South Korea as being emblematic of the deficiencies of current enforceability mechanisms in the EU's trade agreements with respect to labour standards. Wolf Jäcklein, Head of the CGT's International Department, argues that there is a deep-seated lack of interest and knowledge from the Commission side in relation to labour issues in its TSD chapters. However, he also notes that how trade unions respond to the issue of winning enforceable labour standards in EU TSD chapters is a point of strategic debate within the international labour movement:

In the trade union movement, there is a discussion about how we should work on that. Should we write our own template chapter? Or should we just criticise what is on the table and ask for more, ask for additions, improvements? And within the ITUC and ETUC we did not settle that matter, because there are those who say, "if we write a template chapter and we get it and it doesn't work, it's our fault". Those who do not want to take up this responsibility are, for the time being, in the majority (W. Jäcklein, interview).

Another consideration from trade unions' perspective is that DAGs have the potential to stretch already limited union resources allocated for trade issues to an unsustainable level. This is because, instead of a sitting labour secretariat staffed by labour experts from the ILO that could investigate issues for each FTA, union staff (some of whom only deal with trade as one part of a wider brief) would potentially have to attend dozens of DAG meetings a year. As Wolf Jäcklein argues, "as a trade union movement we just don't have the resources to put people aside for ten, fifteen, twenty DAGs with several meetings a year. Only a specialist can follow that and understand what they are talking about, which is impossible" (W. Jäcklein, interview). Though civil society forums to monitor EU trade deals have long been a demand of European trade unions, these calls have also sat alongside demands for enforceable labour standards. By having the former but not the latter, there is therefore also debate among some

union advisors (Interviews with W. Jäcklein and N. Rohde) and within the academic literature (Orbie et al., 2016, pp. 528-529)) about how effective the DAGs can be overall.

The DAG for CETA was established in July 2018. This meant that only two meetings had taken place when interviews with the trade union advisors who were part of the group were completed in November 2018. However, as Daniele Basso notes, it was clear that tensions existed between labour and business representatives within the group based on the divergent demands of each side:

I think CETA has a very symbolic power that comes with it, so whenever you touch CETA it's very controversial with the employers because for them CETA is really a fantastic agreement that they don't want us to impede what has been agreed. For them it has been so difficult to get this agreement through and they don't want to see any view that might eventually trigger member states... So already the employers don't like to sit with us in these trade forums and talk about labour rights, they just want to talk about market access, how to improve European exports. They don't want to be bothered by violation of labour issues; they don't care (D. Basso, interview).

These sentiments were also echoed by the DGB's Nora Rohde who claimed that in the CETA DAG in particular "business is per se against everything that the other two [labour and civil society] are bringing up" (N. Rohde, interview). However, whilst the trade unions' ultimate demand for enforceable labour standards remains elusive, Rohde claims that the labour side of the CETA DAG were able to win an early victory by broadening the scope of the DAG's mandate to monitor the whole of the agreement and not just the TSD chapter, something unions saw as a major limitation of past agreements (N. Rohde, interview).

Conclusion

This chapter has analysed the methods and strategies European trade unions adopted to attempt to influence world trade negotiations during two periods: WTO negotiations, from

the organisation's foundation in 1995 up to the demise of the Doha Development Agenda around 2005; and CETA negotiations, between 2008 and 2018. WTO negotiations took place in the context of ever-increasing neoliberal globalisation. This agenda has only been pursued more vigorously since, with CETA and TTIP negotiations representing attempts by the EU and other leading economic powers to move into new areas such as regulatory alignment, services, and other non-tariff issues. However, the above processes have also been contested and have provoked a response from European unions and wider civil society whose primary concern has been the lack of a social dimension for globalisation and free trade. International organisations, the EU, and national governments have also been affected by these issues and have taken positions themselves, sometimes in alignment with the arguments of trade unions. However, despite some small examples of policy alignment between European unions and other institutions, the wider liberalisation agenda of these institutions has continued relatively unabated.

Nonetheless, in part thanks to the issues consistently raised by European trade unions, the increased politicisation of world trade has been a feature throughout this period. This politicisation began in earnest with the major civil society mobilisations at the WTO Seattle Ministerial in 1999, developed further through the anti-GATS transnational advocacy network, before making a decisive impact through the transnational social movement against TTIP and CETA across Europe. This politicisation has been rooted in increased disillusionment with the neoliberal trade agenda and its impact on broader themes such as social justice, democracy, and sovereignty. Indeed, these themes were consistently mobilised during contestation over ISDS, an issue which captured the public imagination and seemed to represent a line in the sand in terms of the corporate agenda associated with neoliberal free trade. This was exemplified by the fact that European unions, traditionally critical supporters of free trade, were unanimously against ISDS. The response from the European Commission

and others to this politicisation of trade has predominantly been to attempt to depoliticise trade policymaking by promoting greater, but largely ineffective, civil society consultation.

As was the case in the long 1970s, the core strategies of European trade unions to influence world trade negotiations in the contemporary period have been agenda setting, coalition-building, lobbying, and mobilisation. The agenda that European unions have put forward has been based around the notion of 'fair' trade. On this basis, achieving enforceable labour standards has continued to be the core policy objective of European unions in both multilateral and bilateral negotiations. While enforceability has remained elusive the general issue of labour standards was on the WTO's agenda in the 1990s and has become a part of the EU's TSD chapters since the 2011. This would not have happened without key national governments and institutions like the EP taking up the issue at different stages. Thus, labour standards have become far less of a niche issue over time, though it remains an issue that is primarily put forward by trade unions and not the wider social movement that has developed around trade issues.

In contrast, the central issue that came to define CETA and TTIP negotiations was ISDS, an issue that was taken up far more broadly than by unions alone. ISDS was not just discussed at the elite level but also became an issue for public debate based on its wider implications for social justice, democracy, and sovereignty. Trade unions were able to play a key role in defining and increasing opposition to ISDS by linking the perceived toxicity of TTIP with CETA. This was a conscious rhetorical strategy employed by European unions but one that had a material basis given the extensive overlap between the two negotiations and the economic links between the US and Canada.

The level of success achieved by unions in respect to their agenda setting can also be linked to the strength of their coalition-building capacity in both periods. Building a coalition of actors in favour of enforceable labour standards was always likely to be an uphill struggle

for European trade unions given the well-established opposition of governments and some unions and CSOs in the Global South. Nonetheless, efforts were made, primarily through the ICFTU, to develop links with non-European unions and CSOs around the issue which succeeded in keeping the issue on the agenda for a longer period but not to the extent that it was any more likely to be achieved. In fact, unions' most reliable allies on the issue were arguably national governments like the US, Canada, and some European governments, many of whom supported the issue for very different reasons. However, the participation of European unions in the growing social movement against neoliberal globalisation, though limited at this stage, can be seen as an important step in building the coalitions they would develop in later negotiations, particularly in the case of the anti-GATS coalition.

European unions' collaboration with CSOs during the anti-TTIP/CETA campaign was highly significant from a strategic perspective. While European unions had collaborated with CSOs on trade issues before, the campaign against TTIP and CETA saw them become an active component of the broader movement that had developed around trade issues over time. This shift resulted in trade unions working closely with CSOs to build demands against ISDS in particular. However, as the campaign went on, calls for a progressive trade agenda based on common demands around social justice and democracy were also developed. Indeed, trade unions benefitted from their growing links with CSOs in the early days of CETA negotiations when CSOs were far quicker to push for greater transparency and gain information about the likely content of the agreement. In this sense, CSOs displayed a flexibility that unions, as more complex democratic and collective organisations, find harder to achieve. Indeed, the length of time it took for the ETUC and CLC to develop a common position on CETA stands as an example of this.

The lobbying of social democratic politicians remained the primary strategy of European trade unions even in the context of declining social democratic forces. The key

reason for this is primarily that social democratic parties have remained European trade unions' closest political allies but have also proven to be decisive actors when it comes to trade issues. This was especially the case during TTIP and CETA negotiations when both the European Commission and the trade unions identified the SPD, but more specifically leading SPD politicians in key positions of power like Sigmar Gabriel and Bernd Lange, as potential 'veto players' and 'pawnbrokers' on the issue of ISDS and, by extension, the fate of both negotiations.

Additionally, as was the case in the long 1970s, social democratic parties are often composed of competing ideological cleavages that traditionally take very different positions on trade. Thus, winning important parties like the LP, SPD or PS to positions adopted by trade unions can play a vital role in the success or failure of unions' achieving their policy objectives. Indeed, the role of individual social democratic politicians like MEP Jude Kirton-Darling in the EP was very important in bringing union views into the policy debate. However, given the ongoing decline of social democratic parties in Europe this strategy is likely to continue to yield ever-diminishing returns for trade unions in the future (Delwit, 2021).

Another important aspect of European unions' lobbying strategies was that the avenues of influence available to them changed during this period. During WTO negotiations the EU's trade policymaking process had changed little from the long 1970s. Thus, though European unions had developed greater capacity to influence the European level by this stage, the POS remained relatively closed and the national level therefore remained an important avenue of influence based on the party-political links used by unions. This context changed significantly when the EP was given greater powers of oversight on trade agreements and became a co-legislator with the Council through the Lisbon Treaty. This has increased the quantity – though not necessarily the quality – of access points available to

trade unions to attempt to influence the EU's trade agenda with the EP playing a particularly important role.

The nature of bilateral CETA negotiations also provided European unions with opportunities to lobby Canadian politicians, who in many cases were more open to their arguments than the European Commission. Indeed, this lobbying strategy had a tangible impact on negotiations in relation to the JII and helped put pressure on the Commission to introduce enforceable labour standards into the CETA TSD chapter. Interestingly, bilateral discussions between European and Canadian trade unions and Canadian negotiators were primarily conducted by the DGB rather than the ETUC. This reflects the fact that Germany had become the epicentre of opposition to TTIP and CETA in this period. The DGB's links with the SPD thus meant that it could potentially have an influence on the latter, a fact which was understood by both Canadian negotiators and the Commission who organised formal meetings with the confederation to attempt to understand their reasons for opposing both agreements.

The final strategy used by European unions in the contemporary period, mobilisation, represented a key change in their approach to trade. As a result of the links established with CSOs since the late-1990s, European unions have increasingly used mobilisation as a strategy to influence world trade negotiations. These mobilisations have created significant political pressure on the WTO and European institutions during negotiations. Importantly, though more access points for potential union influence over world trade now exist at the European level than ever before, mass demonstrations and transnational 'days of action' have increased and have become the most visible examples of union opposition to world trade agreements.

This increased reliance on mobilisation not only raises questions about the efficacy of existing consultation mechanisms for unions and civil society in relation to trade issues but can also be seen as an example of unions using outsider influence as a means of achieving

their policy objectives. For example, the huge mobilisations and increased politicisation in Germany helped the DGB and, by extension, the ETUC gain greater access to the Commission who were keen to depoliticise TTIP and CETA. This highlights how in certain circumstances situational opportunities can arise for unions to utilise outsider influence to leverage insider influence. Further, the Commission changing its proposals on ISDS can be seen as another example of it being impacted by outsider influence severely disrupting its agenda. Once again, the role played by unions and CSOs in linking TTIP and CETA together was an important strategic choice that helped increase the scale and volume of mobilisations against the agreements. In this respect, while other forms of power have markedly declined, the discursive power and framing capabilities of European trade unions in relation to trade have increased significantly.

The strategies employed by European trade unions to influence world trade negotiations in the contemporary period have brought mixed success. On the one hand, their central policy objective – enforceable labour standards – remains elusive. By contrast, union and CSO opposition to ISDS was far more successful and at key stages threatened to derail both TTIP and CETA negotiations. European trade unions now also have greater institutional opportunities to influence EU trade policy than ever before. Further, the politicisation of trade and opposition to neoliberal globalisation has not only helped create a genuine transnational social movement around these issues but has also made trade an issue for public debate. However, these important changes have not fundamentally altered the course of the wider neoliberal trade agenda, meaning that the possibility of achieving a genuine social dimension to trade remains debatable. These points also raise questions about why European trade unions have been more successful at opposing certain aspects of the EU's trade agenda but far less successful at achieving their own agenda. This important question will be addressed in the final chapters of this thesis.

	TUC	DGB	CGT	ETUC
Agenda-setting	Mixed	Mixed	Mixed	Mixed
Coalition building	Weak	Mixed	Mixed	Weak
Lobbying	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak
Mobilisation	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak
Structural Power	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak
Associative Power	Mixed	Mixed	Mixed	Weak
Institutional Power	Weak	Weak	Weak	Mixed
Discursive Power	Mixed	Mixed	Mixed	Mixed
POS	Mixed	Mixed	Mixed	Mixed
MOC	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak
Framing	Mixed	Mixed	Mixed	Mixed

Table 2: Comparison of trade union strategies and resources during WTO negotiations

	TUC	DGB	CGT	ETUC
Agenda-setting	Weak	Strong	Mixed	Strong
Coalition building	Mixed	Strong	Mixed	Mixed
Lobbying	Weak	Strong	Mixed	Strong
Mobilisation	Weak	Strong	Mixed	Weak
Structural Power	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak
Associative Power	Weak	Mixed	Weak	Mixed
Institutional Power	Weak	Mixed	Weak	Mixed
Discursive Power	Mixed	Strong	Mixed	Mixed
POS	Weak	Mixed	Weak	Mixed
MOC	Weak	Strong	Weak	Mixed
Framing	Mixed	Strong	Mixed	Mixed

Table 3: Comparison of trade union strategies and resources during CETA negotiations

Chapter 7

Trade union strategies to influence world trade negotiations: Change over time

The previous six chapters have analysed literature and data relating to four key themes in the historical and contemporary periods of this thesis: the strength, organisational structure, ideological orientation and political links of the four trade union case studies (chapters 1 and 4); the trade policy objectives of European trade unions and the avenues of influence available to them in world trade negotiations and the EC/EU trade policy process (chapters 2 and 5); and case studies tracing union strategies to influence world trade negotiations (chapters 3 and 6). Chapter 7 will bring this research together to analyse the key temporal changes in trade union strategies to influence world trade negotiations and therefore directly addresses the central research question of this thesis. However, while change over time is the central theme of this chapter, there are also significant continuities that will be addressed.

The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section outlines the key structural changes that have taken place between the two time periods and analyses their impact on European unions' collective power and capacity to influence world trade negotiations. Four scope conditions are highlighted: the entrenchment of neoliberal globalisation; the changing dynamics of world trade; the widening and deepening of European integration; and institutional changes at the European level. Whilst these broader processes have had an overwhelmingly negative impact on European trade unions' organisational strength and ability to influence trade policymaking, they have also presented new opportunities or forced unions to adopt different strategies to address these circumstances.

The second section of the chapter analyses how the trade policy objectives of trade unions have changed over time in the above context. The section thus addresses the agency of trade unions through the lens of their policy preferences. It highlights that European unions'

more defensive policies have changed over time in parallel with the shifting direction of world trade. By contrast, their core trade policy demand, enforceable labour standards, has remained relatively stable over time. This section also highlights how European trade unions have become a more cohesive policy actor over time.

The third and final section compares how union strategies to influence EC/EU trade policy and negotiations have changed between the two periods. This section specifically analyses how unions have sought to achieve their trade policy objectives within the established structural and institutional scope conditions. This section thus directly engages with the agency-structure debate within political science. Specifically, it highlights how European trade unions have predominantly favoured an advocacy strategy based on three primary strategies: agenda-setting; lobbying; and coalition building. Notably, a fourth strategy – mobilisation – has become an increasing feature of union attempts to influence world trade negotiations since the late-1990s and has proven to be a relatively successful approach, albeit with some notable limitations. In this respect, European trade unions, despite declining power and increasing institutional access at the European level, have progressively turned to outsider influence and mobilisation within the broad social movement against neoliberal trade agreements to make their voices heard.

The impact of structural and institutional changes

To understand the strategies of European trade unions and how they have changed over time it is first necessary to place them in their structural and institutional context. In other words, what factors and processes have helped and hindered union strategies to influence world trade? As organisations representing the collective interests of workers, trade unions' two most important resources that play a major role in guiding their strategic choices are the

strength of their collective power and capacity to influence. This section first outlines the four scope conditions that have had the biggest impact on European trade unions and how these conditions have changed over time, before later explaining their combined impact on unions' collective power and capacity to influence world trade.

The first scope condition that has had a major negative impact on unions' power and, therefore, ability to influence world trade is neoliberal globalisation. Chapters 1-3 give a detailed analysis of the economic and political impact of emerging globalisation in the long 1970s. The textile and clothing sector, both in Europe and internationally, exemplifies the impact of economic restructuring on workers and the tensions that existed in this period between the decline of embedded liberalism and the rise of globalisation. In Europe, these trends occurred at different speeds but would become more entrenched over time. By the 1970s the world economy was already becoming increasingly transnational, particularly because of FDI by MNCs (La Barca, 2016, pp. 28-31). FDI in lower waged and less regulated economies increased dramatically from the 1970s onwards, giving rise to a new international division of labour that intensified competition between states and, by extension, workers (Brenner, 2006; Arrighi, 2008). Trade liberalisation was very closely linked to this trend (Büthe and Milner, 2008). In combination with a series of economic crises, the 1970s marked the beginning of the end of embedded liberalism and heralded the rise of neoliberal globalisation. The trade policies of European textile and clothing unions in the sector represented a desire to slow down this process, stem the tide of rising unemployment, and restructure the sector in a manner that could limit social costs.

As liberalism became increasingly 'disembedded' from the national and international regulatory environment, it simultaneously disenfranchised the highly organised national labour movements that had contributed to the unprecedented era of growth, stability, and progress in the post-war era (van Apeldoorn, 2002, p. 56). For European trade unions, the

dramatic increase in labour and capital mobility reflected “capital strategies to outflank organized labor by expanding markets beyond its reach” (Lillie, 2011, pp.122-123). New processes of globalisation also resulted in a change in the character of employment and the composition of the working class, which intensified the decline of nationally organised manufacturing industries where unions had traditionally based their strength (Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman, 2013, p. 29).

Globalisation also began to force trade unions to abandon a predominantly national approach as companies continued to diversify their activities and workforce across territories (Hyman, 2005, p. 142). These processes not only reflected the increasing power and dominance of MNCs, but also a correlating decline in the power and sovereignty of the nation state (Strange, 1996). As this thesis has shown, trade unions have adopted new ways of organising to address these changes but have also at times struggled to develop transnational solidarity between workers in competing sectors of the global economy, especially in the Global South.

The above trends all contributed to and were reflective of the combined influences of neoliberal globalisation. Neoliberalism has developed over time into a programme of wholesale economic restructuring via deregulation, privatisation and flexibilisation of the economy (Bieler, 2003, pp. 23-24). These features have all explicitly attacked two of the traditional bases of union power: “the structural economic position and power of the industrial working class; and the existence of a broadly organised and diffused working-class political culture based on traditional trade union notions of solidarity, socialism, and class consciousness” (Waterman, 2018, p. 129). Understandably, neoliberalism found its most natural home in pro-business conservative and liberal parties throughout Europe. However, this strong ideological shift has also permeated social democratic parties that have traditionally held links with the labour movement, further fracturing party-union links in

many European countries and reducing union influence over party policy and strategy (Lavelle, 2008).

The second scope condition, which is directly linked to the first, is the changing dynamics of world trade. Whilst the long 1970s saw increased tensions between protectionism and liberalisation, by the 1990s the neoliberal trade agenda had become hegemonic. Three trends exemplify this trade agenda: the dramatic rise in trade liberalisation; the institutionalisation of a multilateral world trading regime in the form of the WTO; and the shift in the focus of world trade from ‘across the border’ issues to ‘behind the border’ issues (Bieler, Hilary and Lindberg, 2014, pp. 3-5). Each of these trends has had a profound structural impact on the world economy. In particular, the widening neoliberal trade agenda that was solidified in the foundation of the WTO was combined with a deepening of its governance that “transformed the normative core of the trading system. International trade has expanded considerably over the years, and the WTO, by implication, has redefined the ‘acceptable’ scope of government in numerous trade-related areas” (Mortensen, 2006, p. 174). Rodrik (2012, p. 76) argues that this trend represents a deeper and more pernicious “hyperglobalisation” whereby “the international integration of markets for goods and capital (but not labor) became an end in itself, overshadowing domestic agendas”.

Whilst the foundation of the WTO and the broadening of its trade agenda into more controversial areas had run into severe difficulties by the mid-2000s – not least due to opposition from members from the Global South – the EU, US and others have sought to “achieve what is impossible within a multilateral setting” through bilateralism (Choudry, 2010). Bieler and Morton (2014, p. 42) refer to this trend as the ‘second wind’ of neoliberal free trade. However, as Chapter 6 makes clear, even before this more recent shift, the WTO and the leading trading nations have faced increasing contestation over the direction of world

trade which has created a wider public discourse on the social costs of trade liberalisation and has led to trade unions becoming more vocal in their opposition to neoliberal trade policies.

The third scope condition, the widening and deepening of European integration, is again closely related to the above processes, and has had a mixed impact on trade unions. While ‘Eurosclerosis’ and economic crises characterised the integration project in the 1970s, the drive towards establishing a single market in the mid-1980s, linked with important institutional reforms, has led to greater economic cooperation and dependency between member states and has transferred increased powers to the European level. These changes at the European level must also be understood as a dialectical relationship with changes at the national level. Bieler (2006, p. 10), for example, outlines how the single market both reflected policies of deregulation, privatisation, and liberalisation at the national level in certain states but also offered an economic framework to carry out these policies more systematically throughout Europe.

However, while this neoliberal agenda has become more dominant over time, social elements have also co-existed within this framework, albeit to a lesser extent (van Apeldoorn and Hager, 2010). In this context, European trade unions have consistently argued for a ‘social dimension’ to European integration. Further, ‘pushed’ by globalisation and more hostile national contexts and ‘pulled’ by the potential for greater influence and funding, European trade unions have attempted to redress their declining strength and influence by undergoing their own processes of Europeanisation (Visser, 1998; Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman, 2013). What started out as a side-effect of declining power at the national level has evolved into a more developed strategic orientation with unions increasing their resources and capacity at the European level over time (Mitchell, 2014). Greater organisational Europeanisation has arguably been the single biggest change that European trade unions have made between the historical and contemporary periods. This process was emerging in the

1970s with the founding of the ETUC but developed dramatically in the 1980s and 1990s in parallel with increased European integration.

The fourth and final scope condition outlined throughout this thesis is the impact that key institutional changes at the European level have had on European unions' ability to influence the EU's trade agenda. As highlighted in chapters 2 and 5, prior to the Lisbon Treaty the avenues of influence available for trade unions to advocate their trade policies at the European level were largely limited to either the Commission, who produced the draft mandate and negotiated trade deals, or the Council (via the member states), who had the final say on the negotiating mandate and the deal itself. The EP and EESC were useful forums for coordinating European level union activity but had no direct influence over trade policy. This context changed significantly when the EP was given greater powers of oversight on trade agreements and became a co-legislator with the Council through the Lisbon Treaty (Woolcock, 2010b). Substantively, this has increased the quantity – though not necessarily the quality – of access points available to trade unions to attempt to influence the EU's trade agenda.

These institutional changes have evolved in parallel with the EU's own expanded trade agenda and increased role in global trade (Meunier and Nicolaïdis, 2011; Young and Peterson, 2014). However, these changes have also led to the EU's trade agenda becoming increasingly politicised, in part attributable to the fact that EU trade policy now requires a broader base of support to be ratified by the EP and, in some cases, national parliaments. As Chapter 6 showed, these institutional changes have also coincided with EU trade policies becoming more ambitious and controversial which nearly led to the collapse of CETA. In addition to increased powers for the EP, greater union and civil society influence over the implementation of EU trade agreements has also offered unions new avenues of influence – a trend that also took place at the multilateral level towards the end of the 1990s.

However, despite these improvements, it is worth reiterating that the EP still has no formal power over EU negotiating mandates and implementation forums like the DAGs are still only advisory bodies. Arguably, these features represent a form of ‘reverse lobbying’ (Woll, 2009, pp. 277-278), whereby societal actors are integrated into the policymaking process to increase its legitimacy without fundamentally changing its character. This point also relates to neo-Gramscian arguments that the arena in which EU trade policy is formulated is structurally designed to favour social forces in favour of market liberalisation over social concerns (Ford, 2013).

Though trade has become increasingly politicised since the late-1990s in general and more intensely since the Lisbon Treaty within the EU in particular, the EU’s trade policymaking process attempts to de-politicise trade as a means of further normalising and entrenching its wider market liberalisation strategy (Bailey and Bossuyt, 2013). While trade unions have willingly engaged in the EU’s trade policy process there has also been frustration at the lack of progress on its social agenda. In this context, as highlighted in Chapter 6, European trade unions have increasingly attempted to politicise trade issues to leverage concessions to their own trade agenda from the Commission and some member states. As such, the combination of the EU’s expanded trade agenda and its related institutional changes have created a tension between external trade politicisation and attempts to de-politicise its internal policymaking process.

Taken together, the impact that the above four scope conditions have had on European trade unions’ collective power and capacity to influence world trade has been enormous. Neoliberal globalisation at the national, European, and international levels has significantly weakened the structural and associative power of workers and their trade unions over time through economic restructuring and relocation that has atomised workers and, in developed economies, marked a shift away from the manufacturing industries that have traditionally

been the base of European unions' strength. In general, this is exemplified by the major decline in union membership and density that the TUC, DGB and CGT have all experienced (Vandaele, 2019). Additionally, unions' collective power and their ability to wield it has been blunted by the dual impact of economic deregulation and the increased regulation of workers' rights (Gall, Hurd and Wilkinson, 2011, p. 7).

This reduction in the power of organised labour as a social force can also be linked to a general decline in institutional power as collective bargaining coverage has, in general, also been reduced. Though tripartite institutions and advisory forums have increased over time at the European level and have offered trade unions avenues for influence, they do not carry the same political weight as the embedded neo-corporatist structures of the 1970s - exemplified by those of the UK and West Germany - which had a far more direct impact on policy and the aggregation of workers' interests.

This change is also closely linked to the decline of the 'party-union nexus' which reflected and contributed to unions' power in the 1970s and thus was a key expression of European unions' associative power (Upchurch et al., 2009). Indeed, for all three national confederations the industrial-political link between unions and their traditional political affiliations began to unravel in the 1970s and has only fractured further over time. While the TUC, DGB, and CGT still retain links with the LP, SPD, and PCF respectively, many formal links have either been deliberately uncoupled or have withered and the voting preferences of union members have become increasingly diverse.

The decline of the party-union nexus and the rise of 'Third Way' social democracy can therefore also be linked to a decrease and shift in the representation of union views in national, European, and international institutions. Furthermore, this decline is closely related to the hegemony of neoliberalism and the impact that it has had on unions' discursive power and their ability to articulate counter-hegemonic arguments. However, whilst this problem

can partly be explained by arguing that political and economic discourse has generally shifted to the right over time, trade unions and social democratic parties have also at times tacitly accepted rather than challenged this new terrain (Bieler, 2006; Dunn, 2007; Grady, 2010).

The decline in European unions' power resources has also had a mixed impact on their capacity to influence trade issues. In terms of negative impact, neoliberal hegemony and the related decline in union power has significantly reduced the avenues available to unions and the openness of the POS to union demands. In terms of party-political avenues, chapters 1 and 4 exemplify how the ideological orientations and political networks of the traditional partners of the TUC, DGB and CGT have changed over time and have negatively impacted their ability to exercise influence through national, European, and international routes.

Institutionally, the openness of the POS to trade union influence over trade has always been limited but was arguably stronger in the long 1970s due to unions' strength as a social force and the greater likelihood of actors and institutions sympathising with or feeling the pressure to listen to union views on trade issues. While the POS in the contemporary period superficially appears to have improved through institutional changes at the European level - such as the EP becoming a co-legislator for EU trade agreements and greater consultative mechanisms - these changes have been no replacement for the power that unions have lost over time. Importantly, without an increase in union power that could force greater institutional openness to their demands or place more trade union sympathisers into positions of power, it seems unlikely that these new mechanisms will attain the 'teeth' necessary for unions to use them to challenge the EU's wider liberalisation agenda. In this respect, the link between union power and the POS at the European level is too far removed to leverage the significant political change necessary to be truly effective.

Despite the overwhelmingly negative effect of the four scope conditions on union power and capacity to influence in general, their impact on European unions' MOC has been

more mixed. Though declining membership and weakened political links have greatly reduced unions' capacity for collective action in a material sense, unions have improved their capacity in other respects. The clearest example of this is their greater organisational capacity and cohesion at the European and international level. This is especially true in the case of trade issues. Though internationalism has always been a core value of the labour movement, European unions have been slow to adapt to the developing processes of globalisation and European integration, primarily due to political divisions and the prioritisation of national concerns.

The 1970s marked the beginning of an increased international orientation and organisational Europeanisation with the establishment of the ETUC in 1973. By the 2000s the ETUC had become the key union actor for EU trade issues, both in its coordination and representation of European unions collectively. Greater MOC is also reflected by an increase in union staff and policy advisors focused entirely or partly on trade issues which has helped create some opportunities to inform the EU's trade policymaking process through union participation in expert or advisory groups.

However, Europeanisation has been a double-edged sword for unions. While the establishment and growth of the ETUC stands as an example of European unions developing new forms of institutional power and organisational capacity in difficult circumstances, this has led to an increasing disconnect between European level union influence and unions' most potent power base: the mobilisation of members at company and national level. Further, the form that union Europeanisation has taken not only raises the question of how rooted union activity at the European and international level is in the day-to-day struggles of ordinary union members, but also whether European level unionism is too embedded in the EU's structures and methods. This tension between the ETUC's representative capacity and its

capacity to influence is noted in the wider trade union literature (Dølvik, 1997; Dølvik and Visser, 2001; Gläser, 2009; Hyman, 2013).

The changing avenues of influence available to unions, both as a product of their declining collective power and institutional changes at the European level, have also had a mixed impact on union capacity to influence trade issues. In the historical period, with avenues of influence largely limited to the Commission or via the member states in the Council, the EC's trade policymaking process was relatively more conducive to union influence because their power was overwhelmingly rooted at the national level. With the LP and SPD in power for most of the 1970s and the PS in power from 1981, all three national confederations had strong (TUC) or reasonable (DGB and CGT) access to their respective national governments. A similar political situation prevailed for some of the contemporary period. However, the changed nature of world trade and social democratic parties by this stage meant that trade unions had less avenues of influence at the national level. In contrast, while trade unions had increasingly sought to influence the Commission as the historical period progressed, the national level was by far their most preferred and effective avenue. This growing confidence at the European level, combined with declining power and institutional opportunities nationally, meant that by the contemporary period unions increasingly sought to influence the European level.

In this respect, though the access points on trade issues were very similar between the two periods prior to the Lisbon Treaty, the fact that trade unions were more organised and integrated at the European level by the contemporary period meant that influencing the Commission became far more of a focus. Thus, through institutionalised social dialogue and greater Europeanisation, unions had a greater general influence at the European level, though avenues of influence over EU trade policy were still very limited. The integration of the EP into the trade policymaking and ratification process after Lisbon gave unions greater

influence over an avenue that they were already well organised in. The importance of this change to the unions can be evidenced by their specific focus on securing a sympathetic S&D chair for the INTA committee (J. Kirton-Darling, interview). Nonetheless, though some institutional changes have provided European trade unions with greater opportunities to influence EU trade policy, the EU's institutional bias towards a pro-liberalisation agenda on the whole means that unions still face an uphill struggle to do so.

Change and continuity in unions' policy objectives

While the aforementioned scope conditions have significantly impacted the structural and institutional context that European unions operate in, their policy objectives have also changed over the timespan covered in this thesis. Chapters 2 and 5 provide evidence of change and continuity in the trade policies of the TUC, DGB, CGT and ETUC. On the one hand, decades of increased economic integration and trade liberalisation combined with a general shift in the world trade agenda towards non-tariff and regulatory issues have changed some of the trade issues that unions campaign on. On the other hand, the core demands of European unions in relation to trade such as 'fair globalisation', the offsetting of the negative consequences of liberalisation, and a voice for labour in trade negotiations have remained consistent since the 1970s. With this in mind, this section will first highlight changes in union policy objectives before examining notable continuities.

The first significant example of change in relation to unions' trade policy objectives is that their objectives have become far more cohesive and unified over time. Union trade policies during MFA negotiations reflected the dire situation facing the European textile sector by the 1970s. Union trade policies were explicitly linked to national industrial policies. Competition between states within Europe, let alone internationally, was intense. While

Chapter 2 highlights that the general trade policies of textile and clothing unions in this period dealt with similar themes – the need for government intervention, import controls to limit the impact of competition from developing economies, and the social clause – these policies were also primarily based on national objectives that reflected intense economic competition both inside and outside of the EC. This environment made it more difficult for European unions to develop transnational solidarity and cooperation. The context of the Cold War also meant that political divisions between unions were more entrenched and the fact that the ETUC was only in its infancy in this period meant that greater coordination and cooperation at the European level did not begin to take place until the late-1970s.

Additionally, the 1970s was a period of contestation between the trends of liberalisation and protectionism in general. Therefore, in the context of the ‘new international division of labour’, the direction of the world economy was not a debate that was simply limited to the labour movement but, as Chapter 4 highlights, was also taken up by national governments, industry organisations, and international institutions. This also made it difficult for the EC to act cohesively on trade matters, despite trade being an EC competence, which opened opportunities for union influence over the MFA. However, the policies of the TUC, DGB and CGT unions were far more closely aligned by the end of the 1970s than they were at the start of the decade, primarily because of the severe impact that both the world economic crisis and the more liberal first MFA had had on employment in their respective national sectors. The GTB is the clearest example of this, changing its policy from a pro-liberalisation position to a more protectionist one in a matter of years.

By contrast, the fact that European economies were far more integrated and interdependent in the contemporary period, as well as trade unions’ own Europeanisation, resulted in far greater unity around trade issues within the European labour movement. As the example of the automotive sector in Chapter 5 shows, the consistent problem of transnational

solidarity still existed but intra-European differences over trade policy were far less pronounced. Furthermore, greater Europeanisation has meant that the ETUC now plays a strong coordinating role over trade issues. This is exemplified by the ETUC's method of developing collective trade policy positions highlighted in Chapter 5. As such, both strategically and in policy terms, European trade unions were far more coherent in the contemporary period.

Substantive changes in the trade policies of European unions are the second example of change highlighted in this section. In the long 1970s union trade policies aligned around calls for greater investment in and protection for the textile and clothing sector in the form of import controls negotiated through the framework of the MFA. Once again, though the MFA was an international agreement, these policies were very nationally oriented with each union believing that an integrated trade, industrial and employment strategy at the national could be achieved through neo-corporatist structures in the case of the TUC and DGB unions, or the election of a left government in the case of the CGT unions.

By the contemporary period, unions' trade policies had become far broader and more diverse due to the expansion of issues they had to address. This is exemplified by the fact that union trade policies in the contemporary period aligned around calls for transparency in European and world trade agreements and the protection of public services. As Chapter 6 consistently highlighted, service liberalisation became a central focus of union trade policies and campaigns in this period and represents the fact that world trade itself has shifted towards non-tariff, regulatory, 'behind the border' issues (Bieler, Hilary and Lindberg, 2014, pp. 3-5). In contrast to the national focus taken by unions in the historical period, the contemporary period has seen the ETUC and others consistently reiterate their support for multilateralism as a reflection of the truly global nature of world trade.

The above policies, in both the historical and contemporary periods, predominantly represented defensive positions on world trade that sought to protect jobs and regulation or gain access to processes that unions were not a party to. One policy area that has been an example of continuity through both periods that also represents one of labour's few offensive demands in relation to trade issues is enforceable labour standards. The reason why this has remained a consistent policy for European trade unions is ultimately that free trade creates social costs and an uneven distribution of wealth. This is the fundamental issue that the enforceable labour standards seek to mitigate.

Though in broad terms the social clause has been a consistent feature of union trade policies since the 1970s, there are also some differences in the substantive details of the policy and how it was framed in both periods. At the beginning of the 1970s, the ICFTU's conception of the social clause, as well as referring to core ILO labour standards, also called on GATT members to commit to policies ensuring full employment, full income and social benefits for all workers displaced by restructuring, public control of social and economic re-adaptation, anticipatory structural adjustment measures, and the creation of a tripartite International Commission on Trade and Employment. Though all unions mentioned in the historical period of this thesis supported the concept of the social clause, it is notable that only the ICFTU consistently put forward this wider conception. In fact, as Chapter 3 details, in the heat of MFA negotiations, national trade unions placed far greater emphasis on the policy of import controls than on the social clause. Furthermore, national unions often raised the issue in a very limited way that left them open to accusations of protectionism and self-interest from developing countries. However, Chapter 3 also highlights how unions were keenly aware of how little governmental support there was for the policy at the time and did not want it to distract from the central issue of import controls which had far greater support.

As highlighted in Chapter 6, by the contemporary period the social clause had evolved into a wider debate concerning trade as a vessel for sustainable development and the possibility of introducing labour standards into the multilateral WTO setting. As more ILO conventions have been ratified by states over time the issue has turned more towards enforceability. However, though the issue has increased in importance over time, the substantive policy put forward by European trade unions has arguably grown less ambitious in the same period. For example, though the ETUC's endorsement of the ILO's Decent Work Agenda means it supports productive employment, labour standards, social dialogue, and social protection, this agenda still does not go as far as the ICFTU's conception of the social clause in the 1970s. Once again, this shift can be linked to the decline in trade union power and the expansion of the world trade agenda into new areas, at once forcing unions to adopt more defensive policies and lowering their sights regarding their offensive policies.

Union strategies and their impact on world trade negotiations

The structural, institutional and policy changes outlined in the two previous sections have influenced the strategies used by European trade unions in both periods. Union strategies, while constrained by structural factors, are also the product of unions' agency based on their preferences, the role of individuals within the organisation or wider movement, as well as their collective power and capacity. While structural and institutional changes have generally not been conducive to greater union influence over world trade, the strategic choices that unions make are vital and do not have to be decisively influenced by these factors. After all, though union power has been eroded over time it has not been destroyed entirely and is always changing. The agency of trade unions therefore represents the extent that their power is understood and is chosen to be utilised, either directly through different forms of industrial

action, or indirectly through strategies that advocate their collective interests but do not utilise the power of labour itself (McAlevey, 2016).

Despite changes over time, union strategies in both time periods all fall within this second category and can predominantly be classified as forms of advocacy and, to a far lesser extent, mobilisation. Importantly, though examples of advocacy and mobilisation have been present in both periods the most significant strategic change over time has been a greater reliance by European trade unions on the latter in the context of increasing trade politicisation. This section analyses the four key strategies used by trade unions to influence world trade negotiations - agenda setting, coalition building, lobbying, and mobilisation - how they have changed over time, and their impact on world trade negotiations.

Agenda-setting

McGuire and Scherrer (2010) and Murphy (2010), among many others, note the importance of agenda setting for influencing the trade policy process and world trade negotiations. Cobb and Elder (1983, p. 14) argue that agenda-setting concerns “how issues are created and why some controversies or insipient issues come to command the attention and concern of the formal centers of decision-making, while others fail”. Though they have not always achieved success in this area on their own, European trade unions have nonetheless been effective in getting some of their key policy objectives on the agenda of world trade negotiations: during MFA negotiations, unions helped put forward the demand for stricter import controls for developing economies; though ultimately unsuccessful, unions were at the forefront of bringing the issue of labour standards into the multilateral arena of the WTO throughout the 1990s and early 2000s; and during negotiations over TTIP and CETA, European trade unions

were among the most vocal opponents of ISDS to the extent that it became the defining issue of both negotiations and threatened to derail both agreements.

In all three of the above cases, the framing capabilities of European trade unions have been an important factor in getting key labour issues on the world trade agenda. These capabilities and the character of their framing has also changed over time. In the long 1970s the call for stricter import controls was framed in a number of related ways: the existential threat posed by unfettered free trade in general; ‘unfair’ competition from developing economies specifically; the greed of multinational companies exploiting workers in developing economies; the need for an ‘orderly’ expansion of world trade linked to the social development of developing economies in the context of the ‘new international division of labour’; the lack of concern shown by government ministers and European commissioners for massive job losses in the sector; and the need for secure jobs and sectoral investment.

During WTO summits and negotiating rounds in the 1990s and 2000s unions primarily framed the labour standards debate as a sustainable development issue within the context of the wider policy discussion on ‘fair globalisation’ taking place at the time. However, this discursive element also ran in parallel with an economic rationale that trade unions used to try and ‘sell’ their proposals to governments. Importantly, neither the political nor the economic logic of the social clause put forward by European unions was embraced decisively by unions in developing countries – who viewed global institutions like the WTO and many developed economies with deep suspicion – nor developing countries in general who opposed its economic logic (O’Brien et al., 2000).

Perhaps the clearest case of European trade unions using their discursive power and framing capabilities to set the agenda during trade negotiations can be seen during the anti-TTIP and CETA campaigns. This was particularly the case with the issue of ISDS which was successfully framed by European trade unions and their allies as an attack on democracy,

national sovereignty, and social justice by MNCs. This discursive frame was also employed to play on specific national concerns, such as the privatisation of the NHS in the UK. However, arguably the most effective framing strategy employed by trade unions during their campaigning was to link the toxicity of TTIP with CETA by suggesting that the latter represented ‘TTIP via the backdoor’. This was a vital strategic choice as up until that point CETA negotiations had been relatively uncontroversial even within the European labour movement (with the notable exception of public sector unions). Importantly, this discursive approach broadened out as the campaign progressed and each deal became more and more controversial, leading to trade unions more actively opposing the EU’s trade agenda in general and posing their alternative approach more confidently.

However, Siles-Brügge (2018) highlights the potential pitfalls of such a discursive strategy by noting that at certain stages the European Commission attempted, with some degree of success, to counteract the anti-TTIP campaign’s frames about ISDS in several ways. First, it proposed an alternative to ISDS in the form of ICS and framed it as an entirely new system that addressed the concerns of civil society. Indeed, ICS was used by the Commission as an attempt to reclaim notions of transparency and fairness through the lens of ‘the rule of law’. This is described by Siles-Brügge (2018, p. 20) as a shift from “technocratic repression to co-opting injustice frames” on the part of the Commission.

Second, in the case of CETA specifically, the Commission, MEPs and member states sought to make political capital out of the fact that the anti-ISDS ‘injustice frame’ employed by CETA’s opponents was also shared, for different reasons, by the populist right. The Commission and other CETA advocates thus linked this frame to the economic populism associated with the Brexit vote and Donald Trump’s election victory whilst simultaneously painting the deal and the new ICS formulation as representing ‘progressive’ trade and investment policies by contrast. This strategy made an important impact in that it forced some

CSOs to distance themselves from their previous rhetorical approach but also helped win over the “key pawnbroker” of the SPD into supporting the ICS formulation (Siles-Brügge, 2018, p. 26). In this respect the Commission were able to use a very specific situational opportunity to attempt to discredit union and civil society arguments against ISDS and ICS. From a trade union perspective, this highlights the dangers of relying on discursive power alone given that this power can be fluid and highly dependent on uncontrollable external dynamics.

Coalition building

The agenda-setting capabilities of unions in both periods are also closely related to the strength of the second strategy employed by trade unions to attempt to influence world trade negotiations: coalition building. Frege, Heery and Turner (2004, pp. 145-148) cite coalition building as a vital component of union revitalisation that is based on a range of push and pull factors: pushed by factors such as diminished resources and political exclusion, pressure to broaden interest representation and their policy agenda, and the influx of new ideas and strategies from non-union activists; pulled by the POS, including points of access and degree of consultation (McGuire and Scherrer, 2010, p. 51).

European unions’ have built coalitions with different kinds of societal actors at different stages. During MFA negotiations, trade unions’ most effective allies were textile industry organisations such as the BTC and COMITEXTIL who had a particular interest in negotiating a stricter agreement and greater protection for the European sector. These temporary alliances represented unions’ embedded roles in their sectors and the fact that they were a powerful social force with strong associative and institutional power in countries like the UK and West Germany. Importantly, despite their very different class compositions, in

the 1970s unions and some industry organisations had a mutual interest in protecting jobs in the sector. This was particularly the case in national industries that were yet to fully undergo the processes of liberalisation, modernisation and transnationalisation - such as the UK and France, in contrast to West Germany which began these processes far earlier.

During the contemporary period trade unions have primarily collaborated with the social movement that has developed in opposition to neoliberal free trade that has grown from the late-1990s onwards. This movement can be characterised as a transnational advocacy network – “networks of activists that coalesce and operate across national frontiers” – according to Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) definition. During multilateral WTO negotiations, the ICFTU and some of its national affiliates were active in building coalitions with civil society networks both in the Global North and the Global South to win support for the social clause. Whilst these attempts largely failed, a far more successful example of union-civil society collaboration can be seen in the transnational anti-GATS campaign that developed in the early 2000s. Many of these links would later come to fruition more fully in the movement that developed against TTIP and CETA when CSOs and unions worked closely together to build joint demands and increase their outsider influence by politicising key issues and controversies.

This shift has been something of a new development for European trade unions who have traditionally either built coalitions with more traditional socio-economic interest groups, relied on their party-political links, or eschewed coalitions entirely to rely on their collective strength alone (Waterman and Timms, 2005). With this history in mind, some unions have been more open to building coalitions with CSOs than others. For example, the CGT and DGB have been involved in anti-globalisation networks since the late-1990s, whilst the TUC have generally taken a more cautious approach by building links and drawing on the policy expertise of individual development CSOs rather than the wider movement. The ETUC have

also taken a similar approach, but overall have generally been far more reticent to develop links with the wider movement. However, this reticence goes both ways since it has been argued that the ETUC's perceived closeness to the European Commission has led to them being viewed with suspicion by civil society activists.

The coalitions trade unions have built with other societal actors have again had mixed success. In terms of success, in the long 1970s, because of its policy alignment with societal actors, but also national governments such as the UK, France, Belgium and Italy, trade union demands were integrated into the Commission's MFA negotiating mandate in a way that would have been unlikely through union lobbying alone. A strong factor behind this effectiveness was the extent of European unions' associative and institutional power at this time. With the decline of these power resources, new forms of associative power and increased discursive power became essential to European unions' coalition building capabilities with individual CSOs and the wider anti-globalisation movement which proved essential during the anti-TTIP and CETA campaigns. Importantly, while the quantity of civil society mechanisms to inform EU trade policy has increased over time their quality is strongly debated (Harrison et al., 2019b). Thus, as the POS has become less open to union demands at all levels and opportunities for insider influence have declined in correlation with the changing character of party-union links, unions' MOC and outsider influence have increased and improved through their collaboration with wider civil society.

Lobbying

European trade unions' third key strategy in relation to trade has been to attempt to lobby national and European level politicians. This strategy has once again achieved mixed success. The primary focus of union lobbying over trade issues in both periods has been national and

European parliamentarians from social democratic parties, based on their potential to influence the EU's negotiating mandate and the outcome of negotiations through the Council. In the long 1970s, neo-corporatist structures and close union-party relations in the UK and Germany assured trade unions at least had an advisory role in sectoral and economic policy issues. In the case of the TUC, this role was bolstered by a far more direct influence over party – and thus government – policy through the party-union nexus. The GTB enjoyed some influence and support within the SPD, but this was undermined by the fact that the BMWi, the ministry with competence for West German trade policy, was controlled by the liberal FDP. The CGT's political strategy rejected lobbying as an approach until the election of the PS and thus stayed out of MFA politics almost entirely, instead preferring to focus on workplace issues and electoral politics.

In the contemporary period, lobbying national and European parliamentarians became a more concerted dual strategy for trade unions. Though union influence over party policy had declined in general by this period, all three national confederations were able to secure political support for some of their trade policies in this period. In the case of the TUC and DGB this support led to union representatives being included in their respective government's negotiating teams in the early 2000s. The CGT also found reasonable support for the social clause among PS members of the French Assembly. Since the Lisbon Treaty the ETUC has made a particular effort to influence MEPs and strengthen its Trade Union intergroup. This can be linked both to the increased role of MEPs in EU trade policymaking and, conversely, a decline in social democratic and left-wing MEPs within the EP generally throughout the 2000s and 2010s.

During CETA negotiations, the fact that the agreement eventually required both European and national parliament ratification meant that national level influence increased in importance again. In member states where parliamentary opposition to CETA was stronger,

such as Germany and France, unions made a particular effort to lobby their parliamentarians in the hope of derailing the ratification process. The DGB in particular played an important role in this and also, both through the ETUC and bilaterally, sought to influence Canadian politicians to this end. In this respect, though the decline of social democratic parties has narrowed opportunities for insider influence for trade unions, changes in the trade policymaking process and the increase in bilateral trade agreements have diversified opportunities for unions to influence politicians on a multilevel basis and on both sides of certain agreements.

Attempts to lobby the European Commission also took place during both periods, though this was less prevalent during the historical period due to unions' lack of coordination at the European level. Nonetheless, the existence of Commissioners with a social democratic background (such as Wilhelm Haferkamp and Roy Jenkins) and DG's with a strong interest in supporting the European textile sector (such as DG Industrial Affairs) presented some small opportunities for union influence. However, as detailed in Chapter 3, the effectiveness of this approach was mixed. In the contemporary period, the Commission, and DG Trade in particular, has generally proven to be a fruitless avenue of influence for trade unions whose policies have generally conflicted with the EU's wider trade agenda. While efforts to consult unions and CSOs have improved during the contemporary period and some mild concessions to union policies have been made by different Commissioners – such as relative support for the social clause and a sustainable development agenda – these concessions have not outweighed the Commission's economic objectives.

Overall, the effectiveness of union lobbying strategies have correlated with the decline in their power in general. Primarily, this is because European unions' political networks have become far more diffuse and thus less politically reliable over time. This is particularly pertinent since national and European level social democratic parties and politicians often

proved to be vital actors to influence in terms of the direction of trade negotiations. For example, in the 1970s, the UK Labour government played a key role in moving the EC towards supporting a stricter MFA, while in the CETA negotiations influencing the German SPD and key actors within it was seen by both European unions and the Commission as vital to the outcome of negotiations. This also partly stems from the fact that social democratic parties, which often comprise different political factions with more or less left-wing ideological positions, can be split over trade issues. However, given the ongoing decline of social democratic parties in Europe this strategy has yielded diminishing returns for trade unions, forcing them to pursue greater outsider influence over time.

Mobilisation

The fourth strategy that European trade unions have increasingly used to attempt to influence world trade negotiations has been mobilisation. The way that this strategy has been used by European trade unions has also changed over time. It has also been the least developed and utilised strategy unions have used to influence trade negotiations, though it has arguably been one of its most effective. In the early 1980s both the TUC and GTB mobilised their members at the national level: the TUC organised two demonstrations in spring 1981 – a 2,000-strong demonstration outside of the Houses of Parliament and a 10,000 demonstration in Bradford – in protest against rapidly rising unemployment in the sector; the GTB organised a series of local ‘protest actions’ followed by a 20,000-strong demonstration in Bonn demanding a stricter approach to the MFA by the West German government.

This period also saw the ETUC-TCL attempt to develop transnational collective action. This took the form of a one-hour symbolic protest action on 2 December 1980 which was supported to varying degrees by unions across Europe (Dolan, 1983, p. 604). This example in

particular highlights the growing role of European level trade unionism in this period and an increased understanding of the need for a transnational approach to world trade. However, as explained in Chapter 3, this approach was also criticised by the TUC at the time on the basis that it considered it expensive and ineffective. This reveals that both a transnational approach and the strategy of mobilisation over trade were contested issues within the European labour movement at the time. National level lobbying thus remained unions favoured strategic approach in this period.

By the contemporary period, European trade unions were far more open to the notion of mobilising over trade issues, both nationally and transnationally. This can be linked to a decrease in associative and institutional power and the rapid growth of a transnational social movement against neoliberal free trade which unions oriented towards to different degrees. In this context, trade union mobilisations in collaboration with CSOs have been an increasing feature of trade politicisation since the late-1990s. Indeed, though more access points for potential union influence over world trade now exist at the European level than ever before, mass demonstrations and transnational ‘days of action’ have become the most visible examples of union opposition to EU trade agreements.

Though mobilisation has been the strategy that unions have used the least when it comes to trade issues, it has generally led to successes, albeit in quite a limited sense. In the historical period, the ETUC-TCL’s 1980 one-hour protest action was primarily called to secure greater consultation with the Commission over the MFA. This strategy was successful and helped the GTB secure a meeting with Economics Minister Lambsdorff shortly after the protest. Similarly, the GTB’s 1981 campaign contributed to motions for a less liberal MFA and a social clause in international trade agreements being passed in the Bundestag.

Finally, as shown in Chapter 6, it was the increase in politicisation and mobilisation against TTIP and CETA in Germany in particular that gave the DGB and ETUC greater

access to Trade Commissioner Malmström who was eager to understand union views and garner support from a key member state. However, mobilisation has been secondary to advocacy strategies for European unions rather than a distinct strategy in its own right. A lack of transparency in and access to trade negotiations has often be the issue that has pushed unions towards mobilisation. Ultimately, this shows how in certain circumstances political opportunities can arise for unions to utilise outsider influence to leverage insider influence.

These examples highlight that as associative and institutional power, access to policymakers, and policy alignment with elite actors have all declined, trade union mobilisation has increased and has proven to be relatively successful. Nonetheless, this strategy still has its limitations. First, though a mobilisation strategy can place pressure on decision makers it does not necessarily challenge their power. As such, successful union mobilisations over trade have only occurred at very specific moments of political opportunity or as a result of being ostracised from the policymaking process. Second, union mobilisations have predominantly been used to win greater access to decision makers rather than to necessarily advance wider union demands alone. This relates to a third point, that mobilisations have generally occurred from a place of weakness – i.e., a lack of influence over the negotiating or policy process – rather than strength. Finally, therefore, union strategies have largely been defensive rather than offensive actions. This has also been reflected in policy terms. For example, defensive demands such as stricter import controls in the MFA or the removal of ISDS in CETA have proven to be far more successful than their central offensive demand, enforceable labour standards. Possible explanations for this will be explored in the conclusion below. Also below are three comparative tables (taken from chapters 3 and 6) summarising the strength of the strategies and power resources used by the four European trade union case studies in the three trade negotiations analysed in this thesis to visually reaffirm how they have changed over time.

	TUC	DGB	CGT	ETUC
Agenda-setting	Strong	Mixed	Weak	Mixed
Coalition building	Strong	Mixed	Weak	Strong
Lobbying	Strong	Mixed	Weak	Strong
Mobilisation	Weak	Mixed	Weak	Mixed
Structural Power	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak
Associative Power	Strong	Mixed	Mixed	Weak
Institutional Power	Strong	Strong	Weak	Weak
Discursive Power	Strong	Mixed	Weak	Mixed
POS	Strong	Mixed	Weak	Mixed
MOC	Strong	Mixed	Weak	Weak
Framing	Strong	Mixed	Weak	Mixed

Table 1: Comparison of trade union strategies and resources during MFA negotiations

	TUC	DGB	CGT	ETUC
Agenda-setting	Mixed	Mixed	Mixed	Mixed
Coalition building	Weak	Mixed	Mixed	Weak
Lobbying	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak
Mobilisation	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak
Structural Power	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak
Associative Power	Mixed	Mixed	Mixed	Weak
Institutional Power	Weak	Weak	Weak	Mixed
Discursive Power	Mixed	Mixed	Mixed	Mixed
POS	Mixed	Mixed	Mixed	Mixed
MOC	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak
Framing	Mixed	Mixed	Mixed	Mixed

Table 2: Comparison of trade union strategies and resources during WTO negotiations

	TUC	DGB	CGT	ETUC
Agenda-setting	Weak	Strong	Mixed	Strong
Coalition building	Mixed	Strong	Mixed	Mixed
Lobbying	Weak	Strong	Mixed	Strong
Mobilisation	Weak	Strong	Mixed	Weak
Structural Power	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak
Associative Power	Weak	Mixed	Weak	Mixed
Institutional Power	Weak	Mixed	Weak	Mixed
Discursive Power	Mixed	Strong	Mixed	Mixed
POS	Weak	Mixed	Weak	Mixed
MOC	Weak	Strong	Weak	Mixed
Framing	Mixed	Strong	Mixed	Mixed

Table 3: Comparison of trade union strategies and resources during CETA negotiations

Conclusion

This chapter has analysed the key temporal changes in trade union strategies to influence world trade negotiations. Fundamentally, it has highlighted that despite a major decline in their collective power, European trade unions still have the capacity to influence the direction of world trade. However, this capacity is predicated on a paradox: at the same time as institutional avenues for European trade unions to influence EU trade policies have increased, a greater reliance on outsider influence, particularly in the form of mobilisation, has also been evident. This raises questions about the quality of EU mechanisms for transparency and democratic oversight of its trade agenda, but also the efficacy of existing aspects of the social dimension of trade. This also highlights that although the social dimension of trade is now being addressed more than ever before, both politically and institutionally, the economic dimension of the EU's liberalisation agenda remains its primary concern and continues to undermine efforts towards a more effective social dimension. There is thus a clear tension between these two forces that raises a broader question about whether they can ever be reconciled.

A key question that stems from this chapter and the above conflict is why it appears that European unions have been more successful at opposing EU trade policies than they have been at proposing a labour-centred approach to trade. This is exemplified by the issue of enforceable labour standards, a policy objective that European unions have held since the foundation of the GATT, but which ultimately remains unresolved and contested. In contrast, European unions' opposition to ISDS and other aspects of the EU's recent trade agenda has been successful by comparison.

One explanation for the above is that the strategies used by unions and the coalitions they have built in both examples have been very different. In the case of labour standards,

unions have attempted to influence the elite level by lobbying actors sympathetic to the idea. However, these actors have often supported the idea of labour standards for very different reasons to trade unions. In fact, even political figures like Reagan, Clinton, Blair, and EU trade Commissioners have supported the call by unions for labour standards while implementing the same neoliberal policies that drive the global economic imbalances that these standards seek to address. Furthermore, despite attempts by the ICFTU during the 1990s to build a broader base of support for enforceable labour standards, their efforts were largely unsuccessful.

In contrast to the predominant focus on elite level lobbying around the issue of labour standards, union opposition to ISDS was more dynamic and was grounded in a far broader base of support, both inside and outside of the POS. The campaign in collaboration with CSOs also had a clear objective, unions were overwhelmingly united on the issue, and politicisation of TTIP and CETA became self-fulfilling and generated momentum for the movement based on its successful framing of the core issues. This politicisation in turn created leverage based on the scale of the public backlash against ISDS, leaving politicians concerned that support for ISDS could alienate their core voters. This was particularly the case with social democratic politicians, and it is notable that the issue of ISDS in TTIP and CETA led to clear splits within the SPD and PS among other parties.

However, while different union campaigns and policies can be compared based on their successes and failures, the strategies of European unions have only challenged the broader neoliberal trade agenda in a limited sense. Indeed, even in the case of CETA, the deal was eventually negotiated with major reservations from the ETUC and others despite their successful attempts to limit some of its most objectionable aspects. This raises the question of what alternative strategies trade unions could use to build a labour-centred approach to trade that moves beyond merely defensive demands.

One vital component that is missing from unions' strategies for influencing world trade is their members. It is a curious irony that ordinary trade union members, who are the most directly affected by world trade policies in their workplace and potentially have the most power to impact them through strategic organisation and mobilisation, are almost entirely removed from the influence that unions carry out on their behalf. Indeed, even when European trade unions have pursued a mobilisation strategy, this has primarily involved mobilising their relatively small activist base instead of the collective power of their membership. As McAlevey (2016, pp. 9-12) argues, advocacy and mobilisation strategies draw on an elite theory of power that avoids utilising workers' power based on their structural position and their numerical strength as the largest class in society and are therefore only likely to achieve short-term objectives and narrow policy changes.

Though unions' trade policies are created through their democratic structures and are ostensibly linked to workplace issues affecting their members, it is appointed policy advisors who play the leading role when it comes to union strategies to influence world trade instead of democratically elected workers' representatives. On the one hand this a consequence of trade negotiations being highly technical affairs which are predominantly conducted at the elite level. However, this also represents a huge gap between the 'logic of influence' and the 'logic of membership' (Dølvik, 1997). Further, it is emblematic of European trade unions' preoccupation with the rules of trade rather than the act of trade: the former offers limited opportunities for union influence as 'stakeholders' within a broad policymaking process; the latter is something that workers, who are central to the functioning of world trade, could decisively influence through strategic organising and the mobilisation of workers' power in, for example, global supply and value chains (Moody, 2017; Alimahomed-Wilson and Ness, 2017; Fichter, 2015).

Treating trade simply as a political issue that can be solved by existing political means ultimately bypasses trade unions' most potent power resource: the power of workers to challenge the prevailing status quo through collective bargaining and transnational solidarity. On this basis, existing trade union strategies could be bolstered by bringing the rules of trade and the act of trade closer together. However, to do this successfully requires unions having the ability to mobilise effectively to challenge the unequal power relationships and structural conditions that impact world trade by rebuilding the power that they have lost over time. It would also require European trade unions assessing the success of their strategies to influence. For example, when the trade union advisors interviewed for this thesis were asked whether they assessed the success of their strategies to influence trade issues, none of the interviewees cited a formal process for doing so. This is not to suggest that European trade unions do not care about the success of their strategies, but it does suggest that there are issues of path dependency and resource limitations that are stopping unions from taking a wider view of their strategic options and a critical view of their limitations.

While the move towards greater mobilisation in the contemporary period does point to increased strategic flexibility and understanding of new avenues of influence created by trade politicisation, it is also important to develop greater leverage that is not reliant on situational opportunities but is instead rooted in the collective power of labour. In this respect, though existing strategies have been relatively effective in achieving some of European unions' defensive trade objectives, power and leverage – compelling others to do what they otherwise would not do – are needed to positively change the trade agenda towards unions' demands. This goes some way to explaining why labour's central trade policy objective, enforceable labour standards, is yet to be achieved.

Conclusion

This thesis set out to answer the question of if, how, and why trade union strategies to influence world trade negotiations have changed between the 1970s and the present. This research question was based on an initial loose hypothesis: because trade union power has declined significantly since the 1970s, the strategies used by unions are also likely to have changed over time. The empirical data and literature cited in this thesis have revealed that trade union strategies to influence world trade negotiations have indeed changed over time. These changes have been expressed in three significant ways.

The first significant change that has taken place is that unions' strategies have become more Europeanised over time. In the 1970s, union approaches to trade were predominantly concerned with national issues. As union approaches to the MFA reveal, this focus stemmed from the immediate need to protect jobs in national textile and clothing industries. Further, unions' power, capacity, and political allies were overwhelmingly located at the national level in this period. This situation began to change towards the end of the 1970s as European unions entered a long period of decline due to the rapidly changing economic and political context.

Due to these wider structural changes, by the contemporary period, European unions were far weaker organisations in terms of their power. However, in this time unions began to place far greater emphasis on the European level as an avenue to influence trade policy. European unions were both 'pushed' and 'pulled' towards the European level as a means of mitigating their own diminished power and influence and this coincided with the EC/EU becoming an increasingly powerful trade actor, primarily as a result of deepening market integration and economic globalisation. These factors have also led to the EU acquiring greater policy and institutional competences over trade issues. However, these processes

helped foster a greater coherence to European unions' approach to trade and have increased the quantity of avenues available for them to influence. Improved organisation and capacity at the European level is exemplified by the role the ETUC now plays in developing a collective union approach to trade issues. As such, though European trade unions' power has decreased over time they are now more active on trade issues than ever before.

The second major change by European unions has come by shifting their policy focus towards non-tariff and regulatory issues. This shift has reflected the changing dynamics of world trade with the leading trading powers seeking new economic issues and territories to liberalise. On this basis the 'across the border' issues that concerned trade unions in the historical period have almost entirely been replaced by 'behind the border' issues, particularly since the EU's move towards negotiating bilateral agreements. This shift has been a particular challenge for European trade unions and has resulted in relatively pro-free trade confederations like the TUC, DGB and ETUC becoming far more critical of this agenda. Indeed, issues like ISDS and the liberalisation of public services have come to define many European trade unions' recent interventions on trade, partly because they relate to issues that go far beyond trade agreements alone, such as democracy, accountability, the right to regulate, and questions of social justice more broadly.

The above policy shift relates to the third major strategic change: a greater tendency towards outsider influence generally and transnational mobilisation specifically. Although forms of advocacy remain European unions' core strategies to influence world trade negotiations, the collaboration with CSOs in the anti-TTIP/CETA campaign was a notable departure from convention for several reasons. First, though a transnational advocacy network around trade issues has grown since the late-1990s, trade union confederations engaged with this network far more actively during the campaign. Second, collaboration with CSOs in a broader transnational movement increased the strategic range and flexibility of

European unions who have traditionally avoided mobilisation strategies on trade issues. Third, this helped move the terrain on which unions addressed trade issues away from a depoliticised and largely ineffective policymaking arena and towards the highly politicised public debate that had developed over time. Fourth, this strategic choice helped generate more leverage for union demands. As a result, outsider influence was arguably a far more successful approach than the insider influence traditionally used by unions but also helped bolster their existing insider strategies. This was exemplified by leading EU, US, and Canadian negotiators approaching the ETUC and DGB having identified them as potentially important players in influencing the fate of TTIP and CETA. Overall, European unions' participation in the anti-TTIP/CETA campaign was their most dynamic foray into trade politics to date.

Taken together, the research has highlighted that European unions have been able to influence world trade negotiations as an opposition force. However, they still have limited power and capacity to become a proposition force that can successfully bring a genuine social dimension to EU trade policies. In both the long 1970s and the contemporary period, for example, European unions waged relatively successful short-term defensive campaigns to protect the textile and clothing sector through a stricter MFA and to remove ISDS provisions from CETA. However, the failure to secure their long-held policy objective of enforceable labour standards in multilateral and bilateral agreements is the clearest example of the limits of union strategies when it comes to trade. This is despite more avenues of influence being available to unions than ever before and seemingly greater openness to the issue of labour standards from the EU, as shown by the inclusion of commitments to improved labour standards in its TSD chapters.

Given the above, what are the broader challenges that European trade unions face in achieving their central trade policy goal? This question relates to the conflict between the

EU's economic agenda as a leading trading power and the social costs of that agenda. This is the ground that European trade unions have sought to influence to bring a social dimension to the EU's trade policy. However, as many authors argue, EU trade policy is ultimately predicated on an unbalanced set of power relationships that favour market liberalisation over social regulation (Ford, 2013; Bailey and Bossuyt, 2013; Dierckx, 2015; van Apeldoorn, 2002). Fundamentally, despite some improvements in the transparency of the trade policymaking process and the visibility of labour standards, the EU's neoliberal trade agenda ultimately helps drive the global economic imbalances that these standards seek to address.

One outcome of increased pressure from trade unions and CSOs for a social dimension to its trade policies can be seen in the civil society mechanisms set up by the European Commission to advance the implementation of the TSD chapters of its 'new generation' FTAs. The limitations of these mechanisms are emblematic of the tension between the EU's primary trade objectives and its secondary commitment to certain normative values. For example, extensive discussion and criticism exists regarding the efficacy of the EU's 'soft', 'promotional' approach to labour standards in recent FTAs in the academic literature (Ebert, 2016; Marx, Lein and Brando, 2016; Orbie and Van den Putte, 2016; Sicurelli, 2015; Van den Putte, 2015). Harrison et al. (2019a) in particular raise a plethora of limitations and failings of the operation of the EU's TSD chapters. The ineffectiveness of this approach is perhaps best evidenced by the lack of concrete action taken by the Commission over serious labour violations in South Korea (European Commission, 2021; ETUC, 2021). These violations have taken place despite South Korea ratifying ILO conventions on freedom of association, the right to collective bargaining, and the elimination of forced and child labour that were conditions of the agreement (Harrison et al., 2019b). This example highlights that although commitments to labour standards are now a consistent feature of EU FTAs, the

implementation of them appears to be very limited in comparison with the economic goals of its trade agenda.

With these issues in mind, Bailey and Bossuyt (2013, p. 560) characterise the EU as a “conveniently conflicted counter-hegemon through trade, whereby the EU presents itself as a potential ‘force for good’ through trade, but simultaneously avoids the realisation of that potential (and justifies its non-realisation) by evoking the conveniently-conflicted status that arises from institutional constraints and both internal disagreements and external differences”. Similarly, Orbie (2008, p. 62) argues that,

The rise of value-based objectives in Europe’s trade policy profile appears to be a normative dressing over a free trade agenda, in response to the increased politicisation of Union trade policy, rather than a genuine commitment to reach these objectives... the limited capacity of the EU to engage in a normative external trade agenda basically relates to its *raison d’être*: the Union is institutionally designed to promote negative integration and market-enhancing policies... rather than positive integration and redistribution.

Ultimately, the EU’s approach to labour standards and other sustainable development concerns is predicated on the neoliberal logic that normative results are a side effect of free trade rather a key component (Orbie, 2008). As Meunier (2007, p. 915) puts it, “the EU offers access to its market as a bargaining chip in order to obtain changes in the domestic arena of its trading partners... This conditionality enables the EU to leverage its trade power in exchange for a tamer, more managed competition from many developing economies”. In this respect, even the issue of labour standards is predicated on a transactionalism that feeds into the EU’s broader economic objectives.

The above point is complicated further by the fact that European trade unions have often supported the EU’s free trade agenda, albeit with criticisms and conditions. As highlighted throughout this thesis, this has often had a negative impact on the development of transnational solidarity between unions in competing economic sectors. Strategically,

developing transnational solidarity with other trade unions, particularly in the Global South, would potentially provide one of the most effective counterforces to neoliberal free trade. However, it has been one of the hardest values to achieve and practice, not least because European unions have placed such emphasis on a social dimension in exchange for tacit support of the EU's trade agenda (Hilary, 2014). Indeed, this very problem also exists in the Global North, as shown by the difficulties the ETUC and CLC faced in releasing a joint statement on CETA negotiations, limiting their transnational cooperation for several years (Healy, 2014).

As highlighted throughout this thesis, support for the promotional approach to labour standards by social democratic parties and certain national governments and the European Commission highlight the limitations of this approach, particularly as these same actors' support for labour standards is offset by support for the same neoliberal trade policies that undermine labour standards in the first place. Bieler, Hilary and Lindberg (2014, p. 7) highlight the dangers of this approach:

the challenge of 'free trade' requires trade unions to choose between two competing visions of their identity: as junior partners of capital based on shared interests with their national industries, or as active members of an internationalist movement, the role of which is to contest the power of capital on behalf of working people the world over... The trade union movement risks being divided along these lines for as long as it does not have a shared response to the challenges of 'free trade'.

This is the puzzle that European trade unions must seek to solve if their hopes for a genuine social dimension in world trade is to become a reality.

Though this thesis has contributed to existing knowledge in several academic fields, there are also some limitations that are worth noting. First, as already outlined in the introduction, the ambitious temporal scope of the project meant that it was difficult to select directly comparable case studies. Though using such case studies would have improved the

validity of the research findings from a comparative perspective, the lack of archival data and interviewees for suitable alternative case studies made this an impossibility. Indeed, pursuing a research agenda which overly emphasised directly comparable case studies would ultimately have led to less detailed findings. These findings are the biggest contribution of this thesis to the academic literature and potentially wider society. Further, the primary research aim of this thesis – establishing whether and how trade union strategies to influence world trade negotiations have changed over time – has not been undermined by this limitation.

An additional limitation, which is linked to the methodological challenges stemming from the combined comparative and temporal scope of the project, is the lack of ‘outsider’ perspectives for the contemporary period. This was particularly the case for the WTO case study but also for CETA. Whilst the contemporary chapter on union strategies to influence both agreements draws on interview data with union advisors who directly took part in the process, it was far harder to secure interviews with individuals from, for example, the European institutions, CSOs, and other non-European trade union actors. The latter would have been particularly useful in the CETA case study in which Canadian trade unions were very active and played a key role in influencing the European Commission and key politicians. More ‘outsider’ perspectives may also have provided a deeper understanding of European trade unions’ strategic and policy choices as well as their effectiveness.

Given these limitations, the most obvious avenue of future research would be to explore potential alternative strategies around two themes. Both themes could shift the focus away from trade as a predominantly top-down phenomenon to a bottom-up one.

The first theme could be to develop a greater theoretical and empirical understanding of trade unions’ collaboration with CSOs and wider social movements, both on trade and issues such as climate change, racism, and austerity. In the case of the anti-TTIP/CETA movement,

collaboration with CSOs was seen as a positive development by most European trade unions. However, far more could be learnt about the complexities of this kind of collaboration. For example, how are unions viewed by CSOs in such movements? Do unions play a leading or supporting role in them? Does collaboration lead to policy and strategy transfer between unions and CSOs? To what extent does union participation in broader social movements mobilise union members? Do European unions see this increased orientation to social movements as an ongoing or temporary strategy that was specific to certain issues?

The second related theme could be to explore the potential for greater transnational cooperation between trade unions. The importance of transnational solidarity has come up as a consistent theme throughout the thesis as a vital element of union strategies to influence world trade. Much work has been done on the conceptualisation of official union cooperation and transnational solidarity, but far less systematic research has been done on the transnational connections between workers in the global economy. As mentioned in the previous chapter, there is a growing literature that conceptualises and analyses the potential for union organising and transnational solidarity in global supply chains. This not only stands as a valuable research strand in its own right, but can also be applied to trade, with trade unions developing supply chain organising to bolster existing strategies to influence trade and address the wider decline in union membership and power. Indeed, this kind of approach has already been tentatively developed by the author in collaboration with Unite the Union in a separate research project (Unite the Union, 2021). Though the results of the research show the potential of this approach in supply chains organised by Unite in the UK and Ireland, there is also scope for taking a more transnational approach to explore the potential of the strategy in global supply chains.

Whilst this research project has addressed a major gap in the academic literature, the above highlights that there are other areas to be explored around the broad research theme of

trade union influence. Such research could decisively advance knowledge of trade union mobilisation at the transnational and global level. It could also have direct policy relevance by helping unions to better understand how they can effectively mobilise to shape the changing contours and dynamics of the global economy and world trade. This kind of research would be particularly valuable given the uncertain economic and political context in the aftermath of the Coronavirus pandemic. This environment will undoubtedly create new challenges for trade unions that will require new strategies and policies to address them.

The increased politicisation of trade that has taken place in recent decades has opened up wider public and academic interest in the social dimension of trade. While a body of literature addressing the social dimension of trade exists there is also a distinct lack of research on how trade unions attempt to influence negotiations and the specific strategies they use. As well as seeking to fulfil this major gap in the academic literature, there is potential for the research contained in this thesis to also contribute to the wider policy debate that has opened up as a result of increased trade politicisation. Indeed, arguably the most important theme of this research is the tension that exists between the economic and social dimensions of trade. In this respect, trade unions are vital organisations to study because they have an interest in and are conflicted by both. The research findings also have the potential to help trade unions improve their own strategies to influence world trade.

Analysing how important societal actors like trade unions can directly influence world trade policies is an important contribution of this thesis. Though seemingly endless data, literature and reports exist on the purely economic pros and cons of world trade policies, far less analysis exists that uses the prism of social costs to understand world trade and its impact on society. In this respect, analysing the perspectives and strategies of trade unions offers an insight into the societal aspect of what has predominantly been treated as a purely economic puzzle. A wider contribution that this thesis can make, therefore, is to contribute to the

contemporary debate concerning the need for a ‘social dimension’ to world trade and an alternative to the existing neoliberal orthodoxy that can secure economic equality and social progress. This discussion, whether it concerns labour, consumer, or human rights, environmental regulation, or democratic transparency and accountability, has increased in volume and importance in recent decades. The need for a trade union voice in this discussion is more relevant than ever.

This thesis has shown that European trade unions have been able to influence world trade negotiations by raising and fighting for defensive demands that mitigate some of the social costs of free trade. However, these demands and methods have ultimately not stopped the deeper entrenchment of the neoliberal free trade agenda - an agenda which perpetuates intense competition between workers, companies, and nations in a race to the bottom. On this basis, trade unions still need to solve the puzzle of how to effectively oppose this agenda whilst simultaneously struggling for an alternative vision of trade based on the values and interests of the international labour movement if their demands for fair and sustainable trade policies are to become a reality.

Bibliography

- ACEA. (2017). *The Automobile Industry Pocket Guide, 2016-2017*. ACEA.
- Adriaensen, J., and González-Garibay, M. (2013). The Illusion of Choice: The European Union and the Trade-Labor Linkage. *Journal of Contemporary European Research*, 9(4). <http://jcer.net/index.php/jcer/article/view/459>
- Aggarwal, V. K. (1985). *Liberal Protectionism: The International Politics of Organized Textile Trade*. University of California Press.
- Aldcroft, D. (2014). *The European Economy 1914–2000*. Routledge.
- Alimahomed-Wilson, J., and Ness, I. (2018). *Choke Points: Logistics Workers Disrupting the Global Supply Chain*. Pluto Press.
- Ames, P. (2015). ISDS: The most toxic acronym in Europe, *Politico* (17 September 2015). Retrieved from: <https://www.politico.eu/article/isds-the-most-toxic-acronym-in-europe/>
- Ancelovici, M. (2008). *Between Adaptation and Resistance: Labor Responses to Globalization in France*, PhD Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA. Retrieved from: <https://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/46656>
- Ancelovici, M. (2011). In search of lost radicalism: The hot autumn of 2010 and the transformation of labor contention in France, *French Politics, Culture and Society*, 29(2): 121–140.
- Andolfatto D. (Ed.). (2004). *Les syndicats en France*. La Documentation française.
- Andolfatto, D., and Sabot, J.-Y. (2004). Les héritiers du mouvement ouvrier : CGT et CGT-FO. In D. Andolfatto (Ed.), *Les syndicats en France*, pp. 15-42. La Documentation française.
- Anner, M. (2001). The International Trade Union Campaign for Core Labor Standards in the WTO. *WorkingUSA*, 5(1), 43–63. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1743-4580.2001.00043.x>
- Arrighi, G. (2008). *Adam Smith in Beijing: Lineages of the Twenty-First Century*. Verso.
- Bailey, D., and Bossuyt, F. (2013). The European Union as a Conveniently-conflicted Counter-hegemon through Trade. *Journal of Contemporary European Research*, 9(4), Article 4. <https://jcer.net/index.php/jcer/article/view/444>
- Bark, D., and Gress, D. (1989). *A History of West Germany*. Blackwell.

- Barnouin, B. (1986). *The European Labour Movement and European Integration*. Frances Pinter.
- Bauer, M. (2016). *Manufacturing discontent: The rise to power of anti-TTIP groups* (Research Report No. 02/2016). ECIPE Occasional Paper.
<https://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/174737>
- Bay, L., and Hanke, T. (2017, December 1). Peugeot and Renault Drive Up German Sales, *Handelsblatt*. Retrieved from:
<https://www.handelsblatt.com/english/companies/french-automakers-peugeot-and-renault-drive-up-german-sales/23565240.html?ticket=ST-2624645-YRYIBpwAWfGSxVNUu4da-ap5>
- Bell, D. S., and Criddle, B. (1994). *The French Communist Party in the Fifth Republic*. Clarendon Press.
- Bendt, H. (2003). *Worldwide Solidarity – the activities of the global unions in the era of globalization*. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
- Benford, R.D. and Snow, D.A. (2000). Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment, *Annual Review of Sociology* 26: 611-39.
- Benn, A. W. (1973, March 25). Heath's spadework for socialism, *The Sunday Times*, p. 61.
- Béroud, S., Dompnier, N. and Garibay, D. (2011). Un regain des luttes sociales sur fond de crise économique. In S. Béroud, N. Dompnier and D. Garibay (Eds.), *L'Année Sociale 2011*, pp. 7–23. Syllepse.
- Bevir, M. (2005). *New Labour: A Critique*. Taylor and Francis Group.
<http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/portsmouth-ebooks/detail.action?docID=214828>
- Bieler, A. (2003). Labour, neo-liberalism and the conflict over economic and monetary union: a comparative analysis of British and German trade unions, *German Politics*, 12 (2), 24-44. DOI: 10.1080/09644000412331307574
- Bieler, A. (2006). *The struggle for a social Europe: trade unions and EMU in times of global restructuring*. Manchester University Press.
- Bieler, A., and Morton, A. D. (2001). *Social forces in the making of the new Europe: the restructuring of European social relations in the global political economy*. Palgrave.
- Bieler, A., and Morton, A. D. (2008). The Deficits of Discourse in IPE: Turning Base Metal into Gold? *International Studies Quarterly*, 52(1), 103–128.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2007.00493.x>

- Bieler, A., and Morton, A. D. (2014). Uneven and Combined Development and Unequal Exchange: The Second Wind of Neoliberal 'Free Trade'? *Globalizations*, 11(1), 35–45. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2014.860334>
- Bieler, A., Ciccaglione, B., Hilary, J., and Lindberg, I. (2015). *Free trade and transnational labour*. Routledge.
- Bieler, A., Hilary, J., and Lindberg, I. (2014). Trade Unions, 'Free Trade', and the Problem of Transnational Solidarity: An Introduction. *Globalizations*, 11(1), 1–9. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2014.860319>
- Blutstein, H. (2016). *The ascent of globalisation*. Manchester University Press.
- Bossuyt, F., Orbie, J., and Drieghe, L. (2020). EU external policy coherence in the trade-foreign policy nexus: Foreign policy through trade or strictly business? *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 23(1), 45–66. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41268-018-0136-2>
- Bourque, R., and Hennebert, M.-A. (2011). The Transformation of International Trade Unionism in the Era of Globalization. *Just Labour*. <https://doi.org/10.25071/1705-1436.28>
- Braunthal, G. (1983). *The West German Social Democrats, 1969-1982: Profile of a Party in Power*. Westview Press.
- Brenner, R. (2006). *The Economics of Global Turbulence*. Verso.
- Bridgford, J. (1990). French trade unions: Crisis in the 1980s. *Industrial Relations Journal*, 21(2), 126–135. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2338.1990.tb00846.x>
- Bridgford, J. (1991). *The Politics of French Trade Unionism: Party-union relations at the time of the Union of the Left*. Leicester University Press.
- British Columbia Teachers' Federation. (2016). *Trudeau addresses the Canadian Labour Congress*. Retrieved from: <https://www.bctf.ca/publications/TeacherArticle.aspx?id=39126>
- Brown, W. (2011). International Review: Industrial Relations in Britain under New Labour, 1997-2010: A Post-mortem: *Journal of Industrial Relations*. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022185611401996>
- Brunnengräber, A., Klein, A., and Walk, H. (Eds.). (2001). *NGOs als Legitimationsressource. Zivilgesellschaftliche Partizipationsformen im Globalisierungsprozess*. Leske and Budrich.
- Bulmer, S. (1986). *The Domestic Structure of European Community Policy-Making in West Germany*. Garland.

- Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie. (n.d.). *TTIP-Beirat*. Retrieved from: <https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Artikel/Ministerium/ttip-beirat.html>
- Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie and DGB. (2014). *Anforderungen an Freihandelsgespräche zwischen der EU und den USA unter der Berücksichtigung von Nachhaltigkeit, Arbeitnehmerrechten und der Gewährleistung der Daseinsvorsorge*. Retrieved from: https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/S-T/ttip-dgb-bmwi.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=1
- Bunel, J., and Saglio, J. (1976). La faiblesse de la négociation collective et le pouvoir patronal, *Sociologie du Travail*, 19(4), 383-401.
- Buschak, W. (2003). Der Europäische Gewerkschaftsbund und die Europäischen Gewerkschaftsverbände. In U. Optenhögel, M. Schneider, R. Zimmermann (Eds.), *Europäische Gewerkschaftsorganisationen - Bestände im Archiv der sozialen Demokratie und in der Bibliothek der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung*, pp. 9-19. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.
- Büthe, T., and Milner, H. (2008). The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment into Developing Countries: Increasing FDI through International Trade Agreements? *American Journal of Political Science*, 52(4), 741-762. Retrieved from: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25193847>
- Cable, V. (1983). *Protectionism and Industrial Decline*. Hodder and Stoughton.
- Caiani, M., and Graziano, P. (2018). Europeanisation and social movements: The case of the Stop TTIP campaign. *European Journal of Political Research*, 57(4), 1031–1055. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12265>
- Camilo, F. A. C. (2005). What makes a Round a ‘Development Round’? The Doha Mandate and the WTO Negotiations. *Dialogue on Globalization (Occasional Papers, 13/January 2005)*. Retrieved from: <https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/genf/50034.pdf>
- Campaign for Trade Union Freedom. (2015). *U.S. Chamber Of Commerce Rejects Malmström Proposal On ISDS*. Retrieved from: <http://www.tradeunionfreedom.co.uk/u-s-chamber-of-commerce-rejects-malmstrom-proposal-on-isds/>
- Caporaso, J. A., and Madeira, M. A. (2012). *Globalization, institutions and governance*. Sage.
- Carbone, M., and Orbie, J. (2014). Beyond Economic Partnership Agreements: The European Union and the trade–development nexus. *Contemporary Politics*, 20(1), 1–9. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2014.882570>

- Carter, B., and Cooper, R. (2002). The organizing model and the management of change: A comparative study of unions in Australia and Britain. *Industrial Relations*, 57(4), 712-733.
- CEO et al. (2013). Letter to Ambassador Michael Froman and Commissioner Karel De Gucht, 16 December. Retrieved from: https://corporateeurope.org/sites/default/files/attachments/ttip_investment_letter_final.pdf
- CGT. (2012). *Crise européenne : Agir vite*. Retrieved from: <https://www.cgt.fr/comm-de-presse/crise-europeenne-agir-vite>
- CGT. (2014). *Mobilisons-nous contre le traité transatlantique et les accords de libre-échange*. Retrieved from : <https://www.cgt.fr/comm-de-presse/mobilisons-nous-contre-le-traite-transatlantique-et-les-accords-de-libre-echange>
- CGT. (2015). *Après le référendum en Grèce*. Retrieved from: <https://www.cgt.fr/comm-de-presse/apres-le-referendum-en-grece>
- CGT. (2016a). *Après le TAFTA, disons non aussi au CETA et aux Accords de partenariat économique*. Retrieved from : <https://www.cgt.fr/comm-de-presse/apres-le-tafta-disons-non-aussi-au-ceta-et-aux-accords-de-partenariat-economique>
- CGT. (2016b). *CETA : pour la CGT, le compte n'y est pas*. Retrieved from: <https://www.cgt.fr/actualites/international/institutions/ceta-pour-la-cgt-le-compte-ny-est-pas>
- CGT. (2016c). *Le Ceta, la lutte continue pour le stopper !* Retrieved from : <https://www.cgt.fr/comm-de-presse/le-ceta-la-lutte-continue-pour-le-stopper>
- CGT. (2017). *Activités internationales : Bulletin d'information de l'Espace international de la CGT (26)*. Retrieved from : <https://www.cgt.fr/bulletin-dinformation-de-lespace-international-de-la-cgt-ndeg-26-1er-trimestre-2017>
- Chandler. J. (2005). The Explanatory Value of Social Movement Theory. *Strategic Insights*, 4 (5), 1-9. Retrieved from: <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA521540.pdf>
- Chapelle, S. (2017). *Face à l'adoption du Ceta défendu par Macron, un Parti socialiste divisé*. Retrieved from : <https://www.bastamag.net/Face-a-l-adoption-du-Ceta-defendu-par-Macron-un-parti-socialiste-divise>
- Charnovitz, S. (1987). The influence of international labour standards on the world trading regime a historical overview. *International Labour Review*, 126(5), 565-584.
- Choi, Y-P., Chung, H. S., and Marian, N. (1985). *The Multi-Fibre Arrangement in Theory and Practice*. Frances Pinter.

- Choudry, A. (2010). Fighting FTAs, Educating for Action: The Challenges of Building Resistance to Bilateral Free Trade Agreements, *Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences*, 2(1), 281-308.
- Chun, J. J. (2005). Public Dramas and the Politics of Justice: Comparison of Janitors' Union Struggles in South Korea and the United States. *Work and Occupations*, 32(4), 486–503. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0730888405278950>
- Chun, J.J. (2009). *Organising at the Margins: The Symbolic Politics of Labour in South Korea and the United States*. Cornell University Press.
- Ciampani, A., and Tilly, P. (Eds.). (2017). *National trade unions and the ETUC: A history of unity and diversity*. ETUI.
- CLC. (2010). *CLC statement on negotiations toward a CETA between Canada and the EU*. Retrieved from: <https://www.bilaterals.org/?clc-statement-on-negotiationsandlang=en>
- CLC and DGB. (2016). *German and Canadian unions make concrete recommendations on improving CETA*. Retrieved from: <https://canadianlabour.ca/news-news-archive-german-and-canadian-unions-make-concrete-recommendations-improving-ceta/>
- Cline, W. R. (1987). *The Future of World Trade in Textiles and Apparel*. Institute for International Economics.
- Coates, K and Topham, T. (1988). *Trade Unions in Britain*. Fontana Press.
- Cobb, R.W. and C.D. Elder. (1983). *Participation in American Politics: The Dynamics of Agenda-Building (Second Edition)*. Baltimore and The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Collier, D. (2011). Understanding Process Tracing. *PS: Political Science and Politics*, 44(4), 823-830. doi:10.1017/S1049096511001429
- Commission of the European Communities. (1972). *Etude préparatoire a des actions visant a faciliter l'adaptation et le progrès dans l'industrie textile européenne*. (III/471/72), February 1972. Retrieved from: <http://aei.pitt.edu/id/eprint/37397>
- Commission of the European Communities. (1978a). *Commission Communication to the Council on general guidelines for a textiles and clothing industry policy* (COM (78) 362 final), 20 July 1978. Retrieved from: <http://aei.pitt.edu/50957/1/A10283.pdf>
- Commission of the European Communities. (1978b). *Development Cooperation and the Observance of Certain International Standards Governing Working Conditions (Commission Communication to the Council)*, COM(78) 492 FINAL. Retrieved from: <http://aei.pitt.edu/3792/1/3792.pdf>

- Commission of the European Communities. (1981a). *Annexes VII and VIII in Commission Communication to the Council on the Situation and Prospects of the Textiles and Clothing Industries in the Community* (COM (81) 388 final), 27 July 1981. Retrieved from: http://aei.pitt.edu/8701/1/8701_1.pdf
- Commission of the European Communities. (1981b). *Communication from the Commission to the Council concerning the renewal of the Arrangement regarding International Trade in Textiles (MFA) and Recommendation for a Council decision authorising the Commission to negotiate the renewal of the Arrangement regarding International Trade in Textiles*, COM(81) 129 FINAL. Retrieved from: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:51981DC0129&from=ES>
- COMITEXTIL. (1976). *Bulletin 76/6*. Retrieved from: <http://aei.pitt.edu/98995/1/15.pdf>
- Connolly, H. (2014). Trade Union Radicalism in France: The Renewal of Radicalism in the Context of Crisis and Austerity? In H. Connolly, L. Kretsos and C. Phelan, *Radical Unions in Europe and the Future of Collective Interest Representation*, pp. 49-67. Peter Lang GmbH, Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften.
- Coppolaro, L. (2013). *The Making of a World Trading Power: The European Economic Community (EEC) in the GATT Kennedy Round Negotiations (1963-67)*. Ashgate.
- Coppolaro, L. (2017). GATT, Inflation and Exchange Rate Instability: Liberalising Trade in the Tokyo Round Negotiations (1973–1979). In M. Chelini and L. Warlouzet (Eds.), *Calmer les prix/Slowing Down Prices: L'inflation en Europe dans les années 1970/European Inflation in the 1970s*, pp. 323–342. Presses de Sciences Po.
- Coppolaro, L. (2018a). In the Shadow of Globalization: The European Community and the United States in the GATT Negotiations of the Tokyo Round (1973–1979). *The International History Review*, 40(4), 752–773.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2017.1363073>
- Coppolaro, L. (2020). Surfing (in and out of) the globalization wave: labour standards during the GATT/WTO trade negotiations (1947-99). In L. Coppolaro and L. Mechi (Eds.), *Free Trade and Social Welfare in Europe: Explorations in the Long 20th Century*, pp. 144-161. Routledge.
- Coppolaro, L., and Mechi, L. (2020a). Introduction: free trade and social welfare in a long-term perspective. In L. Coppolaro and L. Mechi (Eds.), *Free Trade and Social Welfare in Europe: Explorations in the Long 20th Century*, pp. 1-12. Routledge.
- Coppolaro, L., and Mechi, L. (Eds.). (2020b). *Free Trade and Social Welfare in Europe: Explorations in the Long 20th Century*. Routledge.

- Courtois, S. and Andolfatto, A. (2008). France – The collapse of the House of Communism. In W. Backes and P. Moreau (Eds.), *Communist and Post-communist Parties in Europe*, pp. 87-132. Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht.
- Cox, R. W. (1979). Ideologies and the New International Economic Order: Reflections on Some Recent Literature. *International Organization*, 33(2), 257–302.
- Cox, R. W. (1981). Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory. *Millennium*, 10(2), 126–155. <https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298810100020501>
- Cox, R. W. (1995). Critical Political Economy. In B. Hettne (Ed.), *International Political Economy: Understanding Global Disorder*. Zed Books.
- Crespy, A. (2008). Dissent over the European Constitutional Treaty within the French Socialist Party: Between Response to Anti-Globalization Protest and Intra-Party Tactics. *French Politics*, 6(1), 23–44. <https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.fp.8200136>
- Crespy, A. (2010). Legitimizing Resistance to EU Integration: Social Europe as a Europeanized Normative Frame in the Conflict over the Bolkestein Directive. *Centre d'Etudes Europeennes (ScPo): No.03/2010*. Retrieved from: www.cee.sciences-po.fr/erpa/docs/wp_2010_3.pdf
- Dahl Martinsen, K. (2019). Defeating TTIP: The French and German parliaments compared. *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, 17(4), 463–480. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s42738-019-00029-7>
- Darlington, R., and Mustchin, S. (2019). The role of the TUC in significant industrial disputes: An historical critical overview. *Labor History*, 60(6), 626–645. <https://doi.org/10.1080/0023656X.2019.1624698>
- De Bièvre, D. (2018). The Paradox of Weakness in European Trade Policy: Contestation and Resilience in CETA and TTIP Negotiations. *The International Spectator*, 53(3), 70–85. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2018.1499849>
- De Bièvre, D., and Eckhardt, J. (2011). Interest groups and EU anti-dumping policy. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 18(3), 339–360. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2011.551068>
- De Comarmond, L. (2015, February 3). Un pragmatique qui cultive une image de dur. *Les Echos*. Retrieved from: <https://www.lesechos.fr/2015/02/un-pragmatique-qui-cultive-une-image-de-dur-199042>
- De Comarmond, L. (2018, May 15). La CGT a perdu 30.000 adhérents en quatre ans. *Les Echos*. Retrieved from: <https://www.lesechos.fr/economie-france/social/la-cgt-a-perdu-30000-adherents-en-quatres-ans-132545>

- Delimatsis, P. (2016). *TTIP, CETA, TiSA Behind Closed Doors: Transparency in the EU Trade Policy* (SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2835956). Social Science Research Network. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2835956>
- Delwit, P. (2021). “This is the final fall”. An electoral history of European Social Democracy (1870-2019). *CEVIPOL Working Papers, 1/2021*. Retrieved from: https://cevipol.centresphisoc.ulb.be/sites/default/files/centre_cevipol/uploads/Cevipol%20WP%202021-%201%20An%20electoral%20history%20of%20European%20Social%20Democracy%5B4%5D.pdf
- De Royer, S. (2016, May 24). Face à la CGT, Hollande et Valls sur le fil du rasoir. *Le Figaro.fr*. <https://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/2016/05/24/01002-20160524ARTFIG00341-face-a-la-cgt-hollande-et-valls-sur-le-fil-du-rasoir.php>
- De Spiegelaere, S. (2016). *Too little, too late? Evaluating the European Works Councils Recast Directive*. Retrieved from: <https://www.etui.org/Publications2/Reports/Too-little-too-late-Evaluating-the-European-Works-Councils-Recast-Directive>
- De Ville, F., and Siles-Brügge, G. (2016). *TTIP: The Truth about the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership*. Polity Press.
- De Ville, F., and Siles-Brügge, G. (2017). Why TTIP is a game-changer and its critics have a point. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 24(10), 1491–1505. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2016.1254273>
- Degryse, C., and Tilly, P. (2013). *1973-2013: 40 years of history of the European Trade Union Confederation*. ETUI.
- Derbyshire, I. (1990). *Politics in France: from Giscard to Mitterand*. Edinburgh: Chambers.
- Deutscher Bundestag. (2002). *Globalisierung der Weltwirtschaft – Herausforderungen und Antworten (1999-2002)*. Retrieved from: https://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/22105217_enquete4-199448
- Devinatz, V. G. (2013). A Cold War Thaw in the International Working Class Movement? The World Federation of Trade Unions and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, 1967–1977. *Science and Society*, 77(3), 342–371. <https://doi.org/10.1521/isis.2013.77.3.342>
- DGB. (1997). *Protokoll: 1997 ordentlicher Bundeskongreß*. DGB.
- DGB. (1999). *DGB: Klares Mandat für Arbeitsstandards ist Bedingung für WTO-Runde*. Retrieved from: <https://www.dgb.de/presse/++co++002cbc92-1552-11df-4ca9-00093d10fae2>

- DGB. (2005). *Geschäftsbericht DGB 2002-2005*. Retrieved from:
<https://www.dgb.de/themen/++co++12cc00ea-1621-11df-57de-00093d10fae2>
- DGB. (2013). *Welthandel: Soziale Rechte unverhandelbar!* Retrieved from:
<https://www.dgb.de/themen/++co++261bee48-5e76-11e3-9295-00188b4dc422>
- DGB. (2014a). *Malmström beim DGB: Gespräche zu TTIP, Sozialstandards und ISDS*. Retrieved from: <https://www.dgb.de/themen/++co++8f63932e-68f2-11e4-8ddd-52540023ef1a/@@dossier.html>
- DGB. (2014b). *CETA: EU-Kanada-Abkommen neu verhandeln*. Retrieved from:
<https://www.dgb.de/themen/++co++10324042-457e-11e4-b1a8-52540023ef1a>
- DGB. (2014c). *Position des Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbundes zu dem Freihandelsabkommen der EU mit Kanada (Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, CETA)*. Retrieved from: <https://www.dgb.de/themen/++co++0c8ffb4a-7eb9-11e4-854b-52540023ef1a/@@dossier.html>
- DGB. (2014d). *Hoffmann: Kein Investorenschutz bei CETA und TTIP*. Retrieved from:
<https://www.dgb.de/themen/++co++2f4b5500-457d-11e4-8899-52540023ef1a/@@dossier.html>
- DGB. (2015a). *CETA bleibt Einfallstor für private Schiedsgerichte*. Retrieved from:
<https://www.dgb.de/themen/++co++1f836108-5de1-11e5-895f-52540023ef1a/@@dossier.html>
- DGB. (2015b). *Gemeinsame Pressemitteilung: TTIP und CETA stoppen! – Für einen gerechten Welthandel!* Retrieved from: <https://www.dgb.de/presse/++co++a48e86b6-4a6d-11e5-9e50-52540023ef1a/@@dossier.html>
- DGB. (2015c). *Über 50.000 Menschen zu Demo gegen TTIP und CETA erwartet*. Retrieved from: <https://www.dgb.de/presse/++co++70e7f4b2-6cca-11e5-b372-52540023ef1a/@@dossier.html>
- DGB. (2016a). *Statement of the DGB: Regarding the Updated Version of the EU Free Trade Agreement with Canada (CETA) After the Process of Legal Scrubbing*. Retrieved from: <https://www.dgb.de/themen/++co++dab3247c-0160-11e6-af9b-52540023ef1a/@@dossier.html>
- DGB. (2016b). *Bündnis ruft zu sieben Großdemonstrationen gegen CETA und TTIP auf*. Retrieved from: <https://www.dgb.de/presse/++co++3bbcaf34-3dd6-11e6-9714-525400e5a74a/@@dossier.html>

- DGB. (2016c). *CETA: Erster Erfolg – mit Einschränkungen*. Retrieved from: <https://www.dgb.de/themen/++co++ef6908ac-4501-11e6-9e36-525400e5a74a/@@dossier.html>
- DGB. (2016d). *Bewertung zum unterzeichneten europäisch-kanadischen Handelsabkommen CETA (Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement) und der verabschiedeten Zusatzerklärungen*. Retrieved from: <https://www.dgb.de/themen/++co++69173142-c20c-11e6-9e19-525400e5a74a/@@dossier.html>
- DGB. (2017). *Eine neue Handelspolitik für Europa – Post-Singapur*. Retrieved from: <https://www.dgb.de/themen/++co++5679fd9c-a1ec-11e7-9e3d-525400e5a74a>
- DG Trade. (2011). *Civil Society Meeting: Trade SIA for the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), 30 March 2011, Centre Albert Borschette, Brussels*. Retrieved from: https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/may/tradoc_147908.pdf
- DG Trade. (2013a). *Civil Society Dialogue*. European Commission. Retrieved from: <https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/84f8b666-49d4-450a-b478-8fcb78ba14de>
- DG Trade. (2013b). *Civil Society Meeting: Bilateral Trade Negotiations: State of Play, 21 January 2013*. Retrieved from: <https://trade.ec.europa.eu/civilsoc/meetdetails.cfm?pastyear=2013andmeet=11400>
- DG Trade. (2014a). *Evaluation of DG TRADE's Civil Society Dialogue in order to assess its effectiveness, efficiency and relevance: Final Report – Technical Annexes*. Retrieved from: https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/january/tradoc_154191.pdf
- DG Trade. (2014b). *Evaluation of DG TRADE's Civil Society Dialogue in order to assess its effectiveness, efficiency and relevance: Final Report*. Retrieved from: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/december/tradoc_152927.pdf
- Dierckx, S. (2015). European unions and the repoliticization of transnational capital: Labor's stance regarding the Financial Transaction Tax (FTT), the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), and the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). *Labor History*, 56(3), 327–344. <https://doi.org/10.1080/0023656X.2015.1042776>
- Dolan, M. B. (1983). European restructuring and import policies for a textile industry in crisis. *International Organization*, 37(4), 583–615. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300034780>

- Dølvik, J. E. (1997). *Redrawing the Boundaries of Solidarity? ETUC, Social Dialogue and the Europeanisation of Trade Unions in the 1990's*. ARENA.
- Dølvik, J. E. (1999). *An Emerging Island? ETUC, Social Dialogue and the Europeanisation of the Trade Unions in the 1990's*. ETUI.
- Dølvik, J. E. (2000). Building regional structures: ETUC and the European Industry Federations. *Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research*, 6(1), 58–77.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/102425890000600107>
- Dølvik, J. E., and Visser, J. (2001). ETUC and Social Partnership. In H. Compston and J. Greenwood (Eds.), *Social Partnership in the European Union*, pp. 11-40. Palgrave.
- Dorfman, G. A. (1976). From the Inside Looking Out (the Trades Union Congress in the EEC). *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 15(4), 248–271.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.1977.tb00954.x>
- Dörre, K., Holst, H. and Nachtwey, O. (2009). Organising – A Strategic Option for Trade Union Renewal?, *International Journal of Action Research* 5(1): 33-67.
- Douglas, W., Ferguson, J-P., and Klett, E. (2004). An Effective Confluence of Forces in Support of Workers' Rights: ILO Standards, US Trade Laws, Unions and NGOs, *Human Rights Quarterly*, 26(2), 273-299.
- Dribbusch, H., and Birke, P. (2014). *Die DGB-Gewerkschaften seit der Krise. Entwicklungen, Herausforderungen, Strategien*. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
- Dunn, B. (2007). Problems of social movement unionism. In A. Gamble, S. Ludlam, A. Taylor and S. Wood (Eds.), *Labour, the state, social movements and the challenges of neo-liberal globalisation*, (pp. 131-146). Manchester University Press.
- Dür, A. (2008). Bringing Economic Interests Back into the Study of EU Trade Policy-Making. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 10(1), 27–45.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-856X.2007.00316.x>
- Dür, A., and Mateo, G. (2014). The Europeanization of interest groups: Group type, resources and policy area. *European Union Politics*, 15(4), 572.
- Dür, A., and Zimmermann, H. (2007). Introduction: The EU in International Trade Negotiations. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 45(4), 771–787.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2007.00747.x>
- Ebbinghaus, B., and Visser, J. (1994). Gewerkschaften und Europäische Integration Barrieren und Wege 'grenzenloser' Solidarität. In W. Streeck (Ed.), *Staat und Verbände*, (pp. 223-255). Westdeutscher Verlag.

- Ebbinghaus, B., and Visser, J. (2000). *Trade Unions in Western Europe Since 1945*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Ebert, F. (2016). Labour Provisions in EU Trade Agreements: What Potential for Channelling Labour Standards-Related Capacity Building? *International Labour Review*, 155(3), 407–433.
- Eberwein, W., Tholen, J., and Schuster, J. (2018). *The Europeanisation of Industrial Relations: National and European Processes in Germany, UK, Italy and France: National and European Processes in Germany, UK, Italy and France*. Taylor and Francis <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315190860>
- Economic and Social Committee of the European Communities. (1980). *European Interest Groups and their Relationships with the Economic and Social Committee*. Saxon House.
- Edgren, G. (1979). Fair labour standards and trade liberalisation. *International Labour Review*, 118(5), 523-536.
- Eliasson, L. J., and Huet, P. G.-D. (2018). TTIP negotiations: Interest groups, anti-TTIP civil society campaigns and public opinion. *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, 16(2), 101–116. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14794012.2018.1450069>
- Elliott, K. A., and Freeman, R. B. (2003). *Can labor standards improve under globalization?* Institute for International Economics.
- Elsig, M., and Dupont, C. (2012). European Union Meets South Korea: Bureaucratic Interests, Exporter Discrimination and the Negotiations of Trade Agreements*. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 50(3), 492–507. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2011.02243.x>
- Engels, J. (2019, 22 November). Twenty Years Later, Remembering the Battle in Seattle. *Labor Notes*. Retrieved from: <https://labornotes.org/blogs/2019/11/twenty-years-later-remembering-battle-seattle>
- EPSU. (2003). *GATS, PSI-EPSU and Pascal Lamy – 17 February 2003*. Retrieved from: <https://www.epsu.org/article/gats-psi-epsu-and-pascal-lamy-17-february-2003>
- EPSU. (2011). *Letter to Karel De Gucht, 13 May 2011*. Retrieved from: https://www.epsu.org/sites/default/files/article/files/letter_to_Karel_de_Gucht.pdf
- EPSU, CUPE, NUPGE and PSAC. (2010). *A Critical Assessment of the Proposed Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement Between the European Union and Canada: A joint position of the European Federation of Public Service Unions and the Canadian Union of Public Employees, the National Union of Public and General*

- Employees and the Public Service Alliance of Canada*. Retrieved from:
https://www.epsu.org/sites/default/files/article/files/Critical_Assess_EU_Can_Deal_-_EN.pdf
- EPSU and PSI. (2010). *Secret details released about Canada-European Union free trade talks*. Retrieved from: <https://www.epsu.org/article/secret-details-released-about-canada-european-union-free-trade-talks>
- Erbès-Seguin, S. (1984). Trade Unions, Employers, and the State: Toward a New Relationship? In M. Kesselman and G. Groux (Eds.), *The French Workers' Movement: Crisis and Political Change*, pp. 277-310. George Allen and Unwin.
- Erne, R. (2008). *European Unions: Labor's Quest for a Transnational Democracy*. Cornell University Press.
- Esser, J. (1982). *Gewerkschaften in der Krise: die Anpassung der deutschen Gewerkschaften an neue Weltmarktbedingungen*. Suhrkamp.
- Ethical Trading Initiative. (n.d.). *Ethical Trading Initiative - 20 years*. Retrieved from: <https://history.ethicaltrade.org/>
- ETUC. (n.d.). *Bernadette Ségol - General Secretary*. Retrieved from: <https://www.etuc.org/en/bernadette-segol-general-secretary>
- ETUC. (1991). *Minutes of 7th Statutory Congress, Stockholm 13-17 May 1991*. ETUC.
- ETUC. (2006a). *ETUC demands a refocusing of EU trade strategy in line with Europe's social and development objectives*. Retrieved from: <https://www.etuc.org/en/pressrelease/etuc-demands-refocusing-eu-trade-strategy-line-europes-social-and-development>
- ETUC. (2006b). *On the Communication "Global Europe: competing in the world"*, Brussels, 7-8 December 2006. Retrieved from: <https://www.etuc.org/en/document/communication-global-europe-competing-world>
- ETUC. (2007). *On the offensive for social Europe, solidarity, sustainability: ETUC activity report, 2003-2006*. ETUC.
- ETUC. (2010). *ETUC welcomes EU Parliament decisions on trade and sustainable development*. Retrieved from: <https://www.etuc.org/en/pressrelease/etuc-welcomes-eu-parliament-decisions-trade-and-sustainable-development>
- ETUC. (2011). *International trade must help strengthen, not undermine, workers' rights*. Retrieved from: <https://www.etuc.org/en/pressrelease/international-trade-must-help-strengthen-not-undermine-workers-rights>

- ETUC. (2013a). *ETUC position on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership*. Retrieved from: <https://www.etuc.org/en/document/etuc-position-transatlantic-trade-and-investment-partnership>
- ETUC. (2013b). *AFL-CIO President Richard Trumka and ETUC General Secretary Bernadette Ségol - Discuss a Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership to Benefit Working Families Globally*. Retrieved from: <https://www.etuc.org/en/pressrelease/afl-cio-president-richard-trumka-and-etuc-general-secretary-bernadette-segol-discuss>
- ETUC. (2013c). *EP Hearing on The Regulatory Dimension of TTIP*. Retrieved from: <https://www.etuc.org/en/speech/ep-hearing-regulatory-dimension-ttip>
- ETUC. (2013d). *Speech given by Judith Kirton-Darling, ETUC Confederal Secretary SandD conference: PANEL II TTIP and labour rights - chance or risk? Brussels, 16 October 2013*. Retrieved from: https://www.etuc.org/sites/default/files/16102013_speech_Judith_1.pdf
- ETUC. (2013e). *EU-Canada: CETA concludes with ETUC criticism about lack of transparency*. Retrieved from: <https://www.etuc.org/en/pressrelease/eu-canada-ceta-concludes-etuc-criticism-about-lack-transparency>
- ETUC. (2014a). *New Commission must end corporate dominance of EU expert groups*. Retrieved from: <https://www.etuc.org/en/pressrelease/new-commission-must-end-corporate-dominance-eu-expert-groups>
- ETUC. (2014b). *Speech given by Bernadette Ségol, General Secretary of the ETUC at the Future of Transatlantic Trade - Washington Post / European Voice Conference, 10 April 2014*. Retrieved from: <https://www.etuc.org/en/speech/future-transatlantic-trade-washington-post-european-voice-conference>
- ETUC. (2014c). *Letter from Bernadette Ségol to Karel De Gucht*. Retrieved from: https://www.etuc.org/sites/default/files/other/files/20140625_karel_de_gucht.pdf
- ETUC. (2014d). *US Ambassador meets trade unions on TTIP*. Retrieved from: <https://www.etuc.org/en/pressrelease/us-ambassador-meets-trade-unions-ttip>
- ETUC. (2015a). *ETUC Action Programme 2015-2019*. Retrieved from: https://www.etuc.org/sites/default/files/publication/files/ces-congracs_2015-rapport-uk-ld_def_0.pdf
- ETUC. (2015b). *The ETUC Resolutions, 2011-2015*. Retrieved from: https://www.etuc.org/sites/default/files/publication/files/ces-brochure_resolutions-uk.pdf

- ETUC. (2016). *ETUC letter asking MEPs to support ICS referral to ECJ*. Retrieved from: <https://www.etuc.org/en/circular/etuc-ask-you-support-ics-referral-ecj>
- ETUC. (2017a). *Reflection paper on Harnessing Globalisation – ETUC Assessment*. Retrieved from: <https://www.etuc.org/en/document/reflection-paper-harnessing-globalisation-etuc-assessment>
- ETUC. (2017b). *ETUC Resolution for an EU progressive trade and investment policy (adopted at the Executive Committee Meeting of 13-14 June 2017)*. Retrieved from: https://www.etuc.org/en/document/etuc-resolution-eu-progressive-trade-and-investment-policy#_ftn11
- ETUC. (2017c). *ETUC submission on the Non-paper of the Commission services on Trade and Sustainable Development (TSD) chapters in EU Free Trade Agreements (FTAs)*. Retrieved from: <https://www.etuc.org/en/document/etuc-submission-non-paper-commission-services-trade-and-sustainable-development-tsd>
- ETUC. (2018a). *Non-paper on introducing an Independent Labour Secretariat to CETA*. Retrieved from: <https://www.etuc.org/en/non-paper-introducing-independent-labour-secretariat-ceta>
- ETUC. (2018b). *ETUC assessment on Commission's non paper on Trade and Sustainable Development (TSD) chapters in EU Free Trade Agreements*. Retrieved from: <https://www.etuc.org/en/document/etuc-assessment-commissions-non-paper-trade-and-sustainable-development-tsd-chapters-eu>
- ETUC. (2021). *Korea trade breach shows need for EU sanctions over labour violations*. Retrieved from: <https://www.etuc.org/en/pressrelease/korea-trade-breach-shows-need-eu-sanctions-over-labour-violations>
- ETUC and AFL-CIO. (2014). *Declaration of Joint Principles ETUC/AFL-CIO: TTIP Must Work for the People, or It Won't Work at All*. Retrieved from: https://www.etuc.org/sites/default/files/document/files/afl-cio_ttip_report_uk_1.pdf
- ETUC and CLC. (2013). *EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement: Joint ETUC-CLC statement*. Retrieved from: https://www.etuc.org/sites/default/files/CLC_ETUC_final_1.pdf
- ETUC and CLC. (2016). *Joint ETUC/CLC Statement – The CETA: where we are and what needs to be changed*. Retrieved from: https://www.etuc.org/sites/default/files/document/files/ceta_where_we_are_at_and_what_needs_to_be_changed_0.pdf

- ETUC and CLC. (2018). *ETUC – CLC joint statement on the Sustainable Development Chapter in CETA - 10 September 2018*. Retrieved from: <https://www.etuc.org/en/document/etuc-clc-joint-statement-sustainable-development-chapter-ceta-10-september-2018>
- ETUC and ITUC. (2007). *ETUC/ITUC Statement of Trade Union Demands Relating to Key Social Elements of “Sustainable Development” Chapters in European Union Negotiations on Free Trade Agreements (FTAs)*. Retrieved from: https://www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/TLE_EN.pdf
- Euractiv. (2015). *France and Germany to form united front against ISDS*. Retrieved from: <https://www.euractiv.com/section/trade-society/news/france-and-germany-to-form-united-front-against-isds/>
- Eurofound. (1998). *Committee created for social dialogue on European and international issues*. Retrieved from: <https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/sr/publications/article/1998/committee-created-for-social-dialogue-on-european-and-international-issues>
- Eurofound. (1999a). *DGB celebrates its 50th anniversary*. Retrieved from: <https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/publications/article/1999/dgb-celebrates-its-50th-anniversary>
- Eurofound. (1999b). *French unions take position on World Trade Organisation talks*. Retrieved from: <https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/sr/publications/article/1999/french-unions-take-position-on-world-trade-organisation-talks>
- Eurofound. (2009). *Trade union membership 2003–2008*. Retrieved from: <https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/publications/report/2009/trade-union-membership-2003-2008>
- European Commission. (2000). *Pascal Lamy Commissaire Européen chargé du Commerce Commerce, développement social et normes fondamentales de travail Confédération Européenne des Syndicats - Comité exécutif, Bruxelles, 26 octobre 2000*. Retrieved from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/fr/SPEECH_00_403
- European Commission. (2001). *Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee. Promoting Core Labour Standards and Improving Social Governance in the Context of Globalisation (COM(2001) 416 final), 18 July 2001*. Retrieved from: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2001:0416:FIN:EN:PDF>

- European Commission. (2002). *Trade Union Advisory Committee Plenary Session: The social dimension of globalization*. European Commission.
- European Commission. (2007). *Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Global Europe: A stronger Partnership to Deliver Market Access for European Exporters*, COM(2007) 183 final, 18 April 2007. Retrieved from: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52007DC0183andfrom=EN>
- European Commission. (2011a). *Policy making—What did the Lisbon Treaty change?* Retrieved from: https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/june/tradoc_147977.pdf
- European Commission. (2011b). *A Trade SIA Relating to the Negotiation of a Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) Between the EU and Canada. Draft Final Report, March 2011*. Retrieved from: https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/march/tradoc_147755.pdf
- European Commission. (2014a). *European Commission to consult European public on provision in EU-US trade deal n investment and investor-state dispute settlement*. Retrieved from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_14_56
- European Commission. (2014b). *Expert group to advise European Commission on EU-US trade talks*. Retrieved from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_14_79
- European Commission. (2015a). *A new start for Social Dialogue*. Retrieved from: <https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=88andlangId=enandeventsId=1028>
- European Commission. (2015b). *Trade for all: Towards a more responsible trade and investment policy*. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. Retrieved from: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/october/tradoc_153846.pdf
- European Commission. (2015c). *Recommendation from the Commission to the Council on the modification of the negotiating directives for an Economic Integration Agreement with Canada in order to authorise the Commission to negotiate, on behalf of the Union, on investment*, 12838/11 (EXT 2), Brussels, 15 December 2015. Retrieved from: <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-12838-2011-EXT-2/en/pdf>
- European Commission. (2015d). *Online public consultation on investment protection and investor-to-state dispute settlement (ISDS) in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement (TTIP)*, SWD(2015) 3 final, Brussels, 13.1.2015. Retrieved from: https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc_153044.pdf

- European Commission. (2015e). *Concept Paper: Investment in TTIP and beyond – the path for reform Enhancing the right to regulate and moving from current ad hoc arbitration towards an Investment Court*. Retrieved from:
https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/may/tradoc_153408.PDF
- European Commission (2015f). *Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: Trade in Services, Investment and E-Commerce – Chapter II – Investment*. Retrieved from:
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/november/tradoc_153955.pdf
- European Commission (2015g). *Commission proposes new Investment Court System for TTIP and Other EU trade and Investment Negotiations*, 16 September. Retrieved from: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5651_en.htm
- European Commission (2015h). *EU finalises proposal for investment protection and Court System for TTIP*, 12 November. Retrieved from:
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1396>
- European Commission. (2016). *The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) – State of Play*. Retrieved from:
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/april/tradoc_154477.pdf
- European Commission. (2018). *Non paper of the Commission services: Feedback and way forward on improving the implementation and enforcement of Trade and Sustainable Development chapters in EU Free Trade Agreements*. Retrieved from:
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/february/tradoc_156618.pdf
- European Commission. (2021). *Panel of experts confirms the Republic of Korea is in breach of labour commitments under our trade agreement*. Retrieved from:
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_203
- European Commission and Government of Canada. (2008). *Assessing the costs and benefits of a closer EU-Canada economic partnership. A Joint Study by the European Commission and the Government of Canada*. Retrieved from:
http://www.sice.oas.org/TPD/CAN_EU/Studies/CAN_EU_JointStudy_e.pdf
- European Commission and Government of Canada. (2009). *Joint report on the EU-Canada scoping exercise*. Retrieved from: https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/eu-ue/can-eu-report-can-ue-rapport.aspx?_ga=2.207143322.802691633.1605111749-1507717515.1605111749&lang=eng

- European Council. (2015). *EU-Canada trade negotiating mandate made public*. Retrieved from: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/12/15/eu-canada-trade-negotiating-mandate-made-public/>
- European Parliament. (2009). *Building Parliament: 50 Years of European Parliament History*. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Retrieved from: https://www.ab.gov.tr/files/ardb/evt/1_avrupa_birligi/1_1_tarihce/50_years_of_european_parliament_history.pdf
- European Parliament. (2010a). *European Parliament resolution of 25 November 2010 on human rights and social and environmental standards in international trade agreements (2009/2219(INI))*, P7_TA(2010)0434. Retrieved from: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-7-2010-0434_EN.html
- European Parliament. (2010b). *European Parliament resolution of 25 November 2010 on corporate social responsibility in international trade agreements (2010/2101(INI))*, A7-0317/2010. Retrieved from: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-7-2010-0446_EN.html
- European Parliament. (2010c). *European Parliament resolution of 25 November 2010 on international trade policy in the context of climate change imperatives (2010/2103(INI))*, A7-0310/2010
- European Parliament. (2010d). *European Parliament resolution of 5 May 2010 on the upcoming EU-Canada Summit*. P7_TA(2010)0142. Retrieved from: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-7-2010-0142_EN.html?redirect
- European Parliament. (2010e). *Debates, Wednesday, 24 November 2010 – Strasbourg. 20. Human rights, social and environmental standards in International Trade agreements - International Trade Policy in the context of Climate Change imperatives - Corporate social responsibility in international trade agreements (debate)*. Retrieved from: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-7-2010-11-24-ITM-020_EN.html
- European Parliament. (2015). *European Parliament resolution of 8 July 2015 containing the European Parliament's recommendations to the European Commission on the negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) (2014/2228(INI))*, P8_TA(2015)0252, A8-0175/2015. Retrieved from: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2015-0252_EN.html?redirect

- European Parliament. (2020a). *Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament—Committee on International Trade*. Retrieved from:
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/RULES-9-2020-06-30-RESP-INTA_EN.html
- European Parliament. (2020b). INTA Standing Rapporteurs and Monitoring Groups. Retrieved from:
<https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/211803/STANDING%20RAPPORTEURS%20on%20Monitoring%20groups.pdf>
- European Parliament Think Tank. (2015). *Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) — State of play and prospects for reform*. Retrieved from:
[https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI\(2015\)545736](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI(2015)545736)
- European Parliament Think Tank. (2017). *From arbitration to the investment court system (ICS): The evolution of CETA rules*. Retrieved from:
[https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2017/607251/EPRS_IDA\(2017\)607251_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2017/607251/EPRS_IDA(2017)607251_EN.pdf)
- Evenett, S. J. (2007). Five hypotheses concerning the fate of the Singapore issues in the Doha Round, *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*, 23(3), 392-414.
<https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grm025>
- Fabry, E. (2015). France: A hotbed of opposition to the TTIP? *Notre Europe : Jacques Delors Institute (Policy Paper 136, 10 June 2015)*. Retrieved from :
<http://www.institutdelors.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/francettip-fabry-jdidgap-june15.pdf?pdf=ok>
- Falke, A. (2005). German Trade Policy: An Oxymoron? In D, Kelly and W, Grant (Eds.), *The Politics of International Trade in the Twenty-First Century*, pp. 252-271. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Farrands, C. (1979). Textile Diplomacy: The Making and Implementation of European Textile Policy 1974-1978. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, (1), 22–39.
- Fetzer T. (2005). Europäische Strategien deutscher Gewerkschaften in historischer Perspektive. In B. Finke and M. Knodt (Eds.), *Europäische Zivilgesellschaft: Konzepte, Akteure, Strategien*, 299–318. Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
- Fetzer T. (2010). Industrial democracy in the European Community: Trade unions as a defensive transnational community, 1968–1988. In M.-L. Djelic and S. Quack (Eds.), *Transnational Communities* (pp. 282–304). Cambridge University Press.

- Fichter, M. (2015). *Organising in and Along Value Chains: What Does it Mean for Trade Unions?* Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
- Field, M. (2013). The Anatomy of EU Policy-Making: Appointing the Experts, *European Integration online Papers (EIoP)*, 17(1), Article 7. Retrieved from: http://eiop.or.at/eiop/index.php/eiop/article/view/2013_007a
- Fielding, S. (2004). The 1974-79 Governments and 'New' Labour. In A. Seldon and K. Hickson (Eds.), *New Labour, Old Labour: The Wilson and Callaghan Governments, 1974-79*, pp. 285-295. Routledge.
- Financial Times. (9 September 2017). *Rise of Jeremy Corbyn puts UK trade unions back in the limelight*. Retrieved from: <https://www.ft.com/content/01cfa9c8-93e0-11e7-a9e6-11d2f0ebb7f0>
- Flassbeck, H. (2010). Putting employment security first will diminish demand – a warning from Germany, *Global Labour Column*, (13). Retrieved from: http://www.global-labour-university.org/fileadmin/GLU_Column/papers/no_13_flassbeck.pdf
- Ford, L. (2013). EU Trade Governance and Policy: A Critical Perspective. *Journal of Contemporary European Research*, 9(4). Retrieved from <https://www.jcer.net/index.php/jcer/article/view/424>
- Ford, M., and Gillan, M. (2015). The global union federations in international industrial relations: A critical review: *Journal of Industrial Relations*. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022185615574271>
- Forum Umwelt und Entwicklung/Gerechtigkeit Jetzt! – Die Welthandelskampagne. (2006). „Wir nicken mit dem Kopf“ *Die Rolle des Deutschen Bundestages in der Handelspolitik der Europäischen Union*. Retrieved from: http://forumue.de/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Wir_nicken_mit_dem_Kopf_AG_Handel.pdf
- Fox-Hoddes, K. (2018). Tariffs Aren't the Best Way to Protect U.S. Steelworkers. Global Solidarity Is, *In These Times*. Retrieved from: <https://inthesetimes.com/article/tariffs-steelworkers-protest-solidarity-trump-labor>
- Fransen, L., and Burgoon, B. (2015). Global Labour-Standards Advocacy by European Civil Society Organizations: Trends and Developments. *British Journal of Industrial Relations*, 53(2), 204–230. <https://doi.org/10.1111/bjir.12017>
- Frege, C., Heery, E. and Turner, L. (2004). The New Solidarity? Trade Union Coalition-Building in Five Countries. In C. Frege J. and Kelly (Eds.), *Varieties of Unionism: Strategies for Union Revitalisation in a Globalising Economy* (pp. 137-158). Oxford University Press.

- French, J. D. (2002). From the Suites to the Streets: The Unexpected Re-emergence of the “Labor Question,” 1994-1999. *Labor History*, 43(3), 285–304.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/0023656022000001788>
- Fröbel, F., Heinrichs, J., and Kreye, O. (1980). *The new international division of labour: Structural unemployment in industrialised countries and industrialisation in developing countries*. Cambridge University Press.
- FTM-CGT. (2015). *Industrie : reconquérir les capacités de production, répondre aux besoins humains et environnementaux, relancer l'économie et l'emploi*. CGT.
- Gaffney, J. (2012). *Political Leadership in France: From Charles de Gaulle to Nicolas Sarkozy*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Gall, G., Hurd, R., and Wilkinson, A. (2011). Labour unionism and neo-liberalism. In G. Gall, R. Hurd and A. Wilkinson (Eds.), *The International Handbook of Labour Unions: Responses to Neo-Liberalism*, (pp. 1-12). Edward Elgar.
- Gallin, D. (2013). The WFTU – Hydroponic Stalinism, *Global Labour Journal*, 4(1).
<https://doi.org/10.15173/glj.v4i1.1132>
- Gamble, P. A. (2009). *The Spectre at the Feast: Capitalist Crisis and the Politics of Recession*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Garcia-Duran, P., Eliasson, L. J., and Costa, O. (2020). Managed Globalization 2.0: The European Commission’s Response to Trade Politicization. *Politics and Governance*, 8(1), 290–300. <https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v8i1.2567>
- GATT. (1974). *GATT Activities in 1973*. GATT.
- GATT Council. (1990). *COMMUNICATION FROM THE UNITED STATES CONCERNING THE RELATIONSHIP OF INTERNATIONALLY-RECOGNIZED LABOUR STANDARDS TO INTERNATIONAL TRADE*. L/6729, 3 October 1990. Retrieved from: https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/91520083.pdf
- GATT Textiles Committee. (1980). *Demand, Production and Trade in Textiles and Clothing since 1973 (Report by the Secretariat of the Textiles Committee)*. COM.TEX/W/84, 3 December 1980. Retrieved from:
<https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/GG/COMTEX/W84.PDF>
- GATT Textiles Committee. (1982). *Report of the Committee Meeting held from 18 November – 22 December 1981*. COM.TEX/26, 4 March 1982. Retrieved from:
<https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/GG/COMTEX/26.PDF>
- George, S. and Wolf, M. (2002). *La Mondialisation libérale*. Grasset/Les Echos.

- Gheyle, N. (2020). Huddle Up! Exploring Domestic Coalition Formation Dynamics in the Differentiated Politicization of TTIP. *Politics and Governance*, 8(1), 301–311. <https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v8i1.2588>
- Gläser C. (2009). Europäische ‘Einheitsgewerkschaft’ zwischen lähmender Überdehnung und umfassender Repräsentativität: die Strukturen des EGB und die Herausforderung der Erweiterungen. In J. Mittag (Ed.), *Deutsche Gewerkschaften und europäische Integration im 20. Jahrhundert*, 215–233. Klartext-Verlag.
- Gobin, C. (1996). *Consultation et concertation sociales à l’échelle de la Communauté économique européenne. Etude des positions et stratégies de la Confédération européenne des syndicats (1958-1991)*. ULB.
- Goetschy, J. (1996). The European Trade Union Confederation and the Construction of European Unionism. In P. Leisink, J. Van Leemput and J. Vilrocx (Eds.), *Challenges to Trade Unions in Europe: Innovation or Adaptation*, pp. 253-266. Edward Elgar.
- Goetschy, J. (2003). *The Open Method of Coordination and EU Integration*. Fachhochschul-Fernstudienverbund der Länder.
- Gourevitch, P., Martin, A., Ross, G., Allen, C., Bornstein, S., and Markovits, A. (1984). *Unions and Economic Crisis: Britain, West Germany and Sweden*. George Allen and Unwin.
- Grady, J. (2010). New Labour and Trade Unions – Collaborators in Neo-Liberalism Together? *University of Leicester School of Management Research Seminar*, 3 November 2010. Retrieved from: <https://www2.le.ac.uk/departments/management/documents/research/research-seminars/grady.pdf>
- Greenwood, J. (2011). *Interest Representation in the European Union [3rd Edition]*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Gumbrell-McCormick, R. (2004). The ICFTU and the World Economy: A Historical Perspective. In R. Munck (Ed.), *Labour and Globalisation: Results and Prospects*, (pp. 34-51). Liverpool University Press.
- Gumbrell-McCormick, R. (2013a). The International Trade Union Confederation: From Two (or More?) Identities to One. *British Journal of Industrial Relations*, 51(2), 240–263. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8543.2012.00897.x>
- Gumbrell-McCormick, R. (2013b). The International Labour Movement. In P. Fairbrother, M-A. Hennebert and C. Lévesque (Eds.), *Transnational Trade Unionism: Building Union Power*, pp. 183-203. Routledge.

- Gumbrell-McCormick, R and Hyman, R. (2013). *Trade Unions in Western Europe: Hard Times, Hard Choices*. Oxford University Press.
- Hajer, M.A. (1995). *The Politics of Environmental Discourse. Ecological Modernization and the Policy Process*. Clarendon Press.
- Hall, P. (1986). *Governing the Economy. The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France*. Oxford University Press.
- Hamann, K., and Kelly, J. (2004). Unions as Political Actors. In C. M. Frege and J. Kelly (Eds.), *Varieties of Unionism*, pp. 93-116. Oxford University Press.
- Hammer, M. (2013). Labour Standards in Segmented Markets: The Construction Industry in Delhi and Moscow. In P. Fairbrother, C. Levesque and M-A. Hennebert (Eds.), *Transnational Trade Unionism: Building Union Power*, (pp. 243-264). Routledge.
- Hannah, E., Scott, J., and Wilkinson, R. (2017). Reforming WTO-Civil Society Engagement. *World Trade Review*, 16(3), 427-448.
- Hansard* HC Deb vol 860 col 715-724 (19 July 1973) [Electronic version].
- Hansard* HC Deb vol 999 col 986-1024 (26 February 1981) [Electronic version]
- Hanson, B. T. (1998). What Happened to Fortress Europe?: External Trade Policy Liberalization in the European Union. *International Organization*, 52(1), 55–85. Retrieved from JSTOR.
- Harris Interactive. (2017). *Sondage Jour du Vote—Le vote au premier tour de l'élection présidentielle de 2017 selon la proximité syndicale*. Retrieved from: https://harris-interactive.fr/opinion_polls/sondage-jour-du-vote-le-vote-au-premier-tour-de-lelection-presidentielle-de-2017-selon-la-proximite-syndicale/
- Harrison, J., Barbu, M., Campling, L., Ebert, F. C., Martens, D., Marx, A., Orbie, J., Richardson, B., and Smith, A. (2019a). Labour Standards Provisions in EU Free Trade Agreements: Reflections on the European Commission's Reform Agenda. *World Trade Review*, 18(4), 635–657. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474745618000204>
- Harrison, J., Barbu, M., Campling, L., Richardson, B., & Smith, A. (2019b). Governing Labour Standards through Free Trade Agreements: Limits of the European Union's Trade and Sustainable Development Chapters. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 57(2), 260–277. <https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12715>
- Hassel, A. (2007). The Curse of Institutional Security: The Erosion of German Trade Unionism. *Industrielle Beziehungen / The German Journal of Industrial Relations*, 14(2), 176–191.

- Hay, C. (1999). *The Political Economy of New Labour: Labouring Under False Pretences?* Manchester University Press
- Hayes, J. P. (1993). *Making Trade Policy in the European Community*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hays, J., Lim, J., and Spoon, J.-J. (2019). The path from trade to right-wing populism in Europe. *Electoral Studies*, 60, 102038. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2019.04.002>
- Haworth, N., and Hughes, S. (2005). From Marrakech to Doha and beyond: the tortuous progress of the trade and labour standards debate. In D. Kelly and W. Grant (Eds.), *The Politics of International Trade in the 21st Century*, pp. 130–43. Palgrave.
- Healy, T. (2014). Canadian and European Unions and the Canada—EU CETA Negotiations. *Globalizations*, 11(1), 59–70. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2014.860798>
- Heery, E. and Kelly, J. (1994). Professional, participative and managerial unionism: an interpretation of change in trade unions, *Work Employment and Society*, (8), 1-21.
- Heinz, J., and Luce, S. (2013). *Labor Standards and Trade Agreements: The Impact of Trade Negotiations on Country Adoption of Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining (Response to DOL099RP20742)*. Retrieved from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/258808756_Labor_Standards_and_Trade_Agreements_The_Impact_of_Trade_Negotiations_on_Country_Adoption_of_Freedom_of_Association_and_Collective_Bargaining
- Heron, T., and Siles-Brügge, G. (2012). Competitive Liberalization and the ‘Global Europe’ Services and Investment Agenda: Locating the Commercial Drivers of the EU–ACP Economic Partnership Agreements*. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 50(2), 250–266. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2011.02220.x>
- Hertwig M., Pries L. and Rampeltshammer L. (Eds.). (2009). *European Works Councils in complementary perspectives: new approaches to the study of interest regulation*. ETUI.
- Hickson, K. (2004). Economic thought. In A, Seldon and K, Hickson (Eds.), *New Labour, Old Labour: The Wilson and Callaghan Governments, 1974-79*, pp. 34-69. Routledge.
- High-Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth. (2013). *Final Report of the U.S.-EU High Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth*. Retrieved from: <https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/reports-and-publications/2013/final-report-us-eu-hlwg>
- Hilary, J. (2014). European Trade Unions and Free Trade: Between International Solidarity and Perceived Self-Interest. *Globalizations*, 11(1), 47–57. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2014.860335>

- Hodges, M. (1977). Industrial Policy: a Directorate-General in Search of a Role. In H. Wallace, W. Wallace and C. Webb (Eds.), *Policy-making in the European Communities*, pp. 113-136. Wiley.
- Hoffmann, J., and Hoffmann, R. (2009). Prospects for European industrial relations and trade unions in the midst of modernisation, Europeanisation and globalisation. *Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research*, 15(3–4), 389–417.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/10242589090150033001>
- Hoffmann, J., Hoffmann, R., Kirton-Darling, J., and Rampeltshammer, L. (Eds.). (2002). *The Europeanisation of industrial relations in a global perspective a literature review*. Dublin: European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions. Retrieved from:
<http://www.eurofound.ie/publications/files/EF02102EN.pdf>
- Hoffrogge, R. (2018). Engineering New Labour: Trade unions, social partnership, and the stabilization of British neoliberalism, 1985–2002. *Journal of Labor and Society*, 21(3), 301–316. <https://doi.org/10.1111/wusa.12340>
- Hopewell, K. (2016). *Breaking the WTO: How emerging powers disrupted the neoliberal project*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Howell, C. (2009). The Transformation of French Industrial Relations: Labor Representation and the State in a Post-Dirigiste Era. *Politics and Society*, 37(2), 229–256.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0032329209333993>
- Howell, C. (2016). Regulating class in the neoliberal era: The role of the state in the restructuring of work and employment relations. *Work, Employment and Society*, 30(4), 573–589. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0950017015595954>
- Howell, T., and Hume, G. (1992). Conflict among Nations, Trade Policies in the 1990s. In T. Howell (Ed.), *Germany*, pp. 145-204. Westview Press.
- Huberman, M. (2012). *Odd Couple: International Trade and Labor Standards in History*. Yale University Press.
- Huet, P. G.-D., and Eliasson, L. J. (2017). Supporters’ responses to contested trade negotiations: The European Commission’s rhetoric on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 30(5–6), 489–506. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2018.1461807>
- Hull, R. (1993). Lobbying A view from within. In S. Mazey and J. Richardson (Eds.), *Lobbying in the European Community*, pp. 82-94. Oxford University Press.

- Hurrell, A. (2007). *On global order: power, values, and the constitution of international society*. Oxford University Press.
- Hurtado, I., and Argerey, P. (2008). Social Dumping: The Debate on a Multilateral Social Clause. *Global Economy Journal*, 8(1), 1–15.
- Hyman, R. (2001). *Understanding European trade unionism: Between market, class and society*. SAGE.
- Hyman, R. (2005). Shifting Dynamics in International Trade Unionism: Agitation, Organisation, Bureaucracy, Diplomacy. *LABOR HISTORY*, (2), 137.
- Hyman, R. (2007). How can trade unions act strategically? *Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research*, 13(2), 193–210. <https://doi.org/10.1177/102425890701300204>
- Hyman, R. (2013). European Trade Unions and the Long March through the Institutions: From Integration to Contention? In P. Fairbrother, M-A. Hennebert and C. Lévesque (Eds.), *Transnational Trade Unionism: Building Union Power*, pp. 161-182. Routledge.
- Hyman, R. (2017). British trade unions and the ETUC. In A. Campiani and P. Tilly (Eds.), *National trade unions and the ETUC: A history of unity and diversity*, pp. 95-118. ETUI.
- ICFTU. (1998). *Fighting for workers' human rights in the global economy: defending fundamental trade union rights*. ICFTU.
- ICFTU. (1999). *Building workers' human rights into the global trading system*. Retrieved from: <https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/netzquelle/01314.pdf>
- ICFTU. (2003). Trade union statement on the agenda for the 5th Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization. Retrieved from: <https://www.tuc.org.uk/research-analysis/reports/trade-union-statement-agenda-5th-ministerial-conference-world-trade>
- ICFTU. (2004). *A Trade Union Guide to Globalisation*. International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
- IG Metall. (2011). *Klares Signal pro Europa: Industriepolitik von IG Metall und Französischen Gewerkschaften*. Retrieved from: <https://www.igmetall.de/politik-und-gesellschaft/internationales/klares-signal-pro-europa>
- IG Metall. (2015). *CETA: Die unterschätzte Gefahr*. Retrieved from: <https://www.igmetall.de/politik-und-gesellschaft/internationales/ceta-die-unterschaetzte-gefahr>
- IG Metall. (2018). *Protektionismus und Preisdumping haben mit fairem Handel nichts zu tun*. Retrieved from: <https://www.igmetall.de/politik-und->

[gesellschaft/internationales/protektionismus-und-preisdumping-haben-mit-fairem-handel-n](#)

ILO. (1999). *Address by Mr. Juan Somavia, Secretary-General of the International Labour Conference, 1 June 1999*. Retrieved from:

[https://www.ilo.org/public/libdoc/ILO_Chronology/09616\(1999-87\)Somavia.pdf](https://www.ilo.org/public/libdoc/ILO_Chronology/09616(1999-87)Somavia.pdf)

ILO. (2002). *A Fair Globalization: Creating Opportunities for All*. Geneva: ILO.

ILO. (2013). *The Social Dimensions of Free Trade Agreements*. Geneva: ILO. Retrieved from: http://www.ilo.org/global/research/publications/WCMS_228965/lang--en/index.htm

ILO. (2020). *Ratifications of Conventions by Number of Ratifications*. Retrieved from: – particularly the transport and logistics workers tasked with moving goods along the chain

https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:10011:14018540868785:::P10011_DISPLAY_BY:2

IMF. (2021). World Economic Outlook database: April 2021. Retrieved from:

<https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2021/April/weo-report?>

Ingram, P., Metcalf, D., and Wadsworth, J. (1993). Strike Incidence in British Manufacturing in the 1980s. *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, 46(4), 704–717.

<https://doi.org/10.2307/2524313>

International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development. (2014). *Germany Changes Tack on ISDS in EU-Canada Trade Deal*. Retrieved from: <https://ictsd.iisd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/germany-changes-tack-on-isds-in-eu-canada-trade-deal>

ITUC. (2010). *Resolution of a sustainable and just development model for the 21st century, 2nd World Congress, Vancouver, 21-25 June 2010*. Retrieved from: <https://www.ituc-csi.org/resolution-on-a-sustainable-and>

ITUC. (2018). *The 4th ITUC World Congress concluded in Copenhagen today with the re-election of Sharan Burrow as General Secretary of the 207 million-member movement*. Retrieved from: <https://www.ituc-csi.org/the-4th-ituc-world-congress-20807>

Jacobi O. (1991). Pionierrolle, aber keine Vormachtstellung für die deutschen Gewerkschaften, *Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte*, 11/91, 681–689

Jakobsen, K. A. (2001). Rethinking the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and its Inter-American Regional Organization. *Antipode*, 33(3), 363–383.

<https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8330.00189>

- Jacoby, W., and Meunier, S. (2010). Europe and the management of globalization. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 17(3), 299–317.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/13501761003662107>
- Jawara, F., and Kwa, A. (2003). *Behind the Scenes at the WTO: The Real World of International Trade Negotiations*. Zed Books.
- Jefferys, S. (2003). Rebel France: Defending Republican Values. *French Politics*, 1(3), 355–368. <https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.fp.8200041>
- Johnson, M. (1998). *European Community Trade Policy and the Article 113 Committee*. Royal Institute of International Affairs.
- Johnson, R. W. (1981). *The Long March of the French Left*. Macmillan Press.
- Jones, K. (2010). *The Doha Blues: Institutional Crisis and Reform in the WTO*. Oxford University Press.
- Josselin D. (2001). Trade unions for EMU: sectoral preferences and political opportunities, *West European Politics*, 24(1), 55-74.
- Jungherr, A., Mader, M., Schoen, H., and Wuttke, A. (2018). Context-driven attitude formation: the difference between supporting free trade in the abstract and supporting specific trade agreements. *Review of International Political Economy*, 25(2), 215–242. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2018.1431956>
- Kaiser, W., and Meyer, J-H. (2013). Beyond Governments and Supranational Institutions: Societal Actors in European Integration. In W. Kaiser and J-H. Meyer (Eds.), *Societal Actors in European Integration - Polity-Building and Policy-making 1958-1992* (pp. 1-14). Palgrave Macmillan.
- Kastendiek, H. (1978). *Arbeitnehmer in der SPD: Heraus-bildung und Funktion der Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Arbeitnehmerfragen (AfA)*. Die Arbeitswelt.
- Keck, M.E and Sikkink, K. (1998). *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*. Cornell University Press.
- Keller, B. (1982). Herausforderungen der 80er Jahre für die Gewerkschaft Textil-Bekleidung, *Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte*, 01/82, 40-50.
- Keohane, R., and Nye, J. (2000). The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation and Problems of Democratic Legitimacy, *Paper prepared for the American Political Science Convention, Washington, D.C., (August 31-September 3, 2000)*.
- Kergoat, J. (1984). From Economic Crisis to Victory of the Left: Workers' Reactions and Union Policies. In M. Kesselman and G. Groux (Eds.), *The French Workers' Movement: Crisis and Political Change*, pp. 277-296. George Allen and Unwin.

- Kerremans, B. and Orbie, J. (2009). The Social Dimension of European Union Trade Policies, *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 14(5), 629-641.
<https://kluwerlawonline.com/journalarticle/European+Foreign+Affairs+Review/14.5/EERR2009045>
- Kirchner, E. J. (1978). *Trade Unions as a Pressure Group in the European Community*. Gower.
- Kirchner, E. J. (1980). International Trade Union Collaboration and the Prospects for European Industrial Relations. In J. Hayward (Ed.), *Trade Unions and Politics in Western Europe*, pp. 124-138. Frank Cass.
- Köpke, G. (1979). Aufgaben und Tätigkeit des Europäischen Gewerkschaftsinstituts (EGI), *Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte*, 05/79, 284-287.
- Krajewski, M. (2011). *Public services in bilateral free trade agreements of the EU*. Arbeitskammer Wien, November. Retrieved from:
<https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=749025071066116028018098086021070107054019017054089075023069113097071007028085100093009030098119110060047101107067116114110005016085069007012082006006123114017126023036065062088095097119126100028014069018096005031123090101065093071127108080127091001024andEXT=pdf>
- Krajewski, M. (2014). *Modalities for Investment Protection and Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) in TTIP from a Trade Union Perspective* (SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2519995). Social Science Research Network. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2519995>
- Kryst, M. (2018). Transnationale Bündnisse von Gewerkschaften und NGOs. Strategien in Interaktion. *Industrielle Beziehungen / The German Journal of Industrial Relations*, 25(2), 209–230. JSTOR. <https://doi.org/10.2307/26511414>
- La Barca, G. (2016). *The US, the EC and World Trade from the Kennedy Round to the Start of the Uruguay Round*. Bloomsbury.
- Labbe, D. (1994). Trade Unionism in France since the Second World War, *West European Politics*, 17(1), 146–68.
- Labour Party. (1976). *Report of the 75th Annual Conference of the Labour Party*. Labour Party.
- Lallement, M. (2006). New Patterns of Industrial Relations and Political Action Since the 1980s. In P. D. Culpepper, P. A. Hall, and B. Palier (Eds.), *The Politics that Markets Make: Social Change in France*, pp. 50-79. Palgrave Macmillan.

- Lamy, P. (2000). *Speech by Pascal Lamy, European Commissioner for Trade, at the French-American Business Council, New York City, 9 June 2000*. Retrieved from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_00_216
- Lamy, P. (2002). Stepping Stones or Stumbling Blocks? The EU's Approach Towards the Problem of Multilateralism vs Regionalism in Trade Policy. *The World Economy*, 25(10), 1399–1413. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9701.00498>
- Lanoszka, A. (2009). *The World Trade Organization: Changing Dynamics in the Global Political Economy*. Lynne Rienner.
- Larsson, B. (2015). Trade Union Channels for Influencing European Union Policies. *Nordic Journal of Working Life Studies*, 5(3), 101–121. <https://doi.org/10.19154/njwls.v5i3.4809>
- Larsson, T. (2003). *Precooking in the European Union – The World of Expert Groups*. Retrieved from: www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/03/63/05/17549c2a.pdf
- Lavelle, S. (2008). *The Death of Social Democracy: Political Consequences in the 21st Century*. Ashgate.
- Leblond, P., and Viju-Miljusevic, C. (2019). EU trade policy in the twenty-first century: Change, continuity and challenges. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 26(12), 1836–1846. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2019.1678059>
- Légifrance. (n.d.). *Décret n°98-1080 du 30 novembre 1998 portant création d'un comité du dialogue social pour les questions européennes et internationales*. Retrieved from: <https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/loda/id/JORFTEXT000000758391/>
- Leiren, M. D and Parks, L. (2014). When trade unions succeed: Cases of blocked liberalisation in the common market, *European Journal of Political Research*, 53(3), 465-479. DOI: 10.1111/1475-6765.12044
- Lillie, N. (2011). European Integration and Transnational Labor Markets. In J. De Bardeleben and A. Hurrelmann (Eds.), *Transnational Europe: Promise, Paradox, Limits*, (pp. 113-129). Palgrave Macmillan.
- Madner, V. (2017). A New Generation of Trade Agreements: An Opportunity Not to Be Missed? In S. Griller, W. Obwexer and E. Vranes (Eds.), *Mega-Regional Trade Agreements: CETA, TTIP, and TiSA: New Orientations for EU External Economic Relations*, pp. 307-313. Oxford University Press. <https://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780198808893.001.0001/oso-9780198808893-chapter-15>

- Maier, C. S. (1984). Preconditions for Corporatism. In J. H. Goldthorpe (Ed.), *Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism*, pp. 39-59. Clarendon.
- Manners, I. (2009). The Social Dimension of EU Trade Policies: Reflections from a Normative Power Perspective, *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 14(5), 785-803. <https://kluwerlawonline.com/journalarticle/European+Foreign+Affairs+Review/14.5/EERR2009053>
- Markovits, A. S. (1986). *The politics of the West German trade unions: Strategies of class and interest representation in growth and crisis*. Cambridge University Press.
- Martell, L. (2007). The Third Wave in Globalization Theory. *International Studies Review*, 9(2), 173–196. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2486.2007.00670.x>
- Martin, A., and Ross, G. (1999a). *The Brave New World of European Labor: European Trade Unions at the Millenium*. Berghahn.
- Martin, A., and Ross, G. (1999b). In the Line of Fire: The Europeanization of Labor Representation. In A. Martin, and G. Ross, G. (Eds.), *The Brave New World of European Labor: European Trade Unions at the Millenium*, pp. 312-367. Berghahn.
- Martin, A., and Ross, G. (2001). Trade Union Organizing at the European Level: The Dilemma of Borrowed Resources. In D. Imig and S. Tarrow (Eds.), *Contentious Europeans: Protest and Politics in an Emerging Polity*, (pp. 53-76). Rowman and Littlefield.
- Martin, R. M. (1980). *TUC: the growth of a pressure group, 1868-1976*. Clarendon.
- Marx, A., Lein, B. and Brando, N. (2016). The Protection of Labour Rights in Trade Agreements: The Case of the EU–Colombia Agreement, *Journal of World Trade*, 50(4), 587–610.
- McAdam, D. (1996). The Framing Function of Movement Tactics. Strategic Dramaturgy in the American Civil Rights Movement. In D. McAdam, J. McCarthy and M.N. Zald (Eds.), *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements. Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures and Framing* (pp. 338-340). Cambridge University Press.
- McAdam, D., McCarthy, J. and Zald, M.N. (Eds.). (1996). *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements. Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures and Framing*. Cambridge University Press.
- McAlevy, J. (2016). *No Shortcuts: Organizing for Power in the New Gilded Age*. Oxford University Press.
- McCarthy, J.D., Smith, J. and Zald, M.N. (1996). Accessing Public, Media, Electoral, and Governmental Agendas'. In D. McAdam, J. McCarthy and M.N. Zald, Meyer (Eds.),

- Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements. Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures and Framing* (pp. 291-311). Cambridge University Press.
- McGregor, J. (2016). EU members unsure how to apply CETA, 2 months from signing, *CBC News*, 15 August. Retrieved from: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-european-union-ceta-trade-provisional-application-1.3715488>
- McGuire, D. (2014). Analysing Union Power, Opportunity and Strategic Capability: Global and Local Union Struggles Against the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). *Global Labour Journal*, 5(1), Article 1. <https://doi.org/10.15173/glj.v5i1.1147>
- McGuire, D., and Scherrer, C. (2010). Developing a labour voice in trade policy at the national level, *Global Labour University Working Papers (Paper No. 8, February 2010)*. Retrieved from: https://www.global-labour-university.org/fileadmin/GLU_Working_Papers/GLU_WP_No.8.pdf
- McIlroy, J. (1995). *Trade unions in Britain today (Second Edition)*. Manchester University Press.
- McIlroy, R. M. (2008). Ten years of New Labour, *British Journal of Industrial Relations*, 46(2), 283-313.
- McIlroy, R. M. (2011). Britain: how neo-liberalism cut unions down to size. In G. Gall, R. Hurd and A. Wilkinson (Eds.), *The International Handbook of Labour Unions: Responses to Neo-Liberalism*, pp. 82-104. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- McIlroy, J., and Campbell, A. (1999). The High Tide of Trade Unionism: Mapping Industrial Politics, 1964-79. In J. McIlroy, N. Fishman and A. Campbell (Eds.), *British Trade Unions and Industrial Politics: The High Tide of Trade Unionism, 1964-79 (Volume Two)*, pp. 93-132. Ashgate Publishing.
- McKenzie, L., and Meissner, K. L. (2017). Human Rights Conditionality in European Union Trade Negotiations: The Case of the EU–Singapore FTA. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 55(4), 832–849. <https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12522>
- Meunier, S. (2005). *Trading voices: the European Union in international commercial negotiations*. Princeton University Press.
- Meunier, S. (2007). Managing Globalization? The EU in International Trade Negotiations*. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 45(4), 905–926. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2007.00753.x>

- Meunier, S., and Nicolaïdis, K. (1999). Who Speaks for Europe? The Delegation of Trade Authority in the EU. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 37(3), 477–501. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5965.00174>
- Meunier, S., and Nicolaïdis, K. (2006). The European Union as a conflicted trade power. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 13(6), 906–925. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13501760600838623>
- Meunier, S., and Nicolaïdis, K. (2011). *International Relations and the European Union*. Oxford University Press.
- Mielke, S. (Ed.). (1983). *Internationales Gewerkschaftshandbuch* (1982 Edition). VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
- Ministère de l'Europe et des Affaires Etrangères. (2014). *Accords de libre échange - Comité de suivi de la politique commerciale*. Retrieved from: <https://www.data.gouv.fr/en/reuses/accords-de-libre-echange/>
- Mitchell, K. (2012). From Whitehall to Thatcher, Delors and the Europeanization of the TUC. *Labor History*, 53(1), 25–50. <https://doi.org/10.1080/0023656X.2011.640179>
- Mitchell, K. (2014). The European Trade Union Confederation at 40: Integration and diversity in the European labor movement. *Labor History*, 55(4), 403–426. <https://doi.org/10.1080/0023656X.2014.932511>
- Mittag, J. (2017). Flexible adaptation between political, social and economic interests: the multi-faceted Europeanisation of German trade unions. In A. Campiani and P. Tilly (Eds.), *National trade unions and the ETUC: A history of unity and diversity*, pp. 19–44. ETUI.
- Mittag J. and Zellin M. (2009). Grenzen der Koordination europäischer Gewerkschaftspolitik: die Episode der Abteilung Europäische Integration des DGB (1972–75). In Mittag J. (Ed.), *Deutsche Gewerkschaften und europäische Integration im 20. Jahrhundert*, pp. 165–186. Klartext-Verlag.
- Monbiot, G. (2013, November 4). This transatlantic trade deal is a full-frontal assault on democracy, *The Guardian*. Retrieved from: <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/nov/04/us-trade-deal-full-frontal-assault-on-democracy>
- Moody, K. (2017). *On New Terrain: How Capital is Reshaping the Battleground of Class War*. Haymarket Books.
- Mortensen, J. L. (2006). The WTO and the Governance of Globalization: Dismantling the Compromise of Embedded Liberalism? In R. Stubbs and G. R. D. Underhill (Eds.),

- Political Economy and the Changing Global Order (Third Edition)*, pp. 170-182. Oxford University Press.
- Mulhearn, C. (2004). Beyond 'Euroland': British trade unions, the single currency and European integration, *Industrial Relations Journal*, 35(4), 296-310.
- Müller, T., and Platzer, H-W. (2017). The European trade union federations: profiles and power resources – changes and challenges in times of crisis. In S. Lehndorff, H. Dribbusch and T. Schulten (Eds.), *Rough waters: European trade unions in a time of crises*, pp. 289-314. ETUI.
- Müller, T., Platzer, H-W., and Rüb, S. (2011). European collective agreements at company level and the relationship between EWCs and trade unions, *Transfer*, 17(2), 217-228.
- Munck, R. (2002). *Globalisation and Labour: The New 'Great Transformation'*. Zed Books.
- Munck, R. (2011). Unions, globalisation and internationalism: results and prospects. In G. Gall, R. Hurd and A. Wilkinson (Eds.), *The International Handbook of Labour Unions: Responses to Neo-Liberalism*, pp. 291-310. Edward Elgar.
- Murphy, H. (2010). *The Making of International Trade Policy: NGOs, Agenda-setting and the WTO*. Edward Elgar Publishing Limited.
- <http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/portsmouth-ebooks/detail.action?docID=631216>
- Myconos, G. (2005). *The Globalizations of Organized Labour: 1945-2004*. Springer.
- Mytelka, L. K. (1982). The French Textile Industry: National Policies and International Trade. In H. K. Jacobson and D. Sidjanski (Eds.), *The Emerging International Economic Order: Dynamic Processes, Constraints and Opportunities*, pp. 129-166. Sage.
- Nachtwey, O. (2013). Market Social Democracy: The Transformation of the SPD up to 2007. *German Politics*, 22(3), 235–252. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2013.788153>
- National Archives. (n.d.). *Sterling devalued and the IMF loan*. Retrieved from: <https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/cabinetpapers/themes/sterling-devalued-imf-loan.htm>
- National Post. (2016). *Trudeau faces off with hecklers for 30 minutes at Canadian Labour Congress youth conference*. Retrieved from: <https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/trudeau-young-unionists-get-into-it-in-ottawa-over-tpp-phoenix-first-nations>
- Neu, A. D. (1976). Protection of the German Textile Industry. In W. M. Corden and G. Fels (Eds.), *Public Assistance to Industry: Protection and Subsidies in Britain and Germany*, pp. 165-183. Macmillan.

- Niethammer, L. (1977). Defensive Integration – Der Weg zum EGB und die Perspektive einer westeuropäischen Einheitsgewerkschaft. In U. Borsdorf *et al.* (Eds.), *Gewerkschaftliche Politik, Reform aus Solidarität: zum 60. Geburtstag von Heinz O. Vetter*, 567–596. Bund-Verlag.
- Novitz T. (2002), Promoting core labour standards and improving global social governance: an assessment of EU competence to implement Commission proposals, *EUI Working Papers*, 2002/59. Retrieved from:
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/5015143_Promoting_Core_Labour_Standards_and_Improving_Global_Social_Governance_An_Assessment_of_EU_Competence_to_Implement_Commission_Proposals
- Novotná, T. (2017). The EU as a Global Actor: United We Stand, Divided We Fall, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, DOI: 10.1111/jcms.12601
- O'Brien, R., Grieco, J. M., Goetz, A. M., Scholte, J. A., Williams, M., Smith, S. (Eds.). (2000). *Contesting Global Governance: Multilateral Economic Institutions and Global Social Movements*. Cambridge University Press.
<http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/portsmouth-ebooks/detail.action?docID=147328>
- OECD. (1979). *The Case for Positive Adjustment Policies*. OECD.
- OECD. (1983). *Textile and Clothing Industries: Structural Problems and Policies in OECD Countries*. OECD.
- Official Journal of the European Union. (2012). *Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union*, C236/47. Retrieved from: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT&from=EN>
- Official Journal of the European Union. (2017). *Joint Interpretative Instrument on the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the European Union and its Member States*, L 11/3. Retrieved from: [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:22017X0114\(01\)](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:22017X0114(01))
- Olsen, J. P. (2002). The Many Faces of Europeanization. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40(5), 921–952. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5965.00403>
- Orbie, J. (2008). The European Union's Role in World Trade: Harnessing Globalisation?, in J. Orbie (Ed.), *Europe's Global Role*, pp, 35-66. Ashgate.
- Orbie, J., and Kerremans, B. (2013). Theorizing European Union Trade Politics: Contending or Complementary Paradigms? *Journal of Contemporary European Research*, 9(4), Article 4. <https://jcer.net/index.php/jcer/article/view/597>

- Orbie, J., and Tortell, L. (2009). *The European Union and the Social Dimension of Globalization: How the EU Influences the World*. Routledge.
- Orbie, J. and Van den Putte, L. (2016). Labour Rights in Peru and the EU Trade Agreement, *Austrian Foundation for Development Research Working Paper*, No. 58.
- Orbie, J., Martens, D., Oehri, M., and Putte, L. V. den. (2016). Promoting sustainable development or legitimising free trade? Civil society mechanisms in EU trade agreements. *Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal*, 1(4), 526–546.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/23802014.2016.1294032>
- Orbie, J., Tortell, L., Kissack, R., Gstöhl, S., Wouters, J., and Hachez, N. (2009). JESP Symposium: The European Union's global social role. *Journal of European Social Policy*, 19(2), 99–116. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0958928708101864>
- Orbie, J., Van den Putte, L., and Martens, D. (2018). Civil Society Meetings in EU Free Trade Agreements: The Purposes Unravelling. In H. Gött (Ed.), *Labour Standards in International Economic Law* (pp. 135–152). Springer International Publishing.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-69447-4_8
- Orbie, J., Vos, H., and Taverniers, L. (2005). EU trade policy and a social clause: A question of competences? *Politique Européenne*, 17(3), 159–187.
- Otto, B. (1975). *Gewerkschaftsbewegung in Deutschland: Entwicklung, geistige Grundlagen, aktuelle Politik*. Bund-Verlag.
- Panitch, L. (1979). *Social Democracy and Industrial Militancy: The Labour Party, the Trade Unions and Incomes Policy, 1945-74*. Cambridge University Press.
- Park, M. (2014). Trade Liberalization and Organized Labour in the Asia-Pacific Region: Barriers to Labour Internationalism. *Globalizations*, 11(1), 71–82.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2014.860319>
- Parker, J. (2008). The Trades Union Congress and civil alliance building, *Employee Relations*, 30(5), 562-583.
- Parks, L. (2009). National and European? Protesting the Lisbon agenda and the Services Directive in the European Union. In L. Bruszt and R. Holzacker (Eds.), *The transnationalization of economies, states and civil societies: New challenges for governance in Europe*, pp.241-261. Springer.
- Parliament of Wallonia. (2016). Résolution sur l'Accord économique et commercial global (AECG), 27 April 2016. Retrieved from: http://nautilus.parlement-wallon.b/rchive/015_201/E/12_5.pdf
- Parsons, C. (2007). *How to Map Arguments in Political Science*. Oxford University Press.

- Parsons, N. (2015). Left parties and trade unions in France. *French Politics*, 13(1), 63–83.
<https://doi.org/10.1057/fp.2014.25>
- Paterson, W. E. (1975). The German Social Democratic Party and European Integration in Emigration and Occupation. *European Studies Review*, 5(4), 429–441.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/026569147500500404>
- Paulson, M. (1999, 1 December), Clinton says he will support trade sanctions for worker abuse, *Seattle Post-Intelligencer*.
- Pécout, A., Rescan, M., and Folliot, C. (2016, November 1). Traité CETA entre l'UE et le Canada: Qui est pour et qui est contre en France ? *Le Monde*. Retrieved from:
https://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2016/11/01/ceta-qui-est-pour-et-qui-est-contre-en-france_5023697_4355770.html
- Pernot, J–M. (2001). Les syndicats français et l'Europe. In D. Labbé and S. Courtois (Eds.), *Regards sur la crise du syndicalisme*, pp. 153–166. L'Harmattan.
- Pernot, J–M. (2013). France. L'Europe, une influence diffuse sur les relations professionnelles mais un sujet de discord syndicale. *Chronique internationale de l'IREs*, 143–144, 75–92. Retrieved from:
<http://www.ires.fr/index.php/publications/chronique-internationale-de-l-ires/item/3581-france-l-europe-une-influence-diffuse-sur-les-relations-professionnelles-mais-un-sujet-de-discorde-syndicale>
- Petrini, F. (2013). Demanding Democracy in the Workplace: The European Trade Union Confederation and the Struggle to Regulate Multinationals. In W. Kaiser and J-H. Meyer (Eds.), *Societal Actors in European Integration - Polity-Building and Policy-making 1958-1992* (pp. 151-172). Palgrave Macmillan.
- Pinder, J. (Ed.). (1982). *National Industrial Strategies and the World Economy*. Routledge.
- Platzer, W. (1991). *Gewerkschaftspolitik ohne Grenzen? Die transnationale Zusammenarbeit der Gewerkschaften im Europa der 90er Jahre*. Dietz.
- Platzer H.-W. (2010). Europäisierung der Gewerkschaften. Gewerkschaftspolitische Herausforderungen und Handlungsoptionen auf europäischer Ebene. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.
- Poletti, A., and De Bièvre, D. (2014). Political mobilization, veto players, and WTO litigation: explaining European Union responses in trade disputes. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 21(8), 1181.

- Politico. (2015). *More than 150,000 protest against EU-US trade deal*. Retrieved from: <https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-mobilizes-against-eu-u-s-trade-deal-merkel-ttip-ceta/>
- Richardson, L. (2012). The Post-Lisbon Role of the European Parliament in the EU's Common Commercial Policy: Implications for Bilateral Trade Negotiations. *EU Diplomacy Paper 05/2012, July 2012 [Working Paper]*. Retrieved on 26 April 2019 from: <http://aei.pitt.edu/39239/>
- Roccati, C. (2017). Europe and the divisions of French trade unionism: a growing awareness. In A. Campiani and P. Tilly (Eds.), *National trade unions and the ETUC: A history of unity and diversity*, pp. 45-66. ETUI.
- Rodrik, D. (1998). "Why Do Open Economies Have Bigger Governments?" *Journal of Political Economy*, 106(5), 997–1032. <https://doi.org/10.1086/250038>
- Rodrik, D. (2012). *The globalization paradox: why global markets, states, and democracy can't coexist*. Oxford University Press.
- Rodrik, D. (2018). Populism and the economics of globalization. *Journal of International Business Policy*, 1(1), 12–33. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s42214-018-0001-4>
- Rosamond, B. (1993). National Labour Organizations and European Integration: British Trade Unions and '1992.' *Political Studies*, 41(3), 420–434. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.1993.tb01647.x>
- Rosamond B. (1998). The integration of labour? British trade union attitudes to European integration. In D. Baker and D. Seawright (Eds.), *Britain for and against Europe: British politics and the question of European integration*, pp. 130-147. Clarendon Press.
- Ross, G. (1982a). The Perils of Politics: French Unions and the Crisis of the 1970s. In P. Lange, G. Ross and M. Vannicelli (Eds.), *Unions Change and Crisis: French and Italian Union Strategy and the Political Economy, 1945-1980*, pp. 13-94. George Allen and Unwin.
- Ross, G. (1982b). *Workers and Communists in France: From Popular Front to Eurocommunism*. University of California Press.
- Ross, G. (1987). Labor and the Left in Power: Commissions, Omissions, and Unintended Consequences. In P. McCarthy (Ed.), *The French Socialists in Power, 1981-1986*, pp. 107-128. Greenwood Press.

- Ross, G. (2019). The French Enigma: Macron, Centrist Reformism, and the Labor Movement. *New Labor Forum*, 28(1), 76–83.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/1095796018817044>
- Rucht, D. (1996). The Impact of National Contexts on Social Movement Structures: A Cross-Movement and Cross-National Comparison. In D. McAdam, J. McCarthy and M.N. Zald (Eds.), *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements. Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures and Framing* (pp. 185-204). Cambridge University Press.
- Ruggie, J. G. (1982). International regimes, transactions, and change: embedded liberalism in the postwar economic order. *International Organization*, 36(2), 379-415.
- Ruggiero, V. (2002). “Attac”: A Global Social Movement? *Social Justice*, 29(1/2 (87-88)), 48–60.
- Schain, M. (1984). Relations between the CGT and CFDT: Politics and Mass Mobilization. In M. Kesselman and G. Groux (Eds.), *The French Workers' Movement: Crisis and Political Change*, pp. 257-276. George Allen and Unwin.
- Scherrer, C. (1998). Protecting Labor in the Global Economy: A Social Clause in Trade Agreements? *New Political Science*, 20(1), 53.
- Scherrer, C., Frank, V., and Greven, T. (1998). *Sozialklauseln. Schriftenreihe der Hans-Böckler-Stiftung*. Dampfboot.
- Schmitt, J., and Mitukiewicz, A. (2012). Politics matter: Changes in unionisation rates in rich countries, 1960–2010. *Industrial Relations Journal*, 43(3), 260–280.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2338.2012.00675.x>
- Schroeder, W. (2005). Der neue Arbeitsmarkt und der Wandel der Gewerkschaften. In H. Heil and J. Seifert (Eds.), *Soziales Deutschland: Für eine neue Gerechtigkeitspolitik* (pp. 85–96). VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
- Schroeder, W. (2008). SPD und Gewerkschaften: Vom Wandel einer privilegierten Partnerschaft. *WSI-Mitteilungen*, 61(5), 231–237. <https://doi.org/10.5771/0342-300X-2008-5-231>
- Seeliger, M., and Wagner, I. (2018). A socialization paradox: trade union policy cooperation in the case of the enforcement directive of the posting of workers directive. *Socio-Economic Review*, 0(0), 1-19. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ser/mwy037>
- Seifen, S. (2009). [Die Bedeutung der europäischen Beschäftigungspolitik für den Strategiewandel der deutschen Gewerkschaften in der Phase der „Eurosklrose“ \(1973–1986\)](#). In J. Mittag (Ed.), *Deutsche Gewerkschaften und europäische Integration im 20. Jahrhundert*, pp. 187–213. Klartext-Verlag.

- Shaev, B. (2018). Liberalising Regional Trade: Socialists and European Economic Integration. *Contemporary European History*, 27(2), 258–279.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0960777318000073>
- Shepherd, G. (1981). *Textile-industry Adjustment in Developed Countries*. Trade Policy Research Centre.
- Sicurelli, D. (2015). The EU as Promoter of Human Rights in Bilateral Trade Agreements, *Journal of Contemporary European Research*, 11(2), 230–245.
- Sikkink, K. (2005). Patterns of Dynamic Multilevel Governance and the Insider-Outsider Coalition. In D. della Porta and S. Tarrow (Eds.), *Transnational Protest and Global Activism*. Rowman and Littlefield.
- Siles-Brügge, G. (2014). *Constructing European Union trade policy: a global idea of Europe*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Siles-Brügge, G. (2018). Transatlantic investor protection as a threat to democracy: The potency and limits of an emotive frame. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 30(5–6), 464–488. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2018.1461805>
- Silver, B. (2003). *Forces of Labor: Workers' Movements and Globalisation Since 1870*. Cambridge University Press.
- Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders. (2020). *SMMT Motor Industry Facts 2020*. Retrieved from: <https://www.smmt.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/SMMT-Motor-Industry-Facts-Oct-2020.pdf>
- Sopinska, J. (2015). Schulz Strikes Deal on ISDS among Fellow Socialists: The compromise amendment seen by Europolitcs also gets the green light from the ISDS-friendly EPP-ALDE-ECR alliance, *Contexte*, 1 July. Retrieved from: https://www.contexte.com/article/pouvoirs/schulz-strikes-deal-on-isds-among-fellow-socialists_42995.html
- Standard Eurobarometer 84. (2015). *Public Opinion in the European Union, Autumn 2015*. Retrieved from: <https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/ResultDoc/download/DocumentKy/71806>
- Steffek, J., and Ehling, J. (2008). Civil Society Participation at the Margins: The Case of the WTO. In J. Steffek, C. Kissling and P. Nanz (Eds.), *Civil Society Participation in European and Global Governance: A Cure for the Democratic Deficit?*, pp. 95-115. Palgrave Macmillan.

- Stop TTIP! (2018). *TTIP and CETA in detail*. Retrieved 20 August 2018 from: <https://stop-ttip.org/what-is-the-problem-ttip-ceta/faqs/>
- Strange, M. (2011). Why Network Across National Borders? TANs, their Discursivity, and the Case of the Anti-GATS Campaign. *Journal of Civil Society*, 7(1), 63–79. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17448689.2011.553432>
- Strange, M. (2015). Power in Global Trade Governance: Is the EU a Unitary Actor, a Tool for Dominance, or a Site of Contestation? GATS and the TTIP Negotiations. *International Journal of Public Administration*, 38(12), 884–894. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01900692.2014.982290>
- Strange, S. (1996). *The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy*. Cambridge University Press.
- Streeck, W. (1984). Neo-Corporatist Industrial Relations and the Economic Crisis in West Germany. In J. H. Goldthorpe (Ed.), *Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism*, pp. 291-314. Clarendon.
- Streeck, W. (1997). Neither European nor Works Councils, *Economic and Industrial Democracy*, 18(2), 325-337.
- Streeck, W. (2003). From state weakness as strength to state weakness as weakness: Welfare corporatism and the private use of the public interest, *MPIfG working paper*, No. 03/2, <http://hdl.handle.net/10419/44260>
- Streeck, W., and Hassel, A. (2003). The crumbling pillars of social partnership. *West European Politics*, 26(4), 101–124. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402380312331280708>
- Swenson, P. (1989). *Fair Shares: Unions, Pay, and Politics in Sweden and West Germany*. Cornell University Press.
- Tarrow, S. (2005). *The New Transnational Activism*. Cambridge University Press.
- Tattersall, A. (2010). *Power in Coalition. Strategies for Strong Unions and Social Change*. Cornell University Press.
- Taylor, R. (2004). The Rise and Fall of the Social Contract. In A. Seldon and K. Hickson (Eds.), *New Labour, Old Labour: The Wilson and Callaghan Governments, 1974-79*, pp. 70-104. Routledge.
- Thierse, S. (2019). Policy entrepreneurship in the European Parliament: Reconsidering the influence of rapporteurs. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 26(2), 267–285. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2017.1409794>

- Thorpe, A. (1999). The Labour Party and the Trade Unions. In J. McIlroy, N. Fishman and A. Campbell (Eds.), *British Trade Unions and Industrial Politics: The High Tide of Trade Unionism, 1964-79 (Volume Two)*, pp. 133-150. Ashgate Publishing.
- Tilly, C. (1978). *From Mobilization to Revolution*. Addison-Wesley Publishing Company.
- Touchstone - TUC Blogs. (2014). *If CETA goes through, TTIP might not matter: Say no to CETA*. Retrieved from: <https://touchstoneblog.org.uk/2014/09/if-ceta-goes-through-ttip-might-not-matter-say-no-to-ceta/>
- Touchstone - TUC Blogs. (2015). *ISDS-lite could yet scupper the EU-Canada trade deal*. Retrieved from: <https://touchstoneblog.org.uk/2015/07/isds-lite-could-yet-scupper-the-eu-canada-trade-deal/>
- Touchstone - TUC Blogs. (2016). *Canadian and European civil society oppose EU-Canada trade agreement*. Retrieved from: <https://touchstoneblog.org.uk/2016/11/canadian-european-civil-society-oppose-eu-canada-trade-agreement/>
- Toyne, B., Arpan, J. S., Barnett, A. H., Ricks, D. A., and Shimp, T. A. (1984). *The Global Textile Industry (World Industry Series: 2)*. George Allen and Unwin.
- Trew, S. (2013). Correcting the democratic deficit in the CETA negotiations: Civil society engagement in the provinces, municipalities, and Europe. *International Journal*, 68(4), 568–575.
- TUC. (n.d.). *Getting to the core: Trade unions and international core labour standards*. TUC.
- TUC. (1975). *TUC Report 1975*. TUC.
- TUC. (1976). *TUC Report 1976*. TUC.
- TUC. (1977). *TUC Report 1977*. TUC.
- TUC. (1978). *TUC Report 1978*. TUC.
- TUC. (1979). *TUC Report 1979*. TUC.
- TUC. (1981). *TUC Report 1981*. TUC.
- TUC. (1982). *TUC Report 1982*. TUC.
- TUC. (1988). *Maximising the benefits minimising the costs: TUC report on Europe 1992*. TUC.
- TUC. (2001). *ICFTU Public Conference in Qatar with Pascal Lamy, European Trade Commissioner*. Retrieved from: <https://www.tuc.org.uk/research-analysis/reports/national/4th-wto-ministerial-conference-doha-qatar>

- TUC. (2002). *International Trade Union Statement on the GATS negotiations*. Retrieved from: <https://www.tuc.org.uk/research-analysis/reports/international-trade-union-statement-gats-negotiations>
- TUC. (2014a). *TUC submission to European Commission's consultation on ISDS*. Retrieved from: <https://www.tuc.org.uk/research-analysis/reports/tuc-submission-european-commissions-consultation-isds>
- TUC. (2014b). *TUC calls for public services and ISDS to be excluded from EU-Canada trade deal*. Retrieved from: <https://www.tuc.org.uk/research-analysis/reports/tuc-calls-public-services-and-isds-be-excluded-eu-canada-trade-deal>
- TUC. (2015). *General Council statement on EU referendum*. Retrieved from: <https://www.tuc.org.uk/research-analysis/reports/general-council-statement-eu-referendum>
- TUC. (2016). *TUC letter to International Trade Secretary Liam Fox calling for him to oppose CETA*. Retrieved from: <https://www.tuc.org.uk/research-analysis/reports/tuc-letter-international-trade-secretary-liam-fox-calling-him-oppose-ceta>
- TUC. (2020a). *TUC Directory 2020*. TUC. https://www.tuc.org.uk/sites/default/files/2020-01/TUC_Directory_2020.pdf
- TUC. (2020b). *TUC concerns about government "global tariffs" plans*. Retrieved from: <https://www.tuc.org.uk/research-analysis/reports/tuc-concerns-about-government-global-tariffs-plans>
- Turner, L. (1982). *The Newly Industrializing Countries: Trade and Adjustment*. George Allen and Unwin.
- Turner, L. (1996). The Europeanization of Labour: Structure Before Action, *European Journal of Industrial Relations*, 2(3), 325-344. DOI: 10.1177/095968019623003
- Turner, S.P. (2014). *The Politics of Expertise*. Routledge.
- Uggla, F. (2006). Between Globalism and Pragmatism: ATTAC in France, Germany, and Sweden. *Mobilization: An International Quarterly*, 11(1), 51–66. <https://doi.org/10.17813/maiq.11.1.q017g82p477p1837>
- UNCTAD. (2014). *UNCTAD World Investment Report 2014: Investing in the SDGs: an Action Plan*. Retrieved from: https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/wir2014_en.pdf
- Underhill, G. R. D. (1998). *Industrial Crisis and the Open Economy: Politics, Global Trade and the Textile Industry in the Advanced Economies*. Macmillan.

- Unite the Union. (2018). *Unite Demands Action for UK Steelworkers*. Retrieved from: <https://unitetheunion.org/news-events/news/2018/march/unite-demands-government-action-to-defend-uk-steelworkers-against-threat-of-us-steel-tariffs/>
- Unite the Union. (2021). *A Collective Bargaining Strategy for Trade*. Retrieved from: https://www.unitetheunion.org/media/3694/unite_trade-report_final_march-2021.pdf
- Upchurch, M., Taylor, G., and Mathers, A. (2009). *The Crisis of Social Democratic Trade Unionism in Western Europe: The Search for Alternatives*. Routledge.
- Van Apeldoorn, B. (2002). *Transnational capitalism and the struggle over European integration*. Routledge.
- Van Apeldoorn, B., and Hager, S. B. (2010). The social purpose of new governance: Lisbon and the limits of legitimacy, *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 13: 209-238.
- Vandaele, K. (2019). *Bleak prospects: mapping trade union membership in Europe since 2000*. ETUI.
- Vandenbergh, J. (2008). On Carrots and Sticks: The Social Dimension of EU Trade Policy. *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 13, 561.
- Van den Hoven, A. (2002). The European Commission's Trade Dialogue with Civil Society: The First Step Towards More Open and Transparent Trade Policy Making? *Europe-Russia Conference Series Workshop on Identity and Representation in an Integrated Europe (Carleton University, May 9-10, 2002)*. Retrieved from: <https://carleton.ca/ces/wp-content/uploads/vandenHoven02.pdf>
- Van den Hoven, A. (2004). Assuming Leadership in Multilateral Economic Institutions: The EU's 'Development Round' Discourse and Strategy. *West European Politics*, 27(2), 256–283. <https://doi.org/10.1080/0140238042000214900>
- Van den Putte, L. (2015). Involving Civil Society in Social Clauses and the Decent Work Agenda, *Global Labour Journal*, 6(2), 221–235.
- Van den Putte, L., and Orbie, J. (2015). EU Bilateral Trade Agreements and the Surprising Rise of Labour Provisions, *The International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations*, 31(3), 263-283. Retrieved from: <https://kluwerlawonline.com/journalarticle/International+Journal+of+Comparative+Labour+Law+and+Industrial+Relations/31.3/IJCL2015015>
- Van der Loo, G. (2016). *CETA's signature: 38 statements, a joint interpretative instrument and an uncertain future (CEPS)*. Retrieved from: <https://www.ceps.eu/ceps->

[publications/cetas-signature-38-statements-joint-interpretative-instrument-and-uncertain-future/](#)

- Van Loon, A. (2018). The political economy of EU trade policy: what do we (not) know? *Zeitschrift Für Politikwissenschaft*, 28(1), 97–110. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s41358-018-0128-1>
- Van Roozendaal, G. (2002). *Trade Unions and Global Governance: The Debate on a Social Clause*. Continuum.
- Verberckmoes, J. (1996). The Politics of Ideological Diversity in France. In P. Pasture, J. Verberckmoes and H. de Witte (Eds.), *The Lost Perspective: Trade Unions Between Ideology and Social Action (Volume 1)*. Aldershot: Avebury.
- Vickerstaff, S. (1989). *The Limits of Corporatism: The British Experience in the Twentieth Century*. Avebury.
- Visser, J. (1998). Learning to Play: The Europeanisation of Trade Unions. In P. Pasture and J. Verberckmoes (Eds.), *Working-Class Internationalism and the Appeal of National Identity: Historical Debates and Current Perspectives*, (pp. 231-257). Berg.
- Visser, J. (2011). Database on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts, 1960-2010: ICTWSS. Retrieved from: [http://archive.uva-aias.net/uploaded_files/regular/ICTWSScodebook30\(2\).pdf](http://archive.uva-aias.net/uploaded_files/regular/ICTWSScodebook30(2).pdf)
- Visser, J., and Ebbinghaus, B. (1992). Making the Most of Diversity? European Integration and Transnational Organization of Labour. In J. Greenwood, J. R. Grote and K. Ronit (Eds.), *Organized Interests and the European Community*, pp. 206-237. Sage.
- VoteWatch Europe. (2016). *EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement*. Retrieved from: <http://www.votewatch.eu/en/term8-eu-canada-comprehensive-economic-and-trade-agreement-draft-legislative-resolution-vote-consent-conse.html>
- Waddington, J. (2006). The trade union merger process in Europe: Defensive adjustment or strategic reform? *Industrial Relations Journal*, 37(6), 630–651. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2338.2006.00425.x>
- Warlouzet, L. (2014). Towards a European Industrial Policy? The European Economic Community (EEC) debates, 1957-1975. In C. Grabas and A. Nützenadel (Eds.), *Industrial Policy in Europe after 1945: Wealth, Power and Economic Development in the Cold War*, pp. 213-235. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Warlouzet, L. (2018). *Governing Europe in a Globalizing World: Neoliberalism and its Alternatives following the 1973 Oil Crisis*. Routledge.

- War on Want. (2014). *TTIP: No public benefits, but major costs*. Retrieved from: <https://waronwant.org/sites/default/files/TTIP%20mythbuster%2C%20Sept%202014.pdf>
- Waterman, A. (2018). The Limits of Embedded Liberalism: TUC Strategies to Influence the Multi-Fibre Arrangement and the GATT Social Clause, 1973–1994. *Labour History Review*, 83(2), 125–146. <https://doi.org/10.3828/lhr.2018.7>
- Waterman, A. (2020). Resisting globalisation? The TUC, the CBI and the politics of protectionism in the UK textile industry in the 1970s. In L. Coppolaro and L. Mechi (Eds.), *Free Trade and Social Welfare in Europe: Explorations in the Long 20th Century*, pp. 126-143. Routledge.
- Waterman, P. (1998). *Globalization, Social Movements and the New Internationalisms*. Mansell.
- Waterman, P., and Timms, J. (2005). Trade union internationalism and a global civil society in the making. In M. Glasius, M. Kaldor, and H. Anheier, *Global civil society 2004/5* (pp. 178-203). SAGE Publications Ltd. Retrieved from: <https://www.doi.org/10.4135/9781446211908.n9>
- Watts, J., and Bale, T. (2019). Populism as an intra-party phenomenon: The British Labour Party under Jeremy Corbyn. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 21(1), 99–115. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148118806115>
- Webster, E., Lambert, R., and Bezuidenhout, A. (2008). *Grounding Globalization*. Wiley-Blackwell.
- Wieczorek-Zeul, H. (2001). The Next WTO Round will be a Development Round: Germany's Position on the Future Trade Round, *Development and Cooperation*, 5(Sept/Oct).
- Wilkinson R. (2001), "The WTO in crisis. Exploring the dimensions of institutional inertia", *Journal of World Trade*, 35(3), 397-419.
- Williams, M. (2005). Civil Society and the World Trading System. In D, Kelly and W, Grant (Eds.), *The Politics of International Trade in the Twenty-First Century*, pp. 30-46. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Wilson, F. L. (1985). Trade unions and economic policy. In H. Machin and V. Wright (Eds.), *Economic Policy and Policy-Making Under the Mitterand Presidency, 1981-1984*, pp. 255-278. Frances Pinter.
- Wintrebert, R. (2007). Attac France et le mouvement altermondialiste, *Courrier hebdomadaire du CRISP*, n° 1978-1979(33), 5–62.

- Woll, C. (2009). Trade Policy Lobbying in the European Union: Who Captures Whom? In D. Coen and J. Richardson (Eds.), *Lobbying in the European Union: Institutions, Actors and Issues*, pp. 268-288. Oxford University Press.
- Wood, L. J. (2004). Breaking the bank and taking to the streets: how protesters target neoliberalism, *Journal of World-Systems Research*, 10(1): 69– 89.
DOI: <https://doi.org/10.5195/jwsr.2004.313>
- Woolcock, S. (1982). Textiles and Clothing. In L. Turner and N. McMullen, *The Newly Industrializing Countries: Trade and Adjustment*, pp. 27-47. George Allen and Unwin.
- Woolcock, S. (2005). European Union Trade Policy. In D. Kelly and W. Grant (Eds.), *The Politics of International Trade in the Twenty-First Century*, pp. 234-251. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Woolcock, S. (2010a). EU trade and investment policymaking after the Lisbon treaty. *Intereconomics*, 45(1), 22–25. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10272-010-0321-z>
- Woolcock, S. (2010b). Trade Policy: A Further Shift Towards Brussels. In H. Wallace, M. A. Pollack, and A. R. Young (Eds.), *Policy-Making in the European Union (6th Edition)*, pp. 381-400. Oxford University Press.
- worker-participation.eu. (n.d.). *European Works Councils: Facts and Figures*. Retrieved from: <https://www.worker-participation.eu/European-Works-Councils/Facts-Figures>
- World Bank. (2019). *International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook and data files*. Retrieved from:
<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.GSR.GNFS.CD>
- Wright, C. (2010). *Swords of Justice and Civic Pillars*. TUC.
- Wright, E. O. (2000). Working Class Power, Capitalist-Class Interests and Class Compromise, *American Journal of Sociology*, 105 (4), 957-1002.
- Wright, V. (1978). The French general election of March 1978: La divine surprise. *West European Politics*, 1(3), 24–52. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402387808424210>
- WTO. (n.d.). *The WTO General Council*. Retrieved from:
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/gcounc_e/gcounc_e.htm
- WTO. (1994). *Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization*. Retrieved from: https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto_e.htm
- WTO. (1996). *DRAFT SINGAPORE MINISTERIAL DECLARATION*. WT/MIN(96)/DEC/W, 13 December 1996. Retrieved from:
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-

[DP.aspx?language=EandCatalogueIdList=48267,32665andCurrentCatalogueIdIndex=1andFullTextHash=1andHasEnglishRecord=TrueandHasFrenchRecord=TrueandHasSpanishRecord=True](https://www.wto.org/DP.aspx?language=EandCatalogueIdList=48267,32665andCurrentCatalogueIdIndex=1andFullTextHash=1andHasEnglishRecord=TrueandHasFrenchRecord=TrueandHasSpanishRecord=True)

- WTO. (1998). United States: statement by H.E. Mr. William J. Clinton, President. Retrieved from: https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min98_e/anniv_e/clinton_e.htm
- WTO. (1999). *Statement by the Right Honourable Stephen Byers, MP, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry*. WT/MIN(99)/ST/8, 30 November 1999. Retrieved from: https://www.wto.org/English/thewto_e/minist_e/min99_e/english/state_e/d5187e.doc
- WTO. (2001). *Doha Ministerial Declaration*, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 20 November 2001. Retrieved from: https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-DP.aspx?language=EandCatalogueIdList=37246andCurrentCatalogueIdIndex=0andFullTextSearch=
- WTO. (2004). *WTO public symposium: "Multilateralism at a crossroads", 25 to 27 May 2004*. Retrieved from: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/symp_devagenda_prog_04_e.htm
- YouGov. (2015). *Mehr TTIP-Gegner in Deutschland als anderswo*. Retrieved from: <https://yougov.de/news/2015/03/31/viele-deutsche-sind-gegen-ttip/>
- Young, A. R. (2019). Two wrongs make a right? The politicization of trade policy and European trade strategy. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 26(12), 1883–1899.
- Young, A. R., and Peterson, J. (2006). The EU and the new trade politics. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 13(6), 795–814. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13501760600837104>
- Young, A. R., and Peterson, J. (2013). 'We care about you, but ...': The politics of EU trade policy and development. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 26(3), 497–518. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2012.734782>
- Young, A. R., and Peterson, J. (2014). *Parochial global Europe: 21st century trade politics*. Oxford University Press.
- Zeiler, T. W. (2013). Requiem for the Common Man: Class, the Nixon Economic Shock, and the Perils of Globalization. *Diplomatic History*, 37(1), 1–23. <https://doi.org/10.1093/dh/dhs009>
- Zeit Archiv. (1981, September 11). *Genug Opfer gebracht*. Retrieved from: <https://www.zeit.de/1981/38/genug-opfer-gebracht/seite-2>

Zeit Online. (2015). *Freihandelsabkommen: TTIP bringt Rekordzahl von Gegnern auf die Straße*. Retrieved 20 August 2018 from: <https://www.zeit.de/wirtschaft/2015-10/ttip-demonstration-berlin-gabriel-ceta>

Annex 1 - List of Interviewees

Yorgos Altintzis	Advisor, Economic and Social Policy, ITUC
Claire Baker	International Officer, Unite the Union
Daniele Basso	Advisor, ETUC
Tony Burke	Former Assistant General Secretary for Manufacturing, Unite the Union
Patrick Correa	International Officer, FTM-CGT
Rosa Crawford	Policy Officer, International Department of the TUC
John Evans	Former member of the TUC's Economic Department and former General Secretary of the TUAC to the OECD
James Howard	Former Director of Economic and Social Policy for the ICFTU, and special advisor to the ILO.
Wolf Jäcklein	Head of International Department, CGT
Tom Jenkins	Special Advisor, ETUC
Jude Kirton-Darling	Former Labour MEP and former Confederal Secretary for the ETUC
Judy McKnight	Former member of the Workers' Group of the EESC
Matthieu Méaulle	Economic Advisor, ETUC
Horst Mund	Director of the Transnational Department, IG Metall
Martin Myant	Associate Researcher, ETUI
Ben Norman	Industrial Researcher, Unite the Union
Stephen Pursey	Former member of the TUC's Economic Department, former Secretary of the Economic and Social Committee of the ICFTU, and former senior policy adviser and G20 coordinator for the Office of the Deputy Director-General of the ILO.
Nora Rohde	Policy Advisor, DGB
Ed Sweeney	Former General Council and Executive Committee member, TUC

Anonymous interviewees

Anti-poverty CSO member

Business CSO member

DG Employment and Social Affairs Official

DG Trade Official 1

DG Trade Official 2

DG Trade Official 3

Annex 2 - List of archives visited

Archiv der sozialen Demokratie, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Bonn

Archives départementales de la Seine-Saint-Denis, Paris

Archives Nationales, Paris

Bundesarchiv, Koblenz

Historical Archives of the European Union, European University Institute, Florence

Institut CGT d'histoire sociale, Paris

International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam

Modern Records Centre, University of Warwick

TUC Library Collections, London Metropolitan University

Annex 4 – Ethical Review confirmation



Ethics-fhss@port.ac.uk

September 10th 2015

Dear Andrew,

Study Title:	From advocacy to expertise? The changing role of trade unions in GATT and WTO trade negotiations, 1973-2013
Ethics Committee reference:	14/15:42

Thank you for submitting your documents for ethical review. The Ethics Committee was content to grant a favourable ethical opinion of the above research on the basis described in the application form, protocol and supporting documentation, revised in the light of any conditions set, subject to the general conditions set out in the attached document.

The favourable opinion of the EC does not grant permission or approval to undertake the research. Management permission or approval must be obtained from any host organisation, including University of Portsmouth, prior to the start of the study

Documents reviewed

The documents reviewed by The Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences Ethics Committee.

<i>Document</i>	<i>Version</i>	<i>Date</i>
Protocol		
Appendix 1: Letter/email to be sent to data custodian of archives		
Appendix 2: Research invitation letter/email		
Appendix 3: Information Sheet		
Appendix 4: Consent Form		
Appendix 5: Interview Schedule		

Statement of compliance

The Committee is constituted in accordance with the Governance Arrangements set out by the University of Portsmouth

After ethical review

Reporting and other requirements

The enclosed document acts as a reminder that research should be conducted with integrity and gives detailed guidance on reporting requirements for studies with a favourable opinion, including:

- Notifying substantial amendments
- Notification of serious breaches of the protocol
- Progress reports
- Notifying the end of the study

Feedback

You are invited to give your view of the service that you have received from the Faculty Ethics Committee. If you wish to make your views known please contact the administrator ethics-fhss@port.ac.uk

Please quote this number on all correspondence – 14/15:42
--

Yours sincerely and wishing you every success in your research,

Chair
Jane Winstone

Email: ethics-fhss@port.ac.uk

Annex 5 – List of funding received

DAAD One Year Research Grant, June 2017 (€10,500)

German History Society Postgraduate Research Bursary, May 2017 (£2,000)

Society for the Study of French History Research Grant, May 2016 (£1,000)

Postgraduate Vibeke Sørensen Grant – 2016 Edition, April 2016 (€1.280)

UACES Travel Scholarship, November 2015 (£1,500)

Society for the Study of Labour History Postgraduate Research Grant, September 2015 (£350)

CEISR /CESTE, University of Portsmouth grant to organise the 2016 History of European Integration Research Society Annual Conference, February 2015 (£1,600)

German History Society/DAAD Summer Language Course Grant, January 2015 (€850)

PhD Fees-only Bursary from CEISR, University of Portsmouth, October 2014

Annex 6 – UPR16 Form

FORM UPR16

Research Ethics Review Checklist



Please include this completed form as an appendix to your thesis (see the Research Degrees Operational Handbook for more information)

Postgraduate Research Student (PGRS) Information		Student ID:	295786
PGRS Name:	Andrew Waterman		
Department:	SASHPL	First Supervisor:	Prof. Wolfram Kaiser
Start Date: (or progression date for Prof Doc students)	01.10.2014		
Study Mode and Route:	Part-time <input type="checkbox"/> Full-time <input type="checkbox"/>	MPhil <input type="checkbox"/> PhD <input type="checkbox"/>	MD <input type="checkbox"/> Professional Doctorate <input type="checkbox"/>

Title of Thesis:	European trade unions and world trade negotiations: The struggle for fair and sustainable trade policies, 1973-2018.
Thesis Word Count: (excluding ancillary data)	104,520

If you are unsure about any of the following, please contact the local representative on your Faculty Ethics Committee for advice. Please note that it is your responsibility to follow the University's Ethics Policy and any relevant University, academic or professional guidelines in the conduct of your study

Although the Ethics Committee may have given your study a ~~favourable~~ opinion, the final responsibility for the ethical conduct of this work lies with the researcher(s).

UKRIO Finished Research Checklist:

(If you would like to know more about the checklist, please see your Faculty or Departmental Ethics Committee rep or see the online version of the full checklist at: <http://www.ukrio.org/what-we-do/code-of-practice-for-research/>)

a) Have <u>all</u> of your research and findings been reported accurately, honestly and within a reasonable time frame?	YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/>
b) Have all contributions to knowledge been acknowledged?	YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/>
c) Have you complied with all agreements relating to intellectual property, <u>publication</u> and authorship?	YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/>
d) Has your research data been retained in a secure and accessible form and will it remain so for the required duration?	YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/>
e) Does your research comply with all legal, ethical, and contractual requirements?	YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/>

Candidate Statement:

I have considered the ethical dimensions of the above named research project, and have successfully obtained the necessary ethical approval(s)

Ethical review number(s) from Faculty Ethics Committee (or from NRES/SCREC):	14/15:42
---	----------

If you have *not* submitted your work for ethical review, and/or you have answered 'No' to one or more of questions a) to e), please explain below why this is so:

--

Signed (PGRS):		Date: 08.06.2021
-----------------------	--	-------------------------