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ARTICLE

# "Securitized" UK aid projects in Africa: Evidence from Kenya, Nigeria and South Sudan

**Ivica Petrikova**[1] | **Melita Lazell**[2]

[1]Royal Holloway, University of London, UK

[2]University of Portsmouth, UK

**Correspondence**
Ivica Petrikova, Royal Holloway, University of London, UK.
Email: ivica.petrikova@rhul.ac.uk

## Abstract

**Motivation:** In 2020, the UK Department for International Development (DFID) was merged with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) as the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO). This policy move strengthens the trend to "securitize" development, whereby the provision of aid is motivated by national security concerns.

**Purpose:** Many researchers have raised concerns about the securitization of aid and its consequences for development, but little research has examined its impact on aid-recipient countries.

**Approach and Methods:** This study evaluates 144 securitized aid projects implemented by DFID between 2000 and 2018 in Kenya, Nigeria and South Sudan, using the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness, impact, and sustainability.

**Findings:** Our analysis finds that although most of the projects assessed were "relevant", i.e. formally aligned with recipient and funders' objectives, many struggled to achieve their intended outputs ("effectiveness"). Few of the projects had a positive "impact". We conclude that the securitized projects reviewed did not significantly strengthen the recipient countries' institutions, stability, or security but had some negative side effects.

**Policy Implications:** In view of the merger of DFID with the FCO and the decision to reduce aid from 0.7% to 0.5% of Gross National Income (GNI), the UK is likely to draw an even closer connection between domestic security priorities and its development aid. In view of our empirical findings, the UK government needs to be more aware of the limitations of development interventions undertaken in the name of security and consider other means of enabling development.

**KEYWORDS**

aid, aid securitization, Department for International Development (DFID), Kenya, Nigeria, South Sudan

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## 1 | INTRODUCTION

In June 2020, the British Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, announced the merger of the UK Department for International Development (DFID) with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) as the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO). The stated rationale for the merger was that UK official development assistance (ODA) had for too long been "treated as some giant cash-point in the sky without any reference to UK interests" and that the new joint department would lend "extra throw-weight and kilowattage" to the UK's goals overseas (BBC, 2020). Although more explicit than previously articulated, the merger of the two departments and the surrounding rhetoric are emblematic of "aid securitization," namely using its bilateral aid to support the donor's national security interests. This has been a trend in the UK in recent years through policy decisions such as the pledge to spend 50% of aid on fragile states and the establishment of a Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF) administered by the National Security Council but partially funded through development aid. Although the ongoing securitization of aid in many countries belonging to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has been extensively acknowledged, its effect on aid-recipient countries has not received the same attention.

Addressing this omission, this article sheds light on the impact of aid securitization on aid-recipient countries through evaluating projects funded by "securitized" UK aid. The article assesses all DFID "securitized aid" projects, 144 in total, funded in three African countries over the last two decades. (The projects are listed in Appendix 1.) Our analysis finds that while on paper most of the projects aligned the recipients' and donor's objectives, they struggled to achieve their intended outputs and provided only very limited long-term benefits. The local "ownership" of interventions is also questioned, as is the concept of ownership more generally. Through this comprehensive analysis, the ineffectiveness and occasionally negative effects of the projects broadly funded in the interest of "national security" become clear. With the recent establishment of the FCDO, this research comes at a pivotal moment for the securitization of UK development aid.

Existing analyses of aid trends suggest that the UK has, in line with its policy discourse, generally increased its provision of development aid to activities deemed to enhance security, broadly defined (Lazell & Petrikova, 2020). Building on this research, our article first assesses what kinds of projects "securitized" aid has actually funded and, second, uses OECD evaluation criteria to examine the projects' effects in three African countries—Kenya, Nigeria and South Sudan—between 2000 and 2018. These countries are diverse in terms of their experience of conflict and can therefore be used to draw some broader conclusions about the impact of aid.

Section 2 presents an overview of UK development policy discourse from the late 1990s to 2018, demonstrating the securitization of its development aid over this period. Section 3 summarizes existing empirical analyses of the securitization of UK aid, as well as the impacts of security-driven projects on aid recipients and explains our methodological approach. In section 4 we present the findings of the analysis and discuss their significance and section 5 presents a final discussion and conclusions.

## 2 | THE SECURITIZATION OF DEVELOPMENT IN THE UK

Drawing on academic research and UK policy documents, this section summarizes the trends concerning the securitization of development, looking first at policy discourse, then aid distribution, and finally impact. In summarizing these trends, this section provides a rationale for our methodology outlined in Section 3.

The increased tendency for donors, including the UK, to link development intervention with domestic security has been well documented (e.g. Beall et al., 2005; Cliffe et al., 2003; Duffield, 2010; Hettne, 2010; McConnon, 2014, 2019; Thomas, 2001; Wilkin, 2002; Wilkinson, 2005; Woods, 2005). Academics and development non-government organizations (NGOs) have been concerned that Western donors increasingly portray conflict and instability in low- and middle-income countries (L&MICs) as a threat to their national security (Duffield, 2010; Hettne, 2010; McConnon, 2014). The literature on the securitization of development owes a debt to the Copenhagen School's original understanding of securitization both as an act of political will and a speech act (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 2; Wilkin, 2002). Furthermore, Buzan's understanding that there is no need for there to be a real existential threat for an issue to be securitized, only for it to be presented as such a threat (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 24), is also echoed in this literature. Duffield (2001), for example, argued that the empirical evidence that "underdevelopment" is a potential international security threat is very weak (see also Stern & Öjendal, 2010). Conversely, while the Copenhagen School argued for the legitimate widening of the traditional security framework to include, for instance, economic security, debates surrounding the securitization of development have tended to problematize the issue.

In terms of development policy, after a brief period following the end of the Cold War, when security concerns were delinked from development and donors were reluctant to engage in conflict zones (Suhrke & Buckmaster, 2006, p. 340), the late 1990s saw a resurgence of the securitization of development among OECD donors. In 2005, Hilary Benn, as Secretary of State for International Development, emphasized that in an interdependent world, conflict and crime crossed borders and therefore no country could "remain aloof from the effects of insecurity elsewhere" (DFID, 2005a, pp. 3–5). Global challenges, including conflict and instability, were no longer seen as contained by distance or borders; a notion that gained particular momentum in the context of the "War on Terror" (Straw, 2002). This discursive trend connecting conflict and fragility in L&MICs with domestic security has intensified in the ensuing 20 years, with conflict and weak governance in African countries highlighted as central to UK security concerns (e.g. DFID, 2007; HM Treasury & DFID, 2015).

The securitization of UK development policy has been underpinned by three related beliefs. The first is that underdevelopment and conflict in L&MICs are mutually reinforcing (e.g. DFID, 2005a, p. 3; HM Treasury & DFID, 2015, pp. 3–5). The second is that instability and conflict in L&MICs are potential sources of insecurity for OECD members and other wealthy countries, including the UK (DFID, 2005a, pp. 3–5; DFID, 2012a, p. 2; Greening, 2015a, pp. 7–8; Greening, 2015b, p. 2). DFID maintained that "conflict and instability overseas have clear consequences for UK peace, security, and prosperity" (HM Treasury & DFID, 2015, p. 13). There is a clear assumption that through terrorism, international crime, and refugee flows, insecurity and underdevelopment in L&MICs have the potential to erode security in the UK (for example DFID, 2005b, pp. 5, 10). The third belief is that development aid can be used to enhance national security (HM Treasury & DFID, 2015, p. 3; Watt, 2010). Unsurprisingly, given its *raison d'être*, DFID explicitly depicted aid as a powerful tool for reducing conflict in L&MICs and creating "a safer…world" in the national interest (DFID, 2012a, p. 1).

According to the UK policy discourse, reducing and preventing conflict in L&MICs requires two types of development intervention (Lazell & Petrikova, 2020). The first are development projects which seek to encourage the development of democratic, inclusive societies that respect human rights. Interventions promoting this "golden thread of democracy" (HM Treasury & DFID, 2015, p. 11) include strengthening the efficiency and accountability of institutions, civil society, and the rule of law, tackling marginalization and exclusion, and advancing the rights and opportunities of women and girls (Greening, 2015b). The second type of development projects aimed at reducing conflict and instability are explicit conflict-prevention and resolution measures, such as the disarmament of civilians and reforms of the security, police, and justice sectors (DFID, 2003, 2005a; Greening, 2015b).

The literature on the securitization of development has generally maintained that the trend has affected the distribution of development aid. McConnon (2014, p. 1146) argued that the "shift in [donor] discourse" coincided with the "prioritisation of fragile states in aid flows" and "specific programmes aimed at addressing [donor] security concerns." Brown and Grävingholt found that "international aid agencies revised their aid strategies to reflect new security concerns and increased aid to strategic conflict-affected countries" (2016, pp. 1–2). These studies, however, focused on aggregate aid levels rather than aid to the two sectors identified by the UK government as key to reducing security threats posed by L&MICs: democratization and good governance projects; and explicit conflict-prevention measures. Lazell and Petrikova's (2020) large-N analysis of aid to these sectors found that aid to both increased between 1995 and 2015 in absolute as well as relative terms. Interestingly, the provision of conflict-prevention aid rose faster in countries not affected by conflict than in conflict-affected countries. Aid to democratization programmes also grew over time, with the increase concentrated primarily in countries of strategic importance.[1]

The rationale for providing aid to the two sectors is to ensure peace and stability in recipient countries, which is then expected to positively affect the donor's security. As with the question of the effects on economic growth (e.g. Doucouliagos & Paldam, 2011), however, there is little consensus regarding the effects of aid projects specifically focused on conflict and instability. While Fearon et al. (2009) posited that even short-term aid projects could increase communities' social cohesion and thus reduce the likelihood of conflicts erupting, Crost et al. (2014) suggested that rebel groups in the Philippines, knowing that conflict-prevention aid projects may weaken their cause, tried to derail the projects, which increased civilian casualties. This discord supports Campbell and Spilker's (2020) observation that aid to conflict-affected countries has different effects in different contexts.

Most research examining democratization and conflict-prevention projects also considers the question of "ownership" (Barron et al., 2011; Kyamusugulwa, 2013). The 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness was a pivotal agreement in the donor–recipient relationship in this regard (Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, 2005). The first of its five principles—ownership—became central to development policy and practice. This agreement acknowledged that people, communities, and states needed to define their own development priorities and strategies, and be responsible for implementation and monitoring. Ideally, the result of ownership would be that communities were empowered to lead the development agenda. Scholarly research generally agrees that aid projects can contribute to sustainable peace only when "owned" by local communities.

Much of the aid provided to fragile and conflict-affected states is, however, "stability" rather than "need-driven" (Steinwand, 2015, p. 411) and hence not "owned" by the population. Furthermore, even formally community-driven development initiatives often lack true participation of and ownership by local communities (King et al., 2010). Goodhand and Sedra (2010) problematized this issue further by highlighting that ownership is often violently contested in conflict-affected areas, which may require donors to choose sides in the conflict. While Addison and McGillivray (2004) saw the potential absence of authority in conflict settings as providing a beneficial power vacuum for donors to implement the type of policy reforms they regarded as most appropriate, evidence from conflict-affected countries such as Afghanistan, Colombia and Iraq suggests that despite billions of dollars spent on democratization and peace-building activities, donors failed to establish strong institutions (e.g. Bizhan, 2018; Elhawary, 2010; Goodhand & Sedra, 2010; Howard, 2015). Kilroy (2015, pp. 22–24) identified genuine participatory approaches in development projects—going beyond consultation

[1]Strategic importance to the UK was estimated on the basis of the number of refugees the UK received from a given country, the number of arms the UK exported there, and the number of terrorist-attack casualties against OECD/EU citizens sustained in the country (Lazell & Petrikova, 2020, pp. 8–9).

to joint decision-making that involves even more marginalized groups in the community—as key to the "ownership" of external interventions.

Beyond the aforementioned studies that focused generally on a small number of specific aid projects, our study analysed all DFID-funded democratization and good governance and conflict, peace and security projects in three African countries between 2000 and 2018. It thus provides a robust analysis of how the UK's securitization of development aid has affected recipient countries and allows us to draw wider conclusions about the merits and limitations of development projects funded in the donor's national interest. Many researchers have raised doubts about the ability of aid projects to help build democratic and peaceful societies; this research makes an important contribution to the empirical base from which to make broader claims about the impact of such aid interventions.

## 3 | METHODOLOGY

### 3.1 | Case selection

We chose Kenya, Nigeria and South Sudan as our case studies because they represent a range on the conflict-affectedness scale and are all of high strategic interest to the UK.[2] They are also former British colonies. Our previous work has shown that securitization is more prevalent in countries of higher strategic interest to the donor (Lazell & Petrikova, 2020). African countries of lower strategic interest to the UK, for instance former French colonies Mali and Senegal, have had comparatively few aid projects funded by the UK and linked to the security agenda (OECD-Stat, n.d.-a), demonstrating the continent's continued division into its former colonial powers' spheres of influence.

Table 1 presents some key summary statistics for the case-study countries. All three fall in the category of low- or lower-middle-income countries (LICs or LMICs) according to the World Bank classification, with South Sudan being the poorest and Nigeria the richest of the three. The strategic interest of all three countries to the UK, calculated on the basis of their refugee flows, arms purchases, and terrorist activity, is relatively high[3] but it is lower in Kenya than in the other two countries. These characteristics are related to the level of conflict experienced by the three countries over the last 20 years. In that period of time, South Sudan suffered a high-intensity and Nigeria a moderate level of conflict, while Kenya experienced only a low level of conflict.

South Sudan gained independence from Sudan in 2011, after decades of intra-state fighting. Two years later, in December 2013, civil war erupted between the country's two main ethnic groups, the Dinka and the Nuer. Several ceasefire agreements were negotiated and subsequently broken in the following years, with the last one—still holding—in August 2018. Nigeria did not experience a nationwide conflict in the period examined but there were ongoing tensions in the Niger Delta, outbreaks of violence between farmers and pastoralist herders in the Middle Belt, and the conflict with the militant group Boko Haram in the North East, which peaked in intensity between 2014 and 2017. In comparison, Kenya was relatively peaceful, with the exception of a flare-up of violence following the 2007 election and sporadic terrorist attacks by the Al Shabab militant group.

Of the case-study countries, Nigeria received on average most UK aid in total but South Sudan most in per-capita terms. In all three countries, about 10% of all UK aid went to fund "securitized" projects in conflict prevention, and democratization and good governance. For comparison, Mali and

[2]Strategic importance to the UK was estimated following Lazell and Petrikova's (2020) method, described in note 1.

[3]For comparison, Senegal's calculated strategic interest to the UK is 0 and Mali's 0.1.

**TABLE 1** Descriptive Statistics of the Three Case-study Countries

| | Kenya | Nigeria | South Sudan |
|---|---|---|---|
| GDP per capita (2018, PPP, 2018 USD) | 4,204 | 5,155 | 1,678 |
| Population (2018, in millions) | 51.4 | 195.9 | 11.0 |
| IDPs (2018, in thousands) | 162 | 2,216 | 1869 |
| UK aid (2000–2018 av., in millions. 2018 USD) | 127.4 | 472.5 | 202.6 |
| UK aid per capita (2000–2017 av. 2018 USD) | 2.5 | 2.4 | 18.4 |
| UK aid to securitized projects (2002–2018 av., in millions. 2018 USD) | 11.0 | 56.7 | 18.0 |
| UK aid to D&GG (2000–2018 av., in millions. 2018 USD) | 9.3 | 52.8 | 7.7 |
| UK aid to CPS (2000–2018 av., in millions. 2018 USD) | 4.0 | 5.8 | 9.7 |
| Strategic interest to the UK (2000–2018, scale 0–3) | 0.4 | 0.8 | 0.7 |
| Conflict (2000–2018) | mild | medium | high |

*Notes:* GDP – Gross Domestic Product; PPP – adjusted for purchasing power parity; av. – average; D&GG – democratization and good governance projects; CPS – conflict, peace and security projects

*Sources*: World Development Indicators, Query Wizard for International Development Statistics (OECD-Stat, n.d.-b), Uppsala University Conflict Data Programme, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) database, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and Global Terrorism Database

Senegal, of low strategic interest to the UK, received 50 to 100 times less UK support for similar projects (OECD-Stat, n.d.-a).

## 3.2 | Methods

As discussed above, UK policy discourse notes two types of projects as contributing to the recipient country's and, by extension, the donor's security — "democratization and good governance" projects (i.e. general investment in government and civil society) and conflict, peace and security projects. We therefore examined all such UK aid projects that began between 2000 and 2018 in the three countries. The documentation for these projects, where available, can be found on DFID's Development Tracker (https://devtracker.DFID.gov.uk).

In the period observed, in Kenya, Nigeria and South Sudan, the UK funded 37, 71 and 36 such projects, respectively.[4] Overall, the UK spent more than GBP 600 million in Kenya, over GBP 1 billion in Nigeria and over GBP 900 million on these projects in South Sudan. In South Sudan, the projects comprised an approximately equal mix of democratization and good governance and conflict-prevention activities, whereas in Kenya DFID funded mostly democratization and good governance projects in the 2000s with a more recent increase in the number of conflict-prevention projects. In Nigeria, despite moderate levels of conflict, the focus was predominantly on democratization activities. Finally, while in Kenya and South Sudan DFID worked on many projects with the national governments, in Nigeria DFID worked only with state governments rather than the national government—due to high levels of corruption, according to the UK government.

[4]For some projects, only one part was focused on democratization, governance, or conflict-prevention—which is the part evaluated here. All projects with brief descriptions are listed in Appendix 1.

In assessing the projects, we drew on four of the six OECD criteria[5] for evaluating development assistance: relevance, effectiveness, impact, and sustainability. Relevance refers to the extent to which aid activities are consistent with the priorities and policies of both recipients and donors. Effectiveness measures whether aid activities have attained their short- and long-term objectives. Impact denotes the positive and negative changes produced by the development interventions and, finally, sustainability assesses if any benefits are likely to continue after donor funding ceases.

In order to find relevant information about the four criteria, we employed qualitative content analysis of project documents from the three countries available on Development Tracker. An iterative process of analysis was used, with text coded to categories and patterns identified (Tracy, 2012). For completed projects, we focused primarily on Project Completion Reports and Impact Evaluations, and for ongoing projects on the most recent Annual Project Reviews. For several projects that began in the early 2000s, there were no documents available because DFID was not required to submit documentation online prior to 2011. There is also little documentation available on projects funded by the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund, which is partially funded by development aid but administered by the UK National Security Council. In an effort to counter any bias in DFID-produced evaluations, we triangulated sources of information where possible using reviews from the Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI), independent impact evaluations, parliament reports, and academic studies.

## 4 | FINDINGS

### 4.1 | Relevance

The OECD's relevance criterion assesses whether the funded development activities are in theory consistent with the goals of the donors and recipients. The broad goal of the UK as a donor is to contribute to building democratic peace in L&MICs in order to strengthen the recipient countries' and, by extension, its own national security (DFID, 2015). According to DFID, this can be achieved through both conflict-prevention and resolution measures (disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR)); civilian peace building; and police, security and justice-sector reforms) and democratization and good governance activities (strengthening the efficiency and accountability of institutions, the role of civil society and the rule of law; tackling marginalization and exclusion; and advancing the rights of women and girls) (Greening, 2015b).

While DFID formulated specific goals for each country, they are all on paper in line with the overall objective of building stable and peaceful societies. A chief goal for DFID Kenya was "to improve government systems and accountability, tackle corruption and reduce conflict and the risks of radicalisation" (DFID, 2018a, p. 1). Similarly, the UK's long-term vision for South Sudan is of "a viable and stable [country], at peace with itself and its neighbours, democratic and respectful of human rights…" (DFID, 2012b, p. 3). In Nigeria, DFID argues that "UK aid contributes towards a more peaceful, democratic and prosperous [country]. This in turn prevents migration [to the UK] and reduces the risk of violent extremism" (DFID, 2018b, p. 2).

[5]http://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/daccriteriaforevaluatingdevelopmentassistance.htm. The criterion of "efficiency," which evaluates the costs of outputs in relation to inputs, was not included as we did not have access to the precise costs of different activities undertaken by the projects. The criterion of "coherence," which evaluates how well aid interventions fit with existing initiatives, was not included as at the time of analysis (2019) it had not yet become one of the official criteria.

These goals have been largely matched by the aid-recipient countries' own development aims. South Sudan's National Development Strategy lists "peace, security and the rule of law" and "democracy and good governance" as its first two objectives (Republic of South Sudan, 2018). Kenya also underlines the importance of maintaining peace and security for the country's sustainable development, but defines strengthening food security, housing, health care and manufacturing as its primary goals (Government of the Republic of Kenya, 2018). Similarly, Nigeria's Economic Recovery and Growth Plan for 2017–2022 described "restoring growth" as its main objective (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2017, p. 12) although reducing corruption, promoting the rule of law and "win[ning] the peace" have also been listed among the government's many aims (ibid., p. 25).

DFID's democratization and governance and conflict-prevention projects in the three countries have funded a wide range of activities, from supporting elections free of violence; army, police and justice-sector reforms; and DDR activities through strengthening the rule of law and enhancing accountability mechanisms to facilitating the countries' devolution processes and improving public-sector institutions in order to provide more efficient services. These activities are thus broadly in line with both the UK's and recipient countries' priorities in the areas of stability and security, although it is worth highlighting that neither are the top development priorities for the governments of Kenya and Nigeria—unlike those of the South Sudanese government.

The relevance of DFID-funded activities in the three countries observed appears, on paper, to be satisfactory. The limitations of this observation—along with the inherent practical problems of trying to promote peace, democracy and good governance through aid—are discussed more in the following sections.

## 4.2 | Effectiveness

The effectiveness criterion in the OECD evaluation framework refers to the extent to which development projects' objectives have been achieved. While at the level of outputs the UK aid projects have a relatively good record (with the exception of South Sudan), the situation is less positive in terms of outcomes, which projects achieved less frequently than outputs.[6] Common themes that emerged regarding some projects' failure to achieve their objectives include donors' incorrect assumptions about the political economy of aid-recipient countries, over-optimism and a lack of "ownership."

Many South Sudanese projects investigated were interrupted during their implementation by the outbreak of violence in 2013 (e.g. SSII; SSVII; SSXIX) and 2016 (SSXXVII). Although DFID could not fully have anticipated the eruption of the civil war nor the subsequent breaches of ceasefires, in some cases insufficient understanding of the country's political economy was described as ultimately responsible for project failure. For example, as part of the South Sudan Recovery Fund, a radio station was built and equipped in Jonglei State, to promote peace-building and reconciliation through broadcasting. However, the radio station was seen to have offered "extremely low value for money" because it failed to broadcast to more than one of the State's 11 counties or in local languages (SSVII, p. 22). Further, a road constructed as part of the same project was eventually (mis)used during the conflict to speed up troop movements. Other erroneous assumptions in the South Sudanese context led to the use of short-term (fly-in fly-out) training sessions, which similarly failed to achieve the project's intended outputs (SSVI). In the same way, incorrect assumptions about the Boko Haram conflict in North-East

[6]Development agencies consider "outputs" results achievable immediately after implementing project activities, while "outcomes" are more mid-term results and assumed to follow on from outputs.

Nigeria hindered the ability of several DFID projects to achieve their intended outputs (e.g. NXXXVI; NXLIV; NLII; NLVII).

Although the projects implemented in Kenya and most of Nigeria were more successful at attaining their intended outputs, DFID's incorrect assumptions often prevented them from translating into the envisaged outcomes. For example, in a programme aimed at strengthening Kenya's regional economic integration (KXXII), DFID assumed that project-driven reductions in trading times would translate into lower prices of goods, strengthening Kenya's economy and thus contributing to the country's stability. However, the prices of goods turned out to be "sticky" as the trading intermediaries did not pass on efficiency gains to consumers. Similarly, in a Nigerian programme aimed at improving the government's efficiency and accountability in infrastructure (NXX), DFID supported the privatization of Nigeria's power sector, under the assumption that this would improve access to electricity throughout the country. The electricity tariffs for poor households rose significantly as a result, however, as private investors took on large loans to purchase parts of the sector and subsequently increased prices to meet their debt obligations (House of Commons, 2016, pp. 26–27). More broadly, in both Kenya and Nigeria, projects aimed at improving the accountability of institutions often wrongly assumed that formal oversight bodies would act as DFID's allies in the fight against impunity—but party allegiances and self-interest generally prevented this (e.g. KXVII; NXVIII; NXLIX).

The second common issue hindering the effectiveness of DFID's interventions was the organization's excessive optimism. Numerous DFID projects in the three case-study countries were described in their final reviews as having been over-optimistic in their initial ideas about how the proposed outputs would lead to the anticipated outcomes. A review of a Community Security and Small Arms Control project in South Sudan (SSXIV) found that the initial expectation that the project would work closely with three state governments on eradicating the root causes of conflict was unrealistic as the state governments lacked both the will and the capacity to collaborate on the project. One of the project's lessons, according to DFID, was to "guard against optimism bias" in development programmes in countries like South Sudan (SSXIV, p. 1). A similar conclusion was reached by the Nigerian Policy Development Facility II programme (NXXXIX), which aimed to inspire key Nigerian institutions to a greater use of evidence in economic and social policy-making but eventually had to acknowledge over-optimism about the programme's potential reach, particularly during election years. The Kenyan Drivers of Accountability project was also criticized for having had unrealistic expectations regarding the timeframe needed to achieve institutional change (KXVII). Numerous other conflict-prevention and democratization and governance projects in the three countries were eventually deemed to have had over-ambitious initial expectations (e.g. SSXV; SSXIX; KXXX; NLVII; NLXIV).

One reason for the excessive optimism in the projects' initial designs lies in the nature of development programmes, which strive to appear capable of achieving major transformative changes to justify the use of taxpayers' money outside the national context (e.g. ICAI, 2011). It is thus probable that, in some instances, development workers were from the project-design stage aware that the projects' intended outcomes were too ambitious and unlikely to ever be fully achieved. But the issue of "ownership" is also connected with the frequent failure of achieved outputs to translate into intended outcomes, which brings us to the third common theme.

The effectiveness of many projects in the three case-study countries was arguably reduced due to the lack of aid recipients' "country ownership." Some programmes lacked support from senior political leadership. The intended output of South Sudan Peace Building Programme (SSV) of improving co-ordination between the country's peace-building institutions was undermined by the lack of buy-in from senior officials, who refused to participate in the programme-organized training. Nigeria's State Partnership for Accountability, Responsiveness and Capability (NXVIII) and State Accountability and Voice Initiative (NXLIX) were particularly unsuccessful in the states (e.g. Enugu, Kaduna, Kano) whose governments did not align with the programmes' priorities (ECORYS, 2017, p. 87). The lack of support from key Kenyan ministries undermined DFID's long-term strategy for public-sector reform in Kenya (KIV). In other cases, programmes had political support but lacked wider participation. The attainment of the South Sudan Recovery Fund project's (SSVII) outcomes was hindered by the lack of consultation with wider groups of beneficiaries beyond senior officials. Meanwhile, Nigeria's Mobilisation for Development (NXXXIV) project, aimed at empowering community-based organizations (CBOs) to demand better local government services, ended up struggling with the fact that as the programme progressed, participating CBOs became gradually less representative of their wider communities and more focused on capturing donor funds. Few of the projects examined even attempted to achieve the kind of inclusive communal participation that allows for joint decision-making and is seen as key to genuine "ownership" (Kilroy, 2015). One potential exception was Nigeria's Facility for Oil Sector Transparency (NXXXII), which was highly praised for its "commitment to local ownership and [successfully] building consensus amongst the government, private sector and civil society" (Bhalla et al., 2016, p. 17).[7]

However, DFID did not always consider strong ownership of interventions by the recipients as positive either, which was particularly notable in Kenya and to some extent in Nigeria. A project aimed at financial and legal-sector reform in Kenya was described as "front[ing] the Government of Kenya… as the real owners and winners," which was allegedly a "sine non qua to maintaining political and institutional will to drive difficult reforms" but meant that donor visibility in the project was reduced—which was noted as something to address in future projects (KIII, pp. 13–14). In Kenya's Devolution Support Programme, reservations about the lack of ownership and the devolution process resulted in DFID calling for a permanent presence of its representatives in all key devolved Kenyan counties (KXXX, p. 10). Similarly, in Nigeria's institutional part of Partnership for Transforming Health Systems 2, DFID reflected on the failure of co-operating state governments to maintain good records of useful project documentation with the resolve not to have "unrealistic expectations" of the local partners' abilities and to instead enhance its own role in "capturing [and storing] key learning" from the projects (NXXI, p. 6).

## 4.3 | Impact and sustainability

The last two OECD assessment criteria relate to the changes, both positive and negative, brought about by the "securitized" development projects and the likelihood of such changes lasting beyond the withdrawal of donors' financial support. As mentioned earlier, many of the projects examined were very optimistic about their potential to achieve positive transformative changes in the three case-study countries. In South Sudan, most projects identified "improved safety and security" as their overall goal. They sought to achieve this through developing a more skilled and organized security sector, enhancing the accountability of government institutions and ultimately establishing a peaceful and secure environment. In Kenya, the projects reviewed aimed to improve the efficiency and accountability of the country's safety and security institutions, tackle the root causes of conflict and strengthen the effectiveness of local governance. In Nigeria, the final goals of the projects examined ranged from a greater accountability of its formal and informal institutions (including the police and the justice system) to an enhanced effectiveness of the country's use of its own resources in inducing inclusive growth and strengthening the country's peace and stability.

[7]It should be borne in mind, however, that the project was described in this way by DFID employees.

In South Sudan, most of the envisaged goals were not attained. Those related to enhanced peace and stability were not achieved, with active fighting in the country between 2013 and 2018. Moreover, since many other projects failed to realize their intended outputs, in turn they also failed to achieve their intended outcomes and impact. Nor does it seem that the South Sudanese projects had other positive effects. Some of the activities undertaken, such as training of civil servants or provision of international advisers, were described by DFID as having had a positive and potentially lasting (i.e. sustainable) impact in the country, but given the dramatic turnover of staff in South Sudanese institutions (SV; SXXII) and general instability, this does not seem plausible. This lack of positive impact was in some cases further exacerbated by DFID's bringing overly-complex technological "solutions" into "difficult environments" (SII; SV; SXI)—a fact also observed by the ICAI (2012, p. 15) about DFID's work more generally.

DFID's beneficiaries in South Sudan, according to one of the project reviews, expressed their preference for receiving capital investments rather than training or technical support. Although things that are built may, by their nature, have more sustainable impact than other donor-funded activities, several DFID-financed constructions in South Sudan did not fare well after the cessation of funding. A police-officer training academy was constructed in Rambour, South Sudan as part of the Safety and Access to Justice Programme (SIV); but since the project funding did not cover the costs of equipment and maintenance for the building, the academy was never used. A new court building in Bor, built as part of a multi-donor United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) project (SXIII), met a similar fate as the donors failed to build an access route to it.

The evidence regarding the impact and sustainability of projects in Nigeria and Kenya is more mixed. Many of the projects reviewed in the two countries achieved or even surpassed their intended outputs. These outputs often failed to translate into the anticipated outcomes, however, for a variety of reasons including the incorrect assumptions mentioned earlier, excessive optimism and a lack of beneficiaries' ownership, and hence could not bring about their intended impact. In other cases, it was not even possible to draw conclusions about the projects' impacts because of insufficient monitoring and evaluation processes (e.g. NXVII; NXX; NXXXIV; NXXXVII; KIV; KXX; KXXIII). Other projects were too optimistic about the changes that they achieved without supporting evidence. We highlight two such projects in Nigeria—Justice for All (NXXII) and Anti-Corruption in Nigeria (NLVI) and two in Kenya—Kenya Conflict Prevention Programme (KXVI) and Drivers of Accountability Programme (KXVII).

The intended impact of both Nigerian projects was reduced corruption. One component of the Justice for All project (NXII) was the promotion of effective and accountable police services through providing technical assistance to several Model Police Stations across five Nigerian states. DFID concluded that the project increased people's satisfaction with and trust in the police. However, not only did ICAI's review of DFID's work on anti-corruption conclude that in general it had little impact on corruption in Nigeria (ICAI, 2014, p. 1), but also an ICAI-commissioned survey of the Model Police Stations found no significant improvement in people's perception of the police as a result of the project (ibid., p. 23).

The Anti-Corruption in Nigeria programme (NLVI, p. 1) aimed to reduce corruption by "providing stronger incentives not to loot public resources and changing public attitudes". A DFID-funded survey conducted in 2019 found a slight decline in the percentage of Nigerians reporting having paid a bribe in the previous year when compared to 2016, from 32 to 30 (UNODC, 2019). DFID took this as evidence of the programme's success and, without any closer scrutiny of causal mechanisms, wondered how much worse the situation would have been without its intervention (NLVI, p. 2). The fact that Nigeria's Corruption Perception Index score in 2019 was two points below (i.e. worse than) its

2016 score was not deemed sufficient to overturn the perception of the programme's accomplishment (Transparency International, 2020).

A similar lack of impact analysis clouded DFID's positive assessment of the impact of Kenya's Conflict Prevention (KXVI) and Drivers of Accountability (KXVII) programmes. The Conflict Prevention (KXVI) programme funded interventions to support free and fair elections and resolve the root causes of violence after Kenya's outburst of post-election violence in 2007. Based on relatively peaceful subsequent elections in Kenya, DFID concluded that, with the help of other DFID projects and the UK's Foreign Office, the project was successful. However, at least eight other international donors conducted similar projects in the country at the time (OECD-Stat, n.d.-b) and there was no analysis made to establish whether any reduction of violence could have been attributed to the project or to DFID's work specifically. ICAI (2012, p. 1) also questioned the project's sustainability, arguing that DFID's election projects generally lacked the ability to strengthen recipients' independent capacities to conduct peaceful and fair elections.

Finally, one of the Drivers of Accountability programme's goals (KXVII) was to improve Kenya's rating on Voice and Accountability (V&A) by the World Bank. The ranking indeed improved throughout the project, declining from -0.3 in 2010 to -0.1 in 2016. Nevertheless, given the multitude of development projects in Kenya during that time, and different drivers of corruption, it is hard to attribute the country's improvement on the measure wholly or even partially to the project, particularly without an actual impact analysis. This is further supported by the fact that the project designers had originally wrongly assumed that "formal [Kenyan corruption] oversight bodies would be [DFID's] allies in fighting impunity" (KXVII, p. 3).

From the projects reviewed, those with the greatest potential to instigate durable change were activities aimed at institutional and/or legislative transformation with good "ownership" by all relevant stakeholders. For example, DFID's work with Kenyan civil society organizations (CSOs) to block legislation restricting such organizations from receiving foreign funding (KXVII), and its work with the government in establishing the Kenya School of Government (KIV), seem to have had a positive impact beyond the duration of the projects. Similar positive results can be noted from the UK Action against Corruption (NXXVII) project in Nigeria, which tried to reduce avenues through which corrupt individuals from Nigeria could use the UK to launder money. DFID projects in Nigeria also claimed at least partial responsibility for the passage and signing of the Violence against Persons Prohibition (NXXXV) and Police (NLVII) Bills, aimed at improving the legislative protection of women's rights and reforming the Federal Police. Again, however, the links between the projects' activities and the eventual success of the legislation were left under-explored and it is clear, particularly in the Police Bill case, that the political context of Nigerian protests against the police must have also influenced President Buhari to finally sign it into law in September 2020. The complex nature of Nigerian legislation is further illustrated by the so-far-lacking presidential signature on the Climate Change Commission and Federal Audit bills, the passing of which by the National Assembly had already been celebrated as successful outcomes by the Coalitions for Change (NXVII) and Partnership to Engage, Reform, and Learn (NXLVII) projects.

## 5 | DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Since 2000, the UK development policy discourse, in line with that of other traditional bilateral (Lazell & Petrikova, 2020) and multilateral (Petrikova & Lazell, 2017) donors, has become increasingly securitized. A relatively high provision of official development assistance (ODA) has been justified by the need to protect the UK's domestic security from threats posed by fragility and instability in L&MICs. Aid has been portrayed as a powerful tool for building sustainable democratic peace in recipient countries, with particular emphasis on investments in conflict prevention and resolution and in democratic, efficient and accountable governance (Greening, 2015b). Empirical analyses have also demonstrated that the securitization of development discourse has affected UK aid disbursement trends, with increasing investment in building democratic institutions and in conflict-prevention activities, particularly in countries of high strategic interest to the UK (Lazell & Petrikova, 2020).

The effects of these "securitized" projects on recipients have not been systematically scrutinized to date, however, which is where our article makes a contribution. Specifically, this study has assessed all "democratisation and good governance" and "conflict, peace and security" projects funded by UK development assistance between 2000 and 2018 in three African countries of high strategic interest to the UK—Kenya, Nigeria and South Sudan—according to the four OECD evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness, impact and sustainability.

With regard to relevance, the activities funded within the projects examined were largely in line with both the UK's overall and country-specific development goals and with the aid-recipient countries' own national strategies. However, recipient countries' goals are frequently influenced by donor agendas; a number of studies have highlighted how aid-recipient countries regularly adjust their priorities to fit donor preferences (Carrie & Malbrough, 2010; Clist, 2016; In'airat, 2014). In fact, it is clear from most recent national development plans in Kenya and Nigeria that peace, stability and democratic institution-building, which are among DFID's key development goals for these countries, are secondary to their primary goals of achieving higher economic growth (Nigeria) and better living conditions for citizens (Kenya). While greater stability and stronger democratic institutions may facilitate the achievement of both sets of goals, it is interesting to note this discrepancy.

The projects assessed performed generally less well on the "effectiveness" criterion than on "relevance." They struggled to translate outputs (immediate objectives) into outcomes (more long-term objectives), and, due to recurrent conflict in South Sudan and North-East Nigeria, even to achieve their intended outputs. Although the specific reasons for this varied by project, common themes included incorrect assumptions at the project-design stage, over-optimism about the projects' transformative potential and deficient project "ownership." Within the scholarly literature and donor documentation, "ownership" is frequently cited as crucial when engaging in institution- and peace-building (Keijzer & Black, 2020); without the recipients "owning" the results, any short-term positive change is likely to disappear with the end of donor funding.

Although projects where all subgroups in a community are involved in the co-design and joint decision-making are regarded as the ideal form of "ownership" (e.g. Kilroy, 2015; Rubin, 2000), this ideal is often difficult to achieve in conflict-affected settings, where even defining a "community" may be problematic (Goodhand & Sedra, 2009). Furthermore, there is frequently a clash between "ownership" by the government (and its different levels) and by civil society (Hellsten, 2012) and the failure on either front, as this research has demonstrated, may impede the achievement of projects' intended outcomes. In Kenya and South Sudan, many of the conflict-resolution and institution-building projects had, at least nominally, the support of the government but lacked genuine engagement by civil society or wider communities (SSVII; SSX; SSXXII; KIX; KXIX). In Nigeria, DFID tried to avoid this issue in several projects by working simultaneously with state governments and relevant elements of civil society, but by omitting the local government level, the material effects of its projects were diminished (NXIX; NXLIX). At the same time, not working directly with the federal government undermined the effectiveness of the projects' efforts to promote legislation, many of which ultimately floundered due to the lack of presidential support (NXVII; NXXXII; NLVII). The issue of the projects' local ownership was further complicated by DFID's concern with maintaining its own "ownership" of the interventions, alluding several times to the desire to increase its "visibility and presence"

(KIII, pp. 13–14; KXXIX; KXXX, p. 10) and thus to maintain "prominence and [gain] increased influencing potential" (NXLI, p. 7; NXX; NXXXIX) in the aid-recipient countries.

As most of the projects we examined were unable to fully achieve their intended outcomes, it follows that they could not achieve their intended impacts. Our finding—that aid-funded projects linked to the UK's security agenda have struggled to positively affect either the security of recipients or the strength and effectiveness of their democratic institutions—fits within broader scholarship. Previous research has emphasized the contradictory nature of the relationship between democratization and stability (Nur-tegin & Czap, 2012) and raised the problems arising from promoting democracy in post-conflict and conflict-affected settings (Diamond, 2006). More generally, attempts to build or strengthen state institutions through development projects have often turned out to be unsuccessful, with aid frequently shaping institutions in aid-recipient countries in the *form* of successful institutions in the donor countries, but without their *functionality* (Pritchett at al., 2013, pp. 14–15; see also e.g. Easterly, 2013; Eriksen, 2017; Gisselquist, 2014).

The projects did lead to some "changes" on the ground, however. Although in South Sudan and to a lesser extent North-East Nigeria, there was limited positive change resulting from DFID's projects because of the recurrent outbursts of conflict, donor activity has had an impact. As Jansen (2017, p. 349) argues, DFID's presence in South Sudan contributed to the political economy of aid, which in turn has promoted the establishment of a "humanitarian protectorate" in the country (this is also arguably the case in North-East Nigeria, see Olojo, 2019). Within such a protectorate, United Nations troops are deployed to protect international humanitarian and development workers, whose presence powerfully affects the character of and relations between the state institutions and civil society.[8]

In the rest of Nigeria and in Kenya, some of the projects reviewed had a positive and possibly even long-lasting effect in specific areas. Nevertheless, our broad conclusion, in line with the findings of independent impact evaluations, is that the aid projects were unable to achieve significant structural, transformative or behavioural change, and that some had negative side effects (e.g. ECORYS, 2017; ICAI, 2011, 2012, 2014; House of Commons, 2016). DFID's refusal to work with the federal government in Nigeria may have not only weakened the "ownership" of some aid initiatives but also undermined the existing federal institutions in place (Katoka, 2018). In Kenya, DFID worked more closely with the government but its desire to build "democratic stability" in a country that already had nominally democratic institutions in place has been queried (Hellsten, 2012). Moreover, Fisher and Anderson (2015) have shown how Western aid support for security-sector reforms in African countries has been used by the countries' governments to strengthen their military–state complexes—with frequently negative consequences for civil society space.

The purpose of this comprehensive review was to systematically evaluate the effects of DFID's projects in democratization and good governance and in conflict, peace, and security—the sectors identified by the UK government as contributing to UK domestic security—on recipients in Kenya, Nigeria and South Sudan. The overall conclusion is that these "securitized" projects did not significantly strengthen the recipient countries' institutions, stability or security[9] but had some negative side effects. The lack of positive impact is at least partially due to the securitization of development aid itself. Not only has the securitization trend increased the volume of aid invested in democracy,

[8]DFID thus operates in the country as an inherently political actor, continuing a long line of British intervention in South Sudan, including the decision in 1947 to unify South Sudan with a very culturally distinct but more powerful northern Sudan (Okeny, 1991) and to subsequently enforce, along with the US and Norway, a hasty separation from northern Sudan in 2011: a decision which the African Union linked to the outbreak of the civil war in 2013 (Jansen, 2017, p. 352).

[9]Even if these projects did increase the countries' security, as Denney (2011) shows in the example of Sierra Leone, security does not automatically translate into "development."

governance and conflict-prevention activities, it has also, for example, led to the increased oversight of such projects by the CSSF rather than DFID. Available documentation on the CSSF projects (e.g. NXLIV; NLII; NLVII; ICAI, 2018) suggests that they suffer from the wrong assumptions, over-optimism and ownership issues that undermine their effectiveness rather more than DFID-implemented projects. But the lack of the projects' positive impact is also more broadly related to the self-interested nature of aid[10] provision, of which the securitization trend is one possible demonstration (e.g. Apodaca, 2017). As we have briefly illustrated, the UK views its "securitized" development projects as a means of maintaining presence and influence in countries considered to be of its own national strategic interest. This consideration has undermined the local ownership and hence potential success of some of the development activities.

In view of the merger of DFID with the FCO in 2020 and the decision to reduce aid from 0.7% to 0.5% of gross national income (GNI), the UK is in the near future likely to draw an even closer connection between domestic security priorities and provision of development aid. In doing so, it should be cognisant of the limitations of development interventions undertaken in the name of security and consider using other means of enabling development, such as reducing global money laundering, advocating for fairer international trade rules, and mitigating climate change and biodiversity loss (e.g. Ziai, 2017).

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[10]This aspect of aid, along with its fungibility, short-termism, volatility and deficient co-ordination (which we did not have space to discuss in this article), have been described as underlying the lack of aid's transformational impact also on other intended outcomes, including achieving high economic growth, poverty reduction or long-term food security.

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## APPENDIX 1

**List of all the projects examined in the article** (from: https://devtracker.DFID.gov.uk)

| Code | Name | Budget (GBP) | Duration | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **South Sudan** | | | | |
| SSI | South Sudan Service Delivery | 56,882,504 | 2006–2013 | To achieve expanded coverage and the use of quality basic services to the people of South Sudan. |
| SSII | Safety and Access to Justice Programme in South Sudan | 6,705,277 | 2007–2015 | To increase capacity of South Sudan Police Service improving coverage, accessibility and effectiveness of security arrangements for citizens. To increase capacity of South Sudan Police Service improving coverage, accessibility and effectiveness of security arrangements for citizens. To increase capacity of South Sudan Police Service improving coverage, accessibility and effectiveness of security arrangements for citizens. |
| SSIII | Supporting Legislative & Electoral Processes in Sudan | 12,092,286 | 2008–2012 | To ensure that the Electoral Processes is peaceful, free and fair |
| SSIV | Safety and Access to Justice Programme | 16,073,923 | 2008–2014 | To build capacity in key police and justice sector institutions, increasing the coverage, accessibility and effectiveness of the services offered to citizens. To build capacity in key police and justice sector institutions, increasing the coverage, accessibility and effectiveness of the services offered to citizens. To build capacity in key police and justice sector institutions, increasing the coverage, accessibility and effectiveness of the services offered to citizens. To build capacity in key police and justice sector institutions, increasing the coverage, accessibility and effectiveness of the services offered to citizens. To build capacity in key police and justice sector institutions, increasing the coverage, accessibility and effectiveness of the services offered to citizens. |
| SSV | South Sudan Peace Building Programme | 5,503,065 | 2009–2012 | To improve the effectiveness of key institutions to mitigate conflict and foster peace in southern Sudan |
| SSVI | Security Sector Development & Defence Transformation | 14,955,118 | 2009–2013 | To transform the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) from a loose guerrilla force into an affordable, professional, disciplined armed force operating under emerging democratic civil control, and to support development of broader Government of South Sudan (GoSS) security decision-making architecture. To transform the SPLA into an affordable, professional, disciplined army operating under and accountable to democratic civil control, and to support development of broader civilian GoSS security decision-making architecture. |

(Continues)

**APPENDIX 1** (Continued)

| Code | Name | Budget (GBP) | Duration | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **South Sudan** | | | | |
| SSVII | South Sudan Recovery Fund (SSRF) | 53,353,210 | 2009–2014 | To assist the Government of South Sudan expedite delivery of post conflict recovery assistance to affected States in South Sudan - meeting priority needs for livelihoods, basic services and infrastructure, community security and governance. |
| SSVIII | Comprehensive Peace Agreement Delivery & Transition - Sudan | 13,708,196 | 2010–2013 | To support the establishment of stable and effective institutions for political conflict resolution and economic management in Sudan. |
| SSIX | Governance Partnership Programme Sudan | 13,006,923 | 2010–2013 | To strengthen democratic governance and equitable delivery of public services through capable, accountable and responsive government, at Federal, State and local levels resulting in a reduction in poverty. |
| SSX | Support to the Joint Donor Office | 1,549,357 | 2010–2014 | To strengthen the capacity of the international community to deliver the development assistance and policy advice to the Government of South Sudan (GOSS) |
| SSXI | Capacity Building Trust Fund Phase II | 4,799,999 | 2010–2014 | To improve Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) ability to allocate resources and deliver services. |
| SSXII | Overseas Development Institute Fellowship | 649,508 | 2011–2012 | To improve Government of South Sudan's capacity in executing its economic policy |
| SSXIII | United Nations Development Programme- Strategic Partnership Programme Phase II South Sudan | 2,516,500 | 2011–2013 | To strengthen democratic governance and equitable delivery of public services through capable, accountable and responsive government, at Federal, State and local levels resulting in a reduction in poverty. |
| SSXIV | Community Security and Small Arms Control (CSAC) Extension | 11,999,997 | 2011–2017 | To provide improved security, governance and Rule of Law in South Sudan’s most conflict prone counties. Specifically, these funds will be invested in: A) Design and delivery of Conflict Sensitive Development Projects (CSDPs) in Lakes State, B) Consolidation of peace-building and conflict resolution in Jonglei and Lakes States, C) Building of state and national level capacity for the Southern Sudan Bureau for Community Security and Small arms Control (SSBCSSAC), D) Development and implementation of a national small arms policy framework. To improve community security in Jonglei State, establish partnerships between local and traditional authorities to address disputes in Lakes and Jonglei States and support the Bureau of Community Security and Small Arms Control to roll out a nation-wide public information campaign. |

(Continues)

**APPENDIX 1** (Continued)

| Code | Name | Budget (GBP) | Duration | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **South Sudan** | | | | |
| SSXV | Support to Accountability Institutions in South Sudan, 2012-2014 | 1,332,095 | 2012–2016 | To support the South Sudan Anti-Corruption Commission to be able to effectively discharge its anti-corruption mandate in terms of countering corruption and enhancing accountability to the South Sudan population and the international donor community. |
| SSXVI | Custom Development & Trade Facilitation Support in South Sudan | 8,139,568 | 2012–2016 | To provide an effective and transparent customs service at the border with Uganda and improve associated trade related institutions in South Sudan (Ministry of Trade, Bureau of Standards, as well as private and civil society organisations). The impact of the work is expected to be felt in an increase in the volume and value of dutiable trade, an increase in business confidence and investment and a decrease in the number of harmful products entering the country. This will benefit the people of South Sudan and will directly contribute to the 8th Millennium Develop Goal (Developing a Global Partnership for Development). |
| SSXVII | Strengthening Economic Governance (SEG) in South Sudan | 6,509,788 | 2012–2017 | To enable Ministries and key institutions in South Sudan (Ministry of Labour, Public Service and Human Resources Development , Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, National Bureau of Statistics) to strengthen their knowledge, skills and systems, and their ability to improve policies and decision-making. This will assist the Government of South Sudan to acquire the technical capacity necessary to improve governance and strengthen the country's economy. |
| SSXVIII | South Sudan Health Pooled Fund II | 108,126,314 | 2012–2018 | To provide a government led effective health system that will deliver improved access to quality health services across six states in South Sudan with a specific focus on reducing maternal and child mortality. |
| SSXIX | Security Sector Development and Defence Transformation (SSDDT)- Phase II | 3,658,827 | 2013–2014 | To assist Government of the Republic of South Sudan to professionalise and right size its military, with stronger civilian oversight and accountability, contributing to improved safety and security for the citizens of South Sudan. To assist the Government of the Republic of South Sudan to ensure that the military are held accountable to stronger civilian oversight contributing to the improved safety and security for the citizens of South Sudan. |
| SSXX | 2015 Election Planning(South Sudan) | 114,173 | 2013–2015 | Supporting South Sudan through targeted baseline research and the provision of technical assistance, to better demonstrate democracy through its delivery of impartial and independent elections, thereby building the trust and confidence of South Sudanese citizens. |

(Continues)

**APPENDIX 1** (Continued)

| Code | Name | Budget (GBP) | Duration | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **South Sudan** | | | | |
| SSXXI | South Sudan Partnership Fund | 654,094 | 2013–2016 | To support the Government of the Republic of South Sudan in driving development outcomes in South Sudan, taking decisions supportive of peace-building and state-building and making more effective use of its financial resources. This will help strengthen core state institutions, support service delivery and build the foundations for economic diversification and wealth creation for the people of South Sudan. |
| SSXXII | Overseas Development Institute (ODI) Budget Strengthening Project | 6,759,538 | 2013–2017 | To support budget Strengthening initiative for the improvement of Public Financial Management in South Sudan |
| SSXXIII | Building Resilience and Adaptation to Climate Extremes and Disasters | 156,375 | 2013–2019 | To help up to 10 million people, especially women and children, in developing countries cope with extreme climate and weather events such as droughts, cyclones and floods (climate extremes). This will be achieved by doing three things. By making grants to civil society organisations to scale up proven technologies and practices in the Sahel, sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia that help people withstand, and more quickly recover, from climate extremes. By identifying the best ways of doing this, and share this knowledge globally to increase the programme's overall impact. By supporting national governments to strengthen their policies and actions to respond to climate extremes. These will all contribute to the Millennium Development Goals on the eradication poverty and hunger, and environmental sustainability, and also respond to the Humanitarian and Emergency Response Review recommendation that DFID should integrate the threat from climate change into a Disaster Risk Reduction. |
| SSXXIV | Improved Community Safety and Security Programme(South Sudan) | 80,943 | 2013–2019 | Improved safety and security for citizens through a more professional and accountable South Sudan National Police Service, working in partnership with local government and communities. |

(Continues)

**APPENDIX 1** (Continued)

| Code | Name | Budget (GBP) | Duration | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **South Sudan** | | | | |
| SSXXV | Supporting the Development of the South Sudan National Police Service (SSNPS) | 857,658 | 2014–2016 | This project aims to increase the effectiveness of United Nations Police (UNPOL) by embedding UK police officers to work on community policing in the capital of Juba. In addition, technical assistance through United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and civil society will support the South Sudan National Police Service's (SSNPS) registration of personnel; Special Protection Units and Police Development Committee, strengthening the focus on accountability; human rights and Sexual and Gender Based Violence. 28,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) Protection of Civilian Sites in Juba are the target beneficiary group. |
| SSXXVI | Support to the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development's (IGAD) Mediation and Ceasefire Monitoring and Verification in South Sudan | 779,379 | 2014–2017 | To contribute towards a resolution of the conflict in South Sudan, by supporting and enhancing the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development's (IGAD) mediation between the two political parties to maintain the |
| SSXXVII | Access to Justice Programme in South Sudan | 1,734,338 | 2014–2019 | To enhance the effectiveness of essential justice services for 250,000 women by reducing impunity and increasing access to justice for them. This will by 2019, contribute towards reducing conflict and building a more stable South Sudan at peace with itself and its neighbours. |
| SSXXVIII | Reducing sexual violence in South Sudan | 0 | 2015–2016 | This project will establish women's peacekeeping teams in two counties in South Sudan. It aims to achieve a sustainable reduction in sexual violence in Aerial and Rumbek counties. |
| SSXXIX | CSSF - Conflict Sensitivity Programme (CSP in South Sudan) | 1,588,427 | 2015–2018 | To provide a Resource Centre that will assist in ensuring that Donors and Implementing partners are able to deliver more effective and more conflict sensitive programmes which will contribute towards the peace building process in South Sudan. |
| SSXXX | South Sudan Humanitarian Programme (HARISS) 2015 - 2020 | 564,999,988 | 2015–2020 | To help approximately three million South Sudanese by providing critical life-saving support and helping people to better cope with shocks from conflict, drought and flooding. This programme aims to save the lives of an estimated two million people who will receive at least one form of humanitarian assistance; and build the capacity of an estimated one million people to recover and cope better with shocks. Over five years this programme will provide food, shelter and access to water and health services to millions of vulnerable people, including women and children. |

(Continues)

**APPENDIX 1** (Continued)

| Code | Name | Budget (GBP) | Duration | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **South Sudan** | | | | |
| SSXXXI | Widening democratic space in South Sudan | 219,528 | 2016–2017 | To improve citizen engagement on the Agreement on Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (ARCISS) and its implementation, through radio discussions, dialogues and talk shows. |
| SSXXXII | Strengthening Public Financial Management and Accountability Institutions in South Sudan | 202,773 | 2017 | To enhance the capacity & capability of public financial management (PFM) and accountability institutions and processes in South Sudan by strengthening Ministry of Finance & Economic Development's senior leadership to lead PFM reforms; enhance State, County & local level planning, budgeting & financial management for improved service delivery and empowerment. This will lead to improved PFM and accountability institutions that hold the executive to account and represent the interests of citizens of South Sudan- including women and youth, by March 2020. |
| SSXXXIV | Women and Girls in South Sudan | 0 | 2017 | Assistance in line with UK objectives on Women and Girls in South Sudan which can include supporting gender equality, empowering women and girls, and safeguarding them from violence |
| SSXXXV | South Sudan National Level Conflict Reduction | 1,830,000 | 2017–2019 | This programme aims to place temporary members of HMG staff, in both Juba and London, to coordinate internally and engage externally on Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS). In addition, it includes a project that will allow provision of both long term and short term technical support to the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC) and the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism (CTSAMM), as well as provide ad hoc training courses or support to activities relating to the implementation of ARCSS |
| SSXXXVI | South Sudan Conflict Reduction | 3,520,000 | 2018–2019 | This programme will support peace building and reconciliation in South Sudan at the sub-national level. This will include: advice to other donors on the drivers of conflict; identifying incidents between communities and helping them resolve the issues peacefully; work with local communities to reduce violence against civilians; strengthening local networks and facilitating local voices to support advocacy on the national peace; and a Peacebuilding Opportunities Fund providing flexible support to peacebuilding opportunities. |
| SSXXXVII | Girls' Education in South Sudan Phase II | 1,082,075 | 2018–2022 | To increase access and the capacity for Girls' in South Sudan to stay in school and complete primary and secondary education by providing them with a broad package of support. This will benefit 240,000 girls, 300,000 boys and 2,600 schools. This contributes towards our MDG's by allowing more children to complete a full course of education and will result in improved learning outcomes, completion rates and a decrease in drop-out/repetition rates in all 10 states of South Sudan by the end of 2018. |

(Continues)

**APPENDIX 1** (Continued)

| Code | Name | Budget (GBP) | Duration | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Kenya** | | | | |
| KI | Political Empowerment Project | 7,545,970 | 2000–2010 | To enable poor and disadvantaged men and women to more effectively participate in democratisation and decision making processes |
| KII | Support to Kenya Land Reform - Phase 2 - 2004-2010 | 1,628,112 | 2004–2010 | To contribute to sustainable growth and poverty reduction in Kenya through the development of a comprehensive policy and institutional framework that strengthens the governance of land and ensures access to land for poor people. |
| KIII | Financial & Legal Sector Technical Assistance Programme (FLSTAP) - Kenya | 6,565,354 | 2004–2013 | To create a sound financial system and strengthened legal framework and judicial capacity that will ensure broad access to financial and related services |
| KIV | Public Sector Reform | 3,089,399 | 2006–2012 | To improve public sector management for a more efficient, effective and ethical delivery of targeted results for Kenyans |
| KV | Public Financial Management Reform | 229,246 | 2006–2010 | To support the Government of Kenya's efforts to achieve a well-functioning Public Financial Management system |
| KVI | Improving Livelihoods for Small Holder Dairy Sector CSCF421 | 302,875 | 2007–2011 | To enable raw milk traders to effectively contribute to the creation of policy and institutional frameworks that are responsive to their needs and the needs of the poor. |
| KVII | Improving Livelihoods Through Sustainable Govt CSCF413 | 246,135 | 2007–2013 | To improve the livelihoods od forest-adjacent communities to claim their rights to manage forest resources and influence local decision making processes. |
| KVIII | Kenya Social Protection Programme | 66,967,078 | 2007–2013 | To establish a government-led national system for long-term and guaranteed cash transfers to the poorest and most vulnerable 10% of households in Kenya. |
| KIX | Parliamentary Strengthening Programme (PSP) | 1,277,691 | 2007–2010 | To strengthen and professionalise the National Assembly of Kenya |
| KX | Kenya Health Programme | 105,730,041 | 2007–2017 | Support the Kenya Ministry of Health (MoH) and implementing partners to strengthen capacity for service delivery support systems and governance. |
| KXI | Africa Crisis Prevention Pool | 3,334,305 | 2008–2010 | To tackle the root causes of conflict in Kenya so as to prevent conflict erupting (specifically preparing for the 2012 elections) |
| KXII | Respecting the Rights & Needs of Mentally Ill People CSCF450 | 275,034 | 2008–2011 | To integrate 3,200 mentally ill people and their 2,900 carers socially and economically into the communities of Nyeri, Laikipia, Nyandarua and Meru South through the support of four partner organizations in the implementation of the mental health and development model |

(Continues)

**APPENDIX 1** (Continued)

| Code | Name | Budget (GBP) | Duration | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Kenya** | | | | |
| KXIII | Rights for Deaf Children and their Families CSCF437 | 139,635 | 2008–2013 | 1440 family-members of deaf children in seven districts understand and advocate for their children's rights to family life, education and protection |
| KXIV | CSCF0484 Empowering Disadvantaged Groups Through Combating Discrimination and Promoting Equality | 83,074 | 2009–2010 | To enable Kenyan CSOs to be key players in building a national anti-discrimination regime. |
| KXV | Promoting Better Regulation Investment Markets & Employment (Prime) - Kenya | 8,036,315 | 2009–2013 | To facilitate better functioning and regionally integrated markets with wider participation of the poor in domestic and international trade |
| KXVI | ACPP: Kenya Conflict Prevention Programme | 1,136,524 | 2010–2011 | To tackle the root causes of conflict in Kenya so as to prevent conflict erupting (specifically preparing for the 2012 elections) |
| KXVII | Drivers of Accountability Programme (DAP) 2010-2015 | 19,999,987 | 2010–2016 | To improve the Kenyan Government's accountability to its citizens by providing support to non-governmental organisations, oversight bodies and independent commissions that can influence and deliver reforms thereby supporting the goal of making Kenya a more stable democracy by 2015 |
| KXVIII | Elections Management and Security - Kenya | 12,956,925 | 2012–2013 | Election management, conflict and security institutions deliver transparent, inclusive elections, manage most disputes peacefully and reduce scale should violence occur |
| KXIX | Kenya Bridge Devolution Programme 2013-2014 | 1,300,000 | 2013–2014 | To build capabilities of county governments to enable them better understand and discharge their constitutional mandates and deliver results that match citizens needs through involving communities in planning and legislation. This will benefit 20 recipient counties (43% of all counties in Kenya) and contribute towards our MDGs by improving good governanace and development which will result in improved county management by March 2014 |
| KXX | Kenya Accountable Devolution Programme | 4,362,218 | 2012–2015 | The programme will contribute to a transitional process in which new county governments are established resulting in greater confidence in local government and the services it delivers. |

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**APPENDIX 1** (Continued)

| Code | Name | Budget (GBP) | Duration | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Kenya** | | | | |
| KXXI | African Institute For Development Policy(AFIDEP)-Building Capacity to use Research Evidence in Kenya and Malawi. | 107,000 | 2013–2016 | The AFIDEP programme is part of the Building Capacity for the Use of Research and Evidence (BCURE) programme. It is the only one of the BCURE programmes with a southern-based consortium lead. AFIDEP aims to strengthen the use of evidence by health policy makers through a series of initiatives targeting policy makers at different levels. |
| KXXII | Building Capacity to Use Research Evidence | 1,017,595 | 2013–2017 | This programme aims to build the capacity of decision makers in low and middle income countries to access, appraise and use research evidence and rigorous data. This programme aims to build the skills and knowledge of decision makers in low and middle income countries to access, appraise and use research evidence. This will enable governing bodies in the South to make better policy and programme decisions, ultimately enabling them to develop more rapidly and sustainably. It also includes an evaluation to strengthen the global evidence base on whether capacity building approaches to supporting evidence-informed policy making can be a cost effective way to reduce poverty. |
| KXXIII | Kenya - Strengthening Regional Economic Integration | 58,005,901 | 2013–2017 | To improve the pace of infrastructure development and enhance regional trade competitiveness, by delivering improvement to the managerial capacity and physical layout for cargo handling at the Port of Mombasa, and improved regulatory framework for trade. This will contribute to increased exports and regional trade in East Africa benefitting the regional population. |
| KXXIV | Social Protection Programme Phase II | 32,364,043 | 2013–2019 | To help 40,000 households to protect orphans and vulnerable children in the family from hunger and under-nutrition and enable those children to get an education and be more healthy. This will be achieved through cash payments until 2017. By this date there will also be a better national social protection system, led by the Government of Kenya. The programme contributes to Millennium Development Goals 1(Reduce Extreme Poverty), 2 (Universal Primary Schooling), 3 (Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women). |
| KXXV | Hunger Safety Net Programme | 119,854,664 | 2013–2019 | To reduce poverty, hunger and vulnerability by providing the poorest households in Kenya's arid and semi-arid lands with cash transfers. This contributes to our MDGs by preventing 720,000 people from becoming poorer and help them to increase their expenditure on food, health, education and wider livelihood opportunities by 2017. |

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**APPENDIX 1** (Continued)

| Code | Name | Budget (GBP) | Duration | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Kenya** | | | | |
| KXXVI | Adolescent Girls Initiative - Kenya | 11,115,996 | 2013–2020 | To improve the lives of at least 6500 adolescent girls in Kenya between the age of 10 and 14, by improving their access to health, education, economic assets and protection from violence. Evidence from research will influence national policy and support scaled up, cost-effective interventions for adolescent girls in the future. |
| KXXVII | UK Aid Match 2013–2016: giving the public a say in how a portion of the aid budget is spent | 8,510,619.00 | 2013–2020 | UK Aid Match allows the UK public to have a say in how an element of the aid budget is spent. DFID will match fund, pound for pound, public donations to appeals made by selected not-for-profit organisations, enabling them to increase their poverty reduction and development work in DFID priority countries. |
| KXXVIII | Prevention of Violence against Women and Girls through Football | 1,499,999 | 2014–2018 | To fill critical gaps in evidence on the effectiveness of sport in changing the dangerous social norms associated with violence against women and girls and assess the effectiveness of policies and interventions to decrease violence against women and girls |
| KXXIX | Improving Community Security Programme | 17,899,750 | 2015–2019 | To support the police and conflict management in Kenya, to improve safety and security for women, girls, boys and men and their communities. |
| KXXX | Kenya Devolution Support Programme | 23,499,996 | 2015–2019 | The Kenyan Constitution, adopted by referendum in 2010, introduced far reaching devolution to 47 newly-established counties. Hopes are high that devolution will improve accountability and service delivery and contribute to poverty reduction. The purpose of this programme is to build and improve public services for Kenyan citizens, particularly focusing at the county level where poverty exists and where public service delivery is poor. The programme will improve the ability of county governments to better plan, deliver and monitor the delivery of public services. This includes working with county governments to strengthen public financial management systems (e.g. improving accounting, audit and procurement systems) to ensure that public money is effectively spent and can be accounted for. It also includes a focus on critical services for example health. The programme will help county governments to improve planning and allocation of budgets for different sectors. |

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**APPENDIX 1** (Continued)

| Code | Name | Budget (GBP) | Duration | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Kenya** | | | | |
| KXXXI | Deepening Democracy Programme | 28,499,990 | 2015–2019 | To improve the Kenyan Government's accountability to its citizens by delivering peaceful, transparent, inclusive elections and providing support to non-governmental organisations, oversight bodies and independent commissions that can influence and deliver reforms thereby supporting the goal of making Kenya a more stable democracy |
| KXXXII | Enhancing Kenya's Rule of Law | 307 | 2016–2017 | Supporting the Rule of Law in Kenya—This project will strengthen Kenya's ability to successful investigate, prosecute and convict criminals based on the application of human rights and international law by identifying where legal reform is needed. |
| KXXXIII | Capacity Building support to Kenya Maritime Police Unit | 0 | 2016–2017 | Maritime Law enforcement training to Kenya's MPU (Maritime Police Unit) to help protect their blue economy against crimes at sea and encourage more trading opportunities in the Maritime Sector. |
| KXXXIV | Partnerships for Development | 3,200,285 | 2016–2023 | Partnerships for Development (formerly known as GREAT for Partnership) will multiply the UK's development impact by boosting partnerships between UK's institutions and their counterparts in the developing world. It will leverage the skills and expertise from a range of UK institutions and supply them initially to DFID partner countries, based on tailored demand. It will initially prioritise the Extractives, Financial Accountability and Anti-Corruption sectors. |
| KXXXV | Tackling Cyber Crime and corruption in Kenya and East African States | 0 | 2017 | A five day workshop to foster partnerships, and fast track the implementation of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC). The key deliverable is an actionable outcome document which East African Association of Anti-Corruption Authorities member states could adopt in fast-tracking the implementation of the United Nations Convention against Corruption. |

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**APPENDIX 1** (Continued)

| Code | Name | Budget (GBP) | Duration | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Kenya** | | | | |
| KXXXVI | Regional Economic Development for Investment and Trade (REDIT) Programme | 84,096,108 | 2017–2023 | The programme aims to increase sustainable and shared prosperity in Kenya by increasing Kenya's trade with the region and the rest of the world. Specifically, the programme will (i) invest in improving the efficiency and capacity of transport, logistics and trade infrastructure at Mombasa Port and key border points; (ii) invest in systems to improve trading standards, reduce non-tariff barriers and enhance transparency in trade processes; (iii) improve the regulatory and policy environment for trade; and (iv) support private sector advocacy for trade competitiveness, the export capacity of Kenyan businesses and the greater participation of women and small and growing businesses in trade. ICF component is supporting Kenya Ports Authority to develop and implement a Green Port Policy to help the port adapt and become resilient to climate change. Key objectives include introducing new climate friendly technologies into the port's operations. |
| KXXXVII | Reducing Insecurity and Violent Extremism in the Northern Territories (Re-INVENT) | 450,000 | 2018–2023 | To improve safety and security institutions at national level and in 6 counties that provide more effective, accountable and responsive services to a public that is actively engaged in improving safety and security in Kenya. |

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**APPENDIX 1** (Continued)

| Code | Name | Budget (GBP) | Duration | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Nigeria** | | | | |
| N I | Public Financial Management Technical Advisory Support Programme through World Bank Trust Fund | 1,539 | 2011–2012 | A DFID & World Bank Trust fund to provide technical advisory support to selected states of Nigeria for better public financial management systems through a World Bank Development Policy Operation Trust Fund. |
| N II | Security Sector Accountability Programme | 17,848 | 2013–2016 | To increase the accountability and capability of the Nigerian security forces in tackling internal instability by helping to build human rights into policy and training, as well as by strengthening oversight from statutory and civil society bodies. This will reduce the negative impacts of conflict on the most vulnerable among the Nigeria population, and contribute to longer-term stability in the country, thus helping create an environment that promotes achievement of the MDGs. |
| N III | Security Sector Accountability Programme | 31,973,212 | 2002–2010 | To support the development of Nigeria-Led justice sector reform so that pro-poor policies are implemented. |
| N IV | Drivers of Pro-poor change in Nigeria | 2,805,522 | 2003–2013 | To better equip DFID Nigeria and international community to support pro-poor reform and make significant progress towards achieving the millennium development goals in Nigeria |
| N V | Support to Debt Management Programme | 4,822,039 | 2003–2009 | To strengthen public debt management through a program to build the capacity of the DMO to world-class standards and develop stronger relationships with stakeholders, financial institutions and the public. |
| N VI | Pro-poor growth policy & knowledge facility | 9,430,520 | 2003–2010 | Improved policy choices that build an enabling environment for pro-poor growth |
| N VII | Public Service Reform | 18,442,785 | 2004–2011 | Progress towards a Federal civil service that is affordable, properly resourced, well-structured and appropriately sized, efficient and effective. |
| N VIII | Service Delivery initiative | 8,331,633 | 2004–2009 | To refocus the Nigerian public sector on service delivery, through effective implementation of service charters, and achieve visible improvements in service delivery through strategic pilots. |
| N IX | Improving Labour Relations in Nigeria | 36,888 | 2005–2009 | To support social dialogue between government, employers, trade unions and civil society to support non-oil sector economic growth and strengthen accountability in labour relations. |

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**APPENDIX 1** (Continued)

| Code | Name | Budget (GBP) | Duration | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Nigeria** | | | | |
| N X | Pro-Poor Growth Programme (PPGP)-Pre Design | 191,147 | 2005–2009 | To promote private sector-led growth in the non-oil sectors by supporting elements of NEEDS and SEEDS |
| N XI | Strengthening the Nigerian National Assembly | 2,556,449 | 2005–2009 | Develop the National Assembly's ability to support pro-poor reform |
| N XII | Securing Forest Land Rights CSCF352 | 381,665 | 2005–2010 | Selected forest-edge communities in Taraba state are empowered to improve their livelihoods by realising their rights to participate in and benefit fully from the management of the forests on which they depend |
| N XIII | Strengthening Transp, and Accountability in Core Niger Delta | 3,262,780 | 2006–2011 | Strengthening Transparency and accountability in the Niger Delta beginning with selected LGAs and diverse communities in the states of Delta, Bayelsa and Rivers. |
| N XIV | Country Partnership Facility | 444,006 | 2006–2010 | To strengthen systems and processes for improved donor harmonisation in Nigeria |
| N XV | Subnational Investment Climate Assessments | 6,533,050 | 2006–2011 | To assess the performance of state governments in creating an enabling environment for business |
| N XVI | HIV/AIDS - Continued Institutional Support to National Response | 631,084 | 2006–2009 | To reinforce the National Coordination Mechanism, explore areas that will feed into the National Strategic Framework 2005–2009 and look to improve the effectiveness of the World Bank Credit |
| N XVII | Coalitions For Change | 7,352,362 | 2007–2011 | Nigeria's Public Resources are used in a more accountable and effective fashion in the delivery of Pro-Poor Services |
| N XVIII | State Partnership for Accountability, Responsiveness and Capability | 63,929,433 | 2007–2016 | To improve the efficiency and effectiveness of selected State level Governments' use of public resources. |
| N XIX | Phase II Support to Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative | 179,961 | 2007–2009 | sustained improvement in transparency and accountability relating to the flow of Nigeria's extractive industries revenues |

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**APPENDIX 1** (Continued)

| Code | Name | Budget (GBP) | Duration | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Nigeria** | | | | |
| N XX | Nigeria Infrastructure Advisory Facility (NIAF) | 32,917,406 | 2007–2012 | To enhance Government of Nigeria's capacity to better plan, prioritise and budget for infrastructure development at federal and state level. |
| N XXI | Partnership for Transforming Health Systems 2 | 175,386,347 | 2008–2018 | Improve the delivery and use of effective, replicable, pro-poor health services for the management of common health problems |
| N XXII | Justice for All Programme | 52,287,258 | 2008–2017 | To improve the capability, accountability and responsiveness of the key organisations in the Nigerian security and justice sector including the anti-corruption agencies at the Federal and selected state level to deliver efficient, effective and accountable policing and remand services, access to justice for all citizens and create an environment that will promote the achievement of the MDGs. |
| N XXIII | Debt Management Office - Phase III | 2,409,907 | 2009–2014 | To strengthen the sustainable capacity of the Debt Management Office to help meet its strategic objectives |
| N XXIV | Growth and Employment in States Programme (GEMS) | 84,718,487 | 2009–2018 | To improve the performance and inclusiveness of key market systems that are important for poor people |
| N XXV | Deepening Democracy in Nigeria | 35,139,989 | 2009–2010 | To strengthen the democratic character of Nigerian political processes and outcomes by providing support to key electoral bodies with technical assistance. This will benefit numerous Nigerians and change their perception about the non-counting of votes during elections. This will contribute to broader good governance by encouraging Nigerians to turn out massively to vote during elections and this will result in the election of credible leaders. |
| N XXVI | Policy Development Facility Programme (PDF) | 14,056,248 | 2009–2016 | To increase the capacity of Federal Government of Nigeria to implement evidence based policies more effectively. |
| N XXVII | UK Action Against Corruption Programme (UKACT) | 39,126,318 | 2009–2020 | UK Action Against Corruption (UKACT) Programme reduces the incentives of corrupt individuals in developing countries to use the UK to launder money; and for UK business and nationals or their agents to bribe in developing countries. The programme will increase UK law enforcement's capacity to trace, confiscate and return stolen assets to developing countries and to tackle bribery in developing countries. |

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**APPENDIX 1** (Continued)

| Code | Name | Budget (GBP) | Duration | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Nigeria** | | | | |
| N XXVIII | Enduring Peace in JOS: Arresting the Cycle of Violent Conflicts | 805,530 | 2009–2012 | To encourage members of Jos communities to find creative alternatives to violence, as a response to conflicts emanating from interaction among them. |
| N XXIX | Strengthening Action Against Electoral Violence in Nigeria | 209,150 | 2009–2010 | To support and empower stakeholders (people, electoral and security agencies) to organise peaceful elections and avoid electoral violence in Anambara State. |
| N XXX | WORLD BANK EXTERNALLY FUNDED OUTPUTS | 576,800 | 2010–2013 | Assessing fiscal performance and public financial management in participating States. |
| N XXXI | Federal Public Administration Reform Programme | 25,081,132 | 2010–2016 | To strengthen core Federal Government systems and capacity to deliver public services by providing technical assistance and support to key Federal Ministries and Agencies, as well as increasing the voice of external accountability actors. This will contribute to reduced levels of corruption, greater transparency and efficiency of the civil service, and ultimately, better delivery of services to meeting the MDGs. Hence, it will benefit Nigerians, improving their satisfaction with basic services provided by the Federal Government by 2016. |
| N XXXII | Facility for Oil Sector Transparency (FOSTER) | 13,213,809 | 2010–2016 | Improved transparency and accountability in oil sector governance. Through ensuring increase in extractive industries revenues identified, improved management and accountability of extractive industry revenues, and improved policy outcomes for local communities affected by natural resource extraction. |
| N XXXIII | NIAF 2 - Nigeria Infrastructure Advisory Facility Phase 2 | 104,576,861 | 2011–2017 | To enhance the management of Nigeria's infrastructure development towards power sector reform, capital spending, repair and maintenance of roads, climate change adaptation and mitigation. This is expected to result to increased economic growth, job creation and contribute towards the MDGs by significantly reducing poverty for the majority of the Nigeria populace by year 2020. |
| N XXXIV | Mobilisation for Development (M4D) Programme | 19,969,986 | 2011–2018 | To ensure service providers, particularly local governments are more accountable and responsive to citizens by improving the quality, accessibility and relevance of economic and social services to 650,000 people (of which at least 30,000 are adolescent girls) by 2018 |

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**APPENDIX 1** (Continued)

| Code | Name | Budget (GBP) | Duration | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Nigeria** | | | | |
| N XXXV | Voices for Change: Empowering Women and Adolescent Girls Programme | 41,099,990 | 2011–2018 | To strengthen the enabling environment for adolescent girls' and women's empowerment in Nigeria by 2017.This will improve the lives of 120000 adolescent girls and women, resulting in greater inclusion of adolescent girls and women issues in political and governance processes and improved use of evidence in policy and practice. |
| N XXXVI | World Bank Governance Partnership Facility Programme | 18,999,999 | 2012–2021 | To improve management of public finances, by working to improve their transparency, increasing citizen engagement in their use, and on better service delivery. It will work with the Federal Government of Nigeria, selected State Governments and civil society by providing technical assistance and support. This contributes towards meeting the MDGs by improving the developing impact of public finances in Nigeria by 2020. |
| N XXXVII | Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme | 38,327,176 | 2012–2017 | Enhance collective efforts to identify and respond effectively to potential sources of violent conflict in Nigeria and reduce the negative impacts of conflict on the most vulnerable among the Nigerian population. |
| N XXXVIII | UK Aid Match 2013–2016: giving the public a say in how a portion of the aid budget is spent | 122,799,944 | 2013–2020 | UK Aid Match allows the UK public to have a say in how an element of the aid budget is spent. DFID will match fund, pound for pound, public donations to appeals made by selected not-for-profit organisations, enabling them to increase their poverty reduction and development work in DFID priority countries. |
| N XXXIX | Policy Development Facility Phase II | 18,499,998 | 2013–2021 | This second phase of Policy Development Facility will continue improving economic and social policy in Nigeria by providing technical support to reformers within Nigerian Government to increase both capacity and use of evidence in policy formulation and implementation. |
| N XL | Regional Initiative Fund 2 (RIF 2) | 2,338,016 | 2014–2017 | To improve state level policy-making processes by providing State Governments and Civil Society Organisations with technical advice and support. This will benefit the populations of the States in which DFID works and improve the ability of DFID Nigeria's whole portfolio of programmes to deliver improvements for poor people. This contributes towards our MDG's by providing better analysis and making policies more coherent; it will result in improved focus and targeting of service delivery and other programmes by 2016. |

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**APPENDIX 1** (Continued)

| Code | Name | Budget (GBP) | Duration | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Nigeria** | | | | |
| N XLI | Deepening Democracy in Nigeria 2 (DDIN2) | 57,446,946 | 2014–2022 | To strengthen the democratic character of Nigerian political processes and outcomes by providing support to key electoral bodies, other relevant arms of government (such as the Legislature) and civil society organisations. Credible elections, an efficient legislature and the scrutiny of government performance by an informed society will motivate government to perform better and be more responsive to the needs of citizens. |
| N XLII | Policy Research Fund | 7,505,493 | 2014–2020 | To make DFIDs Research agenda more responsive through the production of short term policy research that will address the needs of policy makers by providing them with primary evidence that can subsequently be used for policy analysis in such areas as Health, Education, Conflict, Cash Transfers, Aid Transparency, Tax Policy, Social Protection, Energy, Payment by Results, Economics and Innovation. Short term policy driver research studies will be commissioned in the following sectors and regions. A series of case studies will be developed for Higher Education covering Burma, Ghana, Pakistan and Sierra Leone. The information available on Electricity Access and Electricity Insecurity will be reviewed for India. A study will be undertaken on assessing the Cuban Model of Medical Education in sub-Saharan Africa. A review will be undertaken looking at Social Protection and Tax in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa and Activity based Learning will be reviewed in Tamil Nadu, India. |
| N XLIII | Safe Schools Initiative | 346,050 | 2014–2018 | To ensure that children can continue to safely access education in Northern Nigeria by providing an educational and security response for the protection of schools that will build resilience within communities, promote vigilance and awareness of threats and ultimately help prevent future attacks on schools. |
| N XLIV | Support to Stabilisation in North East Nigeria | 1,000,000 | 2014–2016 | To improve early warning, rapid crisis prevention and response to improve stabilisation efforts in North Eastern Nigeria. This contributes towards our MDGs by helping to build free, transparent and accountable political systems and strengthening security and justice. |
| N XLV | Independent Monitoring and Evaluation of Programmes (IMEP) | 2,115,213 | 2015–2016 | To increase the individual and collective performance and impact of the State-Level Programmes through the provision of independent monitoring and evaluation information and analysis. |

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**APPENDIX 1** (Continued)

| Code | Name | Budget (GBP) | Duration | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Nigeria** | | | | |
| N XLVI | Combating torture in Nigeria | 0 | 2015–2016 | This project will contribute to the effective operation of Nigeria's National Preventative Mechanism (NPM), established in accordance with the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture. It will develop a legal framework for the NPM and provide expert assistance and training to its personnel. |
| N XLVII | Partnership to Engage, Reform and Learn (PERL) | 132,999,987 | 2015–2023 | The programme works with government and civil society at federal and state levels to reduce inefficiency and corruption in the use of Nigerian resources and therefore improve delivery of services, including for women, girls and persons with disability. It does this in partnership with other DFID programmes supporting service delivery by helping Nigerian stakeholders improve accountability for use of resources including improving processes for raising revenue, allocating resources, planning and programme implementation. |
| N XLVIII | Facility for Oil Sector Transformation II | 19,499,993 | 2015–2021 | The purpose of the programme is to enhance management of Nigeria's resources from extractive industries through prevention of revenue losses, strengthening management, transparency and accountability of extractive industries and improving policy outcomes for local communities affected by extractive industries. |
| N XLIX | States Accountability and Voice Initiative (SAVI) | 33,821,172 | 2016–2016 | To improve the capability of state houses of assembly, civil society, media and citizens to ask for better performance from government by building their collective credibility, confidence and commitment. This will benefit 62.5 million people (the total population of 10 Nigeria States) by contributing to improved use of public resources essential to the achievement of the MDGs by July 2015. |
| N L | Tackling Radicalisation In Nigeria | 59,406 | 2016–2017 | To work for the de-radicalisation and the re-integration of young people who have been exposed to violent extremist groups, therefore reducing the risk that they become violent and a danger to peace and stability in Nigeria and beyond. It will do this by setting up community forums, training prominent villagers on how to de-radicalise and mentor young people returning to their communities, and teaching these young people professional skills. |

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**APPENDIX 1** (Continued)

| Code | Name | Budget (GBP) | Duration | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Nigeria** | | | | |
| N LI | European Union Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa | 18,899,114 | 2016–2020 | To work through the EU Emergency Trust Fund to promote stability in three regions of Africa and enable better migration management. This will be achieved by tackling the root causes of forced displacement and irregular migration through creating job opportunities, improving food security and access to health and education services. It will work to improve regional migration management processes including fighting human trafficking and other trans-border crimes, helping people return to their countries of origin and dealing with human rights abuses. This UK contribution will support programmes in development in the Horn of Africa: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. This project was approved before the referendum on the UK's membership of the EU. Work is now under way to understand the implications of leaving the EU for the UK's development work. |
| N LII | CSSF North East Nigeria Conflict Management and Stabilisation | 21,199,999 | 2016–2021 | To contribute to preventing further conflict in Nigeria's Northeast by reducing the vulnerability of male and female youth to recruitment by violent extremists in Borno through strengthening government and civil-society led efforts to address key grievances, increase opportunities for youth and promote effective counter violent extrimism messages. |
| N LIII | Political advocacy for economic reform and development in Nigeria | 0 | 2016–2017 | Multiple strands of activity aimed at improving the quality of economic policy making, improving the business environment for growth and development, and building capacity in Nigeria to identify and tackle barriers to trade and investment. Work-strands include: assistance to develop a beneficial ownership register to increase transparency and tackle corruption; an initiative to promote trade, reduce corruption and improve cooperation between public and private stakeholders along trade routes in Nigeria's gateway state of Ogun; unlocking investment opportunities by reviewing private equity franchise investing in Nigeria; and mapping potential to improve business productivity through use of technology in the priority sectors of Agriculture and Education. |
| N LIV | Anti-corruption secondment and training in Nigeria | 0 | 2016–2017 | The project will build on success of existing Anti-Corruption programmes and will deepen the National Crime Agency's work on corruption in Nigeria. The work is focused on providing technical assistance to key crime fighting agencies to improve the gathering of evidence and securing convictions. |

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**APPENDIX 1** (Continued)

| Code | Name | Budget (GBP) | Duration | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Nigeria** | | | | |
| N LV | United Nations Office Drugs & Crime Judicial Maritime support to Nigeria | 0 | 2017–2018 | Maritime mentoring and training to support the Nigerian judiciary and law enforcement agencies to develop capacity to prosecute suspected pirates and protect seafarers around the Gulf of Guinea |
| N LVI | Anti-corruption in Nigeria Programme | 15,549,996 | 2017–2021 | To support Nigeria's effort of tackling corruption by reducing public tolerance and improving enforcement efforts as part of the HMG Nigeria Anti-Corruption Strategy. Nigerian authorities (including anti-corruption agencies) would be supported to achieve an effective sanction regime by legislation and public policies to combat corruption, and ensuring looters are effectively investigated, prosecuted and convicted. Civil society would build public support for anti-corruption and progressively change social norms that currently facilitate (or even encourage) corruption. |
| N LVII | Nigeria Security & Justice Reform Programme | 5,200,000 | 2017–2020 | This programme will deliver defence, security and justice priorities in Nigeria through three interconnected components: (1) Strengthening security and justice accountability through the media. (2) Democratic Oversight and Accountability of the Nigerian Security Sector. (3) Strategic assistance to the Nigerian Police Force (NPF). |
| N LVIII | North East Nigeria Security and Conflict and Stabilisation Programme | 5,800,000 | 2017–2020 | This programme aims to respond to interrelated issues in the northeast of Nigeria. By supporting the Nigerian Police Force and other security and justice actors in their efforts to protect civilians and uphold the rule of law in areas recently recovered from insurgent groups and to allow displaced people and former insurgent group fighters to return to their communities. This is an ODA and non-ODA integrated programme. The spend reported against this programme is the ODA element alone. |
| N LIX | Nigeria Security & Justice Reform Programme | 11,700,000 | 2017–2021 | This programme will deliver defence, security and justice priorities in Nigeria through three interconnected components: (1) Strengthening security and justice accountability through the media. (2) Democratic Oversight and Accountability of the Nigerian Security Sector. (3) Strategic assistance to the Nigerian Police Force (NPF). |

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**APPENDIX 1** (Continued)

| Code | Name | Budget (GBP) | Duration | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Nigeria** | | | | |
| N LX | North East Nigeria Security and Conflict and Stabilisation Programme | 16,800,000 | 2017–2021 | This programme aims to respond to interrelated issues in the northeast of Nigeria. By supporting the Nigerian Police Force and other security and justice actors in their efforts to protect civilians and uphold the rule of law in areas recently recovered from insurgent groups and to allow displaced people and former insurgent group fighters to return to their communities. This is an ODA and non-ODA integrated programme. The spend reported against this programme is the ODA element alone. |
| N LXI | North East Nigeria Transition to Development Programme | 410817423 | 2017–2022 | To deliver an effective response to the basic needs of vulnerable people impacted by the crisis in the North East of Nigeria. The programme will deliver humanitarian assistance in nutrition and food security; protection and Education in Emergencies; multi-sector support including health, water, shelter and livelihoods interventions; as well as enabling a more efficient response to the crisis, including strengthened government planning, budgeting and coordination; and risk management. |
| N LXII | UK Nigeria Infrastructure Advisory Facility (UKNIAF) | 79,999,999 | 2017–2023 | To enhance the management of Nigeria's infrastructure development towards power sector reform, Public Private Partnerships, capital spending, repair and maintenance of roads at the Federal level and in the North-East of Nigeria. This is expected to result to increased economic growth, job creation and contribute towards the Global Goals by reducing poverty for the majority of the Nigeria populace. |
| N LXIII | Maritime Security in Nigeria | 435,000 | 2017 | Assistance in line with UK objectives on Maritime Security in Nigeria which promotes a secure and stable international maritime domain |
| N LXIV | LINKS – 'Powering Economic Growth in Northern Nigeria' | 2,450,000 | 2018–2026 | The project will aim to build on previous economic growth programmes, ensuring continuity of successful work streams. However the change will be a focusing of resources in specific geographic areas, under more cross cutting models. This will achieve both a high targeted impact and a strong demonstration effect, delivering large scale job creation, income improvements and inclusive economic growth. Important additionality will include environmental benefits from renewable energy and improved agricultural land and water use planning, as well as easing the tensions that lead to conflict, through creating economic opportunities, especially for women and youth. This geographic focus will be Kaduna and Kano, and the design will be in line with DFID Nigeria's strategic plan, which is looking to consolidate and intensify DFID focus on a reduced number of northern States. It will incorporate key themes from the wider DFID agriculture and economic growth global strategies. |

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**APPENDIX 1** (Continued)

| Code | Name | Budget (GBP) | Duration | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Nigeria** | | | | |
| N LXV | Nigeria Countering Organised Crime and Corruption | 2,700,000 | 2018–2020 | This programme aims to strengthen local law enforcement capability building and border integrity by supporting the development of the Joint Border Task Force and to build on existing strong relationships with Nigerian law enforcement to deliver capacity building in the management of kidnap cases. |
| N LXVI | Nigeria Delta & Maritime Security and Stability Programme | 900,000 | 2018–2020 | This programme aims to encourage and support Nigerian decision makers to address the prominent issues of instability in the Niger Delta and the Gulf of Guinea by supporting research and pilot projects to deepen understanding in the Niger Delta on security and governance, economic diversification, oil theft and illegal refining, and environmental clean-up. Training and operational capacity building for the Nigerian Navy to develop operational capability and the institutions to deliver improved security in Nigeria's territorial waters and the Gulf of Guinea. This will promote the importance of operating in accordance with maritime and domestic law, International Humanitarian Law and the Law of Armed Conflict. This is an ODA and non-ODA integrated programme. The spend reported against this programme is the ODA element alone. |
| N LXVII | Nigeria Delta & Maritime Security and Stability Programme | 2,000,000 | 2018–2021 | This programme aims to encourage and support Nigerian decision makers to address the prominent issues of instability in the Niger Delta and the Gulf of Guinea by supporting research and pilot projects to deepen understanding in the Niger Delta on security and governance, economic diversification, oil theft and illegal refining, and environmental clean-up. Training and operational capacity building for the Nigerian Navy to develop operational capability and the institutions to deliver improved security in Nigeria's territorial waters and the Gulf of Guinea. This will promote the importance of operating in accordance with maritime and domestic law, International Humanitarian Law and the Law of Armed Conflict. This is an ODA and non-ODA integrated programme. The spend reported against this programme is the ODA element alone. |

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**APPENDIX 1** (Continued)

| Code | Name | Budget (GBP) | Duration | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Nigeria** | | | | |
| N LXVIII | STAMP OUT SLAVERY IN NIGERIA (SOSIN) PROGRAMME | 2,249,999 | 2018–2023 | To reduce the causes and enablers of Modern Slavery in Nigeria by providing a 'whole of government' and civil society support in Edo state for the prevention of irregular migration among vulnerable young people. The programme will stem the outflow of irregular migration by strengthening systems and civil society capacity to address social norms that are accepting of trafficking. The programme has multiple components which include technical assistance to the government of Edo state, a civil society challenge funds, the establishment of a learning platform, accountable grants and an independent monitoring and evaluation component. |
| N LXIX | Supporting Human Rights, Democracy and the Rules based International System in Nigeria | 25,000 | 2019–2019 | Assistance in line with UK objectives on Supporting Human Rights, Democracy and the Rules based International System in Nigeria which helps build prosperous and democratic countries, tackles the drivers of instability and insecurity, and addresses global challenges |
| N LXX | Partnership for Learning for All in Nigerian Education - PLANE | 83,118,875 | 2019–2027 | PLANE programme will support achievement of the UK Aid Strategy's strategic objectives, particularly in relation to tackling extreme poverty and helping the world's most vulnerable. The programme will also work to strengthen resilience and response to crises, support prosperity in Nigeria and strengthen governance in the education sector. The Programme will benefit up to 2 million children by supporting the Government of Nigeria (GoN) in selected states and non-state partners to improve teaching, school quality, education management and efficient delivery of education. This brings together a short term focus on improving the life chances of Nigeria's most vulnerable children with medium term goals to support recovery and stability and longer term development goals to improve the overall education system |
| N LXXI | Supporting Human Rights, Democracy and the Rules based International System in Nigeria | 25,000 | 2018–2019 | Assistance in line with UK objectives on Supporting Human Rights, Democracy and the Rules based International System in Nigeria which helps build prosperous and democratic countries, tackles the drivers of instability and insecurity, and addresses global challenges |