

# Understanding Election Violence in the Philippines: Beware the Unknown Assassins of May

Tom Smith & Joseph Anthony L. Reyes

## Abstract

Despite election violence being a commonly agreed upon phenomena in the Philippines, there had been a dearth in academic research in recent years, largely due to the lack of reliable sources of information. To address this, this article adapts recognised methods from studies such as Newman's 2013 paper, together with McGrath and Gill's 2014 research on terrorism and elections. To expose the timing of election violence, incidents were tracked relative to election dates for the period from 2004–2017, with the results indicating violence increases closer to an election date, and frequency substantially increased during the 14-year period. This is the first academic journal article since Linantud in 1998 to focus on the issue of election violence in the Philippines but through adaptive methodologies goes further to make national analysis. Furthermore, findings reveal statistically significant differences on the types of terrorist attacks and types of targets when comparing election and non-election periods. Complicating factors are explored in relation to majority of attacks attributed to 'unknown' actors and the complex situation during elections. The results also demonstrate that election violence in the Philippines is dominated by the New People's Army and the use of assassination. The paper makes the case for further research and the creation of a dedicated database of election violence in the Philippines and elsewhere, and finally evaluating these few measures implemented by the government that have failed to stem election violence.

## Keywords

Election violence, Philippines, assassination, New People's Army, terrorism,

## Introduction

The Philippines has been beset by long running internal conflicts and political violence since its independence. The democratic process is characterised by violence attributed to various actors to such an extent that it has arguably become an accepted part of its political system. The clichéd phrase of the ‘*Three Gs of Philippine Politics - guns, gold and goons*’ remains inescapable if not just as accurate as ever.<sup>1</sup> Yet, research examining ‘election violence’ in the Philippines has largely been carried out in the margins, seen more as a result of the architecture and culture of the political system, rather than an established practice that requires specific focus. Pockets of research on election violence in the Philippines are found in works on the role of various regimes of the state,<sup>2</sup> the role of ‘private armies’ in extra judicial killing<sup>3</sup> (killing of a person by governmental authorities or individuals without sanction of any judicial proceeding or legal process), the role of the military and security forces,<sup>4</sup> the role of clan-based politics,<sup>5</sup> and clientelism.<sup>6</sup>

This paper focuses and updates prior research on election violence in the Philippines, adapting contemporary methodologies in order to better understand the frequency and nature of election violence. It does this using the whole country as the unit of analysis unlike any prior studies – notably Linantud<sup>7</sup> (which was based on media reports)– with national comparisons across time, types of incident and perpetrators. We then examine any significant associations between target types, attack types with election campaign periods. This allows us to empirically determine how prone the Philippines is to spikes of violence around elections, enabling cross-regional and inter-disciplinary comparison with research from Aksoy and others which found that terrorism in democracies clusters around elections periods in systems with lower “*electoral permissiveness*”<sup>8</sup> wherein it is harder to gain a formal role in politics for small parties.

The Philippines has been noted for its “*long and continuing history of electoral violence*”,<sup>9</sup> however reliably documenting, evidencing and measuring electoral violence has been problematic. Without robust data, policy efforts to remedy electoral violence are likely to be misguided and continued research difficult. Previous reports even recognise the “*familial nature of Philippine politics was one of several factors that fuelled fierce rivalries and bred persistent violence during each electoral cycle*”<sup>10</sup> with a healthy amount of commentary on some of the actors and dynamics at play. What Quimpo calls “*the usual patronage, and perhaps a bit more vote-buying, fraud and violence*”<sup>11</sup> is none the less hard to pin down beyond media reports of particular incidents. However, by utilising a reliable dataset on terrorist attacks across a 14-year election period we find – in line with Newman – that ‘*ballots seem to provoke bullets, with the frequency of terrorist violence increasing closer to the election date and propensity for violence occurring in each phase of the election cycle takes shape as pre-, day of, and post-election activity, with peak violence at or near the actual election date*’.<sup>12</sup> Making this the most robust and detailed study of election violence in the Philippines to date.

## Challenges

The term ‘election violence’, found across wider analysis of Filipino politics, is used to refer to variety of different types of incidents including insurgent clashes, terrorism (itself a contested concept) and individual attacks. Given the political sensitivities of election violence, it is not uncommon to have the label of ‘election violence’ contested by numerous actors - including government. No recognised definition of ‘election violence’ is being used despite its popularisation. Researchers looking at the topic have to be inclusive and then navigate their way through the claims and counter claims, relating a violent incident to the electoral process in itself is a political act in the Philippines presenting a myriad of practical, ethical and security considerations for researchers.

Contemporary work on definitions of 'election violence' offered by the likes of Bjarnegård<sup>13</sup> are welcome but are also being understandably expanded, increasing the demand on the researcher to investigate the linkage to the electoral process. In Maupeu's work on Kenya the same issue of definition meant utilising an "*extensive view of election violence*" that included, pre-election and post-election violence which "*does not mean confusing political violence and election violence as the same concept.*"<sup>14</sup> In the Philippines such investigation is not just difficult given the nature and variety of protagonists but very risky work. As a result, research into election violence in the Philippines has stalled despite the phenomena itself increasing.

Linantud's 1998 examination of "*patterns of violence in Filipino elections between 1965 and 1998*"<sup>15</sup> remains the only specific study of election violence in the Philippines in a peer-reviewed academic journal. His study, based largely on media reports across the period found that "*factional election violence has declined*".<sup>16</sup> Linantud and others referencing the issue had previously relied upon lists of 'electoral violence' compiled at various times in newspapers, most commonly the Philippine Daily Inquirer. Without maintained, archived and ideally centralised records, updating Linantud's methodology is not possible. Beyond Linantud's paper in the 'grey literature' the limited but crucial focus on election violence in the Philippines boils down to just 2 reports, coming in 2004 from Patino and Velasco<sup>17</sup> on behalf of the German Friedrich Ebert Stiftung foundation and then in 2011 from Arguillas et al<sup>18</sup> on behalf of the Vera Files and Asia Foundation. Patino and Velasco utilise '*election-related violence*' rather than the titular '*election violence*' and include "*intimidation, coercion and non-physical forms of harassment*"<sup>19</sup> as well as physical forms of violence.

Using this definition Patino and Velasco sourced their data from 'Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and the Philippine Daily Inquirer'<sup>20</sup> and '*from media reports (Philippine Daily Inquirer, Business World etc.)*'.<sup>21</sup> As with Linantud such methodologies cannot be replicated today with any reliability. Arguillas et al's excellent account of election violence cites Philippine

National Police (PNP) statistics but the report is not footnoted and it is unclear where these statistics came from, nor are there any disclaimers relating to the reliability of this data. In sum, research on election violence in the Philippines is hamstrung by a lack of clear, reliable records.

To advance research into election violence in the Philippines, we must utilise and develop other sources of data. This paper takes on the methodology initiated by Newman of using the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) and provides a platform for future comparative analysis and further focus on the Philippines. The elections in the period between 2004 and 2017 (outlined in table 1) were chosen because of the reliability and completeness of GTD data in this period. Furthermore, the lack of specific geographical data on election violence prevents GIS supported analysis or suchlike and as yet the GTD dataset does not support that. As such this study is a national picture – and the first to do so. A more regional and provincial breakdown is desperately needed though given violence from insurgent groups is localised. This compromise ensures the paper replicates Newman’s methodology but demonstrates the limitations of the GTD for other purposes.

Lastly, compounding the challenges on a universal definition of ‘election violence’ is the issue of a changing ‘election period’ in the Philippines. These are set by COMELEC for each election cycle. Given this research began with the 2003 elections we adopted the 2003 standard of 178 days laid out in Resolution 6446.<sup>22</sup> This was the longest official election period in 14-year study and captures all the following election periods which were shorter –150 days on average.

## Data and Methods

Information regarding terrorist attacks in the Philippines was obtained from the GTD, an open-source database online made available by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). To examine whether violence increases during election

periods, this paper adopts established approaches in investigating patterns of terrorist attacks around elections utilizing GTD information at the individual event level, the day-level<sup>23</sup> and month levels with respective target selections and attack types.<sup>24</sup>

The authors assembled a dataset of terrorist attacks in the Philippines occurring between 2004 and 2017. Working with the same operational definition as Newman in treating “*electoral violence as political violence during the election period with the objective of influencing the electoral process and by extension the election outcome*”<sup>25</sup> the following search criteria, available via the GTD online interface, was applied to: 1) reflect instances of political violence, 2) establish the objective of terrorist attacks as influencing the electoral process and election outcome, 3) exclude ambiguous cases of terrorism, in order to prevent inclusion of primarily criminal acts. All records found in GTD: 181,691 incidents which were then examined across the following three criteria:

1) Criteria (Following options selected on GTD web interface)

Criterion I: The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal.

Criterion II: There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims. In certain cases, there may be some uncertainty whether or not an incident meets all of the criteria for inclusion as a GTD terrorist incident. Exclude ambiguous cases.

Results = 152,641 incidents

2) Date: (between 2004-01-01 and 2017-12-31)

The 2004 elections were the first Philippine elections the GTD covered reliably. In terms of distribution, the data points prior to 2004 were very few and sporadic compared to the succeeding years. End date was set at 2017, as it was the

maximum value for available records at the time of data collection (3 September 2019).

Results = 88,479 incidents

3) Country: (Philippines)

Results = 3,472 Incidents

Records were obtained using the data export function of GTD web interface producing a .csv file and then manual verification of entries conducted for errors and data consistency. It should also be noted that not all incidents involving terrorists are considered as terrorist attacks within the GTD records, examples of this are police or military operations such as the 25 January 2015 'Mamasapano clash' that resulted in the deaths of 44 Special Action Force (SAF) members of the Philippine National Police (PNP) during an operation at Tukanalipao, Mamasapano, Maguindanao, by SAF-PNP against forces from the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). A further nuance of this study is that Newman' paper does not presuppose that GTD criteria can be narrowed for incidents directly related to elections but rather infers it from the clustering of violence around election dates and supplements that with additional analysis with respect to regime types, electoral institutions, and other factors - while this study also establishes the clustering of violence around election periods, it also adapts methods by McGrath and Gill for the analyses of target types and attack types within and outside the periods. Rather than just demonstrating that terror attacks spikes closely around election dates, the findings for this study show terrorism attacks spike at different points before and after election dates, as well as in relation to the election period. The study still acknowledges the limitation distinguishing terrorism aimed at influencing elections from terrorism with other political aims independent of elections.

Under these parameters found 3,472 terrorist incidents between 2004 and 2017 from the dataset, with 5 election years covered (2004, 2007, 2010, 2013, and 2015 general elections).

Table 1 below details the types of elections in this period. Since 1992 national and local elections are normally held on the second Monday of May every third year.

Table 1 - The Filipino Election Cycle 2004-2016

<b>Year</b>	<b>General</b>	<b>Presidential</b>	<b>Senate</b>	<b>House of Representatives</b>	<b>Local</b>	<b>Barangay</b>
<b>2004</b>	General	Presidential	Senate	House of Representatives	Local	(none)
<b>2007</b>	General	(none)	Senate	House of Representatives	Local	Barangay*
<b>2010</b>	General	Presidential	Senate	House of Representatives	Local	Barangay*
<b>2013</b>	General	(none)	Senate	House of Representatives	Local	Barangay
<b>2016</b>	General	Presidential	Senate	House of Representatives	Local	Barangay*

\*Denotes a Barangay (smallest administrative unit in the Philippines) and Sangguniang Kabataan (youth village council) election. Source: COMELEC



Encoding of values were made on the dataset to measure different time periods, and creation of categorical variables such as terrorist targets, attack types, and weapons used (according to GTD classifications). Corresponding statistical methods were utilized on the aggregated dataset such as binomial tests on occurrence of attacks, along with a series of chi-square tests and non-parametric bivariate correlations<sup>26</sup> on variables pertaining to terrorist targets and attack types to determine significant relationships with election periods.

## Results

Findings reveal that overall frequency of terrorist attacks had increased over the 14-year duration (slope: 0.020368204, indicating positive relationship of the number of attacks and time), and that attacks significantly differ in frequency, target, and type during election periods in the Philippines.

### Descriptive Analysis

For the duration of 2004 to 2017, Table 2 presents monthly terrorist attacks. The frequency of attacks has increased over the past 14 years, with 2013 having the greatest number of terrorist attacks (496) and casualties (735) recorded. For the sample, the greatest number of attacks occurred during the month of May, with May 2013 (81 attacks) and May 2016 (81 attacks) - both being election months, having the highest frequencies of terrorist attacks. Looking at specific events, the 27 February 2004 Superferry bombing in Manila Bay by the Abu Sayyaf Group, had the greatest number of fatalities (116), making it the deadliest terrorist attack in Philippines, and among the world's deadliest terrorist attack at sea. A bombing in Makati City on 19 October 2007 conducted by unknown perpetrators had the greatest number of casualties (8 fatalities, 130 injured) among the incidents in the dataset.

Table 2 - Frequency of terrorist attacks from 2004 to 2017 by month

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
January	1	3	10	4	4	19	10	10	8	24	28	39	38	32
February	2	3	7	5	2	24	17	13	13	26	38	38	55	39
March	5		2	1	2	24	17	13	17	29	30	43	54	63
April	4	1	5	10	13	23	17	12	19	54	19	42	59	30
May	1	1	3	6	18	20	42	9	13	81	43	35	81	42
June	7		4	11	32	17	14	14	12	33	27	42	36	47
July		1	3	1	46	23	7	6	13	46	28	34	29	45
August		7	6	2	58	9	10	8	24	34	37	35	31	36
September				3	13	16	15	11	9	50	32	38	14	40
October			3	7	17	23	23	14	17	49	26	47	25	38
November	3		2	5	13	18	20	19	11	32	40	49	26	29
December	7	2	3	2	42	4	7	5	17	38	29	48	36	45
Yearly Total	30	18	48	57	260	220	199	134	173	496	377	490	484	486


## Distribution of terrorist attacks and election periods

Classification using an election period variable categorizes 2,813 out of 3,472 terrorist attacks (or 81.0%) corresponding to dates outside official election periods, while 659 out of 3,472 terrorist attacks (or 19.0%) corresponding to dates within official election periods. Calculated for the analysis is the days until the next closest election and days since the last most recent election. The histogram codes each of the 3,472 attacks twice for a total of 6,944 observations (Figure 2). Herein, an attack is considered as "pre-election" if "days until" is less than "days since," and as "post-election" if "days since" is less than "days until."

A binomial test was performed to determine whether the proportion of occurrence The test determined whether the (19.0%) proportion of terrorist attacks occurring during an official election period differs significantly from 16.3% (or .16255708), which is the null hypothesis parameter - derived from the number of days of the election period in the Philippines over the total number of days in three years, or 178/1095. The results indicate an extremely statistically significant difference ( $p = 0.000$ ). In other words, the proportion of violence during election period significantly differ from a hypothesized value of 16.3% - that there is seemingly a higher number than expected of recorded terrorist attacks during election periods in the Philippines.

As shown in Figure 1, there is seemingly an emerging pattern found in the last three election periods characterized by increased frequency during the months leading up to the election date, and sharply drops immediately the month after. It is worth noting that the one-month period after elections are still defined by COMELEC as officially part of the election period and still enforces a 'gun ban' with increased levels of security nationwide.


Figure 1- Monthly frequency of terrorist attacks during election periods



Using similar a classification methodology to Newman,<sup>27</sup> it appears that terrorist attacks for the period of 2004 to 2017 are almost evenly distributed before and after an election. 1,645 out of 3,435 terrorist attacks (or 47.9%) correspond to pre-election violence, and 1,790 out of 3,435 terrorist attacks (or 52.1%) correspond to post-election violence.

Figure 2 presents results following methods utilized by Newman for plotting the timing of terrorist attacks in terms of days distance to an election. Similar coding was applied, wherein each observation (a terrorist incident) has a corresponding variable encoded for "days until" election and another variable encoded "days since" election, as such when the histogram is presented the observation is situated in relation to the election midpoint in terms of the two variables (positions pre- and post-) within the three-year election cycles. Results show that the distance distribution of 3,472 terrorist events of the Philippine sample are not as pronounced in terms of a normal distribution as compared to the 5,537 events of Newman's 117 multi-country sample. As demonstrated via kernel density estimation, increased frequency can nevertheless be observed occurring during days around election periods.

Figure 2 - Daily distribution of terrorist attacks between 2004 and 2017, centred on the election date, normal distribution line (blue) indicated, and using kernel density estimation (red).



A binomial test was then performed to determine whether the proportion of occurrence for this two-level categorical dependent variable significantly differs from a hypothesized value. In this case, by using the timing variable, it can be tested whether the proportion of post-election violence differs significantly from 50% (.5). The results indicate that there is a statistically significant difference ( $p = 0.014$ ). In other words, the proportion of post-election violence in this sample significantly differs from the hypothesized value of 50%. These findings can also be considered consistent with that of Newman's results of being near-even, as the difference of 4.2% between pre-election and post-election is quite small. Overall, the results support the observation that increased violence occurs in periods drawing nearer to election dates.

As can also be observed in Figure 2 for the aggregated datapoints in relation to distance until and after elections, and nuanced further in table 2, particularly for the election years 2010, 2013, and 2016 - there is a relative lull in terrorist attacks within two months after an election. Hence, there is an overall similarity in terms of the patterns of fluctuations with Newman for terrorist attacks occurring between the years 2000 and 2005 across 117 countries.

In election years the spike in violence in May is twice the level of non-election years, this is particularly stark given the total number of attacks in any year is relatively constant. Recognising that this sample is limited to 14 years, the clear pattern suggests a seasonal element to violence in elections years as illustrated in Figure 3.

Figure 3 - Average Attacks per month






Table 3 presents groups identified with involvement in attacks during election periods as recorded by GTD as perpetrators involved in terrorist attacks. It is worth noting that more than half of the attacks were conducted by unknown assailants.

*Table 3- Perpetrators of Terrorist Attacks during election periods*

Total Attacks during election periods from 2004 -2016:	659
Group name	No. of incidents involved in
New People's Army (NPA)	188
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)	43
Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement (BIFM)	22
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)	9
Maute Group	4
Jemaah Islamiya (JI)	3
Al-Khobar	1
Farmer's Movement of the Philippines (KMP)	1
Jundul Khilafah (Philippines)	1
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)	1
National Democratic Front-Bicol (NDF-Bicol)	1
Partido Marxista-Leninista ng Pilipinas (PMLP)	1
Unknown	386


More than half (58.6%) of the attacks were conducted by unknown assailants during election periods, whereas only 41.1% are unknown during non-election periods. A chi-square test found that the association between identity of perpetrators and periods of election is considered to be extremely statistically significant,  $\chi^2 (1, N= 3472) = 66.349, p < 0.0001$ . One possible explanation for the higher proportion of terror attacks occurring during election period with unknown assailants (58.6%) could be due to (local) political and electoral violence being misattributed or intentionally distorted as terrorist activities.

Adapting methods from McGrath and Gill,<sup>28</sup> the following sections test the difference between non-election and election periods for occurrence of terrorist attacks and across target types or attack types

#### Terrorist targets and election periods

As described in Figure 4, targeting government was found to have an increased frequency percentage during election periods as compared to non-election periods, while business targets had a decrease in frequency percentage during election periods. Military, police, and private citizen & property targets remained relatively constant during non-election period and election periods. Displayed in the following are relevant valid percent when missing data are excluded from the calculations, and not necessarily tallying to 100 as some incidents can have more than one type of target or target. A series of chi-square tests were performed to examine the association between terrorist targets and election periods. For business and government targets, their relation between the election period variable were found to be significant. As also presented in Table 4, non-parametric bivariate correlations using Spearman's Rho indicate a negative relationship for business, while government was found to have a positive relationship with the election period variable. It may be possible that the increase in violence during election periods focused on governmental targets would lessen frequency of attacks towards businesses, as compared to other types of targets.

Figure 4 - Terrorist target types for non-election and election periods, valid percentages



Terrorist attacks on government targets increase during election periods, while terrorist attacks to business targets decrease during election periods and furthermore, based on the timing variable - 416 out of 910 terrorist attacks with government target types (or 45.7%) correspond to pre-election violence, while 494 out of 910 terrorist attacks (or 54.3%) correspond to post-election violence. A binomial test was used to determine whether the proportion of post-election violence for the government target type differs significantly from 50% (.5), with results indicating that there is a statistically significant difference ( $p = 0.011$ ). In other words, the proportion of post-election violence with government targets in this sample significantly differ from the hypothesized value of 50%. Similar to reported observations by Newman, the targeting of government being more frequent after election than before election could potentially be related to dissatisfaction with election results.

Table 4 - Chi-square tests and non-parametric correlations for terrorist target types of non-election and election periods during 2004 - 2017. Adapted from McGrath and Gill (2014)


Target	Election Period	Count (valid %)	Pearson Chi-Square	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Spearman Correlation	Asymp. Std. Error	Approx. Sig.
<b>Business</b>	No	492 (17.5%)	10.473	1	.001	-.055	.015	.001 **
	Yes	81 (12.3%)						
<b>Government</b>	No	711 (25.3%)	20.610	1	.000	.077	.018	.000***
	Yes	224 (34.0%)						
<b>Military</b>	No	212 (7.5%)	0.126	1	.722	-.006	.017	.722
	Yes	47 (7.1%)						
<b>Police</b>	No	314 (11.2%)	0.004	1	.950	-.001	.017	.950
	Yes	73 (11.1%)						
<b>Private Citizens and Property</b>	No	733 (26.1%)	0.607	1	.436	-.013	.017	.436
	Yes	162 (24.6%)						

\*\*\* Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level; Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level; \*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level

## Attack types and election periods

In regard to terrorist attack type, as shown in Figure 4, assassination was found to have an increase frequency percentage during election periods as compared to non-election periods. Whereas armed assault, and kidnapping (hostage-taking) slightly decreased and bombing/explosions and facility/ infrastructure attacks remained relatively the same in percentage levels during non-election period and election periods.

Figure 5 - Terrorist attack types for non-election and election periods, valid percentages





A series of chi-square tests were then performed to examine the association between attack types and election periods. The relation between the election period variable and Assassination was found to very significant. As also described in Table 5, non-parametric bivariate correlations using Spearman's Rho indicate a positive relationship for Assassination with the election period variable.

Table 5 - Chi-square tests and non-parametric correlations for terrorist attack types of non-election and election periods during 2004 - 2017. Adapted from McGrath and Gill (2014)

Attack Type	Election Period	Count (valid %)	Pearson Chi-Square	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Spearman Correlation	Asymp. Std. Error	Approx. Sig.
Armed Assault	No	854 (30.4%)	0.291	1	.589	-.009	.017	.589
	Yes	193 (29.3%)						
Assassination	No	437 (15.5%)	7.874	1	.005	.048	.018	.005**
	Yes	132 (20.0%)						
Bombing / Explosion	No	925 (32.9%)	0.588	1	.443	.013	.017	.443
	Yes	227 (34.4%)						
Facility / Infrastructure	No	388 (13.8%)	2.356	1	.125	-.026	.016	.125
	Yes	76 (11.5%)						
Kidnapping	No	279 (9.9%)	2.545	1	.111	-.027	.016	.111
	Yes	52 (7.9%)						

\*\*\* Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level; Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level; \*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level

In other words, terrorist attacks using assassination increase during election periods. Given that over two-thirds of assassination attacks are government targets, this finding also partly explains the high-stakes nature of Philippine politics. Further, results from a binomial test using the timing variable shows that the proportion of post-election violence with assassination attack types in this sample was not significantly different ( $p = 0.207$ ). from the hypothesized value of 50%. Interestingly, an additional chi-square test reveals a relationship between events (of all attack types) during election period and the use explosives as weapons. Results indicate that there is a statistically significant relationship between election period and explosives being used,  $\chi^2 (1, N= 3472) = 4.205, p = 0.040$ .

One possible explanation for increased used of explosives during election periods in the Philippines is the 'gun ban'<sup>29</sup> implemented by COMELEC and heightened security with police visibility and military checkpoints that could push perpetrators to resorting to improvised explosives.

## Discussion

*"The cycles of political violence mainly follow the rounds of elections in the Philippine democracy, whereas the second type of violence follows the dynamics of the blood feud."<sup>30</sup>*

Although the increased frequency of electoral violence found in this study supports similar general findings in other studies relating to other countries and other periods,<sup>31</sup> caution should still be exercised in drawing general inferences about the election in this 14-year period. Particular considerations must be made for interpretation of results and relating them to extant research based on different sources, case studies and combinations of countries. Wider support for the trends noted above beyond Philippines elections would require both caution and more research. However, this study suggests that election periods in the Philippines can be considered as being more dangerous generally in terms of terrorist attack frequency and

specifically for the government, with higher occurrences of assassinations. Without more location data on these attacks it is unclear if this national trend is shared across a country with significant variances in human and physical geography. The effects of autonomy in the south and the use of automated voting on election violence cannot yet be identified.

The situation is further complicated as a majority of attacks during election periods are conducted by unknown perpetrators and almost half utilize explosives that may circumvent the local temporary 'gun ban' and conventional security measures currently in place. The results of this study also support the observations of previous studies that increased violence occurs in periods drawing nearer to election dates,<sup>32</sup> and has also shown specifically in the Philippines a sudden drop in violence immediately after elections. Figure 3 clearly shows the May election spike in attacks in triennial election years. As a result, the findings here support the claims by the likes of Kreuzer in 2005 that "*violence escalates before elections*"<sup>33</sup> and that this pattern continues. By contrast Scharff's account of COMLEC's measures to curb election violence for the 2010 elections surprisingly found that "*The 2010 election period witnessed a sharp reduction from 2004 in the number of individuals killed and the number of other election-related violent incidents.*"<sup>34</sup> This is in direct contradiction to the findings in this study and is likely attributed to the methodological differences and source data used. It is unclear where Scharff sourced his data from.

The increased violence in recent years of both elections and the Moro conflict support that Kreuzer's observation that the peace process is undermined by violent elections and that in 2005 there was "*a major conviction that electoral democracy should be restricted at least in the transitional phase, since elections are considered to be triggering factors of violence and its escalation.*"<sup>35</sup> However following advances in the peace process and revised political autonomy in Mindanao the likelihood is of more of '*the usual*' election violence.

In relation to prior research on 'electoral permissiveness' as a key factor in election violence, this largely comes down to subjective characterisation. The authors regard the Philippines as having a relatively open electoral system with a high degree of electoral permissiveness- with important caveats and nuances. While anyone can run for office, and many do, with ballot papers crowded with candidates, not everyone can win. Celebrity, campaign spending, political party affiliation, and clan ties carry candidates an awful long way, and while that is particularly dramatic in the Philippines,<sup>36</sup> it is hardly unique compared to other democratic nations regarded as having high levels of electoral permissiveness. Rodrigo Duterte's presidential electoral win, becoming the first president from Mindanao, with only 39% of the popular vote, underlines how a late entrant to the race (filling his candidacy on the last day) some 6 months after his rivals, can penetrate the top of the political establishment quickly. As such, this study does not support Aksoy's hypothesis and findings, particularly as Aksoy's study focused on Western Europe between 1950 and 2004 and used different data. Election violence in the Philippines is one of the prime barriers to entry into the otherwise open arena of electoral politics and as such the issue of electoral permissiveness appears to be a post hoc fallacy in the Philippines.

### Elections of Violence and Violence of Elections

As argued by Bali and Park based on their findings (also from GTD data), "*attention-related incentives may be at work*"<sup>37</sup> in the increase in domestic terrorist events around elections, as terrorist events can draw the spotlight on grievances and inadequacies of the incumbent government. This observation may even hold true extending to activities and events not considered as acts of terrorism by antagonistic groups, such as police and military operations. Walden Bello noted the effect of the 'Mamasapano clash', a botched counter terrorism raid, on the Aquino administration leading to the election of President Duterte.<sup>38</sup> Mamasapano is a prime example of the complexity of competing and rival militant groups and the political violence that arises in various conflicts within the Philippines, detangling them from what we

may want to mark as 'election violence' requires nuanced understanding of the conflicts in the Philippines.

The ambush on 25 January 2015, by BIFM and MILF militants should not be understood as election motivated. At the time, the relatively new BIFM did not operate far beyond its base in the swamplands of Liguasan and cooperation with the MILF has been rare. In fact, deadly violence between the BIFM (a splinter group of the MILF) and MILF is more common than cooperation.<sup>39</sup> The SAF were on a Presidentially ordered hunt for Indonesian bomb maker, Zulkifli bin Hir, aka 'Marwan' and the ambush was an opportune marriage of convenience of two often competing actors in the complex and shifting landscape of conflict in Mindanao.<sup>40</sup> This was by no means a clearly planned strategic attack by a classically understood terrorist group wanting to affect the course of the elections. And yet Mamasapano became an election issue,<sup>41</sup> having occurred after Duterte had already begun to campaign<sup>42</sup> for the presidency and used particularly by the Duterte campaign against his rival Manuel Roxas.<sup>43</sup> Mamasapano demonstrates the difficulty in drawing clear lines between what is and what is not election violence in the Philippines.

This phenomenon, as Bali and Park describe can possibly be explained by an electorate's attention, together with the public's level of engagement and the level of competition among societal groups to aptly garner attention during the critical months prior to elections. Furthermore, the increase in election-month attacks is mediated by electoral competition, in line with "*the 'political access school' which argues that democracies decrease the likelihood of violent action by providing alternative channels of engagement*".<sup>44</sup> Thus conversely, curtailed political access, reduced political opportunity or engagement, would increase terrorist activity.

Within the context of electoral politics in the Philippines, this may mean corresponding strategies towards armed groups being pursued by political entities dependent on their incumbency and agendas. Political incumbents' credibility towards maintaining peace and security and their opportunity to succeed in an upcoming election would be disadvantaged by attacks particularly timed near the election date. In such cases, reduced hostilities, ceasefires or concessions may be made to prevent or stall violence, although eventually would return upon the conclusion of the election period, or even rebound to higher levels in retaliation to promises broken, testing the resolve and capabilities of the new government, or responses to newly-elected official's antagonism to their group. This may have been the case with the confusing and convoluted relationship of the Duterte administration and the communist insurgency against the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), The New People's Army (NPA) and the National Democratic Front (NDF). The CPP-NPA-NDF rebellion and the monthly average attacks recorded in the GTD had almost quadrupled, compared to the first seven months of the new regime when peace talks were supposedly being pursued.

Furthermore, as results indicate that frequency of terrorist attacks significantly differ during election periods in the Philippines, as well as the overall increasing number of attacks and emerging pattern found in the three recent election periods, it may be prudent for the Philippine government in improving and recalibrating security measures during election periods. Particularly as previous studies<sup>45</sup> observed terrorist attacks have the potential to motivate and increase voter turnout, it should be considered that attacks made by terrorists and rebels (as government had now reclassified several groups as such terrorist organizations) or fabricated by unknown parties may be used as a platform for new entrants seeking office or incumbents securing their position. Equally concerning is the possibility of politicians exploiting this feature and sensationalizing violent events for political gain, winning upcoming elections via resentment and promising security, but consequently giving the terrorists the attention and legitimization, they craved in the first place.

## Perpetrators of Election Violence

As the study shows, key questions remain as to who is perpetrating violence at elections that need further scrutiny before we can adequately understand motives. As Table 3 outlines the GTD database attributes 58% of attacks at election times to unknown perpetrators. This does not necessarily indicate weakness in the GTD methodology given the extent of unsolved killings in the Philippines. Across the 14-year period of this study the Philippines has consistently been both one of the most dangerous countries in the world for murder where the perpetrator is not be known.<sup>46</sup> Furthermore, for the number of extra judicial killings where most perpetrators are never identified, the Philippines is one of the highest in the world.<sup>47</sup> Holden has argued that the reasons for extra judicial attacks vary widely and *“those involved in activism against neoliberalism have been killed in the wave of extrajudicial killings underway in the archipelago.”*<sup>48</sup> Furthermore, Holden purports that *“extrajudicial killings were an example of state terrorism”*<sup>49</sup> further complicating the landscape in the Philippines in this period. Indeed, according to Sales, state terrorism in the Philippines has been built into a dysfunctional political system for decades:

*“Successive regimes have established fact-finding missions as if the exposure of bad elements will put an end to state terror and other excesses; but, just as motorcycle-riding assassins frequently disappear through the gates of army camps, so the senior officials who send them on their murderous assignments often disappear through the doors of government departments.”*<sup>50</sup>

Given that violence and corruption have continued since 2009 when Sales made his assessment, we now have evidence of increasing levels of election violence in the 2010, 2013 and 2016 elections as shown in figure 1. The marked increase after 2010 is of course still routed on the problems Sales recognised, but analysis of motive for attacks is made difficult for the same reason. Given attacks (regardless of whether they are at election periods or not) are understood to be the work of security officials, official data and authentication will always prove unreliable.



In Hicken's review of the 2007 elections, he noted that "as in past elections, the 2007 contest was a violent affair, with 126 people killed and 148 injured in election related violence"<sup>51</sup> and references news reports that account for the same attacks listed in the GTD with 'unknown' perpetrators. There is a disjuncture here that is important to recognise given reports of some attacks citing security officials being confident to call some instances 'election violence' and resigned to it as a natural occurrence in Filipino elections<sup>52</sup> and other incidents (also found in the GTD) related to attacks by the NPA are not regarded as 'election violence' – as seen in this Reuters article:

*"We believed the other incidents were not directly a result of the election," said Geary Barias, head of police investigations, adding some deaths were due to ambushes by communist rebels. But, police were forced to retract accusations Maoist-led New People's Army rebels killed two teachers in an arson attack on a vote centre after evidence pointed to two police officers moonlighting for a local politician. "This could be one of the bloodiest elections the country had experienced," said Ronald Llamas of non-government group Compact for Peaceful Elections."*<sup>53</sup>

Not only is this hard to make sense of on a case by case basis but it exemplifies the weaknesses of research solely reliant on media reports. What officials claim is and is not 'electoral violence' and what is recognised as such externally by the GTD, media sources and alike differ. This study has demonstrated that attacks recorded by the GTD at election periods includes attacks by 'unknown' perpetrators that are disputed by governmental actors, rights groups and others who utilise different definitions terrorism and election violence.

### The NPA and Election Violence

Of the named perpetrators found in this study, the NPA accounted for the majority of attacks, accounting for 28%, more than all the Islamist militant groups combined. The notorious Abu Sayyaf Group<sup>54</sup> are listed as perpetrators for only 6% of attacks in election periods. The level of election violence from the NPA compared to the various Islamist groups is significant and does not correspond to military operations against either foe or the international media coverage on these conflicts.

This study is the first to highlight that the NPA are the most violent known group at election periods. Thus far government policy at securitizing elections has not been explicitly guided to tackle the NPA. The latest elections in May 2019 saw the implementation of what the police call 'poll hotspots', which actually account for more than half of the country's land mass, and this data does not support the basis on which these geographies were selected. In addition to the 'gun ban' and use of bodyguards for candidates, the police increased the use of checkpoints in these 'hotspots'. Even as these measures were announced though the National Capital Region Police Office chief Guillermo Eleazar was aware of the public concerns regarding police capability and neutrality: *"I have strict orders to our commanders in the field to observe proper procedures and professionalism when conducting the checkpoints and maintain a non-partisan position in handling political cases."*<sup>55</sup> Further demonstrating the anxiety amongst the electorate that police have been involved in election violence. This is particularly salient in any discussion regarding election violence on or by leftist groups who have not just committed election violence but have also been the targets of it.

While this paper provides an evidentiary basis for improved measures to prevent violence from the NPA at election periods. There is a history, often overlooked and crowded out by coverage focusing on Islamist militancy, that should be noted. Born out of the Hukbalahap Rebellion and resistance to Japanese occupation in the second world war, the communist insurgency has formed a stubborn and violent conflict with the historic focus of NPA activity centred around Samar<sup>56</sup> but since the mid 1980's had *"nation-wide"*<sup>57</sup> ramifications during the Marcos dictatorship. The study shows the level of NPA election violence, but as Holden has noted, the NPA are in part a manifestation of the oppression from government on leftist groups since the beginning of the republic; *"Unable to influence the direction of the government by seeking access to political power through peaceful means the left has been given no alternative other than to 'head to the hills' and attempt to seek access to political power through violent*

means.”<sup>58</sup> Furthermore the study shows that Linantud’s prediction that election violence would come mainly from the Moro conflict “*given the global surge in Islamic religious nationalism*”<sup>59</sup> was not realised. Rather it was Holden’s conclusion a decade ago has been realised as the NPA “*remain in the hills and continue to wage an armed opposition to the state. The Philippines will be locked in a war without end.*”<sup>60</sup> It is important to understand though that the election violence brought by the NPA has long been turned into a deadly currency as Rutten has detailed, the violence of the NPA closely overlaps with that of the clans and the military:

*“Those who are involved in rackets of various kinds likewise need specialists in violence to help run them. For political entrepreneurs, former NPAs are attractive candidates for such positions.”*<sup>61</sup>

As long as these ‘specialists in violence’ are made into a valuable commodity, the violent pedigree from the NPA and others “*who cultivate contacts with a network of rebel returnees known for their good leadership skills and come in handy in election campaigns.*”<sup>62</sup> will continue to mature for the next election cycle.

## Conclusions

Unfortunately, the outlook for future elections is just as “*gloomy*”<sup>63</sup> as when Quimpo had observed a decade ago. We can make such a forecast now on the basis of more reliable and recent statistics. Without significant political reform, managing election violence will be at best treating the symptoms and not the underlying cause. ‘Gun bans’ and increased checkpoints by security forces with trust issues among the population are not mitigating election violence in the Philippines. This adds to previous research elsewhere that “*does not find robust evidence that electoral rules significantly influence*”<sup>64</sup> the levels and types of violence. Those that still hope that development and peace in the Philippines can be realised through the ballot box must understand that elections themselves are not just notoriously violent - but as this paper shows – actually consistently and increasingly violent. This paper adds to the emerging

literature on the issue of election violence<sup>65</sup> to strengthen the argument that elections are violent enterprises in and of themselves. As such, in their current violent form elections are unlikely to be any sort of salvation. In fact, should election violence continue to increase in line with the findings in this research, continuing the current form and practice of the Philippine democratic process will further entrench violent actors and practices.

This research therefore plugs in to wider analysis on the politics of the Philippines that the electorate justifiably “*don’t like elections*”<sup>66</sup> – as was the case in 2005 - and suggests they will become even more unpopular. The “*low expectations*”<sup>67</sup> Calimbahin described were justified in 2010 polls and as the violence has only increased it is hard to see how the electorate’s faith in the authorities’ willingness and ability to tackle election violence can be restored.

#### [The case for a dedicated election violence database](#)

Following the discontinuation of the Philippine Daily Inquirer’s ‘database’ of election violence, reliance on the GTD is by no means a perfect substitute. This paper has exhausted Newman’s method and exploited the best the GTD has to offer. Further research would be greatly facilitated by the creation and maintenance of a dedicated, impartial election violence database. As this paper has outlined, such an endeavour will not be straightforward, given the complexities and entrenched nature of election violence in the Philippines by the various actors (known and otherwise) as outlined here. The very creation of such a database will undoubtedly be opposed by some authorities in the Philippines who, as we have seen, are engaged in election violence in various guises. This chimes with recent research focused on election violence in Indonesia,<sup>68</sup> Mexico,<sup>69</sup> the Middle East,<sup>70</sup> and more generally<sup>71</sup> that note problems with data and state involvement in electoral violence.

Documenting the increasing electoral violence in the Philippines is becoming increasingly problematic. Previous lists by media organisations have stopped and are unlikely to return. Accurately and consistently recording even basic facts such as the date, location and

causalities of attacks cannot be assumed, and reliance on media reportage will result in shortcomings in documenting the violence. Not least given the media crackdown by current President Rodrigo Duterte.<sup>72</sup> Furthermore, to accurately determine and record more perpetrators of attacks and improve upon the GTD, the requirements of maintaining a specific election violence database for the Philippines and elsewhere demand a significant effort. Ideally both through a local contemporary and historical appreciation of the “*levels of campaign overspending, corruption, fraud and political violence that elections were said to have become the rule of ‘guns, goons and gold’*”.<sup>73</sup>

Supplementary Table - Frequency of terrorist attacks from 2004 to 2017 by month, with monthly averages

															Election Year		Non-Election Year			
	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	Total	Av	Total	Av	Total	Av
January	1	3	10	4	4	19	10	10	8	24	28	39	38	32	230	16	77	15	153	17
February	2	3	7	5	2	24	17	13	13	26	38	38	55	39	282	20	105	21	177	20
March	5		2	1	2	24	17	13	17	29	30	43	54	63	300	23	106	21	194	24
April	4	1	5	10	13	23	17	12	19	54	19	42	59	30	308	22	144	29	164	18
May	1	1	3	6	18	20	42	9	13	81	43	35	81	42	395	28	211	42	184	20
June	7		4	11	32	17	14	14	12	33	27	42	36	47	296	23	101	20	195	24
July		1	3	1	46	23	7	6	13	46	28	34	29	45	282	22	83	21	199	22
August		7	6	2	58	9	10	8	24	34	37	35	31	36	297	23	77	19	220	24
September				3	13	16	15	11	9	50	32	38	14	40	241	22	82	21	159	23
October			3	7	17	23	23	14	17	49	26	47	25	38	289	24	104	26	185	23
November	3		2	5	13	18	20	19	11	32	40	49	26	29	267	21	86	17	181	23
December	7	2	3	2	42	4	7	5	17	38	29	48	36	45	285	20	90	18	195	22
Yearly Total	30	18	48	57	260	220	199	134	173	496	377	490	484	486	3472	248	1266	253	2206	245

- 
- <sup>1</sup> James McEnteer, 'Guns, Goons, Gold, and Glitz: Philippine Press Coverage of the 1995 National Elections', *Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics* 1, no. 1 (1 January 1996): 113–20,; Miann Banaag, Ronald U. Mendoza, and John Penalosa, 'Political Economy of Federalism: Insights from Data on Guns, Goons and Gold', SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: , 20 September 2017), <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3040440>.
- <sup>2</sup> Nathan Gilbert Quimpo, 'The Philippines: Predatory Regime, Growing Authoritarian Features', *The Pacific Review* 22, no. 3 (6 August 2009): 335–53, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09512740903068388>.
- <sup>3</sup> Justus M. van der Kroef, 'Private Armies and Extrajudicial Violence in the Philippines', *Asian Affairs: An American Review* 13, no. 4 (1 December 1986): 1–21, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00927678.1986.9933662>.
- <sup>4</sup> William N. Holden, 'Neoliberalism and State Terrorism in the Philippines: The Fingerprints of Phoenix', *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 4, no. 3 (1 December 2011): 331–50, <https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2011.623401>.
- <sup>5</sup> Peter Kreuzer, 'Political Clans and Violence in the Southern Philippines' (Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, 2005), [https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/28419/ssoar-2005-kreuzer-political\\_clans\\_and\\_violence\\_in.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y&lnkname=ssoar-2005-kreuzer-political\\_clans\\_and\\_violence\\_in.pdf](https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/28419/ssoar-2005-kreuzer-political_clans_and_violence_in.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y&lnkname=ssoar-2005-kreuzer-political_clans_and_violence_in.pdf); James Putzel, 'Democratization and Clan Politics: The 1992 Philippine Elections', *South East Asia Research* 3, no. 1 (1 March 1995): 18–45, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0967828X9500300103>.
- <sup>6</sup> Clark D. Neher, 'Political Clientelism and Instability in the Philippines', *Asian Affairs: An American Review* 12, no. 3 (1 September 1985): 1–23, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00927678.1985.10553680>; Julio Teehankee, 'Consolidation or Crisis of Clientelistic Democracy? The 2004 Synchronized Elections in the Philippines', *Between Consolidation and Crisis. Elections and Democracy in Five Nations in Southeast Asia*, 2006, 215–76; Julio C. Teehankee, 'Clientelism and Party Politics in the Philippines', in *Party Politics in Southeast Asia* (Routledge, 2012), 204–32.
- <sup>7</sup> John L. Linantud, 'Whither Guns, Goons, and Gold? The Decline of Factional Election Violence in the Philippines', *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 1998, 298–318.
- <sup>8</sup> Deniz Aksoy, 'Elections and the Timing of Terrorist Attacks', *The Journal of Politics* 76, no. 4 (2014): 901–3, <https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022381614000504>; Deniz Aksoy and David B. Carter, 'Electoral Institutions and the Emergence of Terrorist Groups', *British Journal of Political Science* 44, no. 1 (January 2014): 5–9, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123412000282>; S. P. Harish and Andrew T. Little, 'The Political Violence Cycle', *American Political Science Review* 111, no. 2 (May 2017): 249, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055416000733>.
- <sup>9</sup> Temario Rivera, 'In Search of Credible Elections and Parties: The Philippine Paradox', in *Chasing the Wind: Assessing Philippine Democracy*, 2011, 79, [http://pmdp.loloyd.net/system/files/attachments/Democracy\\_ChasingtheWind2012.pdf#page=61](http://pmdp.loloyd.net/system/files/attachments/Democracy_ChasingtheWind2012.pdf#page=61).
- <sup>10</sup> Michael Scharff, 'Enhancing Security to Restore Credibility: Safeguarding Elections in the Philippines, 2008-2010', *Innovations for Successful Societies* (Princeton University, 2011), 2, [https://successfultsocieties.princeton.edu/sites/successfultsocieties/files/Policy\\_Note\\_ID157.pdf](https://successfultsocieties.princeton.edu/sites/successfultsocieties/files/Policy_Note_ID157.pdf).
- <sup>11</sup> Quimpo, 'The Philippines', 343.
- <sup>12</sup> Lindsay Shorr Newman, 'Do Terrorist Attacks Increase Closer to Elections?', *Terrorism and Political Violence* 25, no. 1 (1 January 2013): 18, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2013.733247>.
- <sup>13</sup> Elin Bjarnegård, 'Making Gender Visible in Election Violence: Strategies for Data Collection', *Politics & Gender* 14, no. 4 (December 2018): 690–95, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1743923X18000624>.
- <sup>14</sup> Hervé Maupeu, 'Revisiting Post-Election Violence', *Les Cahiers d'Afrique de l'Est / The East African Review*, no. 38 (1 April 2008): 193.
- <sup>15</sup> Linantud, 'Whither Guns, Goons, and Gold?', 298.

---

<sup>16</sup> Linantud, 298.

<sup>17</sup> Patrick Patino and Djorina Velasco, 'Election Violence in the Philippines', Online Papers (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2004), <https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/philippinen/50071.pdf>.

<sup>18</sup> Carolyn O. Arguillas et al., 'Democracy at Gunpoint: Election-Related Violence in the Philippines', 2011.

<sup>19</sup> Patino and Velasco, 'Election Violence in the Philippines', 1.

<sup>20</sup> Patino and Velasco, 'Election Violence in the Philippines', 3.

<sup>21</sup> Patino and Velasco, 5.

<sup>22</sup> Commission on Elections, 'COMELEC Resolution No. 6446' (2003), [https://lawphil.net/administ/comelec/comres2003/comres\\_6446\\_2003.html](https://lawphil.net/administ/comelec/comres2003/comres_6446_2003.html).

<sup>23</sup> Newman, 'Do Terrorist Attacks Increase Closer to Elections?'

<sup>24</sup> Stephen McGrath and Paul Gill, 'An Exploratory Study on the Impact of Electoral Participation upon a Terrorist Group's Use of Violence in a Given Year', *Perspectives on Terrorism* 8, no. 4 (6 August 2014), <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/358>.

<sup>25</sup> Newman, 'Do Terrorist Attacks Increase Closer to Elections?', 13.

<sup>26</sup> Duncan Cramer, *Fundamental Statistics for Social Research: Step-by-Step Calculations and Computer Techniques Using SPSS for Windows* (Routledge, 2003), <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203360613>.

<sup>27</sup> Newman, 'Do Terrorist Attacks Increase Closer to Elections?'

<sup>28</sup> McGrath and Gill, 'An Exploratory Study on the Impact of Electoral Participation upon a Terrorist Group's Use of Violence in a Given Year'.

<sup>29</sup> COMELEC, 'Gun Ban', COMELEC, 16 January 2019, <http://www.comelec.gov.ph>.

<sup>30</sup> Kreuzer, 'Political Clans and Violence in the Southern Philippines', 14.

<sup>31</sup> McGrath and Gill, 'An Exploratory Study on the Impact of Electoral Participation upon a Terrorist Group's Use of Violence in a Given Year'; Newman, 'Do Terrorist Attacks Increase Closer to Elections?'

<sup>32</sup> Roland Hodler and Dominic Rohner, 'Electoral Terms and Terrorism', *Public Choice* 150, no. 1 (1 January 2012): 181–93, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9697-3>; Valentina A. Bali and Johann Park, 'The Effects of the Electoral Calendar on Terrorist Attacks', *Electoral Studies* 35 (2014): 346–61; Joseph Robbins, Lance Hunter, and Gregg R Murray, 'Voters versus Terrorists: Analyzing the Effect of Terrorist Events on Voter Turnout', *Journal of Peace Research* 50, no. 4 (1 July 2013): 495–508, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343313479814>.

<sup>33</sup> Kreuzer, 'Political Clans and Violence in the Southern Philippines', 19.

<sup>34</sup> Scharff, 'Enhancing Security to Restore Credibility: Safeguarding Elections in the Philippines, 2008-2010', 8.

<sup>35</sup> Kreuzer, 'Political Clans and Violence in the Southern Philippines', III.

<sup>36</sup> Joseph Anthony L. Reyes, Brando Gabriel C. Arce, and Nicolle Bien N. Madrid, 'Do Money, Power, Family and Connections Really Matter in Politics? Analysing Factors of Success in the 2010, 2013 and 2016 Philippine Senatorial Elections', *The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies* 36, no. 2 (2018): 28–51, <https://doi.org/10.22439/cjas.v36i2.5648>.

<sup>37</sup> Bali and Park, 'The Effects of the Electoral Calendar on Terrorist Attacks', 358.

<sup>38</sup> Walden Bello, 'Chronicling an Electoral Insurgency: "Dutertismo" Captures the Philippines', *Transnational Institute*, 2016.

<sup>39</sup> Edwin Fernandez, '7 Dead in MILF, BIFF Clashes in Maguindanao', *Philippine News Agency*, 5 October 2019, <https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1082382>; John Unson, '7 MILF Men Wounded in BIFF Roadside Bombing', *The Philippine Star*, 26 October 2019, <https://www.philstar.com/nation/2019/10/26/1963475/7-milf-men-wounded-biff-roadside-bombing>.

<sup>40</sup> Tom Smith and Joseph Franco, 'Mujahideen in Marawi: How Local Jihadism in the Philippines Tried to Go Global', in *Exporting Global Jihad: Critical Perspectives from Asia and North America* (London: Bloomsbury Press (I.B. Tauris), 2020), 37–54.



- 
- <sup>41</sup> Jodesz Gavilan, 'Presidential Bets on the Mamasapano Clash', *Rappler*, 24 January 2016, <http://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/iq/119810-2016-presidential-bets-mamasapano-clash>.
- <sup>42</sup> Fact Check Team, 'Duterte Was Already Campaigning as Early as 2015', *Vera Files*, 27 January 2017, <https://verafiles.org/articles/vera-files-fact-check-duterte-was-already-campaigning-early>.
- <sup>43</sup> Julio Teehankee and Yuko Kasuya, 'The Philippine Midterms and the New "Presidential Bandwagon"', *New Mandala* (blog), 28 May 2019, <https://www.newmandala.org/the-philippine-midterms-and-the-new-presidential-bandwagon/>; ABS-CBN News, 'Pangilinan: Duterte Blaming Mar for Mamasapano Is "Pure Politicking"', *ABS-CBN News*, 21 April 2019, <https://news.abs-cbn.com/news/04/21/19/pangilinan-duterte-blaming-mar-for-mamasapano-is-pure-politicking>.
- <sup>44</sup> Bali and Park, 'The Effects of the Electoral Calendar on Terrorist Attacks', 348.
- <sup>45</sup> Robbins, Hunter, and Murray, 'Voters versus Terrorists'; Laia Balcells and Gerard Torrats-Espinoso, 'Using a Natural Experiment to Estimate the Electoral Consequences of Terrorist Attacks', *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 115, no. 42 (16 October 2018): 10624–29, <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1800302115>.
- <sup>46</sup> From 2004–2017, the period of this study, the Philippines was ranked 4th in the 'Murder/Homicide Rate' see World Bank, 'Philippines Murder/Homicide Rate 2004-2017' (Macrotrends), accessed 14 February 2020, <https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/PHL/philippines/murder-homicide-rate>.
- <sup>47</sup> Ciri Human Rights Data Project, 'PIR Index - Extrajudicial Killing', April 2016, <http://chartsbin.com/view/40044>.
- <sup>48</sup> William N. Holden, 'A Neoliberal Landscape of Terror: Extrajudicial Killings in the Philippines', *International Journal for Critical Geographies* 11, no. 1 (2012): 169.
- <sup>49</sup> Holden, 'Neoliberalism and State Terrorism in the Philippines', 346.
- <sup>50</sup> Peter M. Sales, 'State Terror in the Philippines: The Alston Report, Human Rights and Counter-Insurgency under the Arroyo Administration', *Contemporary Politics* 15, no. 3 (1 September 2009): 334, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13569770903118788>.
- <sup>51</sup> Allen Hicken, 'The Philippines in 2007: Ballots, Budgets, and Bribes', *Asian Survey* 48, no. 1 (1 February 2008): 77, <https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2008.48.1.75>.
- <sup>52</sup> Carlos H. Conde, 'Election Violence Escalating in Philippines', *The New York Times*, 6 May 2007, sec. World, <https://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/06/world/asia/06iht-phils.1.5583626.html>.
- <sup>53</sup> Manny Mogato, 'More Die in Philippine Election as Police Cut Toll', *Reuters*, 17 May 2007, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-elections-idUSMAN10652620070517>.
- <sup>54</sup> Joseph Anthony L. Reyes and Tom Smith, 'Analysing Labels, Associations, and Sentiments in Twitter on the Abu Sayyaf Kidnapping of Viktor Okonek', *Terrorism and Political Violence* 0, no. 0 (14 December 2015): 1–19, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2015.1105798>.
- <sup>55</sup> Francisco Tuyay et al., 'Poll Hotspots Expand to 94', *Manila Standard*, 13 February 2019, <https://manilastandard.net/news/top-stories/287701/poll-hotspots-expand-to-94.html>.
- <sup>56</sup> William Holden, 'The Never Ending War in the Wounded Land: The New People's Army on Samar', *Journal of Geography and Geology* 5, no. 4 (11 November 2013): p29, <https://doi.org/10.5539/jgg.v5n4p29>.
- <sup>57</sup> F.A. Mediansky, 'The New People's Army: A Nation-Wide Insurgency in the Philippines', *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 8, no. 1 (1986): 1–17.
- <sup>58</sup> William N. Holden, 'Ashes from the Phoenix: State Terrorism and the Party-List Groups in the Philippines', *Contemporary Politics* 15, no. 4 (1 December 2009): 390, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13569770903416422>.
- <sup>59</sup> Linantud, 'Whither Guns, Goons, and Gold?', 316.
- <sup>60</sup> Holden, 'Ashes from the Phoenix', 391.
- <sup>61</sup> Rosanne Rutten, 'Revolutionary Specialists, Strongmen, and the State: Post-Movement Careers of CPP—NPA Cadres in a Philippine Province, 1990s–2001', *South East Asia Research* 9, no. 3 (1 November 2001): 331, <https://doi.org/10.5367/00000001101297423>.
- <sup>62</sup> Rutten, 356.

---

<sup>63</sup> Quimpo, 'The Philippines', 351.

<sup>64</sup> Aksoy and Carter, 'Electoral Institutions and the Emergence of Terrorist Groups', 2.

<sup>65</sup> Balcells and Torrats-Espinosa, 'Using a Natural Experiment to Estimate the Electoral Consequences of Terrorist Attacks'; Kristine Höglund, 'Electoral Violence in Conflict-Ridden Societies: Concepts, Causes, and Consequences', *Terrorism and Political Violence* 21, no. 3 (29 June 2009): 412–27, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546550902950290>.

<sup>66</sup> Kreuzer, 'Political Clans and Violence in the Southern Philippines', 32.

<sup>67</sup> Cleo Calimbahin, 'Exceeding (Low) Expectations: Autonomy, Bureaucratic Integrity, and Capacity in the 2010 Elections', *Philippine Political Science Journal* 32, no. 1 (21 December 2011): 103–26, <https://doi.org/10.1163/2165025X-03201004>.

<sup>68</sup> S. P. Harish and Risa Toha, 'A New Typology of Electoral Violence: Insights from Indonesia', *Terrorism and Political Violence* 31, no. 4 (4 July 2019): 687–711, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2016.1277208>; Ursula E. Daxecker and Brandon C. Prins, 'The Politicization of Crime: Electoral Competition and the Supply of Maritime Piracy in Indonesia', *Public Choice* 169, no. 3 (1 December 2016): 375–93, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-016-0374-z>.

<sup>69</sup> Aldo F. Ponce, 'Violence and Electoral Competition: Criminal Organizations and Municipal Candidates in Mexico', *Trends in Organized Crime* 22, no. 2 (1 June 2019): 231–54, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12117-018-9344-9>.

<sup>70</sup> Nadir Gergin, 'Bullets for Ballots: Electoral Violence in Insurgencies', in *Eradicating Terrorism from the Middle East: Policy and Administrative Approaches*, ed. Alexander R. Dawoody, Public Administration, Governance and Globalization (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016), 323–49, [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31018-3\\_18](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31018-3_18).

<sup>71</sup> Alex Braithwaite and Jessica Maves Braithwaite, 'Restricting Opposition in Elections and Terrorist Violence', *Terrorism and Political Violence* 32, no. 7 (2 October 2020): 1550–72, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2018.1495627>; Rebecca Lordan-Perret et al., 'Attacks on Energy Infrastructure Targeting Democratic Institutions', *Energy Policy* 132 (1 September 2019): 915–27, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2019.06.025>.

<sup>72</sup> Tom Smith, 'Philippines' Dictator Duterte Turns on the Media That Helped Elect Him', *The Conversation*, 16 January 2018, <http://theconversation.com/philippines-dictator-duterte-turns-on-the-media-that-helped-elect-him-90149>; Tom Smith, "'Duterte's Dictatorship Is Complete with Closure of Major News Network'", *Southeast Asia Globe*, 7 May 2020, <https://southeastasiaglobe.com/philippines-duterte-dictatorship/>.

<sup>73</sup> Quimpo, 'The Philippines', 340.