



# Getting to the point

Reducing gun and knife crime in Britain:  
lessons from abroad

Dr Bob Golding and Jonathan McClory  
Edited by Gavin Lockhart

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## About the authors

### **Dr Bob Golding**

*Senior Associate Lecturer, in Criminal Justice Studies, University of Portsmouth; Consultant*

Bob Golding was lately an Assistant Chief Constable with Warwickshire Police until his retirement in 2006. Additionally he held the Research and Development portfolio for the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO). Since retirement, he has been both Programme Manager in setting up the Home Office/ACPO National Ballistics Intelligence Programme; and programme consultant on ACPO's Criminal Use of Firearms Group, involving a programme of projects relating to gun crime based around intelligence, enforcement and prevention.

### **Jonathan McClory**

*Research Fellow for the Crime and Justice Unit at Policy Exchange*

Jonathan joined Policy Exchange in 2006 and has specialised in policing and violent crime. Jonathan graduated from the University of Michigan with a dual degree in economics and politics. In 2006 he completed an MSc in Public Policy at University College London. This is his sixth publication for Policy Exchange.

### **Gavin Lockhart**

*Head of Crime and Justice Unit, Policy Exchange*

Gavin Lockhart has responsibility for crime and justice research at Policy Exchange. Gavin worked as a management consultant before joining Policy Exchange in August 2006. He has edited ten Policy Exchange reports including *Measure for Measure*, *Fitting the Bill* and *Unlocking the Prison Estate*.

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## Executive Summary

Since the first report in this series was published in July 2008, gun and knife crime has stubbornly remained in the headlines – and on the political agenda. Murder is always shocking; never more so than when both perpetrator and victim are young. Twenty-seven people were killed as a result of gun and knife crime on London’s streets in 2008 and 380 people in England and Wales as a whole. And there is a wider economic cost to this human loss. The economic cost of all murders with firearms amounted to more than £200 million. When murders with knives are included, the cost is approximately £628 million.<sup>1</sup>

The number of knife murders has increased by 23% over the past ten years; injuries caused by knives have increased by 30% from 1997, and police arrests for carrying a weapon with a blade or point in and near schools went up 500% from 1999 to 2005. Culprits are younger, and the fear that they spread is driving more young people to carry knives for self-protection. Injuries and deaths from knives far outstrip those from firearms: knife crimes are four times more common than gun crimes; and the risk of serious injury is more than double that for gun crime. Guns are strictly regulated but restricting the supply of knives is impossible.

At the heart of this report is a study of four cities – Toronto, Chicago, Boston and Amsterdam – which have successfully dealt with surges in gun and knife crime. The scale of their impact is astonishing: violent crime in Boston is half the level experienced in the 1990; Chicago reduced their homicide rate by nearly 40% between 1998 and 2007; Toronto has seen the same drop off in violence since 2005. Lessons from work in these cities have helped the research team identify issues which require immediate attention in England and Wales.

### Problems

**Poor intelligence.** Poor intelligence and information sharing between schools and police is a pervasive problem throughout England and Wales. Many school administrators fear that their school will be stigmatised if the police get involved. Although police have a presence in some London secondary schools, this should be only a first step towards more far-reaching prevention work in schools. In Boston, where police have been embedded in at-risk primary schools, they have been able to intervene before violence erupts.

“ Experience from home and abroad demonstrates that interventions are critically dependent on the collaboration of partners ”

**Weak international agreements on gun control and supply that do not involve the Home Office and police.** Cross-departmental co-operation can fail in any realm of government policy; this has been true of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Home Office when it comes to combating the illicit international arms trade.

**Unclear domestic legislation.** Interviews have confirmed the position taken in our first report, *Going Ballistic*, that current legislation governing firearms and offensive weapons is piecemeal and incomplete – in short, not fit for purpose.

**Gangs taking over areas.** Gangs and high-risk individuals can create virtual “no-go” areas, where residents fear for their safety. Without the power to impose carefully targeted civil injunctions, gang activity can destroy civilised living conditions for some communities.

<sup>1</sup> In England and Wales the total social and economic cost of a murder is estimated to be £1,662,500 (see Chapter 1)

*No co-ordinated approach to outreach work.* Outreach work in high-risk areas of England and Wales, although good as far as it goes, would be more effective if it were fully co-ordinated and if the relationship between police and qualified outreach workers were better defined. Experience from abroad demonstrates that interventions are critically dependent on the collaboration of partners; the strength of partnerships and the sustainability of these arrangements is a real concern.

*Missed opportunities for intervention.* Victims of violent crime are up to 70% more likely to become violent assailants themselves, but there is no national programme in place to offer trauma support and follow-up counselling to victims who receive hospital treatment.<sup>2</sup> Hospital treatment for victims of violent crime should be a point of intervention to curb the likelihood of future violence.

*Multi-agency Public Protection Arrangements are not used appropriately.* Multi-agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPAs) were designed to manage and monitor sex offenders after release from prison. However, they have wider potential. MAPPAs should be used to target gun and knife crime offenders, who also pose a risk to society.

## Solutions

Toughening sentences and simplifying the criminal justice system are just two of the many tools available to policymakers. The authors argue that more attention should be given to the underlying social and economic factors that drive young people to carry weapons and to get involved with gangs: the public health approach. Interventions must occur with younger age groups than they might have done 20 years ago. Early engagement and support for vulnerable families and individuals, and information sharing between police pro-

tective services and other agencies are essential.

Given the difficulty of measuring knife crime, policymakers need access to every possible source of data. The police are not given unfettered access to data and information about individual victims of violent crime receiving hospital treatment. Children and youths treated for gun and knife violence should receive counselling from an outreach worker while in hospital, with follow-up after discharge. Successful programmes of action in Boston, Chicago and Toronto have one thing in common: practitioners and policymakers have understood that working with other organisations to reduce the demand for guns and knives over a number of years is the only way to turn the tide of youth violence.

The Government's most recent attempts to reduce gun and knife crime, the tackling guns action plan (TGAP) and the tackling knives action plan (TKAP) show promise. These employ both long-term diversionary measures and short-term suppression measures to take weapons off the streets. According to senior police sources, the early results of the tackling knives plan are positive. However, its funding expires at the end of March 2009, while the problem of knife crime will not. The positive steps taken under both action plans must be made permanent. The Government will never solve the problem of violent gun and knife crime through a one-year initiative; it will require a generation of work.

The authors' recommendations centre on addressing the risk factors associated with violence and establishing practical intervention and prevention programmes. The full list of 20 recommendations can be found on page 56. The following are the most important:

*Deploy police to primary and secondary schools.* Police forces in large conurbations should provide dedicated police officers for at-risk primary and secondary schools,

<sup>2</sup> Interview with senior representative, Metropolitan Police, London, October 2008

and further education colleges. Police should have a role in delivering an anti-violence curriculum in co-operation with students. Embedding police officers in schools is vital for identifying at-risk children and youths at the earliest possible age, and channelling them into available resources and services.

*Develop an anti-violence curriculum.* The Department for Children, Schools and Families should – in partnership with other government departments – develop good practice guidelines for an anti-violence curriculum in primary and secondary schools.

*Pass legislation to allow police to ban certain individuals from specific locations.* A law is required to enable police to ban high-risk individuals from specific areas for a specified period of time. Birmingham's use of Section 222 of the Local Government Act 1972 allowed police and councils to combat gang activity and avert potential violence until this practice was banned. Simpler, more practical and timely powers have been used to good effect in Amsterdam.

*Share information from A&E departments.* The Department of Health should produce guidelines instructing hospitals to share information on A&E patients treated for violent crime with the police service. Stabbings should be reported in the same way as gunshot wounds.

*Use hospital and prison as a point for intervention.* When victims or offenders present themselves to the health service or criminal justice system, there is an opportunity to intervene and reduce the risks of further violence. Hospitals should offer psychological trauma assessment and follow-up counselling services. Prisons need to provide bespoke intervention programmes for gun and knife offenders.

This publication provides an updated account of best practice in the reduction of violent crime abroad. It also discusses how co-operation and co-ordination internationally could limited the supply of firearms. But why have policies that have been shown to work not been implemented in England and Wales? The authors believe that institutional structures in both national and local government hinder effective multi-agency strategy to reduce violent crime. The setting up of crime and disorder reduction partnerships in 1998 was an encouraging development, but interviews with senior police officers revealed that some agencies are reluctant participants, which is not helped by a lack of clear lines of accountability for participants. This means that multi-agency work on violent crime reduction is not occurring as it should. Although outside the scope of this report, the authors feel there is an urgent need for further research into governance and accountability arrangements of agencies and local authorities at a local level.



# 1

## Introduction

3 Squires P et al, *Street Weapons Commission: Guns, Knives, and Street Violence*, London: Centre for Crime and Justice Studies, 2008

4 Glasgow sometimes dubbed the 'knife crime capital of Europe', has (according to the World Health Organisation) the highest murder rate in Europe. Although overall levels of crime have fallen in the west of Scotland, levels of violent crime, in particular knife crime, have remained relatively constant for the last 40 years

5 Hayden C, Hales G, Lewis S and Silverstone D, "Young men convicted of firearms offences in England and Wales: an exploration of family and educational opportunities for prevention", *Policy Studies*, 29:2, 163 –178, 2008

6 Squires P et al op cit

7 Golding B and McClory J, *Going Ballistic*, London: Policy Exchange, 2008

8 Simmons J, Legg C and Hoskins R, *National Crime Recording Standard (NCRS): an analysis of the impact on recorded crime. Part One: the national picture*, Home Office, online report 2003; see [www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs/2/hors254.pdf](http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs/2/hors254.pdf)

9 Coleman C, Hird C and Povey D, op cit, p12

10 The BCS has been problematic since its inception, as it does not include victims under the age of 16. According to evidence from police and youth offending team workers, under-16s are experiencing more violence than before. The Home Office has announced plans to include under-16s in future British Crime Surveys, although it remains to be seen how effectively they will be able to measure under-16 victimisation rates.

11 Nicholas S, Kershaw C and Walker A, *Crime in England and Wales 2006/07*, London: Home Office, Table 2.01, 2007


Firearms in England and Wales *Going Ballistic*, the first report in this series, explored the extent of gun, gang and knife crime in England and Wales. Based on primary research from surveys and interviews with police constables, youth offending team managers, young offenders and public polling, the report revealed a significant gap between official crime statistics on gun and knife crime and the reality experienced on the street. This second report focuses on the lessons that policy-makers can learn from abroad on how to tackle gun and knife crime effectively.

Gun crime is relatively rare in the UK and is concentrated in urban areas with high levels of social exclusion and economic deprivation. Most recorded gun crime is committed with real or replica guns, or air weapons. Knives and sharp instruments are the most common murder weapons in England and Wales, accounting for roughly one third of all homicides.<sup>3</sup> Rates of murder and serious violence in England and Wales fall midway between those of similarly developed societies.

Crime Statistics in England and Wales Establishing a clear picture of the state of gun and knife crime in England and Wales is a challenging task given the disparate and often conflicting sources of data. These range from official statistics (the British Crime Survey and police recorded crime), to secure sources (criminal intelligence maintained by law enforcement agencies).<sup>4</sup> However published statistics need to be interpreted with care: non-

reporting and non-recording of incidents mean that recorded crime figures do not and cannot include all crimes committed, as demonstrated in Figure 1.<sup>5</sup> Additionally, the British Crime Survey (BCS) does not wholly represent the reality of society's experience of crime.<sup>6,7</sup> Changes in police recording practices – notably to the counting rules in 1998 and the introduction of the national crime recording standard in 2002 – have led to artificial shifts in violent crime statistics.<sup>8,9</sup>

**Figure 1: Relationship between reported and unreported crime**




According to the British Crime Survey, overall levels of crime fell by a third between 1997 and 2007.<sup>10</sup> But, according to police recorded crime statistics, serious violent offences increased by 35% in the same period.<sup>11</sup>


### Gun Crime Statistics

Statistics on firearms offences show a long-term upward trend over the past ten years with a fall over the past two years. Firearms (excluding air weapons) were reported to

**Figure 2: National violence index: trends in police recorded violence and BCS reports of violent offenders**



**Figure 3: Crime recorded by the police in which firearms were reported to have been used as principal weapon, England and Wales, 1998-99 to 2006-07**



have been used in 9,650 recorded crimes in 2006-07. For all firearms offences (excluding air weapons) there was a 4% increase to the year ending December 2007.<sup>12</sup> Offences involving imitation weapons totalled 2,517 in 2006-07, a 23% reduction on the previous year and handgun offences decreased by 11% to 4,175.<sup>13,14</sup>

Figures for gun-related homicides and attempted homicides are arguably more reliably reported than crimes that result in less serious injury. In total, there were 750 in 1997-98 and 1,456 in 2004-05.<sup>15</sup> They have since fallen, but at 818 for 2006-07, remain above their pre-1998 level.<sup>16</sup> A 2005 study found people thought that although the most serious gun crime had fallen in the short term, less serious inci-

dents, such as street robbery with a firearm, had increased.<sup>17</sup> The reasons behind this sentiment could be twofold: first, people may have been more inclined to report incidents, second, there has been an increase in the use of “undischarged” firearms or replicas.<sup>18</sup> Table 1 shows total injuries and fatalities from firearms from 1998 to 2005.

#### Knife Crime Statistics

According to the British Crime Survey, levels of knife crime have remained fairly stable at around 6-7% of all violent crime.<sup>19</sup> Knives and sharp instruments are the most common method of killing in England and Wales, accounting for roughly one third of

12 Home Office Statistics, Connected, Crime in England and Wales 2007/08, [www.connected.gov.uk/facts/gun-crime/index.html](http://www.connected.gov.uk/facts/gun-crime/index.html)

13 Kaiz P, “Homicides, recorded crimes involving firearms”, in Povey D et al (eds), *Homicides, Firearm Offences and Intimate Violence 2006/07* (Supplementary Volume 2 to Crime in England and Wales 2006/07), 31 January 2008, Home Office online report 03/08; see [www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs/08/hosb0308.pdf](http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs/08/hosb0308.pdf)

14 Golding R and McClory J, op cit

15 Hales G, Lewis C, Silverstone D, *Gun Crime: the market in and use of illegal firearms*, Home Office Research Study 298, pp 3-4, 2006

16 Kaiz P, op cit

17 Povey D and Kaiz P, “Recorded Crimes Involving Firearms”, Chapter 2 in Povey D et al, op cit, p 39

18 Interview with ACPO Criminal Use of Firearms working group representative, May 2008

19 Problems with the construction of the BCS survey sample (specifically the exclusion of those aged under 16, under-reporting of less serious knife injuries by victims and the BCS focus on national average rates of victimisation) may be responsible for obscuring the relevant trends

**Table 1: Recorded offences involving use of a firearm in England and Wales where injury was caused, by degree of injury, 1998-99 to 2001-05**

Year	Non-air weapons				Air weapons				Total
	Total	Fatal injury	Serious injury*	Slight injury	Total	Fatal injury	Serious injury	Slight injury	
1998/99	864	49	162	653	1,514	0	133	1,381	2,378
1999/00	1,195	62	200	933	1,977	0	171	1,806	3,172
2000/01	1,382	72	244	1,066	1,821	1	166	1,654	3,203
2001/02	1,877	95	392	1,390	1,915	2	165	1,748	3,792
2002/03	2,179	80	416	1,683	2,377	1	156	2,220	4,556
2003/04	2,367	68	437	1,862	2,395	0	157	2,238	4,762
2004/05	3,856	77	410	3,369	1,502	1	143	1,358	5,358

Source: Table 3b in Povey and Katza (2006: 76) in Coleman *et al.* (2006) HOSB 02/06.

\* A serious injury is one which necessitated detention in hospital or involved fractures, concussion, severe general shock, penetration by a bullet or multiple shot wounds.

all homicides.<sup>20</sup> Murders involving knives or other sharp instruments increased by 28% from 1997 to 2007.<sup>21</sup>

In the past, police have not recorded knife crime as a separate offence, recording violence by the scale and type of the injury (GBH, wounding) not by the weapon used. It was only after the National Audit Office report, *Reducing the Risk of Violent Crime*, in February 2008 criticised the availability of police data regarding weapon use that knife crime data came to be recorded separately. And because official knife crime figures have been collected for only one year, there is no way to identify any trends in police recorded statistics. However, various reporting sources can be used to discern a clearer picture of knife crime.

There are three sources of data that point to an increase in knife carrying. Although potentially ambiguous on their own, when taken together they indicate a definite increase over the last ten years. The first of these sources is “self-reporting” surveys of young people, which suggest a steady rise in instances of knife carrying. The second source is police data, which shows that more people are being charged with carrying a weapon in a public place.

Finally, data from hospital accident and emergency departments shows that more people are receiving treatment for stab wounds.<sup>22</sup>

In a series of self-reporting surveys carried out by MORI on behalf of the Youth Justice Board, a steady rise in the proportion of youths carrying knives was observed: in 2002, 20% of schoolchildren interviewed said that they had carried a knife at some point during the previous 12 months; in 2005, it was 32%.<sup>23</sup> Meanwhile, recorded offences for weapons possession (having an article with a blade or a point in a public place) increased overall by 66% from 1999 to 2005.<sup>24</sup> Possession of an offensive weapon without a “reasonable excuse” increased by 30% over the same period.<sup>25</sup> In and around schools the problem has increased fivefold; arrests for having an article with a blade or point on school premises increased 500% from 1999 to 2005.

The growth in weapon offences could be explained by the police taking a more proactive approach to weapons carrying. However, hospital accident and emergency departments have also reported a substantial increase in the number of patients receiving treatment for stab wounds. A

20 Squires, P *et al.*, *op cit*

21 Coleman C, Hird C and Povey D, *op cit*


22 Squires, P. *et al.*, *op cit*

23 Phillips, A and Chamberlain V, *MORI Youth Survey 2006*, London; Youth Justice Board for England and Wales, 2006

24 *Ibid*

25 *Ibid*

Figure 4: Hospital admissions for knife wounds, HES Online



2006 study of A&E departments found that the number of people admitted as a result of stab or sharp instrument injuries rose by 30% from 1997 to 2005.<sup>26,27,28</sup> Figure 4 shows the increase in hospital admissions for knife wounds from 2002 to 2007.

Firearms in an international perspective  
In 1996, the World Health Organisation (WHO) declared violence a growing public health problem, and has more recently classified violence as a “pandemic”.<sup>29</sup> There

are parts of the world where this seems an apt description, as Table 2 shows.

The WHO has estimated that there are about 2.3 million annual deaths globally due to violence, and 460,000 of those deaths are a result of firearms.<sup>30, 31</sup> In *Going Ballistic* we observed that “the bulk of research on gun crime concludes that more guns do indeed mean more crime and that countries with higher gun ownership rates have higher rates of homicide, injury and suicide involving firearms”.<sup>32</sup> For example, in 2003 in the US there were 11,700 gun homicides (a rate of 4.0 per 100,000 pop-

### Economic cost of violence

The cost of gun crime, a somewhat crude measure of the destructive capacity of violence, has been researched by economists. In the US, the direct costs to the police service of a fatal gunshot have been estimated at more than \$40,000.<sup>33</sup> These costs include police and emergency services’ time, as well as the cost of investigation. Other studies have included the indirect costs associated with firearms deaths. Although the value-of-life measurement differs across studies, one estimates the cost of a fatal gunshot at \$2.8 million, factoring in a lifetime of wages, and a non-fatal gunshot wound at \$249,000.<sup>34</sup>

Firearms-related damage has been estimated to cost \$195 a person a year in Canada and \$495 a person a year in the US. The total cost of firearms death and injury in Canada is estimated at \$6.6 billion.<sup>35</sup> In the UK, the cost of a non-fatal gunshot wound is estimated to be £110,000.<sup>36</sup>

In England and Wales the Home Office estimates the total social and economic cost of a murder is £1,662,500 (inflation adjusted), making the cost of all murders with firearms in 2006-07 more than £200 million. When the number of murders with knives (258 in 2006-07) is included the cost rises to approximately £628 million. This figure does not include the costs of non-fatal assaults or injury with guns or knives.

26 Konig T and Knowles C, “Stabbing: data support public perception”, *British Medical Journal*, 2006

27 Anecdotal evidence provided in the Police Federation submission to the Home Affairs Select Committee in 2007 backed this up: “The prevalence of knives on the streets has undoubtedly increased over the years. Police officers not only have to assist victims of knife crime but are all too often victims themselves: 28% of police officers have been threatened by a knife on at least one occasion in the last two years.”

28 Police Federation, “Memorandum submitted to the Select Committee on Home Affairs – knife crime”, House of Commons: Hansard Archives Research, 200

29 Krug E et al (eds), *World Report on Violence and Health: Summary*, Geneva, Switzerland: World Health Organization, 2002

30 966,000 of these deaths are the result of suicides, 874,000 are homicides and 596,000 are war related. The annual death toll occurring in non-conflict areas as a result of firearms is estimated at 200,000

31 Cukier W and Sidel V, op cit

32 Golding B and McClory J, op cit, p14

33 Miller, T and Cohen M, “Costs of Gunshot and Cut Stab Wounds in the United States with some Canadian Comparisons”, *Accident Analysis and Prevention*, vol 29, no 3, 1997, pp 329-341 (adjusted for 2007 inflation)

34 Miller, T. and Cohen, M., op cit

35 Cukier W and Sidel V, *The Global Gun Epidemic*, London: Praeger Security International, 2006

36 Interview with West Midlands BCJ Commander, April 2008

**Table 2: Countries with the highest rates of reported firearms deaths**

	Country	Year	Total firearm deaths (minimum)	Total firearm death rate (minimum)	Gun homicide rate	Gun suicide rate	Accidental firearm death rate	Undetermined death rate	Percent of homicides with firearms	Percent of firearm deaths that are homicides
1	Colombia	2002	22827	55.7	51.8				86	93
2	Venezuela	2000	5689	34.3	22.15	1.16	0.42	10.57	67	95
3	South Africa	2002	11709	26.8	26.1				54	97
4	El Salvador	2001	1641	25.8	25.3				71	98
5	Brazil	2002	38088	21.72	19.54	0.78	0.18	1.22	64	97
6	Puerto Rico	2001	734	19.12	17.36	1.17	0.49	0.1	91	91
7	Jamaica	1997	450	18.6	18.2	0.37			58	98
8	Guatemala	2000	2109	18.5						
9	Honduras	1999	1677	16.2	16.2					
10	Uruguay	2000	104	13.91	3.11	7.18	3.53	0.09	63	22
11	Ecuador	2000	1321	13.39	10.73	0.77	0.25	1.63	68	22
12	Argentina	2001	371	11.49	4.34	2.88	0.64	3.63	70	38
13	USA	2001	29753	10.27	3.98	5.92	0.28	0.08	64	38


ulation). In Canada, there were 161 gun homicides (a rate of 0.5 per 100,000). Figure 5 shows the firearms ownership rates compared to the rate of firearms deaths in 20 high-income countries.

The intention of legislative controls is, of course, to reduce gun use in crime by restricting supply and thus make it more difficult, time consuming or costly for a criminal or potential criminal to obtain a firearm.<sup>37</sup>

Although it is often said (in the context of regulatory regimes) that deaths or injuries caused by the use of firearms is relatively small (they represent 0.4% of all recorded crime in England and Wales),

their impact is nevertheless considerable. For example, in Germany only 0.25% of all crime involved a firearm.<sup>38</sup> But this represents 16,411 cases where firearms were used to threaten 10,883 times and were fired 5,528 times – a considerable number even allowing for the size of Germany.<sup>39</sup> Additionally, gun use can have an impact on community safety and confidence generally, as we have seen in parts of London or other large cities in Britain. A report in *The New York Times* recently drew attention to a drastic increase in the deaths of young people from gun crime in major US cities, affecting the safety of whole communities and areas.<sup>40</sup>

**Figure 5: International firearms deaths per 100,000**



37 Ludwig J and Cook P, *Evaluating Gun Policy: effects on crime and violence*, Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003

38 Dobat A, Heubrock D and Stoter J, "Weapons ownership and weapons abuse in Germany", in *Kriminalistik*, vol 60, no12, pp 724-728, 2006

39 Bruggeman W, Fijnaut C, Sievers L, Spapens, T and Van Erve W, Report to the Pearls in Policing conference, The Hague June 2008

40 Bruggeman, W Fijnaut C, Sievers L, Spapens, T and Van Erve W, op cit, p13

Turning to Western Europe, Switzerland has one of the highest rates of gun ownership and a high rate of firearms deaths compared to other Western European countries, where it tops the league table with 6.4 firearms deaths per 100,000 people.<sup>41</sup> France also has a relatively high rate of gun ownership – an estimated 18.2% of households own a firearm. Although detailed firearms death and injury rates are not available for France, it has the third highest firearms homicide rate in Europe.<sup>42</sup>

However, many countries within Western Europe have imposed strict regulation of firearms, perhaps because of the experience of war – epitomised by multinational agreements which followed the Second World War.<sup>43</sup> As a result the rates of firearms deaths in Europe vary significantly. (In all European countries for which data is available suicides account for the largest percentage of firearms deaths.)

Germany, for example, has had a relatively strict regime since legislation was introduced in 1972 in response to domestic terrorism. The law states that “the number of gun owners and the number of types of privately held guns must be limited to the lowest possible level in the light of the interests of public safety”.<sup>44</sup> Licensing in Germany requires certification of need, certification of trustworthiness, certification of technical knowledge and certification of physical fitness. Carrying a weapon

is reserved for those who can demonstrate that their life is in acute danger, and gun owners must have been citizens or residents of the country for at least three years.<sup>45</sup>

The Netherlands also operates a strict regulatory regime and its firearms homicides are low. To own a gun you must be over 18 and a member of a nationally licensed gun club for at least a year. Licence applications are approved by the police, licences must be renewed annually and firearms registered. Automatic and semi-automatic weapons are banned. In 2006 further rules were introduced to make gun ownership stricter and revocation easier – including for committing a crime and “moving in criminal circles”.<sup>46</sup>

Australia and Canada have also registered significant declines in forms of gun violence targeted by legislation; however, the impact of domestic gun laws in Canada are thought to be undermined by the flow of illegal firearms from the US.<sup>47</sup>

### Structure of Report

This report addresses the question of how to reduce gun crime and knife crime in England and Wales from two angles: demand and supply. Chapter 2 examines the demand side of the issue. This is developed in Chapter 3, the heart of the report, which analyses how four cities – Boston,

#### Comparing gun crime in the United States and Canada

The number of robberies without firearms is quite similar in both countries: 74 per 100,000 in Canada and 87 per 100,000 people in America. But The US has the highest rates of firearms crime in the developed world: 40% of its more than 400,000 robberies a year involve firearms, and there are 62 victims of armed robberies per 100,000 people.<sup>48</sup> In Canada 14.6% of 21,751 robberies in 2001 involved firearms, and 14 victims of armed robberies per 100,000 people.<sup>49</sup>

Despite a dramatic decline in crime during the 1990s America still has a homicide rate that is about four times greater than England and Wales (FBI, 2005; Cotton and Bibi, 2005). The difference is largely accounted for by gun homicides because firearms are involved in 70% of all American homicides but less than 10% of those in England and Wales.

41 Ludwig J and Cook P, op cit

42 Ibid

43 Bruggerman W, Fijnaut C, Sievers L, Spapens T and Van Erve, W, op cit, p30; see also the Benelux agreement on weapons and ammunition, 1970; and the European Convention on the control of the acquisition and possession of firearms by individuals, 1978 European Treaty Series 101

44 Salvesberg J, “Gun Control and Gun Violence: Lessons from a German Comparison”, *New York Law School Journal of International Comparative Law*, vol 15, no 2, 3 1995

45 Ibid

46 Ludwig J and Cook P, op cit

47 Ibid

48 Ibid

49 Ibid



Toronto, Chicago and Amsterdam – have dealt with guns and knives. This chapter is divided into sections on police tactics, educational programmes and police involvement in schools, social and outreach work, providing opportunities for youth, developing a multi-agency approach, community engagement, and offender management. We argue that a multifaceted system of prevention, intervention, and suppression is the only way to combat rising levels of gun and knife violence effectively.

In the long term, prevention is the best solution but, in the short term, intervention and targeted suppression tactics must be put in place. Because a great deal of violent crime goes unreported, policymakers must also focus efforts and resources on reducing the rates of victimisation. We look at policies that have worked in Canada and the four case study cities.

Chapter 4, on the supply side, looks at the international context of the illicit firearms trade and how this affects the UK. It describes efforts to produce global agreements limiting illicit firearms trade, criticises the failure of agreements thus far to have an impact on illegal firearms supplies and explains the reasons for their failure.

The final chapter recommends a range of policies that are being applied in other countries and that would be useful in the British context. We argue the need for a well-articulated strategy of prevention,

intervention and suppression that targets both the demand and the supply side of gun and knife crime.

### *Methodology*

The primary research carried out for this report comprises four city-level case studies: Amsterdam, Chicago, Toronto and Boston. The case study cities were chosen to reflect a variety of different experiences of violent crime; and different approaches to reducing violent crime. The research team also wanted a diverse sampling of cities with differing municipal government structures, policing systems, and cultural context.

Boston and Chicago were chosen because they have had success in reducing violent crime but have used different strategies. Toronto and Amsterdam are more directly comparable to the British experience, with tighter regulations on firearms and lower rates of homicide.

The case studies were built on both primary and secondary sources. Each consisted of structured interviews with senior police officers, local government officials, social and outreach workers and police intelligence officers. The research methods employed also include secondary data analysis, including strategy, policy and tactical documents; material provided by agencies including police departments; police statistics; and literature review and analysis.

# 2

## Reducing Demand

### The Public Health Approach

Policies built on the belief that the criminal justice system alone holds the key to reducing violent crime are bound to falter.<sup>50</sup> In academic circles, research on curbing violent crime has moved on to encompass a broader investigation of the environmental factors that contribute to the root causes of violent crime. However, the preventative implications of the public health approach have not yet been realised in practice. Both the literature review of *Going Ballistic* and the example of successful foreign programmes identified in this latest report lead us to conclude that a public health approach should be central to a strategy for reducing violent crime in the long term.

The public health approach is based on the principle that violence is a disease, one best tackled by prevention. Instead of focusing on the actions of individual citizens, it considers how to improve the physical and social environment to reduce the likelihood of destructive behaviour and to reduce the harm done by such conduct.<sup>51</sup> As David Hemenway has argued, “a key step in the public health approach is to change social norms—not only norms of behaviour but also norms of attitude about what conditions are acceptable. A commonly cited example is that of spitting in public. In the early twentieth century spitting in public places changed from normal behaviour to an unacceptable practice”.<sup>52</sup>

### *Public health: risk factors*

Public health studies have consistently reported that laws that require safer storage of firearms are linked to fewer deaths and

injuries from firearms.<sup>53</sup> In one study, legislation requiring gun owners to keep firearms locked away was associated with reductions in accidental deaths of children.<sup>54</sup> Similarly, evaluations of American laws at the state level that restrict handgun purchases have been followed by reductions in violent offences.<sup>55</sup> Preventive legislation can be effective, but effective suppression of violent crime is crucial if its full benefits are to be realised.

“ The public health approach emphasises the importance of dealing with both the supply of violence and demand side ”

The public health approach emphasises the importance of dealing with both the supply of violence (changing the physical environment) and demand side (identifying and mitigating the risk factors that lead to violent behaviour). One of the most significant risk factors contributing to violent crime is membership of a street gang. Comparisons between gang members and non-gang members were statistically significant and showed that roughly two-thirds of current gang members had taken a weapon to commit an offence; more than half had possessed a gun; and three-quarters said they had mixed with people who possessed guns.<sup>56</sup>

Risk factors associated with gang membership are, by and large, the same as those associated with violent offending, be it gang related or not. They include poverty, alco-

50 Waller I, *Less Law, More Order*, Ancaster, Ontario: Manor House Publishing, 2006

51 Ibid

52 Hemenway D, *Private Guns, Public Health*, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2004

53 Golding, B. and McClory J, op cit

54 Cummings P et al, “State gun safe storage laws and childhood mortality due to firearms”, *Journal of the American Medical Association*, vol 278, pp 1084-86, 1997

55 Wright M, Wintemute G and Rivara F, “Effectiveness of denial of handgun purchase to persons believed to be at high risk for firearm violence”, *American Journal of Public Health*, vol 89, pp 88-90, 1999

56 Ibid



57 Dahlberg, L. "Youth Violence in the United States Major Trends, Risk Factors, and Prevention Approaches", *American Journal of Preventive Medicine*, vol 14, issue 4, pp 259-272, 2000

58 Herrenkohl T et al, "Developmental Risk Factors for youth Violence", *Journal of Adolescent Health*, vol 26, no 2, pp 176-186, 2000

59 Elliot D, "Serious violent offenders: onset, developmental course and termination", *The American Society of Criminology Presidential Address*, vol 32, pp 1-22, 1994

60 Loeber R and Stouthamer-Loeber M, "Development of juvenile aggression and violence: Some misconceptions and controversies", *American Psychology*, vol 52, pp 242-259, 1998

61 Wilson W, *The Truly Disadvantaged: the Inner city, the Underclass, and Public Policy*, Chicago: University of Chicago, 1987

62 Prothrow-Stith D and Spivak H, *Murder is No Accident*, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2004

63 Ibid

64 Ibid

65 Brewer D et al, "Preventing serious, violent and chronic juvenile offending", in Howell J et al *A Sourcebook: Serious, Violent and Chronic Juvenile Offenders*, pp 61-141, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1995

66 Elliott D et al, "The effects of neighborhood disadvantage on adolescent development", *Journal of Crime Delinquency*, vol 33, pp 389-426, 1996

67 Herrenkohl T et al, "Developmental Risk Factors for Youth Violence", *Journal of Adolescent Health*, vol 26, no 3, pp 176-186, 2000

68 Hawkins J et al, "A review of predictors of youth violence", in Howell J et al, op cit, pp 106-146

69 Herrenkohl T et al, op cit

70 Farrington D, "Early predictors of adolescent aggression and adult violence",

71 Klein M, *The American Street Gang: Its Nature, Prevalence, and Control*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995

hol, violence in the media, witnessing or experiencing violence in the home, socially disorganised communities, poor academic performance, sub-standard housing, lack of opportunities for social activities, lack of access to legitimate employment, and presence of gang members in the family, peer group or neighbourhood.<sup>57</sup>

Individual risk factors, including psychological and biological characteristics identifiable in children at very young ages, may increase their vulnerability to negative social and environmental influences as they grow up.<sup>58</sup> A number of studies have suggested that gender may be a factor in youth violence and this is supported by arrest statistics for violent offences.<sup>59,60</sup> The risk factors associated with violent crime are generally well known, but are worth stating in detail.

Poverty is a major risk factor for involvement in violence.<sup>61</sup> Poverty clearly creates vulnerability to violence, as it does for many public health problems.<sup>62</sup> Poorer children are also more likely to grow up without consistent contact with fathers or positive role models.

A dysfunctional family – characterised by abuse and neglect is likely to result in violent behaviour.<sup>63</sup> When violence takes place in the home, children learn it as an acceptable behaviour. Thus children who experience violence firsthand as victims of child abuse are more likely to commit violent acts themselves: hurt children become hurtful children.<sup>64</sup>

Being exposed to crime and drug dealing in a neighbourhood, as a consequence of socially disorganised communities, is another important risk factor for committing violence later in life.<sup>65</sup> Drugs being prevalent in a community may also be an indicator of decreased economic opportunity. Moreover, exposure to poverty both at

the neighbourhood and family level is likely to co-occur with neighbourhood disorganisation, also elevating risk for violence.<sup>66</sup> Disorganised communities are more likely to expose youths to a multitude of risk factors and research has shown that the likelihood of delinquency, mental health disorders, and substance abuse increases with exposure to a greater number of risk factors.<sup>67</sup>

Poor academic performance among individuals is often cited as a risk factor. A child's level of academic achievement and experiences in school are strongly correlated to violence risk.<sup>68</sup> According to research, children who have little interest in school and perform poorly on academic tasks from a young age are at risk not only for school failure and exclusion, but from engaging in anti-social behaviour and violence.<sup>69</sup> Farrington found that children who performed poorly in school had higher rates of self-reported violence.<sup>70</sup>

Access to employment, too, is an important risk factor in both violent crime and gang membership. Klein has previously argued that "uneducated, underemployed young males turn to the illegal economies enhanced by gang membership, including selling drugs in some instances. Older males who in earlier decades would have matured into more steady jobs and family roles hang on to the gang structure by default."<sup>71</sup>

Identifying these risk factors is essential to the design of intervention and prevention policies and they must be delivered by a coherent and co-ordinated multi-agency approach. Information sharing and risk management is vital to delivering long-term reductions in violent gun and knife crime. Each city visited by the research team gave some amount of insight into how to build a successful multi-agency strategy for dealing with violent crime.

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# 3

## Lessons from Abroad

### The Case Studies

This chapter analyses which programmes work, which look promising and which are ineffective.<sup>72</sup> The work of the programmes is broken down into the following categories:

- Suppression and police tactics
- Education
- Social intervention
- Community mobilisation and multi-agency approach
- Provision of opportunities
- Offender management

A summary of the lessons learnt from each city is set out in Table 3.

#### *Toronto*

Toronto is Canada's largest city and one of the most diverse cities on earth: nearly half (49%) of its 2.5 million population was born outside the country. It has one of the lowest homicide rates of all major cities in North America. In 2004 there were 1.8 homicides per 100,000 people, and homicides oscillate between 65 and 70 a year. Gang violence primarily involves handguns, but knife crime has been growing. The drugs trade has increased significantly in the past five years, accompanied by an escalation in inter-gang conflict and gun crime.<sup>73</sup>

The city's proximity to the American border means that its gun controls are vulnerable to handguns smuggled across the border. According to intelligence officers in the Toronto police, illegal handguns sell for between £650 and £700; 30-40% of

guns they recover are stolen registered firearms and 60-70% of these have been smuggled in from the US.<sup>74</sup>

Gun violence became an extremely sensitive and political issue following a 2005 Boxing Day shooting in the centre of Toronto in which several innocent bystanders were wounded or killed.

#### *Chicago*

Chicago has a population of 2.8 million people – similar in size to Toronto. But its experience of crime has been entirely different. Chicago has traditionally had one of the highest rates of homicide among major American cities. It has averaged 724 homicides a year over the past 15 years. The current homicide rate stands at about 15.65 per 100,000, more than double the rate of New York (7 per 100,000). After a peak of 943 homicides in 1992, Chicago police reorganised its force in accordance with the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS).

Following the implementation of CAPS, crime dropped throughout the 1990s, and in 2004, Chicago recorded 448 homicides, the lowest figure since 1965. Total homicides in the city have remained steady, reporting 449, 452, and 435 in 2005, 2006, and 2007 respectively. The overall crime rate has continued the downward trend that has taken place since the early 1990s.<sup>75</sup>

#### *Boston*

Boston is a much smaller city than the others discussed here; there are 581,000 people living within the city limits. But

72 Programme analysis has been shown to be effective. See Lawrence W. Sherman et al, *Preventing Crime: What Works, What Doesn't, What's Promising*, Report to the US Congress, Washington, DC: U.S. Dept of Justice, 655, 1997

73 Interviews with Chief of Toronto Police, William Blair

74 Interview with Dr A. Mukherjee, Chair of Toronto Police Services Board, Toronto, ON, 23rd July 2008

75 Chicago Police Department news release, Chicago, IL: Chicago Police Department, 19th January, 2007

**Table 3: Lessons from international case studies**

	Boston	Chicago	Toronto	Amsterdam
<b>Suppression/ Police Tactics</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Targeted deployment in hot-spot areas</li> <li>2. Developed intelligence dissemination process</li> <li>3. Dedicated Youth Violence Strike Force</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Move to proactive, problem-solving policing</li> <li>2. Improve intelligence gathering</li> <li>3. Development of TRU specialist units for flexible deployment in hotspots</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Focus police in hot-spots</li> <li>2. Improve police intelligence capability</li> <li>3. Develop specialised, flexibly deployed anti-violence unit</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Long-term strategy: an eight-year plan</li> <li>2. Change to work processes, strategy and priorities</li> </ol>
<b>Community Mobilisation and Multi-Agency Approach</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Recognition that violence is a community problem, not just a police problem</li> <li>2. Buy-in and co-operation from health care professionals</li> <li>3. Partnership with community outreach workers/clergy</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Make community engagement a police priority</li> <li>2. Creation of beat meetings</li> <li>3. District advisory councils to advise police beat commanders</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Recognition of ethnic diversity in communities</li> <li>2. Increase cultural and linguistic sensitivity through officer training</li> <li>3. Actively recruit minority officers</li> </ol>	
<b>Education and Police in Schools</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Dedicated police schools unit, with a permanent presence in 50 of Boston's 150 schools</li> <li>2. Police have established a presence in middle and elementary schools (intervening as early as possible)</li> <li>3. Use of school-wide interventions with clergy and police</li> </ol>		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Police liaison officers in all violence-prone high schools</li> <li>2. Police officers embedded in schools help students to run an anti-violence education programme</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Police-developed anti-violence curriculum delivered in schools</li> <li>2. Improved information sharing between police and schools</li> </ol>
<b>Social Intervention</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Direct partnership with highly trained social workers, operating within police stations</li> <li>2. Commitment to working with the most hard-to-reach youths</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Successful use of street outreach workers</li> <li>2. Partnership and information sharing between street workers</li> <li>3. Targeting outreach work where it is most needed</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Long-term focus on prevention planning</li> <li>2. Sustainable funding</li> <li>3. Engage with at-risk children earlier rather than later</li> </ol>	
<b>Offender Management</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Governance structures over criminal justice agency provide for better partnership working</li> <li>2. Employment placement for offenders</li> <li>3. Strict monitoring of parole compliance</li> </ol>			
<b>Opportunities Provision</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Recognition of the link between opportunities and violent/gang crime</li> <li>2. Investment in job training and placement programmes produces substantial savings</li> </ol>			

despite its smaller size, it has suffered many of the same crime problems that blight large urban centres in North America.

Although overall homicide rates in the United States declined between the 1980s and the 1990s, youth homicide rates, particularly those involving firearms, increased dramatically.<sup>76</sup> Boston experienced an unprecedented rise in youth violence beginning in the mid to late 1980s and continuing through the early 1990s.<sup>77</sup> According to research, the epidemic, measured as a homicide problem, was most prevalent among 18 to 24-year-olds in the city's poor, predominantly black neighbourhoods.<sup>78</sup>

Boston has faced challenging demographic trends. Between 1995 and 2005 the city experienced an increase in its adolescent population of 45% for 10 to 14-year-olds and a 38% increase for 15 to 19-year-olds.<sup>79</sup> 26% of the city's children are living in poverty, 53% of children city wide live in single parent homes and 20% of children have no parent in the labour force.<sup>80</sup>

### *Amsterdam*

Firearm regulations in the Netherlands are stringent. Gun owners must be members of a Royal Netherlands Shooting Association certified gun club for a full calendar year to receive a licence. They must be over the age of 18 and a gun licence must be approved by police and renewed annually. All firearms are registered in a national database. Legislation passed in 2006 made weapons permits easier to revoke – crimes or even “moving in criminal circles” now constitute grounds for revocation. However, even with tight regulations, the use of firearms for criminal and/or terrorist activities still has “an enormous impact on Dutch society”.<sup>81</sup>

The growth of gun and knife crime in Amsterdam has been similar to trends in England and Wales, though it occurred earlier. By the end of the 1990s,

Amsterdam was facing a similar problem to England and Wales today.<sup>82</sup> A homicide took place almost every weekend in Amsterdam in 1999.

## Suppression and Police Tactics

### *Toronto Case*

Following the 2005 Boxing Day shooting the Toronto police agreed that their traditionally reactive approach had to be replaced by a policy of prevention.<sup>83</sup> The result was the Toronto Anti-Violence Intervention Strategy (TAVIS) launched the same year. It is a task force aimed at reducing overall levels of violent crime, not only gang-related violence. It is built on a foundation of intelligence-led policing, requiring police to improve their intelligence-gathering capability and make better use of collected intelligence. To build capacity rapidly, police intelligence squads have been given more money and manpower.

In order to combat rising gun violence in hot spot areas, the police developed three rapid deploy teams, capable of doubling the police numbers in a given ‘beat’. Each team consists of 72 officers, equivalent to the size of two beat patrols, and members are selected for their community engagement skills.<sup>84</sup> They provide the police with the resilience required when the risk of conflict increases, especially in situations of gang violence.

Local unit commanders have effectively been empowered to develop their own response to violent crime in their area.<sup>85</sup> And this has been made possible by focusing resources on hotspots identified by careful analysis of when, where and in what circumstances violent crime is concentrated. This “focused neighbourhood” initiative is supported by the Toronto police crime information analysis unit, which analyses crime data in real time to inform officer deployment.<sup>86</sup> The unit has identified the 20 most violence-prone

76 Fox J, *Trends in Juvenile Violence: A Report to the United States Attorney General on Current and Future Rates of Juvenile Offending*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, NCJ 170379, 1996

77 Braga A and Kennedy D, “Reducing Gang Violence in Boston”, in *Responding to Gangs: Evaluation and Research*, Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice, NCJ 190351, 2002

78 Kennedy D and Braga A, “Youth Homicide Epidemic in Boston”, presented at the Sloan Youth Violence Working Group meeting, Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia, 20th March, 1998

79 Boston Police Department, submission to the Department of Justice, 2006

80 Ibid

81 “Beyond our domestic border”, Long-range programme 2006-2010, Amsterdam: Landelijk Platform Vuurwapens, 2006


82 Interview with Paul Gademan, Chair of Police European Firearms Experts Group, Amsterdam, September 2008

83 Interview with Dr A Mukherjee, Chair of Toronto Police Services Board, Toronto, ON, 23rd July 2008

84 Ibid

85 Ibid

86 Interview with Tim Davey, Toronto Police Crime Information Analysis Unit, Toronto, ON, 22nd July 2008



areas in the city and ranks them on volume and density of violent crime. Using this data, the unit can determine which areas need sustained increased enforcement.<sup>87</sup>

**Chicago Case**

Homicides peaked in Chicago in 1992, sparking wholesale changes in how the Chicago Police Department operated. In partnership with Professor Wesley Skogan of Northwestern University, the department developed the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS). It was launched in April 1993 and after testing in pilot sites was rolled out across the city. Chicago's police moved from being a largely centralised, incident-driven crime suppression agency to a more decentralised, customer-driven organisation dedicated to solving problems, preventing crime and improving the quality of life in the city's neighbourhoods.

At the outset, the entire police department was trained in a five-step problem-

solving process and beat officers were supported by a co-ordinated system for delivering city services. Deployment strategies have now shifted to a form of hotspot policing, targeting resources where they are most needed.<sup>88</sup>

Organisational change that makes a real difference in fighting crime and helping to solve neighbourhood problems is rewarded as are individuals, who can win a department problem solving award as well as honourable mention certificates.<sup>89</sup> The 25 districts also conduct their own award ceremonies for citizens who assist the community at large and participate in the CAPS programme.

Crime control and prevention are integral, and integrating parts, of the strategy.<sup>90</sup> The department's five-step problem-solving process includes:

1. Identify and prioritise
2. Analyse
3. Design strategies

87 Ibid  
 88 Interview with Sgt Christopher Bieldfeldt, Chicago Police, Chicago, August 2008  
 89 Ibid  
 90 Ibid

The CAPS initiative also encouraged police and communities to take joint responsibility for public safety, and so breakdown the “us against them” barrier that so often divides police and residents in vulnerable neighbourhoods. A successful strategy for community involvement is to target faith-based leaders who can assist the police with information as well as providing a voice for the community. A civilian, volunteer facilitator is also appointed to each of the 280 beats throughout the City and facilitates the monthly beat community meeting with the police. An additional resource is the CAPS implementation office within the Chicago Police Department. These are civilian employees who organise and work with community members on prevention and chronic crime and disorder. This group is credited for establishing a large faith-based police support group within the communities.

4. Implement strategies
5. Evaluate and acknowledge success

Thus, step 3, designing strategies, may involve educating the public on prevention techniques, or assisting a location to make itself a less desirable target for criminal activity. The creation and implementation of prevention strategies are an important part of the problem-solving process.

The initiative in Chicago covered all areas of the city with highly visible (and expensively deployed) foot patrols.<sup>91</sup> In 2003 Chicago Police created the target response units (TRUs) designed to give additional manpower to hotspot areas as needed. As in Toronto, the TRUs give the flexibility and resilience the police need to suppress instances of increased risk of violence. The response units are not connected to any other unit and are capable of changing deployment on a daily basis. At present, there are three TRUs in operation, each comprising 80 officers. Their operational costs have been calculated at \$14,109,784 for the year 2009.<sup>92</sup>

As in Toronto, patrol deployment is informed by intensive, real-time intelligence analysis. The hub of intelligence for the Chicago police is the Fusion Centre, which opened in late 2007 and operates 24 hours a day.<sup>93</sup> All intelligence on major events throughout the city is immediately communicated to the centre, where it is analysed and disseminated to officers on the street. The Fusion Centre brings together municipi-

pal, state, and federal agencies to act on intelligence. It is also responsible for informing the deployment of officers and produces a weekly intelligence bulletin with updates on drug selling hotspots, gun violence and gang operation locations, the whereabouts of wanted offenders and a list of the week’s serious incident reports.

Because the Fusion Centre is operational 24 hours a day any new intelligence is disseminated to officers immediately. The intelligence unit of the Chicago Police supplement the real time information supplied by the Fusion Centre, which produces a weekly intelligence bulletin with updates on drug selling hotspots, gun violence and gang operation locations, whereabouts of wanted offenders, and a list of that week’s serious incident reports.

#### ***Boston Case***

As in Toronto and Chicago, Boston has developed a problem-solving approach to policing, making good use of intelligence gathering and focused on accountability for district level commanders. The Boston Police Department has also found a balance between hotspot policing in violence-prone areas and police engagement with the community through Safe Street Teams – foot and bicycle patrols in vulnerable communities.<sup>94</sup> Officers on these patrols make an effort to check in with residents and business owners and discuss any concerns they have. The patrols have increased police visibility in high-risk areas and

<sup>91</sup> The policing strategy being rolled out in England and Wales is based on the principles of CAPS: creating a visible police presence on the streets, engaging with the community and subsequently increasing social capital in neighbourhoods


<sup>92</sup> *Mayor’s Budget Recommendations 2009*, Chicago, IL: Mayor of Chicago’s Office, 2008

<sup>93</sup> Interview with Sgt Christopher Bieldfeldt, Chicago Police, Chicago, August 2008

<sup>94</sup> Interview with Deputy Superintendent Nora Baston, Boston, MA, July 2008



Figure 7: Firearms homicides in Boston, January-August 2008



helped to build social capital and community organisation.<sup>95</sup>

The BPD has focused attention on those communities where crime is concentrated and on the small percentage of offenders who are responsible for the majority of violence. Safe Street Teams have been deployed specifically where violent crime is most likely to occur. Targeted deployments that engage with and empower the community have worked well in the Safe Street Team sites. Bowdoin and

Geneva area had no homicides in 2007, compared to five in 2006, and there has been a 15% reduction in all violent crime for the area.<sup>96</sup> Grove Hall had one homicide in 2007 and a 3% decrease in all violent crime. Overall, violent crime in the sites fell by 12% from October 2007 to March 2008.<sup>97</sup>

*Intelligence*

In order to inform targeted deployments, Boston Police Department has an extreme-

95 Ibid

96 *Outreach, Intervention, and Enforcement Strategies*, Boston, MA: Boston Police Department, 2008

97 Ibid

ly well developed intelligence gathering and dissemination system known as the Boston Regional Intelligence Center (BRIC). BRIC is a local law enforcement fusion centre designed to address the problem of collecting and analysing information across multiple local law enforcement jurisdictions and disciplines.<sup>98</sup> It has adapted the federal intelligence cycle for local community policing.<sup>99</sup> BRIC has also opened up the process of intelligence operations to local stakeholders, which has enabled greater flows of information and developed a sense of trust between community leaders and police. Intelligence cycles are also run on a 24-hour basis, making it more responsive to real-time crime.

The three most important measures of success for BRIC are participation, products and prevention. Numerous stakeholders from public safety personnel to public health workers and transportation department representatives, and even private companies participate in daily BRIC meetings with specialists in the areas of homeland security, gang violence, street crime, organised crime and technology crime.<sup>100</sup>

With a number of intelligence source streams, BRIC produces an array of intelligence products, including a daily brief, crime maps and statistical compilations of crime data. Intelligence flows both ways, and representatives of stakeholder groups have multiple means to pass on information.<sup>101</sup>

#### *Youth Violence Strike Force*

Because young men aged 16 to 24 are responsible for most violent crime, the BPD created the Youth Violence Strike Force (YVSF). It is made up of 40 BPD officers and 10 additional full-time officers from outside agencies, who form a day and a night unit.

The day unit is primarily proactive, patrolling the city's hotspots, identifying, monitoring and developing intelligence on the worst gang offenders.<sup>102</sup> This year, the

strike force has been responsible for 20% of the BPD's firearms seizures, but accounts for only 2% of the department's officers.<sup>103</sup>

The night unit consists of two sergeants, one sergeant-detective, twenty officers, three detectives, one transit detective, and eight Massachusetts state troopers.<sup>104</sup> The night unit's primary responsibilities are monitoring hotspots and key gang members, gathering and disseminating intelligence and formulating strategies on how to address the problems with youth and gang-related violence.

#### *Amsterdam Case*

After a peak in violent crime in 1999, Amsterdam introduced an eight-year strategy to reduce gun and knife crime in the city – the National Firearms Platform – which balances enforcement and prevention.<sup>105</sup> In contrast to the approaches of the 1970s to the 1990s, when the fight against firearms was mainly reactive, the current procedure is built on six pillars: policy, prevention, increasing the likelihood of apprehension, professionalism, work processes, and co-operation.

The Government, police and NGOs first needed to agree clear and tougher norms with regard to the possession and use of firearms. This is reflected in appropriate legislation (sentences have been increased to four to eight years for possession of an illegal firearm), school regulations, pub and restaurant licences, general police ordinances, stop-and-search procedures, and knife bans.<sup>106</sup>

The prevention pillar supports the implementation of policies that require concrete, preventive measures. Targeted prevention was at the centre of the second pillar. Its policies include: increased stop-and-search powers, monitoring of shooting clubs, spot checks on gun-licence holders, information and inspection at schools and the screening of people visiting pubs and clubs. Police and mayors (*Burgemeester*) have the power to deal

98 Program Summary: Boston Regional Intelligence Center, Boston, MA: Boston Police Department, 2007

99 Ibid

100 Ibid

101 Ibid

102 Interview with Deputy Superintendent Gray French, Boston Police, Boston, MA, July 2008


103 Ibid

104 Ibid

105 Interview with Paul Gademant, Chair of Police European Firearms Experts Group, Amsterdam, September 2008

106 Ibid





with violence prone bars and clubs by closing establishments that do not adhere to codes of safety. It is similar to the UK, where British police keep a watchful eye on bars and clubs, but local government has more power to act than they do.

To increase the chances of catching criminals with illegal weapons, police in Amsterdam increased their firearms investigations, improved procedures for responding to intelligence, carried out more searches of residences, and conducted more vehicle checks.

The professionalism and competence of officers charged with reducing firearms crime is being improved through education, training, legal courses, exchanging of best practice between forces and attending expert meetings and workshops.<sup>107</sup>

In order to enhance professionalism and ensure the delivery of the objectives of the National Firearm Platform, it is important

that the work processes of all government departments and agencies involved in the fight against violent crime are able to exchange information efficiently.<sup>108</sup> This means their work processes must evolve to include the new data systems (such as the Dutch national firearms data and drug file systems).

The sixth pillar of the National Firearms Platform is co-operation, which – like aligning work processes – requires risk sharing and management between departments. Reducing gun and knife crime cannot be the sole task of the police. Other Dutch government agencies committed to the issue include: the Royal Marechaussee, the Economic Control Service, the Customs Service, the Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and other law enforcement agencies.

The long-term strategy and the role of each pillar are represented in Figure 8. It

107 Ibid

108 Ibid

shows how intelligence is the foundation of a violent crime reduction strategy.

The above figure shows how information and intelligence on all facets of criminal firearms use inform strategy. Intelligence should be the foundation of a violent crime reduction strategy. Strategy is then developed into policies dedicated to prevention.

Because the fight against violent gun and knife crime requires an integrated approach across government departments, a long-term plan was devised, based on the six pillars, It allowed the Dutch government and police to avoid the pitfalls of a knee-jerk response to the surge in gun crime.

### Lessons – Suppression

Intelligence gathering and dissemination on key players involved in gangs and violent crime was a vital element in police tactics in all four cities studied. In England and Wales, the police National Intelligence Model plays a similar role. But more could be done and there are useful lessons to learn from police forces abroad.

Amsterdam's work on combating violent gun and knife crime was based on an eight-year plan, whereas the Home Office's action plan for tackling gangs had an operational and funding lifespan of less than two years. We believe that long-term planning and funding is essential if long-term reductions in violent crime are to be achieved.

The rolling out of neighbourhood policing has been a commendable development in England and Wales, but Toronto, Chicago, and Boston have already advanced to hotspot policing, a more efficient deployment of resources that gives police added flexibility and resilience in the most high-risk areas.

Community Mobilisation and a Multi-agency Approach

### *Boston – Multi-agency Approach*

In the early 1990s, youth violence was exacting a heavy toll on many communities in Boston. A number of agencies began working to address the issue, but their efforts were uncoordinated and piecemeal. When he was appointed Chief of Boston Police in 1991, William Bratton championed the formation of partnerships between police and city agencies and they formed the bedrock of violent crime prevention in the city. The Boston Police Department now boasts one of the most well developed multi-agency strategies for violent crime reduction in America. Intervention work among high-risk youths has benefited immensely from these partnerships, whose members can act on a range of issues that fall outside the traditional remit of the police. For example, the BPD has a close working relationship with the Boston Center for Youth and Families (BCYF), which is the largest social services agency in the city.

During the 1990s, BPD transformed itself into a facilitator, able to act as a hub for a number of organisations. The philosophy of the BPD is that they are in a great position to lead action – or bring together agencies that can act – on a range of issues that exist outside of the traditional remit of the police.

The head of the Boston Youth Violence Strike Force commented: “[violence] is a community problem that has to be solved by a whole group of agencies, not just the police; social service providers, street workers, employment, public health, all these different agencies combined, have a part to play.”<sup>109</sup> In July 2002 the BCYF was established as the City's youth and human services headquarters, bringing together under one roof the services provided by Boston Community Centers; the Boston 2:00-6:00 After School Initiative; the Mayor's Office of Community Partnerships; and

<sup>109</sup> Interview with Deputy Superintendent Gray French, Boston Police, Boston, MA, July 2008

the Recreation Division of the City's Parks and Recreation Department. BCYF's mission is "to enhance the quality of life for Boston residents by supporting children, youths, and families through a wide range of comprehensive programs and services."<sup>110</sup> The organisation has 46 facilities across 20 neighbourhoods and serves some 90,000 residents each year with childcare, youth activities, adult education and sports. BCYF also provides an alternative education programme called City Routes for youths who have been excluded from school.

Each site has four youth workers who help to organise events, run workshops and support the street worker programme – a specialised unit of adults offering support to young people involved in gangs.<sup>111</sup> The programme began in 1990 and currently employs 26 street workers and four senior street workers under the BCYF umbrella. They are assigned to specific neighbourhoods and once they have built up a relationship with an individual they try to steer him into gang exit support programmes. Many of the support services offered will be through agency partners.

Interventions and social work in Boston tend to focus on the family unit, rather than a single child or young person. For any family intervention, one agency will work with them on health issues, another will work with them through the schools, while law enforcement will be looking to play any positive role it can. There is a culture of co-operation among these agencies which encourages them to communicate and share information about what exactly is going on with a particular family.<sup>112</sup>

Involving the healthcare community in violence prevention was essential, though not easy. It required the efforts of a small number of healthcare professionals to spread the message that as well as treating the increasing number of victims of youth violence, they had an opportunity

to intervene: these victims run a high risk of suffering more injuries in the future.<sup>113</sup>

Boston City Hospital implemented a programme to ensure that all children and youths admitted to the hospital with injuries from violence receive a prevention assessment and follow-up sessions to reduce risks of future involvement.<sup>114</sup> Patients treated with injuries from violence are seen by a multidisciplinary support team including both a trauma counsellor and a violence prevention counsellor. For victims of violence, there is a very high risk that they will experience further violent injuries in the future. Children and youths were visited in the hospital by an outreach worker, who continued to work with patients after they were discharged.

Another multi-agency programme involving healthcare is the Child Witness to Violence Programme. As its name suggests, it helps children who have been exposed to violence of any sort. It is led by a social worker, but referrals come from hospitals and police. Children who have witnessed violence exhibit symptoms similar to those seen in adult post-traumatic stress disorder and need assessment and counselling. With prompt support children can learn to deal with their immediate symptoms and avoid longer-term consequences – especially becoming violent assailants themselves.

Most hospital emergency rooms in Boston routinely screen for domestic violence and, increasingly, other units in hospitals are doing the same.<sup>115</sup> At the Children's Hospital Medical Center in Boston, a programme called AWAKE routinely screens for domestic violence in families where child abuse has been found and provides extensive social, legal and mental health services to address multiple issues simultaneously.

Boston Police Department has also joined forces with academics from the Kennedy School of Government at

110 Interview with Chris Byner, Boston Centers for Youth and Families, Boston, MA, July 2008

111 Ibid

112 Interview with Jennifer Mechnochie, Boston Police, Boston, MA, July 2008

113 Prothrow-Stith D and Spivak H, op cit

114 Ibid

115 Ibid

Harvard University. Together they have created the Boston Gun Project, an inter-agency working group. It has applied quantitative and qualitative research techniques to assess the nature and dynamics of youth violence in Boston; designed a short-term intervention strategy; and developed and evaluated Operation Ceasefire, a programme to combat youth gun crime. The programme, based on the “pulling levers” deterrence strategy,<sup>116</sup> delivered an unequivocal message to gangs that violence would no longer be tolerated.<sup>117</sup> The message was then backed by pulling every lever legally available to law enforcement officials when violence occurred.<sup>118</sup> The working group would only target specific gangs as a result of violent behaviour. Once they had been warned against future violent crime, those gangs specifically targeted by police were effectively self-selecting.<sup>119</sup> Although the pulling levers approach was instrumental in BPD’s enforcement strategy, it was carried out in concert with other agencies (probation, housing, social services, etc).

### ***Boston – Community Mobilisation***

The reduction in youth homicide and violence in Boston can be attributed to a broad process that led to changes in attitudes and beliefs beginning with community engagement and grassroots crime prevention. Two doctors, Deborah Prothrow-Stith and Howard Spivak, have been central to this success. They began work on violence prevention as early as 1982 with a four-year grant from the Boston health department. Their project adopted a broader public health approach, identifying risk factors that drive children and youths towards violence, many of which were found to be rooted in the community environment.<sup>120</sup> (In the 1980s violence was only just beginning to be recognised as a public health problem; today the role of environmental factors in violent crime is well

supported by research.)<sup>121,122</sup>

Prothrow-Stith and Spivak went on to establish the first public health-based initiative for the prevention of youth violence in America – the Boston Youth Violence Prevention Project – funded by local philanthropists and their own Boston Foundation.

For an entire year, the focus of the project was to “pound the pavement” and build a community of support.<sup>123</sup> Efforts at building community co-operation were supplemented with approaches to all possible stakeholders. The police, city hall, juvenile courts, mental health staff, youth workers, social workers, clergy, housing associations and school administrators were contacted in an appeal to take action on preventing violence. Members of the Boston Youth Violence Prevention Project attended community meetings of all sorts to spread the word. The goal in the early stages was to drive a shift in social norms and attitudes towards violence and community safety. After this, it moved on to outreach work and the training of youth work professionals in violence prevention. Outreach work was targeted at specific neighbourhoods and two dedicated outreach workers, familiar with the more challenging neighbourhoods of Boston, were recruited and trained.

As more and more community groups began to work with the project and the outreach workers developed relationships with at-risk youths, the need to sustain the project became a priority. Funding is always an issue for violence prevention programmes, for both those operating in the third sector and those run by the government. It secured philanthropic funding for several years, and finally its proven effectiveness in violence prevention persuaded the City of Boston to fund the programme.

Another grassroots initiative that has formed a partnership with the Boston Police Department is the Ten Point

116 Interview with Alec Bassos, Boston Police, Boston, MA, July 2008

117 Braga A and Kennedy D, “Reducing Gang Violence in Boston”, in *Responding to Gangs: Evaluation and research*, Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice, NCJ 190351, 2002

118 Kennedy D, “Pulling Levers: Chronic Offenders, High-Crime Settings, and Theory of Prevention”, *Valpraiso University Law Review*, vol 31, pp 449-484

119 Braga A, Kennedy D, Waring E and Peihl A, “Problem Oriented Policing, Deterrence, and Youth Violence: An Evaluation of Boston’s Operation Ceasefire”, *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency*, vol 38, no 3, pp 195-225, 2001,

120 Prothrow-Stith D and Spivak H, op cit

121 Herrenkohl T et al, “Developmental risk factors for youth violence”, *Journal of Adolescent Health*, vol 26, no 3, pp 176-186, 2000

122 Halliday-Boykins C and Graham S, “At both ends of the gun: testing the relationship between community violence exposure and youth violent behaviour”, *Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology*, vol. 29, no 5, pp. 383-204

123 Prothrow-Stith D and Spivak H, op cit

Coalition of clergy and lay leaders, formed in 1992 after a gang shooting erupted in Morning Star Baptist Church during the funeral of a young gun-shot victim.<sup>124</sup>

The Ten Point Coalition focuses on at-risk youths in communities that the city's services are unable to reach, or even identify. It collaborates with other groups, agencies, and institutions to reduce duplication of effort. The mayor's office has asked the coalition to focus on eight hotspots and it also works with the BPD to mediate between gangs. Its intervention may be triggered by a single event or a call for assistance from the police schools unit.

Mentoring is also extended to offenders from the moment they are taken into custody. Mentors are often ex-offenders themselves, and are thus able to identify with their clients. They work with a case manager, handling caseloads of around 50 offenders at a time.<sup>125</sup> The cost to the city of funding the mentors and case workers is \$176,979 per year.

The Safe Neighbourhood Initiative (SNI) has also aided police engagement with communities through its three core principles: co-ordinated law enforcement; neighbourhood revitalisation; prevention, intervention, and treatment.<sup>126</sup> The SNI allows community residents to work directly with police and government officers to identify and address neighbourhood issues.<sup>127</sup> Regular communications through meetings and better co-ordination of government resources have helped to ensure its success.

The SNI employs project co-ordinators who are responsible for steady leadership and day-to-day operation. It provides a formal mechanism for exchange between community residents and police, and having two dedicated co-ordinators ensures that the dialogue between police and the community remains open. The cost of two co-ordinators for targeted communities is \$110,433, and they are funded by a state level grant.<sup>128</sup>

### *Chicago – Community Mobilisation*

From its inception, the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy has made community involvement – building relationships with residents, business owners, and community leaders – a priority. There was early recognition that the success of CAPS rested squarely on grassroots engagement and that the strength of Chicago's neighbourhoods would determine whether or not the programme was successful. In an effort to create a strong sense of awareness about public safety, CAPS instituted monthly beat meetings in each of the city's 281 police beats.

In 1996, two years after it began, a survey found that a majority of Chicago residents (59%) knew about the change in police strategy and the implementation of community policing.<sup>129</sup> By 1998, 79% of Chicago residents were aware of CAPS and in 2003 the figure was 81%.

Although the level of awareness surrounding CAPS was encouraging, it did not guarantee participation. Community engagement in CAPS was formally based on the beat meetings, unique to Chicago's community policing programme. The meetings have several purposes: they provide a forum at which police and residents can exchange information and prioritise local concerns.<sup>130</sup> Evaluation of CAPS has found that attendance at beat meetings is often highest in areas where public safety challenges are most difficult.<sup>131</sup>

Participation in beat meetings has risen slightly since they were rolled out across the city in 1995. In their first year, 58,000 Chicagoans attended beat meetings. In 2002 (the last year for which complete data is available) the total number of attendees was 67,300.<sup>132</sup> There are, however, still improvements to be made to the system and issues that need to be resolved to make beat meetings more effective. Officer turnover in beats and

124 Interview with representative of Ten Point Coalition, Boston, MA, July 2008

125 City of Boston's *Comprehensive Strategy to Address Youth Gang and Gun Violence*, Year Three, Boston, MA: Boston Police Department, 4th September 2008

126 Ibid

127 Ibid

128 Ibid

129 Skogan W and Steiner L, *Caps at Ten: Community Policing in Chicago*, Chicago, IL: The Chicago Community Policing Evaluation Consortium, January 2004

130 Ibid

131 According to Skogan's analysis there is a +.42 correlation between attendance at a beat meeting and poverty in that beat area

132 Ibid



districts still remains too high, making it harder to establish relationships of trust with residents. Expectations also have to be managed. Some residents who attend beat meetings expect too much from the police, which can lead to disappointment and unproductive meetings.

Another vehicle for public involvement in CAPS are the district advisory committees, widely known as DACs. These are groups of residents, community organisation leaders, business owners and representatives of local institutions, who meet regularly with the commander and police district leaders to discuss district affairs. DACs were established to assist district commanders in establishing community safety priorities and the most appropriate police tactics to meet those priorities. In return, district commanders can expedite the resolution of community problems by helping local residents to access resources from city services.

Evaluation surveys showed that public confidence in the Chicago Police Department improved steadily from 1994, when CAPS began, to 1999. After reaching a high in the early 2000s public confidence levelled off.<sup>133</sup>

Systematic community engagement through community policing, monthly beat meetings and the district advisory committees have changed attitudes to public safety in Chicago's neighbourhoods. Policing with a strong focus on prevention is popular, and communities are aware that together with the police they can improve local public safety. In this respect, policing in England and Wales has a long way to go.

### *Toronto – Community Mobilisation*

Toronto's efforts to reduce violent gun and knife crime only began in earnest three years ago; changing police strategy has been the cornerstone. As well as improving its intelligence-led strategy and deploying resources more efficiently,

efforts have been made to improve community engagement in the city's 13 most diverse neighbourhoods.<sup>134</sup>

In 2005, a special unit of minority officers began work in these socially excluded communities; meanwhile Toronto police are actively trying to recruit more minority officers with much-needed language abilities. The Toronto Police Services Board has sponsored a youth cricket programme to establish better links with minority communities and find potential recruits. Another successful programme employs interns from minority backgrounds with the aim of recruiting more minority police cadets. Meanwhile, the number of minority officers being promoted to senior positions has increased.

Police training has been reformed, so that officers deployed to hotspots have improved problem-solving capabilities and can engage with communities better.<sup>135</sup>

Since the new training programmes began operating, complaints against the police dropped 20% from 2005 to 2007.<sup>136</sup> Police recorded contacts (documentation that a police officer has spoken to someone on the street) increased 60% over the same period.<sup>137</sup> The push for a more diverse and representative police force has created a cultural shift within the police force, which has been welcomed as overwhelmingly positive.<sup>138</sup> Public support has increased since 2005.<sup>139</sup>

Where police have increased deployment in hotspots, they have taken every precaution to let residents know that they are targeting dangerous behaviour and not the people of the neighbourhood in general. Police in these areas give out business cards in multiple languages explaining why deployment has been increased. There is a practical focus on disseminating information and intelligence to street-level officers, who then pass it on to members of the public.

133 Skogan W and Steiner L, op cit

134 Interview with Dr A Mukherjee, Chair of Toronto Police Services Board, Toronto, ON, 23rd July 2008

135 Interview with Chief of Toronto Police William Blair, Toronto, ON, 22nd July 2008

136 Ibid

137 Ibid

138 Ibid

139 Interview with Dr A Mukherjee, Chair of Toronto Police Services Board, Toronto, ON, 23rd July 2008

### Lessons – Community Mobilisation

The creation of Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRPS) in 1998 established an excellent mechanism for co-ordination between police and a range of local government agencies in England and Wales. Although CDRPs have aided partnership working, performance varies widely across the country. Without any one office holding CDRPs to account, there is no mechanism for ensuring adequate co-operation between police and local government agencies.

In contrast to the British experience, Boston and Chicago have been able to co-ordinate multi-agency efforts to reduce violent crime. Because the police and all city agencies are ultimately accountable to the mayor, partnership work is more of an institutional priority.

The Boston experience in particular highlights the value of partnerships formed with academics. The relationship the BPD forged with researchers at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University has proved invaluable. Although the Home Office commissions academics to contribute to central research programmes, the partnership between the BPD and Harvard is fundamentally different, focusing on issues specific to the Boston context.

Finally, the progress that the Toronto police service has made in developing sensitivity to ethnic minorities and its recruiting tactics and community engagement in minority areas are worthy of further study.

### Education and Police in Schools

Identifying and addressing the early risk factors associated with youth violence at appropriate points in childhood development is important for prevention.<sup>140</sup> Teachers and school administrators are normally best placed to identify the first signs that a child or youth is exhibiting violent behaviour or a potential for violence. Schools in high-risk communities should have a well developed, coherent anti-violence curriculum, as well as an embedded relationship with the police service.

#### *Toronto Case*

In England and Wales, both offenders and victims of violent crime have become younger over the past ten years.<sup>141</sup> This phenomenon has also been witnessed in Toronto.<sup>142</sup> Because a significant amount of youth violence takes place in and around schools, the Toronto Police Service places police officers in high schools in high-risk areas. Police liaison officers are permanently based in schools and work to build relationships and trust with students.

The police presence in schools has led to better engagement with students in violence-prone schools: students take an active role in prevention, developing an education curriculum on conflict management and the risk of violence. Schools in Toronto that have a police liaison officer have more reporting of threats and bullying and a drop in victimisation rates.<sup>143</sup> While the focus of the programme was initially on high schools, it will soon be expanded to include middle schools in high-risk areas.

Dr Alok Mukherjee, chairman of the Toronto Police Services Board, has emphasised the need to manage conflict and risk, and cites the police liaison programme as essential in tackling youth violence. It promotes information sharing between teachers, school administrators and police, a huge step forward in risk management.

140 Hawkins J et al, "Predictors of Youth Violence", *Juvenile Justice Bulletin*, Washington, DC: Department of Justice, 2000

141 Interview with Chief Superintendent David Keller, Greater Manchester Police, Manchester, April 2008

142 Interview with Chief of Toronto Police, William Blair, Toronto, ON, July 2008

143 Ibid

Schools and police have always had an uneasy relationship in cities on both sides of the Atlantic. School administrators are often reluctant to bring police officers into schools, as it implies that the school has a violence problem. While police liaison officers were initially introduced to high-risk schools only, Dr Mukherjee has committed the board to bringing them into every highschool in Toronto.<sup>144</sup>

### *Boston case*

Getting co-operation from schools has not been an easy task. Boston police have had a dedicated unit assigned to schools for more than ten years.<sup>145</sup> The unit has a permanent presence in 50 of the 150 schools in Boston, and 80 officers serve in the unit. At the outset, it worked only with high schools, but it quickly became clear that effective prevention was needed at the middle school level.<sup>146</sup> More recently, police have concluded that to reach at-risk children and really educate them about the dangers of gang violence, they need a presence in elementary schools.<sup>147</sup> This strategy is backed up by research findings on prevention.<sup>148</sup> If primary school aged children start forming gangs, they may not understand what they are ultimately getting themselves into.<sup>149</sup> There may, however, be substantive reasons why they want to group together – protection from another group, for example. Where there is a police presence in schools, such issues can be easily resolved and most children involved in mimicking gang behaviour have no problem slipping back into the mainstream.<sup>150</sup>

Initially, the police went into schools to gather intelligence on gangs, and met significant resistance. One interviewee said: “We’ve had some schools that didn’t want us on the same street because, whatever we were doing, will impact their school in a negative light.”<sup>151</sup>

The police are fully aware of the dangers of over-criminalising young people. When a youth in Boston is arrested, he

will get what is called a Criminal Offender Record Information (CORI), which will show up on background checks.<sup>152</sup> A person with a CORI cannot go into the military or work at a bank. Getting a job anywhere becomes very difficult depending on the seriousness of the arrest: doors of opportunity shut. As a result, the schools unit does everything it can to avoid criminal prosecution.<sup>153</sup>

In one example, a group of elementary students got their friends together and started wearing red bandanas (signalling gang colours). Teachers thought that they were merely mimicking the gangster lifestyle, but were nevertheless concerned that it would lead to dangerous behaviour. When the school police intervened, they found that the students involved were the children of former gang members – a massive risk factor for future violent behaviour. The school unit police spoke to their parents and explained that their children were in danger of following the same destructive path that they had. Afterwards the children did much better in school. As one school unit detective told us, “I think that we really have to educate children at the primary school [level]; stay on top of students in middle (secondary) schools; and then you’re going to see a drastic decline [in violent incidents] in high schools.”<sup>154</sup>

One of the most effective school intervention programmes run by Boston Police is Operation Homefront, which was originally developed as a grassroots partnership between BPD and local clergy. It is designed to reach the students most at risk of gang involvement and aims to offer them positive alternatives to gang activity; it provides referrals to various services and informs parents of their children’s involvement in anti-social behaviour and gangs.<sup>155</sup>

Supplementing targeted, individual interventions, Operation Homefront runs anti-gang presentations at schools to large audiences of students. Presentations are also given to parents of high-risk or gang-

144 Interview with Chairman A. Mukherjee, Toronto Police Services Board, Toronto, ON, July 2008

145 Interview with Deputy Superintendent Gray French, Boston Police, Boston, MA, July 2008

146 Interview with Detective Vincent DiFazio, Boston Police, Boston, MA, July 2008

147 Ibid

148 Webster-Stratton C and Taylor T, “Nipping Early Risk Factors in the Bud: Preventing Substance Abuse, Delinquency, and Violence in Adolescence Through Interventions Targeted at Young Children (0–8 Years)”, vol 2, no 3, pp 165–192, 2001

149 Interview with Detective Vincent DiFazio, Boston Police, Boston, MA, July 2008

150 Ibid

151 Interview with schools unit detective, Boston Police, Boston, MA, July 2008

152 Interview with Detective Vincent DiFazio, Boston Police, Boston, MA, July 2008

153 Ibid

154 Ibid

155 Ibid



involved youth. They highlight the consequences of violence and outline the array of resources available to students and teachers to reduce violence. Following a general presentation, a list of the most at-risk students is created by the team of partners involved in Operation Homefront. Based on the list, clergy, police, school administrators, and probation officers conduct home visits. Interventions are not reactive and do not need to be triggered by a school-wide problem or major incident.

Each year Operation Homefront makes an estimated 800 home visits to young people identified by police as at risk.<sup>156</sup> The School Police Unit has consistently reported that approximately 80% of home visits are successful within each quarterly reporting period.<sup>157</sup> Home interventions were deemed successful if there was no further interaction with police or a violent incident.

Operation Stop Watch is a school-based initiative addressing truancy in and around Boston public schools and Massachusetts Bay Transport Authority stations. It involves transit police, Boston Police Schools Unit, the Youth Violence Strike Force, juvenile probation services and a myriad of volunteers and provides high visibility and proactive law enforcement strategies in high crime areas, with a focus on schools and students.<sup>158</sup>

#### *Amsterdam case*

Research on the Dutch experience of youth violence suggested that youths were likely to carry weapons for self-protection. As a result police became involved in delivering a school curriculum on the dangers of carrying and using weapons.<sup>159</sup>

Mayors in the Netherlands can give police in particular areas short-term, random stop-and-search powers and have done so in areas surrounding high-risk schools. According to interviewees, these powers have been used effectively in Amsterdam.<sup>160</sup>

Information sharing between schools and police has improved significantly under the Firearms Platform.<sup>161</sup> Schools have committed to registering incidents of violence and weapons carrying, although it is done carefully, and at times reluctantly, as schools do not want to be stigmatised. Police also gather information in an informal way, which does not always require the criminalisation of incidents at schools. In Amsterdam, there are between 40 and 50 schools that are now co-operating with the police on weapons control.

#### Lessons – Education

Ideally, social services should be able to identify the most at-risk children before they have reached primary school. Programmes like Sure Start – despite implementation problems – show promise. Additionally, home visits for young, first-time, and at-risk mothers have been reported to be effective in mitigating risk factors for violent behaviour in their children.<sup>162</sup>

Police in London have done well to engage some secondary schools in London neighbourhoods, but have not gone beyond that. Boston has moved from embedding police in high schools, to engaging with middle schools, and recently with primary schools, allowing them to intervene at the earliest point in education. Boston's use of schools as a venue for anti-violence intervention and conflict resolution is also worth noting.

Police in England and Wales should look at the experiences of cities abroad that have successfully engaged with schools and look to improve partnerships with schools. School administrators need to move beyond the fear of stigmatisation that comes with putting police in schools.

156 Ibid

157 Interview with Deputy Superintendent Gray French, Boston Police, Boston, MA, July 2008

158 Boston Police Department, *Youth Violence Strike Force, 2007 Annual Report*, Boston, MA: BPD, 2007

159 Ibid

160 Ibid

161 Ibid

162 Olds D and Kitzman H, "Review of Research on Home Visiting Pregnant Woman and Young Mothers and Parents of Young Children", *Future of Children*, Winter 1993

Table 4: Models for Outreach Work

Model	Strengths	Weaknesses
Clinical	Provides professional individual level assessment and counselling services to youth.	Costs exceed alternative models due to employed licensed social workers.
	Monitors the progress of a small number of high-risk youth on a more consistent basis because of the ongoing contact between individual youth and social worker.	May be a little less flexible to respond to street level events in real time due to professional values and modes of work.
Programme-based	Contacts a large number of young people and can serve as a program referral source for them.	Relies on their agreement to attend the programmes recommended. Outreach workers generally have little ability to monitor the progress of youths.
	Relatively easy to deploy to neighbourhoods which are experiencing gang violence.	Concerns about mixing gang and non-gang members in the same activities, increasing gang cohesion and ensuring that gang workers do not over-identify with gang members.
		Agency policies or regulations sometimes limit the ability of street outreach workers to serve the most at-risk youth.
Street-based	Understand community dynamics and have credibility with large numbers of neighbourhood youth.	Lack of training and supervision can occasionally put the street worker or some youths they are involved with at risk of violence or retaliation from others who are involved with gangs.
	Extremely flexible and among the least expensive.	

### Social Intervention

Street outreach work requires individuals to “pound the streets”, making contact and establishing relationships with youths in vulnerable neighbourhoods.<sup>163</sup> They serve three important roles in the fight against violent crime. First, they communicate to youth in high-risk areas that violence will not be tolerated by police and, if they engage in violence, they can expect to face the strongest possible punishment. Secondly, street workers build relationships with at-risk youths and can refer them to neighbourhood programmes for educational or vocational support, or anti-substance abuse services. Thirdly, they engage with youth in activities and learn about potential conflicts, with the aim of disrupting future violence.

Street outreach workers, co-operating closely with police and social workers, have been a crucial part of the community safety initiative structure that has helped Boston to combat violent crime and youth crime.<sup>164</sup>

Outreach work usually takes one of

three forms. The programme-based model aims to establish contact with at-risk youths and get them to join programmes where they will receive further counselling, opportunity for education and job training, and/or referrals to other services.<sup>165</sup> This model is usually run by agency-based street workers (such as the Boys’ and Girls’ Club of Boston), working in collaboration with a team of other agency employees who are responsible for providing case management, direct services and referrals of young persons identified by the street workers.

The clinical model provides one-on-one intensive intervention services between a clinical social worker and a young person at risk of gangs and violence. The Youth Service Providers Network in Boston (which is discussed later) is an example of this model. Police and other agencies refer individuals at risk to the clinical social worker, who can provide crisis intervention, trauma services, youth risk assessment or

<sup>163</sup> Ibid

<sup>164</sup> Decker, S, Bynum T, McDevitt J and Varano S, “Street Outreach Workers: Best Practice and Lessons Learned”, Innovative practices from the Charles E Shannon Jr Community Safety Initiative Series, July 2008

<sup>165</sup> Ibid

other interventions intended to decrease risky behaviour.<sup>166</sup>

The third model of outreach work is the street-based intervention model. Its goal is to mediate conflicts between youth on the street to reduce violence and bring peace to gangs in conflict. It may also refer individuals to youth service programmes or a centralised agency. Street-based intervention programmes are often administered by a youth service agency but the day-to-day activities of the street workers are often not connected to the agency's work.<sup>167</sup> Street workers are recruited from a variety of sources. Some may be reformed former gang members. However, caution should be exercised in hiring street workers. There have been instances of street workers aggravating problems, not alleviating them.<sup>168</sup>

### *Boston Case*

Boston's Youth Service Providers Network (YSPN) is an outreach programme based on the clinical model of outreach work. YSPN acts as a safety net for the most vulnerable and high-risk youths who come into contact with police. It employs only the most highly qualified youth social workers. All are required to have a master's degree, are licensed as psychotherapists, carry out clinical assessments and are generally better paid than average city or state social worker.<sup>169</sup>

YSPN staff work out of police stations in Boston, but are not employed by police. There is a network social worker in every police station in Boston, but they remain clearly separate from the police and are very careful about sharing any information with officers. They work with the most troubled youths over a long period of time and are able to produce very good results through development of positive relationships. Besides providing intensive counselling, YSPN staff are responsible for getting youths into alternative education, substance abuse programmes, health services and/or vocational training.

The network focuses on the most difficult and hard-to-reach 20% of youths who are caught up in the criminal justice system. Upon referral of a case, the social worker meets with the youth in question to understand what has led to his or her referral and devises a plan of action that may include long-term counselling using resource-intensive multisystems therapy (MST).<sup>170</sup>

The YSPN started in the mid 1990s with a funding grant from the Comprehensive Communities Grant. The goal of the organisation then was to assist police in their engagement with neighbourhoods. As the head of YSPN explained, "Eventually, someone thought, 'wouldn't it be great if a police officer had a phone number and they could call a social worker, and he or she could get to the root of some of the problems these kids face?'"<sup>171</sup>

Eventually YSPN social workers took up residence in police stations, so that they could take referrals directly from police officers. Now they have access to all incident reports from police when they arrest a young person and are able to identify trends in offending. "We can look at every incident report and you begin to think 'this family is always in trouble, or they're always the victim'".<sup>172</sup> This was extremely helpful "because we know that it's 2 to 3% of the population that is responsible for 90% of crime".<sup>173</sup>

Working primarily out of police stations, each district based social worker provides service to approximately ten new young people a month. In the course of a year, a district based social worker will provide services to 120 new clients and continue seeing 40 clients from the previous year.

### *Chicago Case*

The Chicago Project for Violence Prevention started in 2000 and works with community-based organisations to develop

166 Ibid

167 Ibid

168 Interview with Deputy Superintendent Gray French, Boston Police, Boston, MA, July 2008

169 Interview with Jeff Butts, Head of YSPN, Boston, MA, July 2008

170 MST lists strengths and weaknesses, prioritises treatment goals and monitors results. It looks beyond the individual patient to the parents, principal caregivers, families, social and community systems, and risk factors and protective factors. Treatment relies heavily on cognitive behavior therapy, behaviour therapy and pharmacotherapy as well as indirect therapeutic interventions with family and environmental systems

171 Interview with Jeff Butts, head of YSPN, Boston, MA, July 2008

172 Ibid

173 Ibid

and implement strategies to reduce and prevent violence, particularly shootings and killings.<sup>174</sup> Its CeaseFire project, which began operating in 2004, has been a model of outreach to at-risk youths.

CeaseFire's activities are divided into five core components that address both the community and those individuals who are most at risk of involvement in gun and knife crime: community mobilisation, outreach, faith leader involvement, public education and police participation.<sup>175</sup> Conflict mediation is its most important activity. CeaseFire's outreach workers and conflict mediators are "streetwise individuals who are familiar with gang life in the communities where CeaseFire is active".<sup>176</sup> Many street workers in the programme are former gang members and have spent time in prison, but they have reformed and are now eager to keep others from making the same mistakes. CeaseFire street workers use their experience and knowledge of the streets to seek out and build relationships with vulnerable youths who are susceptible to the violent norms that exist in high-risk neighbourhoods.

Conflict mediators (or violence interrupters) are a component of CeaseFire. Like outreach workers, most mediators have served time in prison and were, at one point in their life, close to Chicago's gangs. Rather than working with individual clients, they mediate between gangs and diffuse inter-gang tension before violence erupts.<sup>177</sup>

### *Canadian Cases*

The National Crime Prevention Centre (NCPC) in Ottawa provides national leadership on effective ways to prevent and reduce crime by intervening on the risk factors before crime happens. The NCPC approach is to promote the implementation of effective crime prevention practices through funding and evaluating innovative prevention programmes and spreading best practice through evidenced-based research. The following gives an overview of NCPC

sponsored programmes that have shown promise in reducing violent crime.

### *Project Early Intervention*

Project Early Intervention (PEI) was a programme that provided support to high-risk children aged 6 to 12 years, living in high-needs social housing neighbourhoods in Ottawa between 1999 and 2003. The initiative offered life skills development classes, a homework support centre, sports and recreation opportunities and ongoing counselling.

Priority was given to children who had a sibling or parent involved in the criminal justice system; were living in homes affected by domestic violence; and/or were engaged in behaviour likely to result in charges under the Young Offenders Act. One of the programme's key strengths was its focus on a specific set of at-risk children.

The project received three-year funding totalling CA\$600,000 to cover costs associated with developing and evaluating a life skills programme for children. The expected outcomes of the project were increased school attendance, reduced crime, violence and antisocial behaviour and calls to police for service.

PEI worked well in partnership with Ottawa Housing, the housing association, which made space available for classroom and meeting spaces. The local elementary school donated its library and gymnasium for use in recreational and sports programming.

The social skills pilot programme included role-play activities, videos, discussions and games aimed at teaching children about impulse control, anger management and conflict avoidance and resolution.<sup>178</sup> Programme co-ordinators also hired two neighbourhood teens to act as de facto mentors and to help identify children most at risk.

Evaluation of the project showed that the sports and recreation component gave

174 CeaseFire, Report to the State of Illinois 2007, Chicago, IL: University of Illinois at Chicago, 2007

175 CeaseFire, Report to the State of Illinois 2007, Chicago, IL: University of Illinois at Chicago, 2007

176 CeaseFire, Report to the State of Illinois 2007, Chicago, IL: University of Illinois at Chicago, 2007

177 CeaseFire, Report to the State of Illinois 2007, Chicago, IL: University of Illinois at Chicago, 2007

178 *Project Early Intervention*, Ottawa, ON: Caledon Institute of Social Policy, October 2000

participants the chance to apply the life skills learned in the classroom. Aggressive behaviour and violence, social exclusion, and general mental health and development showed improvement. PEI is a promising crime prevention initiative for children. The project contributed to building knowledge of recreational and life-skills programmes that help them to become positive members of the community.

#### *Kids 1st Project*

The Kids 1st Project was a crime prevention programme for children aged 9 to 11 years that ran from 2000 to 2004. The programme was offered to children who were at risk of, or had already been involved in, criminal and/or violent behaviour. The objective of the project was to help at-risk children avoid future violent and delinquent behaviour by promoting the acquisition and maintenance of social skills.

The programme was delivered over the course of a year by childcare professionals and educators on a voluntary basis. The Kids 1st Project offered participants a variety of services, including individual counselling, family support and partnership with schools. Evening sessions at an Attendance Centre Phase for 12 weeks helped children to develop new skills and to reduce problem behaviours. The programme provided structured activities, which centred on developing thinking skills, behaviour management and social recreation.

Access to appropriate support services was facilitated by the project's community placement phase. This was available to participants for an additional 36 weeks and included 12 booster sessions in which children and their families received structured maintenance within a group setting.

Evaluation of the project examined attitudes and behaviours of 60 participants before and after the intervention. This was complemented by a comprehensive risk assessment drawn up from parents, teachers

and project staff before and after the programme. Contacts with police among participants were also recorded in the evaluation.

The evaluation reported that at-risk children in need of prevention services were successfully targeted by the Kids 1st Project. 91% of the children involved in the project were classified as high-risk, meaning they were affected by multiple risk factors.<sup>179</sup> The drop-out rate among participants was low and overall attendance was high. However, the project was not without shortcomings. There were difficulties linking participants to available support services in their community, something which intervention programmes in England and Wales also suffer from.<sup>180</sup>

The outcome evaluation indicated that social skills improved, at least in the short term. Problems in the areas of mental health, social and cognitive skills, consequential thinking, social perspective taking, problem solving and interpersonal skills were reduced. There were also statistically significant changes regarding aggressive behaviour and incidents of violence.<sup>181</sup> Nearly two years after the completion of the programme, only 13.3% of participants had had any contact with the police, a positive outcome given that all participants were high risk. However, because the project ran for only four years, the long-term impact of the intervention was not as effective as it could have been.

#### *Middle School Project: Families & Schools*

The Middle School Project was an implementation of the Family and Schools Together programme for children aged 9 to 12 years, who exhibited risk factors such as isolation, school difficulties and aggressive behaviour, and came from disorganised families. It was offered in six schools in four provinces over a three-year period starting during the 2002-03 school year and 206 families completed the programme.<sup>182</sup>

The goal was to develop resilience skills in children to reduce the likelihood of their

179 *Kids 1st Project, Evaluation Summaries*, Ottawa, ON: National Crime Prevention Centre, 2007

180 Interview with Head of Crime Prevention, Metropolitan Police, London, October 2008

181 *Kids 1st Project*, op cit

182 *Middle School Project: Families & Schools, Evaluation Summaries*, Ottawa, ON: National Crime Prevention Centre, 2008



being involved in future violence and criminal behaviour. A team including school staff, community agency representatives, parents and children was formed at each school to plan and deliver weekly sessions for families and their children over 11 weeks. Activities included a family meal, family communication games, time for children to interact with one another, a parent support group, and one-to-one time between parent and child.

For the evaluation process, a quasi-experimental design was used. Data was collected from participants for an 11 week non-intervention period before the start of the programme and again at intake, thus enabling evaluators to compare any changes occurring over the 11 weeks of the programme with those occurring during the earlier period.<sup>183</sup> Post programme data was collected at two-year intervals to determine whether goals were met and sustained.

The evaluation process reported that over 30% of the participants functioned below their academic grade level at intake; 90% had received in the past, or were currently receiving, some type of special service from their school; 45% of families who entered the programme reported income levels below CA\$30,000 (£16,215) per year. Upon entry, the children had below average social skills, as rated by parents and teachers on the social skills rating scale (SSRS).<sup>184</sup> Most families attended all nine family sessions and the mean attendance for graduating families was 8.4.

Self-reported satisfaction with the programme was high, with parents giving a mean rating of 8.7/10. Family adaptability and cohesion increased slightly over time, but there was no statistically significant shift in the level of social isolation. Children's social skills ratings improved post-programme, but their scores returned to intake levels after one year. Teachers' ratings of academic competency occurred between intake and year one follow-up. Some children also

showed significant reductions in school office referrals.<sup>185</sup>

The Middle School Project targeted very high-risk families whose difficulties were so entrenched that short-term prevention was not likely to have the desired results; a programme of greater intensity and duration would be more appropriate. However, the project was a success in making inroads to the children targeted, and initially engaging the families. Where the programme failed was in its ability to link these children and families into further services. This is a challenge for all intervention programmes. Even with decent partnership arrangements, there needs to be better co-ordination between support service providers and those working directly with at-risk children and families.

#### Lessons – Outreach

All of the above programmes have lessons for the development of violence prevention initiatives in the United Kingdom. The most important is the need for long-term programmes when targeting those most at risk: a one-year programme with little follow up will not be able to generate the impact desired, as the Middle School Project showed. They also illustrate the need to engage with at-risk children earlier rather than later.

Boston's YSPN programme also illustrates the importance of identifying and supporting the most at-risk of young offenders. Although there are a number of support programmes available to at-risk young people, none provides mentors to channel them into the resources available. The Home Office should consider embedding highly trained social workers into a limited number of urban police stations.

183 Ibid

184 Ibid

185 Ibid

### Provision of Opportunities

Professor John Pitts, author of the groundbreaking report *Reluctant Gangsters*, has argued that lack of access to labour markets is a crucial factor in gang membership.<sup>186</sup> Pitts makes the case that without sufficient employment opportunities, at-risk youths are more likely to join a street gang, often one engaged in the black market economy. While that may seem self-evident, not enough urban centres have made job training and employment for at-risk youth a top priority. The most obvious barrier is adequate funding. Employment training and placement programmes have a great deal of potential for reducing violent crime and producing savings (reduced police, court and incarceration costs), but because they require investment and the savings generated are not “cashable”, they do not receive the consideration they deserve.

### *Boston Case*

While providing social activities such as sports and recreation is important, Boston has done well to create a programme that offers employment training and job placement. Youth Opportunity Unlimited Boston (known as YOU Boston) provides an intensive case management service that includes support, counselling and referrals to education, housing, childcare, substance abuse services, and other services a young person might need.

YOU Boston is built on a tiered system to ease participants into training and eventually get them into a job placement. The programme targets at-risk youths to change the way they think about their behaviour and how they interact with people, effectively teaching them how to interact with colleagues in the workplace.

It serves mostly young people aged 14 to 24 years who have been involved with the courts. The average age of active clients involved is 20.4 years and the average age at intake is 17.5 years. 80% of clients are male and 84% are black; 14% are Latino; 2% are

white; and 1% Asian. 65% test below the sixth-grade reading level. More than 75% are affiliated to a gang and 95% are involved with the courts.<sup>187</sup>

Juvenile probation accounts for 19% of referrals, adult probation 21%, Department of Youth Service 30%, and House of Corrections and others account for another 30%. Other referrals may come from the Youth Service Providers Network, alternative education programmes, street workers, Boston police or the city’s Department of Social Services.

The YOU Boston team has 16 full-time case managers and a career development team. The programme balances counselling with career development. Transitional employment services work in a phased approach of three levels: pre-placement, bridge internship and individual placement.

After an evaluation at intake, case managers must continue to think holistically about the development and circumstance of each youth. They must be aware of the level of education, what a youth’s family situation is like, the state of their work situation and the relationship between a youth and their supervisor. Most programme participants will be assigned to the job readiness training. Many individuals have extremely poor communication skills when they enter the programme. At intake stage most are unable to make a business related phone call and are unable to understand the difference between talking to friends and talking to a job supervisor.<sup>188</sup> They lack conflict resolution skills and cannot respond appropriately to authority in a work environment.<sup>189</sup> Development of these soft skills is a crucial part of the pre-placement curriculum.

During the pre-placement workshops, participants receive a minimum wage and must demonstrate a willingness to work through attendance, attitude and effort.<sup>190</sup> Pre-placement training lasts two weeks, with a two-and-a-half-hour session every day. The sessions include interactive training, role play, games, team building, small group work and

186 Interview with Professor John Pitts, Policy Exchange, London, May 2008


187 Interview with Kimberly Pelletreau, Youth Opportunity Boston, Boston, MA, July 2008

188 Interview with Kimberly Pelletreau, Youth Opportunity Boston, Boston, MA, July 2008

189 Interview with Kimberly Pelletreau, Youth Opportunity Boston, Boston, MA, July 2008

190 Youth Opportunity of Boston Strategy Document, Boston: YO Boston, March 2008

Figure 9: YOU Boston process



individual reflection. There is a daily points system and training evaluation to track the progress of participants.

After successful completion of the pre-placement level, participants are placed with agencies and community-based organisations in a group internship called the bridge programme, subsidised by YOU Boston. Bridge placements pay a subsidised wage of \$8 per hour. The bridge programme can last between six weeks and six months and is a team-based experience. Each participant works five hours a day and must stick to a structured daily curriculum to reflect real work experience and skill development.<sup>191</sup>

Bridge programme projects are completed within a team and recent work is varied, but it always serves the community in some way. One team completed an inventory of donations, food pantry operation, cooking and serving in the kitchen and general maintenance for a homeless shelter. Another project cleaned and helped to refurbish a high school during the summer.<sup>192</sup>

Following graduation from the bridge programme, participants are assigned an individual placement with a community-based partner organisation for three to six months. As with the bridge stage, youths work five hours a day and must demonstrate ability to work independently, communicate effectively and handle themselves professionally.<sup>193</sup> Case managers continue to see partici-

pants on a weekly basis and carry out monthly evaluations.

In this stage, case managers will emphasise the amount of training and development work that the participant has had. Figure 9 outlines the process.

In addition to employment services, YOU Boston works to connect youth to education services and opportunities. There is an excellent alternative education network that YOU Boston works with regularly. However, alternative education places can be expensive – the organisation spends approximately \$650,000 per year on alternative education places for programme participants. Other educational options include a GED (high school diploma equivalent) training programme on site. YOU Boston also offers higher education counselling and support for those who want to access post-secondary school education. From March 2008, YOU Boston started a vocational training programme in partnership with the Department of Youth Service and Boston Police Department.

When YOU Boston was founded, it was given a federal grant of \$5,000,000 from the Department of Labour. However, the federal grant expired in 2005, and funding has been halved.<sup>194</sup> The annual operational budget for YOU Boston is now \$2.3 million, but the cut in funding has meant that the organisation lost half its staff. Eligibility criteria for

191 Youth Opportunity of Boston Strategy Document, Boston: YO Boston, March 2008

192 Youth Opportunity of Boston Strategy Document, Boston: YO Boston, March 2008

193 Youth Opportunity of Boston Strategy Document, Boston: YO Boston, March 2008

194 Interview with Kimberly Pelletreau, Youth Opportunity Boston, Boston, MA, July 2008



participants have had to be prioritised and the programme now focuses on the most high-risk youths, who are almost all involved with the courts.<sup>195</sup>

Funding now comes from several sources: 50% is collected from a state level grant, 35% comes from the Mayor's office and 15% from charitable giving.<sup>196</sup> The organisation has recently acquired charitable status, which makes securing philanthropic funds much easier, although it still faces a financial shortfall.

Broken down to the participant level, the annual cost of putting an individual through the programme is about \$4,000. If a programme participant requires an alternative education placement, then costs could run closer to \$10,000 a year. However, the average cost of incarcerating someone is \$24,000 a year.<sup>197</sup> Success is most often measured in the retention rate, meaning that participants are working, in education, or involved in vocational training. Currently the retention rate stands at 79%. Given that all programme participants are extremely high risk and 95% have criminal records, such a high retention rate suggests that YOU Boston is working.

195 Interview with Kimberly Pettetreau, Youth Opportunity Boston, Boston, MA, July 2008

196 Interview with Kimberly Pettetreau, Youth Opportunity Boston, Boston, MA, July 2008

197 Fears D, "US panel considers alternatives to prison", *Boston Globe*, 13th October 2008; [www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2008/10/13/us\\_panel\\_considers\\_alternatives\\_to\\_prison/](http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2008/10/13/us_panel_considers_alternatives_to_prison/)

198 Boston Police Department, Bureau of Field Services/Field Support Division, *2007 Annual Report*, Boston, MA: BPD, 2008

199 Boston Police Department, Bureau of Field Services/Field Support Division, *2007 Annual Report*, Boston, MA: BPD, 2008

200 *City of Boston's Comprehensive Strategy to Address Youth Gang and Gun Violence*, Year Three, Boston, MA: Boston Police Department, 4 September 2008.

### Lessons – Opportunities Provision

Given the importance of providing job training, education, and employment opportunities to youth in high-risk areas, local councils need to make programmes like YOU Boston a priority. They require considerable investment but the potential savings are significant. There is scope for third sector provision of such a programme, with a well defined role for the police service in its implementation. YOU Boston is able to reach the most at-risk youths because of its relationship with police and the criminal justice system.

## Offender Management

### *Boston Case*

The partnership between Boston Police and the Suffolk County Probation Service is extremely well developed. Information sharing and joint operations between the BPD and the Suffolk County Probation Service have been an integral part of the "pulling levers" strategy in Boston. As a host of stakeholders has worked to change the expected norms in Boston's most challenging neighbourhoods, the police and probation service have worked to keep offenders from slipping into recidivism.

The most intensive programme in the BPD/probation service partnership is Operation Nightlight – which works closely with the Youth Violence Strike Force. It aims to prevent probationers who have been involved with gangs and committed violent crimes from re-offending or being victimised. As its name implies, Operation Nightlight is most active between 7.00 pm and midnight, the hours when probationers are most likely to default on their restrictions and curfews. The BPD and the probation service have made more than 500 visits to probationers and spread the word that the police will not tolerate the breaking of probation conditions, making re-offending more difficult.<sup>198</sup>

Police and community partners have evaluated Operation Nightlight and given it credit for an almost 200% increase in probation compliance and thus has reduced recidivism.<sup>199</sup> Given the high-risk targets of Operation Nightlight, this figure marks a significant return from investing in the programme.

The Boston Re-entry Initiative (BRI) is another programme aimed at dealing with the most high-risk and violence prone offenders after release from prison. The BRI recognises that the highest risk offenders are more likely to re-engage in gang and gun violence unless they are offered comprehensive help to change their lives.<sup>200</sup>

The BRI starts working with offenders at

the beginning of their sentences. It targets the ‘impact players’ associated with gang activity, violence and firearms crime.<sup>201</sup> Boston Police Department lists the cost of the BRI as \$279,676 a year. This covers two BRI mentors, two case managers and one assistant re-entry co-ordinator. It is difficult to calculate the total potential savings, but if the initiative keeps just 12 offenders a year from re-offending, the programme has more than paid for itself.

### Lessons – Offender Management

Governance structures for the British criminal justice system fail to provide adequate accountability for partnership working between police and other agencies. Boston’s Operation Nightlight is a good example of two crime and justice agencies working in concert for the common cause of violent crime reduction. The BRI also illustrates the need to expand the use of multi-agency public protection arrangements (MAPPA) in England and Wales for violent gun and knife crime offenders. Better offender management, inside prisons and upon release, have potential to yield both short and long-term reductions in violent gun and knife crime. The rate of recidivism, currently higher than 60%, is a blight on the British criminal justice system. Although prevention strategies need to focus on children and youth, better management of offenders should be part and parcel of any violent crime reduction strategy. Prison offers an obvious venue to reach gun and knife crime offenders, and following their release from custody, these offenders should be given tailored support and held to strict release conditions.

### Results

The timing of each of these four cities’ strategies, and their experiences of violent crime, vary. Some of their approaches to violent crime were similar and some unique. As result it is difficult to draw comparisons between their rates of violent crime. We can, however, reasonably compare the situation *within* each city over time.

#### **Boston**

From 1970, violent crime began to pick up rapidly in the city, reaching a peak in the early 1980s and levelling off until the mid 1990s. Figure 10 gives the violent crime trends for the city over the last 17 years. Boston’s Gun Project and Operation Ceasefire, in particular, have been held up around the world as examples in how to reduce violent crime and its “pulling levers” strategy has been the focus of extensive academic research.<sup>202</sup>


The Boston “miracle” went beyond traditional policing and brought together a range of government service providers, community leaders and third sector organisations as partners in public safety, and the results are telling. From 1970, violent crime began to pick up rapidly in the city, reaching a peak in the early 1980s and levelling off until the mid 1990s. As the case study describes, a broad range of actors and stakeholders took an active role in the efforts to reduce violent gun and knife crime. Moreover, different groups took action at different times. As a result, it is difficult to distinguish the impact of any one programme, but overall statistics do indicate the effectiveness of Boston’s efforts as a whole. Figure 11 charts the number of homicides in the city a year. The trend follows the same pattern as that for violent crime as a whole, though year-on-year, swings are more pronounced.

A number of American cities have tried to replicate Boston’s approach, especially targeting police patrols at violent crime hotspots, with varying success. Operation Ceasefire,


201 City of Boston’s Comprehensive Strategy to Address Youth Gang and Gun Violence, Year Three, Boston, MA: Boston Police Department, 4 September 2008.

202 Braga A, “Pulling levers focused deterrence strategies and the prevention of gun homicide”, *Journal of Criminal Justice*, vol 36, pp 332-343, 2008

**Figure 10: Levels of violence crime in Boston 1997-2007**



**Figure 11: Annual number of murders in Boston 1980-2007**



which began in 1995, benefited from groundwork laid by community outreach work and had an immediate impact.<sup>203</sup> A similar programme rolled out in Indianapolis and evaluated in 2006 resulted in a statistically significant decline in homicide rates.<sup>204</sup> These findings supported those of other research: police interventions do reduce firearms crime.<sup>205</sup>

Both graphs show violent crime and homicides falling from the early 1990s through to 2004, when violent crime levels were at 30 year lows and homicide levels were at or near historical lows. Although the figures have risen recently, this slight

upturn can be interpreted as a regression towards the mean. Violent crime is still 50% below the level experienced in 1990.

However there was a spike in homicides (and non-fatal shootings) in 2005 and 2006, which coincided with reductions in funding for a number of Boston prevention programmes like YOU Boston and YSPN. It is outside of the scope of this study to test whether the two are correlated statistically. On the one hand, the reduction in prevention funding, discussed early in the report, was followed by a spike in violent crime. On the other, violent crime and homicides in Boston from the

203 Braga A, Kennedy D, Waring E, and Piehl A, "Problem-oriented policing, deterrence, and youth violence: An evaluation of Boston's operation ceasefire", *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency*, vol 38, pp 195-226, 2001

204 McGarrell E, Chermak S, Wilson J and Corsaro N, "Reducing homicide through a 'lever-pulling' strategy", *Justice Quarterly*, vol 23, no 2, pp 214-231, 2006

205 Cohen J and Ludwig J, "Policing crime guns", in Ludwig J and Cook P (eds), *Evaluating Gun Policy*, Washington, DC: Brookings, pp 217-250, 2003

late 1990s and early 2000s rose from near historic lows. A recent analysis has shown a 12% decrease in violent crime in the city's hotspots for the period October 2007 to March 2008 compared to the same period in the previous year. Increased access to philanthropic funding and adjustment in tactics from police both seem to have proved effective.


**Chicago**

The Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy changed the nature of policing and community engagement in the city. Academics


evaluated its effects after ten years and their findings have generally been positive.<sup>206</sup> Raw data before 1998 was not available to us, but summary reports on CAPS reported a 19% reduction in violent crimes from 1992 to 1997.<sup>207</sup> Moreover, the number of victims of a serious crime fell by 39,000.<sup>208</sup> The graph below charts the total number of annual homicides in Chicago from 1990 to 2007.

CAPS was rolled out across Chicago in 1994, and looking at Figure 12, 1994 marks the beginning of a 13-year fall in the number of homicides. Chicago's reliance

**Figure 12: Annual number of murders in Chicago 1990 - 2007**



**Figure 13: Number of murders in Chicago each year by weapon type 1998-2007**




206 Skogan W and Steiner L, *Caps at Ten: Community Policing in Chicago*, Chicago, IL: The Chicago Community Policing Evaluation Consortium, January 2004

207 CAPS at 5: A report on the progress of community policing in Chicago, Chicago, IL: City of Chicago, 1998

208 Ibid

**Figure 14: Changes in number of shootings by location 2000-04**




on intelligence-led deployment of police into hotspot areas, combined community engagement, has been accompanied by a 48% drop in total annual homicides.

Figure 13 illustrates the reduction in firearms homicides from 1998 to 2007. Targeting resources in the most at-risk areas has led to a 38% reduction in firearms homicides from 1998 to 2007. Violent crimes in general declined steadily

from 1998 to 2007, at a compound annual rate of 5.3%.<sup>209</sup> The total of violent crimes recorded in 2007, 34,895, represents a ten year decline of 39% from the 56,746 recorded in 1998.<sup>210</sup>

Chicago also had promising results in targeted outreach interventions. Figure 14 shows that gun crime fell further in the neighbourhoods targeted by the CeaseFire programme than in other parts of the city.


**Figure 15: Reductions in shootings in CeaseFire and non-CeaseFire zones, first six communities, 2000-04**



209 2007 Annual Report: A Year in Review, Chicago, IL: Chicago Police, 2007

210 Ibid

**Figure 16: Reductions in shootings in CeaseFire and non-CeaseFire zones, eight new communities, 2005-06**



\* Results are statistically significant:  $p < 0.01$

\*\* Results are statistically significant with  $p < 0.05$

Communities are: Englewood, Brighton Park E, Garfield, Albany Park, Little Village, Austin, Grand Boulevard, Woodlawn

Other evaluations also credit CeaseFire with significant falls in shootings in its targeted areas.<sup>211</sup>

The graph below shows that firearm discharges in CeaseFire neighbourhoods decreased at a greater rate than in comparison neighbourhoods. The significance of the differences speaks to the importance of police tactics working in concert with well defined and effective street outreach programmes.

The graphs below show the reduction in shootings in CeaseFire communities compared to the rest of Chicago.

In 2006, homicides rose by 5% in Chicago, but in CeaseFire zones they fell by 22%. The effect was especially marked in those CeaseFire zones which began in 2005 – there homicides fell by a combined 53%.<sup>212</sup>

### **Toronto**

Toronto is the most difficult of the three cities to evaluate, as gun crime did not emerge as a public concern until 2005. Toronto Police Service's changes in strategy are still being developed. Like Chicago, Toronto has built its response on intelligence-led deployment. Community engagement has also been a priority, but

its diverse population speaking many languages makes this a far more daunting undertaking than in Chicago. The Toronto Police Service has to deal with the challenges that come with an extremely diverse population, the most pronounced of which is language. Given the specific context of Toronto, The TPS approach has been more about improving relations between communities and police than explicitly empowering communities as the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy has.



Building better relationships with excluded communities has led to a 40% reduction in violence since 2005. In one targeted area, that drop is as high as 83%. Firearms offences have also fallen; fewer shootings occurred in 2007 than 2005. Figure 17 shows the reduction in shootings and gun crime victims.

Figure 18 shows the reduction in the number of gun calls to police. The past three years indicate that the city's approach is yielding results. The intelligence-led Toronto Anti-Violence Intervention Strategy, the resilience of rapid response teams and targeted community engagement are proving to be effective suppression tactics.

211 Kerr N, Ransford C, Metzger T and Slutkin G, "CeaseFire Chicago: A Public Health Approach to Reducing Shootings and Killings", Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Society of Criminology, Atlanta, Georgia November 2007; [www.allacademic.com/meta/p201110\\_index.html](http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p201110_index.html)

212 CeaseFire, Report to the State of Illinois 2007, Chicago, IL: University of Illinois at Chicago, 2007





The impact of Chicago and Boston’s efforts at reducing violent crime is apparent in the crime trends in both cities. Toronto, too, has shown improvements, but its efforts are still under development and it will take longer before a full evaluation is possible. None of the above cities provides a perfect solution to gun and knife crime. Nor should any city take a blueprint from another city and apply it

wholesale to its own unique context. However, there are a number of valuable policy ideas that should be applied widely. The impact of Chicago and Boston’s violent crime reduction efforts are evidenced in the crime trends in both cities. While Toronto has shown gains, the city’s efforts are still in the developmental stage and it will take longer before a full evaluation is viable.

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# 4

## Reducing Supply

### Introduction

In *Going Ballistic*, the first research report of this series, we recommended controlling illicit weapons through limiting importation of ballistics material, introducing legislative changes and changing police enforcement tactics. As a result of our research in North America and the Netherlands, for this second report, the following section recommends more far-reaching legal reform. It also discusses how co-operation and co-ordination of institutions, both internationally and in Britain, could help to limit the illicit supply of firearms.

It is inevitable that this section focuses on firearms rather than knives. Knives are readily available to those who wish to use them illegally, so there are obvious limitations on what can be usefully recommended from the perspective of supply. The law as it stands does restrict the availability of certain potentially lethal knives (such as flick knives, lock knives) and the carrying of knives with blades longer than 3 inches in public places. In addition, restrictions on the sale of knives to under 18s have been introduced. But ultimately, for knife crime, we must concentrate on the demand side factors. That said, it is worth reiterating our proposal in *Going Ballistic* for a thoroughgoing review of the complex legislation relating to the criminal use of knives.<sup>213</sup>

### International context

The 2007 Small Arms Survey, compiled in Geneva and carried out by researchers on the ground around the world, illustrates the extent of global gun supply. Its key findings are:<sup>214</sup>

- Every year 530,000 to 580,000 small arms are produced under licence or as unlicensed copies (60% to 80% of total production);
- Nation states acquiring original technology far exceed those that “own” original technology;
- Only 57% of weapons produced by those acquiring technology are produced under licence;
- There are 875 million civilian, law enforcement and military firearms in the world;
- 75% (650 million) are owned by civilians (270 million of these are in the US)
- 60 states made “irresponsible” small arms shipments to 36 countries in 2002 to 2004;
- Transparency among major small arms exporters is poor in many countries;
- The least transparent are Bulgaria, North Korea and South Africa.

Other sources indicate that eight million new firearms, both legal and illegal, are manufactured annually. The abuse of firearms presents problems in the West, notably in large cities in North America and Western Europe, particularly in Chicago, London and Paris, as well as in conflict and post-conflict zones. So while 300,000 people die each year as a result of firearms related incidents in conflict or post-conflict regions of Africa, southeast Europe and southeast Asia, another 200,000 die as a result of incidents involving firearms in other parts of the world including Europe and North America.<sup>215</sup>

Possession of, and trade in, illegal firearms has grown over the past 18 years,

<sup>213</sup> Golding B and McClory J, op cit

<sup>214</sup> The Small Arms Survey: *Guns and the City*, 2007, Geneva: Graduate Institute of International Studies; see [www.smallarmssurvey.org](http://www.smallarmssurvey.org)

<sup>215</sup> United Nations, cited in Bruggerman W et al, “The world’s police and the containment of the illegal production, the illegal trade and the illegal possession of small arms and light weapons (SALW)”, p.6 and 13, Report to Pearls in Policing conference, The Hague, 15-18 June 2008

since the collapse of the Soviet Union. There is a buoyant trade in illegal firearms sourced from military arms dumps in central and eastern Europe, central and south-east Asia.<sup>216</sup> Skilled gunsmiths, in Croatia and Serbia are reported to be producing substantial quantities of illegal firearms. Many are subsequently smuggled into Western Europe.<sup>217</sup> Other sources of firearms include the theft of weapons from legal arms dealers; fraudulent arms dealers who feed guns to criminals directly or indirectly;<sup>218</sup> the “sale” by military and police personnel of firearms in war zones (note for example the “loss” of 190,000 Kalashnikovs supplied by the US to the police and army in Iraq);<sup>219</sup> and arms dealers selling on weapons purchased from police and military stocks to illegitimate sources (note the case of the British arms dealer attempting to sell ex-SAS machine guns to Iran, contrary to the arms embargo).<sup>220</sup>

#### *International actions: the strategic level*

Internationally, there has been a growing recognition of the illicit firearms supply problem. In 1998, The UN General Assembly convened a conference on the small arms trade, after which a preparatory committee was set up. In 2000, after lobbying pressure, it committed to combating the illegal small arms (the third protocol) at the Palermo Convention on transnational crime. This was followed a year later by a UN programme of action that encouraged updates to legislation; improved training of police and customs; and destruction of some weapons and weapons surrenders.

An outline of these international interventions is set out in table 5.

Despite the progress outlined in Table 5, there has been a failure to “co-ordinate the fight against the illegal arms trade at the central level in most countries”. Moreover, there has been failure to “contribute sufficient staff and resources in cross-border co-operation to

effectively tackle illegal trafficking of firearms.”<sup>221</sup>

A further shortcoming of the international convention and associated protocol in practice is the absence of any recognition of the role of police and customs in addressing the production, distribution and possession of illegal firearms.<sup>222</sup> This is a staggering conclusion, and the reasons behind this are twofold:

- The programme was designed from the perspective of Foreign Affairs departments and humanitarian organisations.
- Police services internationally have failed to prioritise the trade in illegal firearms. Police services do not feature in EU policies on this issue, for example.<sup>223</sup>

In the UK, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (specifically the arms trade unit and counter-proliferation department) has the lead on this issue. Consequently, any proposed UN arms trade treaty would fall under the remit of the Foreign Office – leaving the Home Office conspicuously absent from the process, despite its responsibility for policing. Given the “local” consequences and the intelligence role of policing, excluding the Home Office from the process of curbing illicit arms trade seems self-defeating.

#### The third protocol

The purpose of the third protocol on the illegal production and trade in firearms was to:

- Reinforce co-operation between states in relation to the illegal trade and production of firearms;
- Reinforce co-operation between states on the investigation and prosecution of transnational criminals and those involved in organised crime groups;
- Make provisions to penalise the illegal production and trade of weapons;
- Make provisions for the identification

216 Wood B and Peleman J, “The arms fixers: controlling the brokers and shipping agents”, Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, 1999, cited in Bruggeman W et al, op cit, p14

217 Spapens A and Bruinsma M, “Smokkel van handvuurwapens vanuit voormalige Oosterbloklanden naar Nederland”, (trafficking of small arms from the former Eastern bloc to the Netherlands) Tilburg: IVA, cited in Bruggeman W et al, op cit, p14

218 Spapens A and Bruinsma M (2004) “Illegale vuurwapens in Nederland: smokkel and handel” (illegal firearms in the Netherlands, trafficking and trade) Tilburg: IVA, cited in Bruggeman W et al, op cit, p14

219 *Le Monde*, 6th August, 2007

220 *The Guardian*, 20th April, 2008

221 Bruggeman W et al, op cit, p 6

222 Bruggeman W et al op cit (2008) p. 6.

223 Bruggeman W et al op cit (2008) p. 6-7

and registration of weapons, and their import and export;

- Make provisions for regulation of arms dealers activities;
- Make provisions for settling disagreements between states.<sup>224</sup>

Interestingly, the primacy of Foreign Affairs departments over these issues contradicts

articles 11 through 14 of the third protocol, which calls for police involvement, in that they require:

- Investment in police control (with or without customs) of the import, transfer and export of weapons and in the transnational co-operation between these services;

224 UN General assembly, A/RES/55/255, 'Resolution adopted by the General assembly: Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime 8th June 2001 New York: United Nations

**Table 5: Protocols and agreements on transnational trafficking of firearms**

Date	Instrument	Description
15th November 2000 Came into force 29th Sept 2003	United Nations Convention Against Transnational Crime (the Palermo Convention) <i>General Assembly Resolution 55/25</i>	This is an international instrument which was opened for signature at a conference in Palermo, Italy in December 2000
July 2001 Went live in 2005	Programme of Action for the Palermo Convention	
31st May 2001 Came into force 3rd July 2005	Protocol to the Palermo Convention on the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking of firearms, their components, and ammunition (the third protocol) <i>Adopted by General Assembly resolution</i>	This is the last of three protocols added to the Palermo convention. This is the first legally binding instrument at a global level on the issue of small arms. It is intended to promote, facilitate and strengthen co-operation between states to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit manufacture and trafficking in firearms, their parts, components and ammunition.  States must be party to the Palermo convention before becoming a party to any of the protocols. States that ratify the protocol (as the UK has done) must commit to three so called normative provisions in their domestic and legal arrangements, namely: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) establishing criminal offences concerning the illegal manufacture of, and trafficking in, firearms;</li> <li>2) system or systems of government licensing and authorisation which ensures legitimate manufacturing and trafficking in firearms;</li> <li>3) systems and arrangements to address the tracing and marking of firearms</li> </ol>
12th July 2006	Report of the UN conference to review progress in the implementation of the programme of action <i>UN General assembly: A/conf. 192/2006/rc/9</i>	A progress report on the programme of action which describes progress as disappointing
14th November 2006	UN resolution on an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) UN, General Assembly, first committee, 61st session, A/61/394: general and complete disarmament	Adopted by 139 States (including the UK), with one rejection (the US) and 24 not voting (including Russia, and many states in the Middle East and East Asia)
October 2007	UN General Assembly first committee (disarmament and international security): tasked experts to formulate a draft ATT for discussion in 2008	In the UK, this is the responsibility of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office through its arms trade unit and counter-proliferation department. We understand that the Foreign Secretary chaired a meeting on the progress of the ATT in September 2008

- Exchange of information on criminal organisations involved in the illegal arms trade;
- Sharing of technical and scientific expertise to combat illegal weapons production and trade;
- Mutual assistance in tracing trading routes and in adequately responding to requests for legal assistance;
- Appointment of liaison agencies at a national level;
- Co-operation with legal weapons producers in the fight against the illegal trade;
- Provision of training and technical support to parties to the protocol.<sup>225</sup>

We do not believe commitments made in line with this protocol can be met “if there are no requirements in place for the organisation and staffing of police services, (centrally provided by Government) to support it”<sup>226</sup> – a point we shall return to in the context of the arrangements in the UK. This is a recurring theme, and *Going Ballistic* made recommendations concerning the failure of central government to provide for the continued funding of the National Ballistics Intelligence Service and the National Firearms Intelligence Cell. This gap in funding is leading to what is essentially an ad hoc intervention by the Association of Chief Police Officers to maintain these essential services.<sup>227</sup>

In July 2001 the programme of action to deliver the third protocol was adopted.<sup>228</sup> National targets and measures were set out in relation to:

- Measures used in the fight against the illegal trade in small arms and light weapons (including criminal intelligence development, management of confiscated weapons, development of transnational co-operation in identification and investigations relating to the illegal firearms trade).

- Co-operation and assistance in the implementation of the programme of action (including assisting states that require it in delivering the plan, developing policing systems, training and exchange of experience; using technology such as the Interpol weapons and explosives tracking system and other databases; and using existing forms of international co-operation, police and judicial in investigating and prosecuting illegal firearms dealers).<sup>229</sup>

The implementation of the action plan, however, has been described as “flawed” by some professional observers.<sup>230</sup> A report to a UN conference on 12th July 2006 found that “progress to date is only marginally more encouraging and remains disappointing in many areas. Overall implementation of the programme of action has been mixed globally, regionally, nationally, and thematically.”<sup>231</sup>

#### *Towards an Arms Trade Treaty?*

Perhaps in response to criticisms, there has been increasing pressure for the development of an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) to provide for universal standards to guide the arms trade – effectively “a legally binding international agreement establishing a set of basic rules to regulate the international transfer of conventional weapons”.<sup>232</sup>

A UN resolution in this regard was adopted on 14th November 2006 by 139 States, with one rejecting the ATT (the United States) and 24 not voting (including Russia and many states in the Middle East and East Asia).<sup>233</sup>

In October 2007, the UN General Assembly’s first committee (disarmament and international security) asked experts to formulate a draft treaty for discussion in 2008. The British Government apparently supports an ATT.<sup>234</sup> The lead rests with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and we understand that the Foreign Secretary David Miliband has in September 2008

225 UN General assembly, A/RES/55/255 op cit; see also Bruggeman W et al, op cit pp 19-20

226 Bruggeman W et al, op cit, p20

227 Golding B and McClory J, op cit

228 <http://disarmament.un.org/cab/poa.html>

229 Bruggeman W et al, op cit, p21

230 Bruggeman W et al, op cit, p22

231 UN General assembly A/conf.192/2006/rc/9 Report of the UN conference to review progress in the implementation of the programme of action, 12th July 2006

232 Arias Foundation for Peace and Human Progress; [www.armstradetreaty.com/att/lab/outatt.php](http://www.armstradetreaty.com/att/lab/outatt.php) extracted 14th September, 2008

233 UN, General assembly, first committee, 61st session, A/61/394 General and complete disarmament, 14th November 2006

234 Interview with ACPO representative, September 2008

chaired a meeting on the progress of the ATT.

In addition to obvious concerns about the slow progress of international action and of states (including the UK) in supporting the principles of the third protocol – we raise the point made earlier that this is a cross-departmental issue. For police and customs officers there is a local and practical dimension to any arms trade treaty, as well as a global one from the FCO perspective.

### *The European Union*

Within the EU there were some successes in relation to the UN programme of action. Most member states passed some legislation to support implementation (arms legislation in Europe, as indicated earlier, is, with some exceptions, tight<sup>235</sup>); and also took action with respect to third world countries.<sup>236</sup>

Within the EU there are already a number of relevant arrangements, which include:

- *The Schengen Agreement 1995<sup>237</sup> and the Schengen Implementation Convention of 1990, in particular articles 77-91 on the acquisition, possession and sale of firearms and ammunition.*<sup>238</sup>

The context was the abolition of border controls required enhancing of measures in relation to firearms. A report on the directive underpinning this element of Schengen however, recognised the problems of differences in legislation and registration arrangements between states, making information exchange about firearms difficult; it commented also that states “failed to perform as required”.<sup>239</sup>

- *A directive amending EU directive (Schengen) in the light of the third protocol.*<sup>240</sup>

This amendment proposal submitted in 2003, was focused upon dealing with

the illegal arms trade; setting up registration systems in member states to support simple tracing and identification of weapons; putting in measures to ensure integrity of arms traders and penalties in legislation aimed at illegal firearms production, trade and adaptation of firearms. It was only on 16th April 2008 that member states (excluding Austria) voted in favour of these amendments.<sup>241</sup>

The extremely slow progress outlined in relation to the third protocol, therefore, is reflected at European as well as at international level.

Firearms supply – the UK context

### *Firearms supply and legislation in the UK*

The Firearms Act 1968, the primary source of firearms law, is 40 years old. In *Going Ballistic*, we made the case for a thorough-going review of the legislation. The firearms and licensing working group (FELWG) of the Association of Chief Police Officers (chaired by Assistant Chief Constable Whiting, Dorset Police), has long argued the need for a root-and-branch review of firearms legislation. The working group consists of firearms, explosives and licensing experts (not just derived from police forces), whose role is to determine operational policy, provide advice and work with practitioners on the interpretation of policy in relation to firearms management and licensing. In 2004, the group submitted 70 recommendations for changes in the law, with detailed justification, to the Home Office (See Appendix 4).<sup>242</sup>

The seven underlying principles of its submission were:

1. Public safety
2. Countering illegal possession and criminal use
3. Standard criteria for assessment of fitness to possess firearms
4. Standard criteria for possession of all firearms with potential lethality

235 See for example Schengen Agreement 1985 and Schengen implementation Convention 1990, articles 77-91 on the acquisition, possession and sale of firearms

236 Bruggeman W et al, op cit, p24

237 Although the UK did not sign up to Schengen in all respects (for example in relation to open borders) it has subsequently adopted some elements, for example, the Schengen Information System or SIS

238 Cited in Bruggeman W et al, op cit, p30

239 EU, Implementation of Council Directive 91/477/EEC 18 June 1991, Brussels 15th December 2000, COM (2000) 837 final; cited in Bruggeman W et al, op cit, p31

240 EU, Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Directive 91/477/EEC, Brussels, 2nd March 2006 COM (2006) 93 Final

241 Council of EU, press release 2863 Council Meeting Justice and Home Affairs, Luxembourg 18th April 2008; cited in Bruggeman W et al, op cit, p32

242 Taylor S and Barnard K, Submission to the Home Office for the Controls on Firearms London: ACPO, 2004



5. Flexibility to respond to potentially dangerous developments in firearms technology
6. Simplicity and ease of administration at no net cost to public funds
7. No undue restriction on the legitimate occupational or recreational use of firearms

Some piecemeal changes have since been introduced in response to events, however the fundamental reform that ACPO sought has not materialised.<sup>243</sup> Two recent criminal prosecutions have highlighted the consequences of not reforming the law.

### *Regina v Shepherd (Operation Mokpo)*

Operation Mokpo began 18 months after a series of shootings in North London.<sup>244</sup> On 13th September 2006, Detectives from Operation Trident raided the home of David Shepherd in Dartford, Kent.<sup>245</sup> This raid was co-ordinated with raids by agents from the US Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives in New Jersey. Police were looking for evidence of weapons smuggling, gun trafficking and supply of weapons to drugs gangs.

The evidence against Shepherd, including that derived from a sting operation in which undercover officers discussed the purchase of weapons with him, (including a Belgian revolver, a French service revolver, a Smith and Wesson altered to fire Russia military issue bullets and a British Bulldog pistol).<sup>246</sup> These firearms were all advertised on Shepherd's website. Shepherd was a licensed firearms dealer and his website had more than 250,000 visitors. He claimed he had one of the largest weapons collections in Britain, with 850 modern and antique weapons for sale.<sup>247</sup>

The officer leading the raid, Detective Superintendent Kevin Davis, was quoted as saying "hundreds and hundreds of weapons were found", and that "it's probably the biggest seizure of firearms that

Operation Trident has had since its conception".<sup>248</sup> Around 900 guns were confiscated.

Most were rifles and shotguns, they were legal because Shepherd had been licensed by Kent Police as a registered firearms dealer. There were also handguns that were banned from sale unless, under the current firearms legislation, "they were antiques for display only".

Shepherd was subsequently prosecuted on 13 firearms charges. Nine months after the raid he was acquitted of all charges, his defence being based on the antique firearms exemption in the 1968 Firearms Act (s58 allows for the sale of certain weapons as "curiosities or ornaments"). The prosecuting barrister told the jury: "If an individual has a genuine Wild West type revolver...in a display case above the mantelpiece...with no intention of doing anything untoward with it – then it will fall within the exemption. If however the individual takes the same revolver out of its display case and uses it to commit an armed bank robbery then the exemption does not apply...because it is no longer being possessed as a curiosity or ornament."<sup>249</sup>

The antique weapon exemption, however, is vague – section 58 provides no definition of "antique" – it is for the courts to determine on the merits of each case. Such guidance that is available suggests that "antique" weapons include "flintlocks, muzzle loading guns and anything of obsolete calibre" (ie a cartridge type that is no longer manufactured).

### *Regina v Wilkinson*

From 2004 to 2007, Grant Wilkinson was part of a conspiracy to convert blank firing replica Mac-10 sub-machine guns into weapons capable of firing live ammunition; and was then involved in a conspiracy to move those weapons through a supply chain to criminal gangs. Wilkinson purchased 90 replica guns from a legiti-

<sup>243</sup> Golding B and McClory J, op cit

<sup>244</sup> Tendler S and Brown D, "Police Seize hundreds of weapons from the home of collector" *The Times*, 14th Sept 2006

<sup>245</sup> The Metropolitan Unit set up to investigate "black on black" gun crime in London. In 2006 at the time of the raid there had been 11 killings by shooting under investigation by the Trident team

<sup>246</sup> Summers C, "When is a gun not a gun?", BBC News, 29th July, 2007

<sup>247</sup> Tendler S and Brown D, "Police Seize hundreds of weapons from the home of collector", *The Times*, 14th Sept, 2006

<sup>248</sup> Tendler S and Brown D "Police Seize hundreds of weapons from the home of collector" *The Times*, 14 Sept 2006

<sup>249</sup> Summers C, op cit

mate outlet on the pretext that they were for a Bond film. He converted sheds in his property in Reading into a workshop and a test firing room, where he proceeded to convert the replicas into lethal firearms. Thirty-nine were recovered by police in other operations; and 51 shootings involved the converted Mac 10s. Between 30 and 40 of these weapons have still to be recovered. Although realistic imitation firearms, such as Wilkinson bought, were banned under the Violent Crime Reduction Act 2006, it is not illegal to buy deactivated guns, which can be converted into live weapons.<sup>250</sup> The Home Secretary indicated at the beginning of 2008 plans to ban these types of guns, plans which are still being considered.<sup>251</sup>

Wilkinson was found guilty. He received life imprisonment on four out of nine counts (possession of firearms with intent to endanger life and possession of ammunition with intent to endanger life). The difficulties for the prosecution involved in proving intent were overcome in these extreme circumstances. Maximum sentences (five years only) were applied for counts of conspiracy to sell or transfer firearms and conspiracy to sell ammunition. Had he been found guilty on these counts only the court would have been severely limited in its sentencing powers, and the public would not have been protected from the risk that Wilkinson posed for long. The level of sentencing in firearms cases is urgently in need of review – a view shared by the sentencing judge.<sup>252</sup> Meanwhile the anomaly in law regarding deactivated weapons remains.<sup>253</sup>

These cases highlight some of the shortcomings in firearms legislation. Legal loopholes continue to exist as a consequence of the Government's failure to review, or act promptly on, repeated recommendations to change firearms legislation. Consistent failure by Government to respond to demands for a thorough going review of firearms statutes over the

last four years clearly does nothing to enhance public safety in the context of modern gun related criminality – at least on the basis of the cases cited here. And arguably such failures are inconsistent with the Governments' obligations within the third protocol, specifically its undertakings in relation to criminal legislation concerning the illegal manufacture and trafficking of firearms.

### *Firearms supply and firearms tracing*

The UK legislative regime regarding firearms is an important aspect of controlling gun crime, but the enforcement of these statutes – in particular the investigative and preventative capabilities provided by firearms tracing – is the other side of the coin. Once again, it is important to refer back to the UK's obligations and commitments as a signatory to the Palermo convention and the third protocol, discussed earlier in this report. Both of these agreements specifically refer to the obligation of signatory states, in one of its 'normative' provisions, to commit to systems and procedures for marking and tracing firearms. A narrow interpretation of their wording will not be sufficient if further inroads are to be made into the illicit supply of firearms.

A national firearms tracing service (NFTS) for England and Wales was established in April 2001, as part of the then National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS).<sup>254</sup> It was a "response to the then perceived increase in armed criminality and recognition that there was no central point within the UK for the collation of intelligence regarding weapons seizures and recoveries on a national basis".<sup>255</sup>

The primary aims of the tracing service "were to co-ordinate requests from within the UK to trace firearms recovered from crime within the UK for UK police forces, and to receive and allocate similar tracing requests from law enforcement agencies overseas". Before the creation of the tracing service in 2001, requests from within the

250 See Recommendation 9 in Golding B and McClory J, *Going Ballistic*, London: Policy Exchange, 2008

251 O'Neill S and Fresco A, Grant Wilkinson guilty of running one of the UK's biggest ever gun factories, *The Times* 28th August, 2008

252 Her Honour Judge Smith: Sentencing Remarks in R v Wilkinson, Reading Crown Court, 28th August, 2008

253 Golding B and McClory J, *op cit*

254 Firearms tracing is the linking of, or tracking of, a weapon or ammunition to the last known lawful owner or manufacturer to identify its origin, earliest known history and ownership

255 MacDonald J, "Firearms Tracing – shaping future direction: a 3 track approach", ACPO, unpublished, 2007

UK had been conducted on an ad hoc basis by Interpol's desk within NCIS.<sup>256</sup>

Effectively what was being developed was a national contact point for "recovered firearms intelligence". However, this embryonic initiative faltered in April 2006 when the Serious and Organised Crime Agency was created. It did not see firearms supply at that time as a priority,<sup>257</sup> even though a report by the Inspectorate of Constabulary, "Guns and Community" had recommended that police forces make greater use of the tracing service.<sup>258</sup>

“ The development of high-level protocols beyond Europe, for example with the Department of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms in the US, would widen the scale and effectiveness of tracing internationally ”

This is not to say that the NFTS, when active, was particularly effective – comments include it was "at best slow", or, "frequently there was no response to the request, or it was so slow as to be of little or no use". UK police forces often made their investigation/inquiry directly to police forces and agencies abroad.<sup>259</sup> There have been a number of positive developments, however. The national firearms licensing management system has been developed to provide police forces in England and Wales with a database containing details of all licence holders and any weapon owned/registered to them.<sup>260</sup>

In addition, an ACPO/Home Office funded initiative established the national ballistics intelligence system, and a multi-agency national firearms intelligence cell (NFIC), which is well positioned to take over the functions of the firearms tracing service. Through its working group on the criminal use of firearms, ACPO has addressed the intelligence gap domestically – though in the absence of continuing government funding.

With respect to firearms tracing across the EU, Europol's role is both to "gather and develop intelligence for member states in respect of all EU inter-member state firearms tracing requests". However, in practice there seems to be "confusion between Europol and EU member states as to what Europol is looking to deliver to member states with respect to firearms tracing".<sup>261</sup> There are international relationships, understandings and agreements that require further development. The problems that beset the tracing service under NCIS are international in origin. For example there is no control agreement or memorandum of understanding with the receiver/handler of international inquiries.<sup>262</sup> The many links in the chain of international inquiries translate into delays and non-responses – senior officers investigating serious crimes often have to use personal contacts to get the information they require.<sup>263</sup>

There have been many missed opportunities for co-ordinated intelligence and information sharing. An obvious place to start would be with a European-wide firearms tracing agreement, with protocols systems and structures to expedite international inquiries. A police-led working group of European firearms experts has drafted a memorandum of understanding on firearms tracing with EU member states.<sup>264</sup> However, to be effective, this needs high-level political support and funding, and possibly legislation. This is another example of practitioners filling a gap in the absence of appropriate action at government level.

There are difficulties that practitioners cannot reasonably be expected to overcome – for example, the operating relationship between Europol and Interpol, and the need to obtain clarity and agreement on the scope and nature of information exchange, including compatibility of systems.<sup>265</sup> This is another area where the Government should be engaged if it wants to curb the supply of illegal firearms. Similarly the development of high-level protocols beyond Europe, for

256 MacDonald, J (2007) Firearms Tracing – shaping future direction: a 3 track approach' ACPO (unpublished)

257 Interview with ACPO representative, September 2008

258 "Guns and the Community", HMIC, London: Home Office, 2004

259 MacDonald J, op cit

260 Lord Cullen recommended setting up the system following the shootings in Dunblane in 1996

261 MacDonald J, op cit

262 Ibid

263 Ibid

264 MacDonald, J (2007) Firearms Tracing – shaping future direction: a 3 track approach' ACPO (unpublished); interview with the chairman of the , September 2008

265 Interview with members of the European Firearms Expert Working Group, September 2008

example with the Department of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms in the US, would widen the scale and effectiveness of tracing internationally.<sup>266</sup>

Critical process issues within law enforcement agencies in the UK remain to be addressed. *Going Ballistic* commented on the importance of key agencies co-operating effectively and this applies also to work on firearms supply.<sup>267</sup> But it is more than just an issue of co-operation that is relevant here: it is about effective information handling. For example, when Revenue and Customs seizes firearms, their compo-

nent parts or ammunition, it notifies a department within the Metropolitan Police, which passes on information to police forces. However, “there is ambiguity surrounding the subsequent action, or in some cases apparent inaction, that is taken in forces. Furthermore there is currently no collation of data.”<sup>268</sup> Thus, business processes, as well as systems, require attention at police force level both nationally and locally – the former in all probability capable of being addressed by a properly resourced NFIC; the latter being a responsibility and priority within police forces.

266 MacDonald J, op cit

267 Golding B and McClory J, op cit

268 MacDonald J, op cit

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# 5

## Recommendations

The emerging theme from the case studies and existing research on violent crime reduction is one of repetition and reoccurring findings. Research in the 1990s was essentially advancing the same policy prescriptions as research today. Thus the conclusions of this research publication are neither unique nor groundbreaking; they do, however, provide an updated account of best practice in the reduction of violent crime abroad.

“ We believe that institutional structures in both national and local government hinder an effective multi-agency strategy to reduce violent crime ”

Which begs the question: why have the policies that have been shown to work not been implemented in England and Wales? We believe that institutional structures in both national and local government hinder an effective multi-agency strategy to reduce violent crime. The setting up of crime and disorder reduction partnerships in 1998 was an encouraging development, but interviews with senior police officers revealed that some agencies are reluctant participants, which is not helped by a lack of clear lines of accountability for participants. This means that multi-agency work on violent crime reduction is not occurring as it should. Although outside the scope of this report, the authors feel there is an urgent need for further research into governance and accountability arrangements of agencies and local authorities at a local level, recognising the intrinsic com-

plexity and implications for what might amount to a constitutional reform. Dutch local government arrangements and the role of the *burgemeester* are very helpful; as is the potential of the mayoral model in London as the mayor takes on the role of chair of the Metropolitan Police Authority.

The following recommendations have been developed after careful consideration of the case studies, review of existing research, and consultation with senior police officers in the Metropolitan Police. The recommendations are divided into two sections: supply and demand. The supply-side recommendations concentrate on dealing with illicit firearms supply in an international context; the capacity to track and investigate illegal firearms and their criminal use. The demand-side recommendations are built on a three-pronged strategy of prevention, intervention and suppression of violent gun and knife crime.

### Demand-Side Recommendations

Much is made of the potential for educational programmes in anger management and conflict mediation in schools. The Boston experience illustrates the usefulness of a well defined anti-violence curriculum in schools. However, such educational programmes in England and Wales are not subject to rigorous evaluation or based on best practice. According to a senior Metropolitan Police officer no clear doctrine or best practice for anti-violence education curriculum exists on a national level. That is not to advocate a one-size-fits all model should exist; however, most anti-violence programmes in schools take place on a one-off, ad hoc basis without a long-term perspective.

#### **Recommendation 1:**

- The Department for Children, Schools and Families should – in partnership with government departments – develop and implement good practice guidelines

for an anti-violence curriculum in primary and secondary schools.

A long-term, anti-violence curriculum should incorporate modules explaining the risks of carrying weapons and the damage they do, anger management and conflict resolution. At present, many anti-violence educational efforts in schools are piecemeal and short-term.

**Recommendation 2:**

- Police forces in urban centres, such as London, Liverpool, Manchester and Birmingham, should send dedicated police officers into primary and secondary schools and further education colleges in at-risk areas. Police should have a role in delivering an anti-violence education curriculum in co-operation with students. They will have a chance to identify at-risk children and youths at the earliest possible age, intervening and channelling them into available resources and services.

Poor intelligence and information sharing between schools and police is a pervasive problem throughout England and Wales. Some schools are more forthcoming and co-operative with police than others. Many school administrators fear being stigmatised when police get involved. Although London police have a presence in some secondary schools, this should only be a first step towards a more complete engagement. Meanwhile, further education colleges have become areas of concern for violence and police have no presence in further education institutions.

**Recommendation 3:**

- Mandatory jail sentences with respect to gun and knife crime offending should be applied as stated in the legislation. This is an essential aspect of communicating to potential offenders that the use of firearms and knives will

not be tolerated, and that tough consequences await those who refuse to abide by this social norm.

As the authors argued in *Going Ballistic*, mandatory sentences are not being carried out as they were intended. Ministry of Justice figures show that only 141 out of 281 people sentenced for possession of a firearm in 2006 received the mandatory minimum five years.<sup>269</sup> There are indications that this is changing, which is encouraging, but there must be a full commitment to enforcing mandatory minimum sentences for carrying weapons. Much of Boston's success in reducing serious youth violence lay in the city's ability to change social norms. The police let dangerous members of the community know that if they did not give up violent pursuits, the full force of the law would be used to incarcerate them for as long as possible. If mandatory minimum sentences are not implemented, it sends the wrong message to violent offenders and potential violent offenders.

**Recommendation 4:**

- A legislative remedy to enable police to ban high-risk individuals from specific areas for a specified period of time.

Gangs and high-risk individuals, through threatening behaviour, can impose virtual "no-go" areas and a general sense of fear. Without the power of carefully targeted civil injunctions, gang activity can destroy civilised living conditions for some communities. Birmingham's use of Section 222 of the Local Government Act 1972 allowed police and councils to combat gang activity and avert potential violence. Simpler, more practical and timely powers in this regard were used to good effect in Amsterdam.

**Recommendation 5:**

- Outreach work in high-risk areas should be resourced and developed

269 Hope C, "Half of criminals caught with guns escape minimum jail term", *The Daily Telegraph*, 17th October, 2008 [www.telegraph.co.uk/news/news\\_topics/politics/lawandorder/3216019/Half-of-criminals-caught-with-guns-escape-minimum-jail-term.html](http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/news_topics/politics/lawandorder/3216019/Half-of-criminals-caught-with-guns-escape-minimum-jail-term.html)



according to best practice, and should incorporate clinical, programme, and street models.<sup>270</sup>

Outreach work throughout high-risk areas in England and Wales, although commendable, does not have a co-ordinated approach or the structure to be as effective as it could be. The Metropolitan Police Authority's violent crime reduction strategy plans to make use of street pastors as outreach workers, but this aspect of the strategy remains ill-defined. Outreach work is a crucial means of reaching hard to contact, at-risk youth. Outreach workers should be able to identify at-risk youth and channel them into available services like education, job-training, substance abuse counselling etc.

**Recommendation 7:**

- The Department of Health should produce guidelines instructing hospitals to share information on A&E patients treated for violent crime.

Given the difficult nature of measuring knife crime, policymakers need access to every possible source of data. However, neither the police nor the Home Office has unfettered access to data and individual information for victims of violent crime receiving treatment. In *Going Ballistic*, we outlined earlier research on the public health approach to violent crime reduction, and the importance of incorporating the health service into the fight against violence. The sharing of information would be an important first step in bringing the health service into the cause.

**Recommendation 8:**

- Children and youths treated for gun and knife violence should receive counselling by an outreach worker in hospital, with follow-up after discharge as part of a prevention focused plan.

Victims of violent crime are up to 70% more likely to become violent assailants themselves, and yet there is no national programme in place to offer trauma support and counselling to victims who receive hospital treatment.<sup>271</sup> Hospital treatment for victims of violent crime should be a point of intervention to curb the likelihood of future violence.

**Recommendation 9:**

- The prison service should implement a targeted, properly resourced and bespoke intervention programme for offenders involved in gun, knife and gang crime. This should be undertaken in partnership with police and the Home Office.

Interventions to reduce future violent crime must be put in place at every possible point of access. Boston has done well to develop interventions and provide services to violent offenders. Prisoner interventions for gun and knife crime offenders have been a mainstay of the city's strategy for reducing violent crime. In England and Wales, however, there is lack of targeted interventions in prisons for gun and knife crime offenders. Gun and knife crime offenders receive the same intervention programmes as any other offender.

**Recommendation 10:**

- Multi-agency public protection arrangements (MAPPA) should be extended across England and Wales to manage violent ex-offenders and other high-risk individuals effectively.

These arrangements were originally designed to manage the risks posed by sex offenders after release. However, MAPPA are not being used to their full potential. They should be used to ensure effective and appropriate multi-agency management of gun and knife offenders who may pose a risk to society.

<sup>270</sup> See discussion of models on page 66

<sup>271</sup> Interview with senior representative, Metropolitan Police, London, October 2008.

**Recommendation 11:**

- Police in urban areas should regularly review the membership of their independent advisory groups to ensure that they reflect communities. Police need to ensure their engagement strategies are sensitive to ethnic shifts. The Toronto Police Service has done an excellent job responding to a very diverse community and police forces in England and Wales could build on the positive engagement work done in Toronto.

Major urban centres across England and Wales are undergoing an ever-shifting ethnic make-up. Shifting demographics has had a subsequent impact on gangs and violent crime. However, police engagement with the community, fails to account for changing demographic trends. As a result, police Independent Advisory Groups do not necessarily represent the ethnic make-up of the communities they are designed to serve.

**Recommendation 12:**

- Extend the multi-agency risk assessment conferences to include victims of serious gun and knife violence.<sup>272</sup>

Interviews with senior Metropolitan Police officers revealed that victim counselling from the police service often fails to extend beyond the immediate family of victims. Violent crime can inflict a heavy toll on community members and there is a dearth of immediate support and counselling offered to its wider victims.

**Recommendation 13:**

- A stronger border force and more rigorous screening of entrants into the UK should be a priority. Successful adoption of Boston's "pulling levers" deterrence strategy should make use of all available powers across agencies, including immigration and passports offences.

Anecdotal evidence given in interviews with police officers from urban centres in England and the UK revealed that a significant amount of gun and knife crime is being perpetrated by illegal immigrants.

**Recommendation 14:**

- There should be a statutory sanction enshrined in legislation to underpin the partnership duties set out in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 and in any other approved guidance (for example, multi-agency public protection arrangements).

Information sharing outside of multi-agency public protection arrangements and prolific priority offenders was poor. Not all partners were complying fully with the information sharing guidance outlined in the Crime and Disorder Act, and the impact of this was that suitable interventions were not being identified for young people in need or at risk. On some occasions information held about young people in need or at risk was not utilised by other partners who had a statutory duty to act on it.

**Supply-Side Recommendations**

As we argued in the supply-side section of this report, there are significant shortcomings in the capacity of the UK Borders Agency to stop firearms being smuggled into the country. Interviews with police intelligence officers in several English cities indicated problems with tackling the illicit supply of firearms from abroad. There has been a failure to contribute sufficient staff and resources in cross-border co-operation to tackle the illegal trafficking of firearms.

**Recommendation 16:**

- The Government should commit dedicated law enforcement resources on a joint agency basis (eg Serious Organised Crime Agency, police and customs), directed specifically at devel-

<sup>272</sup> Multi-agency Risk Assessment Conferences (MARACs) involve police, probation, education, health, housing and the voluntary sector, working together on an individual victim's case. MARACs are currently used for victims of domestic violence, but there is potential for expanding their use for gun and knife crime

oping and delivering cross-border co-operation in relation to the illegal trafficking of firearms.

**Recommendation 17:**

- The Home office and ACPO should be fully engaged in partnership with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) in developing the UK response to these international arrangements. It needs to be negotiated at the appropriate level in government.

Cross-departmental co-operation can fall down in any realm of government policy; there has been a distinct lack of engagement between the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Home Office in combating the illicit international arms trade. The FCO – through its arms trade unit and counter-proliferation department – is directly responsible but, given the local ramifications of illegal firearms and the intelligence role of policing, the Home Office and the police also need to be fully involved.

**Recommendation 18:**

- The Government should centrally fund National Ballistics Intelligence Service (NABIS) and National Firearms Intelligence Cell (NFIC), to ensure the future and continuity of the programmes. Funding for both would eventually pay for itself by saving investigation time.

The failure of central government to provide for the continued funding of the national ballistics intelligence system and the national firearms intelligence cell has led the Association of Chief Police Officers to maintain these essential services out of their own budget in an ad hoc manner. However, this is not a sustainable practice,

and it leaves the future of a crucial investigative tool insecure.

**Recommendation 19:**

- The legislation affecting both knife and gun crime should be subject to a thorough review with the object of simplification and clarification. Such a review should address the criticisms raised by ACPO in 2004 (see Appendix 4); the issues raised in recent high-profile cases concerning deactivated, reactivated, and antique weapons; and specific issues in relation to manufacture and trafficking of weapons in the light of the Palermo Convention commitments.

Interviews carried out for this publication have underlined the position taken in our first report, *Going Ballistic*, that current legislation governing firearms and offensive weapons is not fit for purpose, being piecemeal and incomplete. The Palermo Convention, in particular its third protocol, which places general obligations on the UK concerning its legislative regime around firearms, has not been sufficiently acted on. The Firearms Act 1968 is now 40 years old. Loopholes continue to exist as a consequence of a failure to instigate a full review of firearms and offensive weapons legislation.

**Recommendation 20:**

- The illicit supply of firearms should be made an explicit priority for ACPO, Serious Organised Crime Agency and Revenue and Customs. The Government should take the lead in the development and implementation of international arrangements and agreements for firearms tracing to support investigations rather than, as now, leaving the responsibility to practitioners.

# Appendix 1

## Recommendations

Suppression	Education	Social Intervention	Community Mobilisation and Multi-agency Approach	Offender Management
<p><b>Recommendation 4</b> (Supply Side): The legislation affecting both knife and gun crime should be subject to a thorough review with the object of simplification and clarification.</p>	<p><b>Recommendation 5</b> (Demand Side): The Department for Children, Schools, and Families should develop an anti-violence curriculum for primary and secondary schools.</p>	<p><b>Recommendation 9</b> (Demand Side): Outreach work in high-risk areas should be resourced and developed on the basis of proven best practice.</p>	<p><b>Recommendation 1</b> (Supply Side): The Government should deliver cross-border co-operation in relation to the illegal trafficking of firearms.</p>	<p><b>Recommendation 7</b> (Demand Side): Mandatory jail sentences with respect to gun and knife crime offending should be applied as stated in the legislation. This is an essential aspect of communicating to potential offenders that the violent use of firearms and knives will not be tolerated</p>
<p><b>Recommendation 8</b> (Demand Side): A law to enable police to ban high-risk individuals from specific areas for a specified period of time.</p>	<p><b>Recommendation 6</b> (Demand Side): Police forces in urban centres should send dedicated police officers into at-risk primary and secondary schools, and further education colleges. Police should have a role in delivering an anti-violence education curriculum in co-operation with students.</p>	<p><b>Recommendation 12</b> (Demand Side): Children and youths treated for gun and knife injury should receive counseling by an outreach worker in hospital with follow-up after discharge, as part of a prevention focused evaluation and treatment plan</p>	<p><b>Recommendation 2</b> (Supply Side): The Home Office and ACPO should be fully engaged in partnership with the FCO in developing the UK response to international arrangements for cross-border co-operation.</p>	<p><b>Recommendation 13</b> (Demand Side): The Prison Service, in partnership with police and the Home Office, should implement a targeted, resourced, and bespoke intervention programme for offenders involved in gun, knife and gang crime.</p>
<p><b>Recommendation 9</b> (Demand Side): There needs to be a clear carrot and stick approach. In high risk areas, deterrence should be supported by a clear message that violence will not be tolerated; all agencies to pull every lever legally available when violence has occurred.</p>		<p><b>Recommendation 15</b> (Demand Side): Police in urban areas should carry out regular reviews of membership of their IAGs to ensure they reflect communities. Police forces in England and Wales could follow the example of the positive engagement work done in Toronto.</p>	<p><b>Recommendation 3</b> (Supply Side): The Government should fund NABIS and NFIC centrally to ensure the future of the programmes. This would eventually pay for itself by saving investigation time.</p>	<p><b>Recommendation 16</b> (Demand Side): Extend the MARACS to include victims of serious gun and knife violence.</p>
<p><b>Recommendation 17</b> (Supply Side): The Home office and ACPO should be fully engaged in partnership with the FCO in developing the UK response to these international arrangements. It needs to be negotiated at the appropriate level in government.</p>			<p><b>Recommendation 10</b> (Demand Side): Multi-agency public protection arrangements (MAPPA) should be extended across England and Wales to manage violent ex-offenders and other high-risk individuals effectively.</p>	<p><b>Recommendation 18</b> (Demand Side): Sanctions should be applied rigorously where statutory duties have not been complied with.</p>
<p><b>Recommendation 20</b> (Supply Side): The illicit supply of firearms should be made an explicit priority for ACPO, Serious Organised Crime Agency and Revenue and Customs. The Government should take the lead in the development and implementation of international arrangements and agreements for firearms tracing to support investigations rather than, as now, leaving the responsibility to practitioners.</p>			<p><b>Recommendation 11</b> (Demand Side): The Department of Health should produce guidelines instructing hospitals to share information on A&amp;E patients treated for violent crime.</p>	<p><b>Recommendation 14</b> (Demand Side): MAPPA should be extended across England and Wales to manage violent ex-offenders and other high-risk individuals.</p>
			<p><b>Recommendation 19</b> (Demand Side): There should be a statutory sanction enshrined to underpin the duties set out in the Crime and Disorder Act and in any other approved guidance (eg MAPPA)</p>	

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## Appendix 2

### Examples of Currently Running Programmes in London

#### The Wave Trust/Barnardo's (0-19)

The Wave Trust promotes work with high-risk families to identify children at risk from an early age, and family-based interventions are being developed. It is also working with the London Safeguarding Children Board and Barnardo's on approaches to prevent child abuse through sexual exploitation.

#### MissDorothy.com (7-16)

This programme will support all secondary schools in London over the next three years, and primary schools in areas of high priority. The website provides lessons on crime and its consequences, domestic violence, extremism, forced marriage, drugs, alcohol, guns and knives, gangs and bullying.

#### Volunteer Police Cadets (VPC) and Project YOU (12-19)

The VPC is expanding and developing a partnership with other uniformed youth organisations across London through Project YOU. This will offer young people exciting opportunities for gaining skills and active citizenship.

#### Street Pastors (11-18)

This scheme has been set up by volunteers from the Ascension Trust. Initially funded in 2007-08, it could be expanded to make young people feel safer at the peak time of victimisation, 3-5pm as they leave school, and other times when they are vulnerable.

#### The Prince's Trust (13-18)

This will extend programmes into more secondary schools and to help school leavers in areas of high crime by providing music and other awards programmes.

#### Met-Track (11-18)

This is a programme offering 5,000 young people an opportunity to take up sport. The scheme was successfully piloted in the London Borough of Bexley in 2005, and has since expanded into five more boroughs. It now includes 15 boroughs.

#### Voyage Programme

This currently operates in the London boroughs involved in Operation Trident (Brent, Hackney, Haringey, Lambeth, Newham and Southwark) targeting gun crime among black youths. More than 3,600 young people have taken part in workshops. The National Black Police Association has also developed a programme, VOYAGE, to ensure that young people are listened to; it includes a leadership programme.

## Appendix 3

### Example of Activities Matrix from Boston

Suppression	Social Intervention	Opportunities Provision	Organisational Change and Development	Community Mobilisation
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Intelligence collection</li> <li>● Intelligence analysis</li> <li>● Intelligence sharing and dissemination</li> <li>● Co-ordination of intelligence regionally with other law enforcement agencies</li> <li>● Development of strategy based on intelligence</li> <li>● Co-ordination of suppression strategies locally and regionally</li> <li>● Selection of highest risk offenders for intervention and suppression</li> <li>● High visibility patrols and saturation patrols</li> <li>● Investigation</li> <li>● Monitor offenders in programming</li> <li>● Swift enforcement as required</li> <li>● Collaborate with prosecution</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Selection of participants for intervention programming</li> <li>● Referral of target groups to programmes and services</li> <li>● Co-ordination of and participation in panel presentations to target groups</li> <li>● Problem solving and youth outreach in districts</li> <li>● Filter and manage funds for community agencies for partnership programs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Selection of participants for programming</li> <li>● Referral of target groups to programming</li> <li>● Filter and manage funds for community agencies for partnership programmes</li> <li>● Problem solving and youth outreach in districts providing referrals to services</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Development of Youth Violence Strike Force to focus on gangs</li> <li>● Development of Safe Street Teams into existing district patrols to focus on problem solving</li> <li>● Development of Boston Regional Intelligence Center to facilitate sharing of crime intelligence</li> <li>● Participation in and co-ordination of gang and gun related task forces and projects</li> <li>● Development of gang database, re-entry database and various systems</li> <li>● Utilise crime analysts and technology to improve intelligence collection and analysis</li> <li>● Include community and faith-based partners in development of programming through close collaboration</li> <li>● Infuse community policing into everyday activities and mission</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Include community and faith-based partners in development of programming through close collaboration</li> <li>● Development and participation in multi-jurisdictional and multi-agency task forces and programmes</li> </ul>



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## Appendix 4

# ACPO Recommendations for Changes to Firearms Legislation (2004)\*

### Part 1: Firearms

- 1.1 Devolve administration of section 5 firearms to police
- 1.2 Remove gas, pepper sprays and stun guns from the Firearms Acts
- 1.3 Agree with shooting associations which firearms are acceptable for which purpose
- 1.4 Agree with appropriate body optimum calibre for handgun used for humane killing
- 1.5 Restrict section 5 handguns to those requiring them for within their employment
- 1.6 Retain period on loan without notification at 72 hours
- 1.7 Exemption for pump action rifles in .22RF calibre extended to “rimfire up to .22 calibre”
- 1.8 Continue with three categories, section 1, 2 and 5 but administered on one certificate
- 1.9 Good reason for shot guns is not progressed without further study and consultation
- 1.10 A common standard be used in the assessment of fitness to possess all types of firearms
- 1.11 There are no changes to current conditions on certificates
- 1.12 Only the amount of ammunition authorised to be possessed need be recorded on the certificate
- 1.13 There are no changes to current conditions on certificates
- 1.14 Firearms not to be kept on unoccupied premises for prolonged periods
- 1.15 Applicants to provide proof of identity
- 1.16 The police to revoke any certificate or authority issued by them
- 1.17 Amend subsections 48(1) and (2) to include civilian officers
- 1.18 Investigate the possibility to charge a fee for an EFP
- 1.19 Investigate the possibility to change the format for EFPs
- 1.20 Power of entry for FEOs to inspect security
- 1.21 Minimum standard of security to be specified on certificate
- 1.22 Amend Firearms Rules so that all official forms conform to a common standard
- 1.23 Like-for-like variations should not require authority to acquire/exchange
- 1.24 No variations permitted within the first twelve months of a certificate
- 1.25 No change is required to control or restrict the number of guns
- 1.26 Applicants must be of exemplary character
- 1.27 Sentence to a term of imprisonment, suspended or otherwise, prohibits possession of all firearm whether subject to certification or not, for life. Application may be made for the prohibition to be removed.
- 1.28 Certificates to be granted for up to three years
- 1.29 To continue co-operation with the BMA to improve the passage of medical information
- 1.30 Authority to suspend certificates for a given period.
- 1.31 Conduct study into the merits of mandatory training
- 1.32 Conduct study into the merits of third party insurance
- 1.33 Adopt the definition of component part as given by the FCC
- 1.34 Include component parts for shot guns on certificate
- 1.35 Investigate improvement to line management of firearms licensing whether within the police service or outside it
- 1.36 FCC to continue
- 1.37 Repeal section 5A(4) (expanding ammunition) and amend Deer Act

\* Derived from ACPO Submission to the Home Office for the Controls on Firearms (2004) London: ACPO (unpublished)

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## Part 2: Unlicensed Guns

- 2.1 Define all words which have specific meaning within the Acts
- 2.2 Sale of imitation firearms remain unlicensed
- 2.3 Air weapons to be sold by registered firearms dealers (RFDs) only
- 2.4 All imported deactivated firearms and those brought in by visitors to be deactivated to 1995 standard
- 2.5 Deactivated firearms are not subject to licensing
- 2.6 Define antique
- 2.7 Define lethality at one joule

## Part 3: Young People and Guns

- 3.1. The minimum age for a firearm or shot gun certificate is 14 years
- 3.2 Between 14 and 17, the young person must be supervised (individually) by a person over 21 who has held a certificate for more than three years.

## Part 4: Trade

- 4.1 RFDs to be subject to same criteria as certificate holders for possession of firearms
- 4.2 Period of registration should remain at three years
- 4.3 No change to inspections, can be regulated by best practice
- 4.4 Trading pending appeal against removal from the register is unlawful
- 4.5 Define servant or use employee
- 4.6 Details of all employees requires for police checks
- 4.7 Liaison with other agencies for further research regarding firearms in transit
- 4.8 Review immunity provided by Section 96 of the Postal Services Act

## Part 5: Ammunition

- 5.1 Amend prescribed condition to make shot gun cartridges subject to security and consideration given to their possession without a certificate unlawful
- 5.2 Production of certificates to purchase/acquire cartridges and component parts of ammunition
- 5.3. Repeal section 5A(4) prohibiting expanding ammunition


## Part 6: Other Issues

- 6.1 Repeal section 11(4) for miniature rifle ranges
- 6.2 Investigate distinction between theatrical performances and re-enactment
- 6.3 Consider repealing section permitting prohibited firearms to be used for starting races
- 6.4 System of vetting or exemption for crown servants for companies managing firearms for the MoD
- 6.5 Repeal exemption for those carrying/transporting firearms to/from Proof Houses.
- 6.6 Resolve issue of between club location and secretary's address
- 6.7 List approved target disciplines
- 6.8 Consider options to Crown Court Appeals
- 6.9 Requirement for British visitor's permit remains unchanged
- 6.10 Sponsors to be more accountable for their visitors.
- 6.11 Define the following words in the Acts:  
Antique, artificial targets, carrier, historic interest, imitation, lethality, occupier, registered firearms dealer, renewal or regrant, replica, readily convertible, residence, small firearm, servant, (or use "employee"), supervision (qualifications, experience or age required), trophies of war, use, variation one-for-one (or like-for-like). Clarify section 7(3)
- 6.12 Improve technological terms
- 6.13 Evaluate methodology to assess fees
- 6.14 Notification to include down rating of air weapons

Since the first report in this series was published in July 2008, gun and knife crime has stubbornly remained in the headlines – and on the political agenda. Murder is always shocking; never more so than when both perpetrator and victim are young. Twenty-seven people were killed as a result of gun and knife crime on London’s streets in 2008 and 380 people in England and Wales as a whole. And there is a wider economic cost to this human loss. The economic cost of all murders with firearms amounted to more than £200 million. When murders with knives are included, the cost is approximately £628 million. The number of knife murders has increased by 23% over the past ten years; injuries caused by knives have increased by 30% from 1997, and police arrests for carrying a weapon with a blade or point in and near schools went up 500% from 1999 to 2005. Culprits are younger, and the fear that they spread is driving more young people to carry knives for self-protection.

Injuries and deaths from knives far outstrip those from firearms: knife crimes are four times more common than gun crimes; and the risk of serious injury is more than double that for gun crime. Guns are strictly regulated but restricting the supply of knives is impossible. So, what should the Government do?

Dr Bob Golding and Jonathan McClory build on the findings of their first report, and discuss four case studies from international cities that have successfully reduced violent gun and knife crime.



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Policy Exchange  
Clutha House  
10 Storey's Gate  
London SW1P 3AY

[www.policyexchange.org.uk](http://www.policyexchange.org.uk)