Protest Events, Welfare Generosity, and Welfare State Regimes

A Comparative Analysis of Welfare States and Social Unrest

David Pritchard

Abstract: This article examines data from the Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive and the Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset on protest events, levels of welfare generosity (the extent to which welfare protection is provided by non-market actors), and welfare state regimes in 18 advanced industrialized countries across the period 1971–2002. Using a direct measure of protest events in terms of frequency of riots, demonstrations, general strikes, political assassinations, and attempted revolutions, the article finds that there is a significant relationship between welfare generosity, welfare state regimes, and protest events. The findings demonstrate that more extensive welfare arrangements—conceptualized through the use of empirical data—not only ameliorate social disadvantages and thus legitimize market economies and capital accumulation, but also bring about stability and social order.

Keywords: comparative analysis, protest events, social citizenship rights, social unrest, state regimes, welfare states

Introduction

On average, over a fifth of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) across advanced industrialised countries is spent on the main social policy areas that constitute the welfare state—old age pensions, survivors allowances, incapacity-related benefits, health services, family benefits, active labour market programmes, unemployment benefits, housing provision, and other related forms of
social spending (OECD, 2018). The United Kingdom is on course for the largest reduction in the scope of the state ever undertaken by any large advanced economy over a ten-year period (2010–2020). Data from the International Monetary Fund’s “World Economic Outlook” (IMF, April 2019) demonstrates that only Ireland is enacting public spending cuts that are proportionately larger over the same period. No major European nation is being asked to deliver spending cuts on this scale. Since the global financial crisis, social unrest has clearly been linked to austerity and retrenchment in Southern Europe and elsewhere. Indeed, there is robust statistical evidence to support this (Ponticelli and Voth 2011; Taylor-Gooby 2013). However, there is little research on how the study of welfare generosity and welfare state regimes can contribute to the understanding of social unrest. This article seeks to remedy this situation.

It can only be speculated as to the future that awaits populations that are afforded the support of welfare systems across developed countries. This is a critical historical and social moment in which many advanced nations, such as the United Kingdom, switch from models of social security to a limited conditional welfare regime supported by increasing levels of surveillance and punishment (Cain 2013; Wacquant 2007). Yet, there are important questions about what the welfare race to the bottom might bring about. The welfare state has always been a two-sided coin. On the one side, welfare arrangements have been concerned with the amelioration of social and economic disadvantages and the management of risk. However, the flip side has been concerned with the maintenance of social order and control. Using secondary data on 18 OECD countries across the period 1971–2002 (Banks and Wilson 2018; Scruggs 2006), this article will examine relationships between protest events and welfare arrangements. Thus the following question can be posed: Do relatively extensive social citizenship rights and generous welfare
systems lead to social stability? It is hypothesised that countries with lower levels of welfare generosity and limited welfare state regimes experience greater levels of social unrest.

**The Determinants of Protest**

There are numerous perspectives and theories that have sought to explain the determinants of protest. These encompass psychological interpretations of crowd behaviour (Le Bon 1896; Reicher et al. 2004), the history from below and moral economy of historical revisionists (Hobsbawm and Rudé 1973; Rudé 1964, 1981; Thompson 1971), sociological interpretations of collective violence and urban unrest (Bauman 2011; Benyon 1987, 2012; Hall and Winlow 2014; Moxon 2011; Treadwell et al. 2012) and multifaceted features of public disorder (Moran and Waddington 2015; Waddington 1992, 2007, 2010; Waddington and Critcher 2000; Waddington et al. 1989), to name but a few.

In his work on contentious politics, Tilly (1978, 2003, 2008) highlighted how the forces of social unrest were linked to their social, economic and political contexts. In particular, Tilly (1978) regarded collective violence as inherently political. Far from being abnormal and the side effects from the structural changes of urbanisation and industrialisation, “violent protests grow most directly from the struggle for established places in the structure of power” (Tilly 1978: 9). For Tilly, collective violence was normal, in the sense that it acted as a political barometer. Social unrest has many different causes and can vary widely across countries and time. Nevertheless, as Tilly noted, “the character of collective violence at a given time is one of the best signs we have of what is going on in a country’s political life. The nature of violence and the nature of the society are intimately related” (1978: 2).

Tilly regards collective violence as a form of contentious politics. Collective violence should be interpreted “as contentious because participants are making claims that affect each
other’s interests. It counts as *politics* because relations of participants to governments are always at stake” (2003: 26). Political regimes consist of agents of government, polity members, challengers, subjects, and outside political actors who shape public politics through interactions, transactions, and claim-making. Public politics can encompass tax collection, military service, voting, receipt of social security entitlement, and many other kinds of transactions between the state and the citizen. Nevertheless, routine forms of public politics can become contentious politics if there is collective resistance to them such as tax revolts or opposition to national service. Indeed Tilly (2003) notes that there are other forms of public politics that are heavily imbued with contention such as the rebellion, the revolution, the social movement, the demonstration, the general strike, and the contested election. Thus contentious politics and collective claim-making can result in interpersonal and collective violence.

The literature on the determinants of protest is littered with psychological, social-historical, and sociological interpretations. There is little from the realms of social policy on how the study of welfare programmes can contribute to the understanding of social protest. This is a curious anomaly. After all, welfare programmes are part of *public politics*, in the sense that they involve interactions, transactions, and claim-making. Historically, the welfare state has been shaped by social movements and processes of democratisation that have sought to broaden rights and obligations. Significantly, welfare programmes can also be interpreted as a form of *contentious politics* (McAdam et al. 2001). They are contentious because they involve claim-making, which affects the interests of others, and they are political because they constitute a relationship between the citizen and the state. Indeed Tilly regards contentious politics as “interactions in which actors make claims bearing on someone else’s interests, in which governments appear either as targets, initiators of claims, or third parties” (2008: 5). Inherently, welfare programmes are shaped by
contention, collective action, and politics. Indeed, the literature on policy feedback, or on how “policies produce politics” (Pierson 1993: 595), is worthy of consideration. It should be noted that it is not the author’s aim to extensively review the well-trodden literature on policy feedback here. Rather it is to consider how aspects of the literature can be applied to an understanding of welfare states and protest events, or if you will, how welfare programmes produce contentious politics.

Policy feedback implies that policy shapes politics and that politics brings about changes in policy, with the former process not always recognised as much as the latter. In effect, policy choices have political consequences. Concern with policy feedback was brought about by the historical institutionalism within comparative politics (Skocpol 1979, 1992; Skocpol et al. 1985; Thelen 2004; Tilly 1990). As a tradition of political analysis, historical institutionalism seeks to assess the historical processes and episodes that affect the origin and transformation of institutions that govern political and economic relations within societies (Fioretos et al. 2016). Schattschneider (1935) introduced the notion that policies make politics. In later work, Lowi (1964, 1972) and Wilson (1973, 1989) sought to link specific policy types to particular political outcomes. Importantly Pierson (1993) notes that three policy effects can be identified - the activity of interest groups, the transformation of state capacities, and the socio-economic circumstances of mass publics. Furthermore, Pierson (1993) identifies two feedback mechanisms (resource/incentive effects and interpretive effects) and three sets of actors affected by these mechanisms (government elites, social groups, and mass publics). It is the latter that is of the most importance here. Pierson contends that “the effects on mass publics may turn out to be the most important political consequences of government growth” (1993: 597).

In a review of the key work on policy feedback effects among the mass public, Campbell (2012) contends that policies alter the capacities, interests, and beliefs of the state and
governmental elites, but also importantly those of the public. Policy effects can be positive or negative, which enhance or undermine political participation and shapes the political attitudes of the individual citizen. Policy effects can profoundly shape the relationship between the citizen and the state, and subsequently the ability of governmental institutions to function effectively according to democratic processes and norms.

Intriguingly, Pierson (1993) argues that Esping-Andersen’s (1990) comparative work on welfare regimes calls for closer attention to policy feedback effects. Esping-Andersen notes that given “the magnitude and centrality of the welfare state, it is indeed unlikely that we shall understand much of contemporary society unless it becomes part of our models” (1990: 141). Pierson (1993) argues that in itself the work of Esping-Andersen (1990) does not consider how the socio-economic circumstances of mass publics influence political processes. Rather The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism offers opportunities to explore how policy feedback influences politics. With that in mind, social protest is political, albeit contentious politics. However, the welfare state is analytically absent from the literature on protest events. It is important to be careful and avoid conflating correlation with causation. Indeed reverse causation could also be at work. Nevertheless, an important question remains – how do different types of welfare state influence protest events, or if you will contentious politics, in advanced capitalism?

The following section assesses the data and scoring methods in Esping-Andersen’s (1990) decommodification index and the revision, reworking, and recasting of that by Scruggs’ (2006) Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset. The next section also examines data relating to protest events. The section after that presents inferential statistics relating to findings on the statistical relationships between protest events, welfare generosity, and welfare state regimes in 18 countries across the period 1971–2002. It is important to note that Scruggs’ (2006) Comparative Welfare
Entitlements Dataset examines welfare generosity across this period. For the purposes of comparison, data on protest events are also drawn from the same period (Banks and Wilson 2018).

Data and Methods

Measuring Welfare Generosity

In his influential research The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (1990), Esping-Andersen attempted to establish “ideal types” as an essential starting point for further theorisation. The work was moulded by an important interpretation of comparative social policy that viewed existing theoretical models of the welfare state as inadequate (Esping-Andersen 1990: 2). His aim was “to offer a reconceptualization and re-theorization on the basis of what we consider important” (Esping-Andersen 1990: 2). Based on data from the Social Citizenship Indicator Program (SCIP) using three major welfare programmes, and the development of a comparable decommodification index scoring system, he identified three clusters of regime types or worlds of welfare: social democratic, conservative, and liberal.

The social democratic regime was characterised by the principles of universalism and egalitarianism, often found in Scandinavia and the Low Countries, with welfare programmes linked to social citizenship. This regime type was interpreted as one which offered a relatively high degree of autonomy for the individual beyond merely a cash-nexus relationship with the market and other bridging relationships with societal institutions such as the family. The second regime type was shaped by European corporatism and the continental conservatism of Christian Democracy. This model was based on subsidiarity and the contributory principles of social insurance. Welfare entitlement had a wide coverage but given the nature of funding arrangements replicated social stratification within labour markets. The third regime type, termed the liberal
regime, was characterised by the primacy of market individualism within the Anglo-Saxon countries and the selectivism of welfare provision.

It is important to note that Esping-Andersen’s (1990) regime types are of course “ideal types” that in some respects are theoretical abstractions as much as they are empirical models rooted in hard comparative data. In part, his “worlds” are shaped by the extensiveness of social rights in those capitalist democracies or what Marshall (1950) defined as social citizenship. Esping-Andersen (1990) conceptualised these social rights using Polanyi’s (1944) notion of decommodification, which refers to “the degree to which they permit people to make their living standards independent of pure market forces” (Esping-Andersen 1990: 3).

The data used in the construction of Esping-Andersen’s (1990) decommodification index were drawn from datasets collected for the large scale Social Citizenship Indicator Program (SCIP) conducted by the Swedish Institute for Social Research (SOFI). The database incorporates comparative data on welfare rights and duties across the 18 OECD countries that appeared in Esping-Andersen’s work (SOFI 2014). These were based on five major social insurance programs across those countries collected on 14 different occasions from 1930 to 1995. Programmes included unemployment, sickness, industrial/workplace injuries, family leave, and pension benefits. The collected data explored different types of household and family formation and examined the gross and net replacement rates of the social insurance programmes, conditionality, length of benefit payments, and the methods of funding. The research sought to highlight the welfare rights and duties legislated for in such programmes that were regarded as indicative of key components of contemporary welfare states or what Marshall (1950) referred to as the rights of social citizenship.
Esping-Andersen’s (1990) decommodification index utilised key data from the SCIP relating to unemployment, sickness, and pension social insurance programmes. There are several uncertainties about particular aspects of his scoring system, but broadly speaking his methodology can be identified (Scruggs and Allan 2006). Benefit replacement rates, qualifying conditions, insurance coverage, and take-up rates were used to calculate the three social insurance programmes. Decommodification scores were based on averages and standard deviations computed for each country on each of these dimensions of the social insurance programmes for the year 1980. Extreme values were corrected. The scores were summed together for each of the 18 countries to generate the scoring metric (Esping-Andersen 1990; Scruggs and Allan 2006).

Using data on the same aspects of social insurance programmes from 1980 (albeit not from the Social Citizenship Indicator Program), Scruggs (2006) and Scruggs and Allan (2006) replicated the decommodification scores following the same methods presented in Esping-Andersen’s (1990) original work. The correlation coefficients between their replication results and Esping-Andersen’s (1990) original results indicated near perfect linear relationships.

Beyond the calculation of replication results, Scruggs (2006) and Scruggs and Allan (2006) also computed “decommodification” scores, albeit in the sense of a generosity index for 1980 (and indeed for all years across 1971–2002), based on what was believed to be the most accurate values and features of the three social insurance programmes. Somewhat erroneously, later work from Scruggs (2007) uses the same terminology. The two calculations and indices are different from one another. They used different estimates of some of the key components of the programmes in comparison to those deployed in Esping-Andersen’s (1990) work and their replication rates. The method of scoring remained the same. Importantly, there were very strong correlation coefficients
between their generosity index results and the decommodification scores presented in Esping-Andersen’s (1990) original work (Scruggs and Allan 2006).

In other work, Scruggs (2006, 2007) used his *Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset* containing data on the three social insurance programmes (encompassing replacement rates, eligibility, and the insured population) to construct a second generosity index over the period 1971–2002. The dataset draws upon statistics from sources such as the European Commission, the OECD, and the United States’ Social Security Administration. Data were collected relating to the years 1971–2002. The second generosity index followed similar methods to those of its predecessor, the replication results, and Esping-Andersen’s (1990) original work. Standardized values (z-scores) were used.

Scruggs’ (2006, 2007) “decommodification” scores index and his second generosity index (hereafter referred to as simply the generosity index) provide vital evidence. Both indices are incredibly useful in charting changes in the key aspects of social insurance programmes, and thus by proxy, variations in welfare state arrangements in the 18 countries from 1971 to 2002. Both theoretically and empirically, the data can be used to better understand the extensiveness, or otherwise, of social citizenship rights in advanced industrial capitalist democracies. The results in the two indices show a near perfect linear relationship. For the purposes of this analysis, scores from the generosity index are employed.

**Measuring Protest Events**

One of the most useful sources of secondary data on protest events is the *Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive* (CNTS). This was originally a product of the State University of New York (Binghamton), and it was launched in the autumn of 1968 by the late Arthur Banks from what was the Center for Comparative Political Research, which is now the Center for Social Analysis (Banks
and Wilson 2018). The CNTS consists of nearly 200 variables, some of which go back as far as 1815, for over 200 countries. Originally designed to collect the aggregate data recorded in *The Statesman’s Yearbook*, this was abandoned in favour of additional sources and has grown substantially over the years and is updated on an annual basis. The data are in longitudinal format and are suitable for quantitative analysis. Variables cover such topics as demographics, politics and elections, international status indicators, government expenditure and income, economics and trade, and data on infrastructure and media. Significantly the CNTS also collects data on domestic conflict events. These include assassinations, general strikes, guerrilla warfare, major government crises, purges, riots, revolutions, and anti-government demonstrations.

In their research on the relationship between budget cuts and social unrest, Ponticelli and Voth (2011) in part use the CNTS data by taking the sum of the number of assassinations, demonstrations, riots, general strikes, and attempted revolutions to develop their CHAOS measure of protest events. Their method is replicated here. Thus for the purposes of this analysis, CHAOS is the sum of these 5 protest events in a single year in each of the 18 countries for the period 1971–2002. This matches the time period that the data on welfare generosity covers in the *Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset* (Scruggs 2006).

The analysis proceeds in three stages. The first stage of the analysis examines protest events (CHAOS scores) and the ways in which they are related to the generosity scores outlined in the above discussions. The second stage of the analysis constructs a regression model to assess the relationship between the various social insurance programmes and protest events (CHAOS scores). The final stage of the analysis evaluates the differences between regime types and generosity groupings on median number of protest events (CHAOS scores).
Findings

As discussed in the previous section, the analysis employs data from the *Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive* (Banks and Wilson 2018) and the *Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset* (Scruggs 2006). The first stage of the analysis examined the relationship between the summed measure of protest events (CHAOS scores) and the variables measuring levels of welfare generosity.

A Pearson correlation coefficient was computed to assess the relationship between generosity scores and CHAOS scores (table 1). There was a negative correlation between the two variables $r = -.238$, $n = 576$, $p < .005$. Overall, there was a small to moderate negative correlation, with higher levels of generosity associated with lower levels of protest events.

**TABLE 1 PLACED HERE**

The individual components of generosity were also assessed (table 1). There is a significant relationship between unemployment generosity scores and CHAOS scores. There is a negative correlation between the two variables. Sickness and pension generosity scores were more modestly related although highly significant at the 1 percent level. The initial results from the first stage of the analysis imply that across the 18 countries (from 1971 to 2002) there is a significant relationship between more extensive welfare entitlements (in terms of the generosity index and its individual components) and maintenance of social order.

In the second stage of the analysis, a multivariate model was constructed to examine the effect of individual welfare programmes on protest events (CHAOS scores). The model included the three independent variables (unemployment, sickness, and pension programme scores). The model chosen uses linear regression.

**TABLE 2 PLACED HERE**
Table 2 shows the regression model. The tolerance statistics are all above 0.64, indicating a high degree of multicollinearity. The R squared statistic of 0.071 falls to 0.066 when adjusted to take account of the sample size. This shows some explanatory power for a model of this type. The standardised coefficients in the model generally follow the pattern of zero-order correlation as in table 1, which lend support to assumptions about multicollinearity. There are several points that are worthy of consideration. The negative relationship between unemployment generosity scores and protest events remains and continues to be significant. Sickness and pension generosity scores, which are significant in correlations in table 1, cease to be significant in the regression model, since other factors have greater explanatory power.

The findings are robust. More extensive unemployment entitlements tend to bring about social order and unrest is less likely. Historically, Bismarckian-style unemployment insurance schemes were introduced to pacify the demands of the industrial working class. Famously, unemployed workers in Britain were photographed marching under the banner that read “Work or riot, one or the other!” (Clarke 2008). Intuitively, and as expected, the extensiveness of sickness benefits and pension entitlements are unlikely to explain social order. Protestors tend to be younger and in reasonable health.

There are some important caveats to add. The generosity index is of course attempting to measure the extent of social citizenship rights within those countries. The summed components of the overall generosity index are the three social insurance programmes. Multicollinearity is expected to be high as the independent variables correlate strongly with one another. In effect, it can be argued that they are measuring the same phenomenon, in this instance, social citizenship rights. Indeed, other factors are potentially at work to explain the variance within CHAOS scores. These could include the degree of racism within societies, police-community relationships, relative
deprivation, income inequality, economic growth, political systems and constitutional structures, production regimes, and so forth. Reverse causation could also be at work. Those dimensions are beyond the scope of the analysis in this article, but are worthy of consideration in other research.

Esping-Andersen’s (1990) work has been questioned on numerous theoretical, methodological, and empirical grounds (Bambra 2007; Esping-Andersen 1999; Powell and Barrientos 2011; Scruggs 2006; Scruggs and Allan 2006). Nevertheless, the original welfare capitalism typology is useful in conceptualising the scope of welfare arrangements and entitlements, albeit here using the work of Scruggs (2006). Important questions remain about protest events in different welfare regime types and in different welfare generosity groupings. Is there a difference in CHAOS scores between regime types and those countries with high, moderate, or low levels of generosity? These are explored in the third stage of the analysis. Using the generosity index (Scruggs 2006), CHAOS scores are examined across the 18 countries using the CNTS data from 1971–2002. Two Kruskal–Wallis Tests are run to assess the relationships between regime types, generosity groupings, and the levels of protest events (CHAOS scores). Esping-Andersen’s (1990) conventional classification of countries into regime types is used here.

A Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted to evaluate differences between Esping-Andersen’s (1990) three different welfare regime types (social democratic, conservative, and liberal) on median number of protest events (CHAOS). The test indicated a statistically significant difference, $\chi^2 (2, 576) = 46.9, p < .001$.

Mann-Whitney U tests were conducted as follow-up tests to evaluate pairwise differences among the three groups. A Bonferroni correction was applied and so all effects are reported at a .017 level of significance. Results showed significant differences between the social democratic countries and conservative countries, $z = -6.67, p < .001$, and social democratic countries and
liberal countries, $z = -5.30, p = .001$, but not between the liberal and conservative countries, $z = -1.53, p = .125$.

A Kruskal-Wallis test was also performed to assess differences between the three groups of nations arising from the generosity index results on median number of protest events (CHAOS). The test indicated a statistically significant difference, $\chi^2 (2, 576) = 70.0, p = .001$.

Post-hoc tests and the Bonferroni adjustment were undertaken. Results demonstrated significant differences between countries with high, moderate, or low levels of welfare generosity. Significant differences emerged between countries with high levels of generosity and those with moderate levels of generosity, $z = -4.17, p = .001$. Significant differences are also observable between countries with high levels of generosity and low levels of generosity, $z = -8.39, p = .001$. In addition, significant differences appear between countries with moderate levels of generosity and those with low levels of generosity, $z = -4.17, p = .001$.

Figures showed that the social democratic regime group had a mean rank of 232.5, the liberal regime group had a mean rank of 305.1, and the conservative group, had a mean rank of 328.2. It is important to add several caveats about the CNTS data. Across the period 1971 to 2002, the number of protest events in any one year ranged from 0 – 5 in social democratic countries, from 0 – 19 in conservative countries, and from 0 – 30 in liberal countries.

Other trends are evident across countries with high, moderate, or low levels of welfare generosity. Countries with high generosity had a mean rank of 228.9, countries with moderate generosity had a mean rank of 285.3, and countries with low generosity had a mean rank of 351.3. Across the period 1971 to 2002, the number of protest events in any one year ranged from 0 – 5 in countries with high levels of generosity, from 0 – 13 in countries with moderate levels of generosity, and from 0 – 30 in countries with low levels of generosity.
The results of the Kruskal-Wallis and post-hoc tests demonstrate a statistically significant difference in the median number of protest events suggesting rejection of the null hypothesis in both instances. It can be implied from these results that social democratic welfare regimes and countries with high levels of welfare generosity, which are characterised by universal welfare arrangements and widespread social citizenship rights, were less likely to experience protest events in comparison with their counterparts across the period 1971 to 2002.

Conclusion
This article has examined the relationships between welfare generosity, welfare state regimes, and protest events. There are statistically significant correlations between the variables, with plausible effects of individual welfare programmes on protest events. Using the respective works of Banks and Wilson (2018) and Scruggs (2006), social unrest appeared to be greater within the liberal and conservative regimes and within countries with moderate and low levels of welfare generosity, when compared with social democratic regimes and highly generous countries across the period 1971 to 2002. The findings demonstrate that more extensive welfare state arrangements - conceptualised through empirical data on welfare generosity and welfare state regimes - bring about lower levels of social unrest within societies. Welfare policy shapes the contentious politics of protest events.

Other research converges around several important findings (Dorling 2012; Mason 2013; Ponticelli and Voth 2011; Taylor-Gooby 2013; Winlow et al. 2015). Spontaneous and disorganised outbursts of violent social unrest are linked to the social and economic restructuring that the twin dynamics of globalisation and neoliberalism have brought about in contemporary times. It is not by chance that these social phenomena have re-emerged in advanced industrialised countries in recent decades. Almost without exception, these factors have impacted upon all of the 18 eighteen
countries to varying degrees. Admittedly there are different levels of unrest, which are often driven by unique internal happenings and unforeseen external episodes, but culminating in expression through either legitimate protest or the street theatre of violence. Furthermore, and within each country, it is those who are least capable of dealing with tumultuous socio-economic change that turn to the “ballot box of the poor”.

However, socio-economic transformations do not constitute the entire explanation. It would be wrong to assume that they did. Socio-economic stresses are more or less permanent features for many citizens within OECD countries. Yet, episodes of social unrest remain uncommon events. It is rare for the social fabric to be dramatically torn. Importantly structural explanations are the flipside of a double-sided coin. Individuals also have agency. Other research shows that feelings of hopelessness, frustration and social injustice from interactions and confrontations with state actors can lead to violent actions (Akram 2014; Jobard 2009; Lightowlers 2015; Moran and Waddington 2015; Naegler 2012; Waddington 2011).

Despite some notable exceptions (Taylor-Gooby 2013), the influence of welfare entitlements, and thus by proxy social citizenship rights, on the maintenance of order seems to be an overlooked area of research. This is an anomaly. After all, the emergence of the Bismarckian-style welfare state was used to pacify the demands of the industrial working class in several European countries in the late nineteenth century. Institutional arrangements were developed and later extended into the grand bargain between capital and labour in the mid-twentieth century. Of course, that bargain began to be challenged by the New Right and New Left in the 1970s. Famously, O’Connor (1973) argued that in order to pacify the populace, the state spends more on welfare than the capitalist system can afford. Thus the need for legitimation and the need for capital accumulation come into conflict. Similarly, while questioning the ontological and ideological
nature of the term ‘the welfare state’, Gough (1979) acknowledges two major contradictions within welfare provision. The first of these are the coinciding trends for welfare provision to be both progressive and coercive. Second, state welfare expenditure legitimises capitalism but at the same time obstructs it. More recently, Streeck (2011, 2012) has acknowledged that the relationship between capitalism and the welfare state is combined yet contradictory.

Famously Foucault (1977) examined social ordering and control in late modern society. In his work, he argues that the social sciences did not bring about emancipation and social progress. Rather they brought about regulation and coercion. They were part of his carceral archipelago. Indeed, he regarded the welfare state as one of many societal artefacts that brought about his power-knowledge structure. Thus the welfare state was recast as the penal state. Penal welfarism brings about security, regulation, control, and punishment. Garland (1985, 2001) redeployed the term in his historical accounts of how the welfare state and the modern criminal justice state were intertwined and employed to bring about social order in contemporary societies. In later work, Garland (2014) argues that we should view the welfare state as a normal social fact in the Durkheimian sense of the term. Moreover, and again borrowing from Foucauldian analysis, he argues that “I conceive of the welfare state as a distinctive ‘governmentality’ – that is to say a mentality or ‘rationality’ of governing” (Garland 2014: 328).

Social policy and other social science disciplines can contest arguments about retrenchment, convergence, or the restructuring of the welfare state. Nevertheless, it remains a functional dimension of advanced industrialised countries in recent decades. Thus it can be contended that the welfare state is a form of governmentality that is used to govern and control populations. Indeed, it seems feasible to argue that more extensive welfare states bring about social
order, whereas more limited arrangements are dependent on other more punitive forms of state control.

Ranci (2001) argues that welfare states are forms of rational altruism aimed at pursuing egalitarianism and redistributive social objectives. They are heavily imbued with the values of social integration and reciprocity. Titmuss (1970) acknowledged that the welfare state was an important social bond between strangers, a set of institutions that guaranteed reciprocity, but at the same time offered a sense of belonging to a civil community. Indeed in earlier work, Titmuss (1950, 1968) recognised that the welfare state was a form of risk management in advanced industrial society – in the sense of managing natural and human-made risks through the collective mechanisms of the state. Other social theorists such as Beck (1992) and Giddens (1999) argued that human-made risks increase as societies become more complex and interconnected. Beck (1992) viewed contemporary society as a “risk society” where citizens are exposed to socially and economically constructed risks. Thus the state becomes a guarantor in the sense of seeking to offset risk (Downes and Hansen 2006; Feeley and Simon 1992). This analysis implies that there are lush fruits to harvest from the disciplines of social policy and criminology relating to welfare entitlements and the management of risk and social (dis)order within contemporary societies. Indeed there are parallels here with the literature surrounding penalty, punishment, and welfare.

Importantly, this article has found that countries with extensive social citizenship rights - characteristic of social democratic welfare regimes - and highly generous welfare state arrangements experience lower levels of social unrest. In comparison, countries with other welfare models experience greater levels of social unrest. There are observable policy feedback effects here. Policy shapes politics. Welfare programmes shape the contentious politics of protest events. Different types of welfare state arrangements influence protest events. Indeed the findings
highlight that low levels of welfare generosity and limited welfare state regimes effect the conditions for the “ballot box of the poor” to do what it does.

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**Note**

1 The countries comprised Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Table 1. Pearson Product Moment Correlation between Measures of Generosity and Protest Events.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measures of Generosity</th>
<th>Correlation</th>
<th>Sig. (2-tailed)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Generosity Score</td>
<td>-.238**</td>
<td>.000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unemployment Generosity Score</td>
<td>-.242**</td>
<td>.000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sickness Generosity Score</td>
<td>-.192**</td>
<td>.000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pension Generosity Score</td>
<td>-.165**</td>
<td>.000</td>
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Note: ** = significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); * = significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table 2. Multivariate Analysis of CHAOS Scores (Linear Regression).

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<th>Standardised Coefficient</th>
<th>T-Statistic</th>
<th>Significance</th>
<th>Correlation</th>
<th>Tolerance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment Generosity Score</td>
<td>-.182</td>
<td>-3.848</td>
<td>.000**</td>
<td>-.242**</td>
<td>0.728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sickness Generosity Score</td>
<td>-.069</td>
<td>-1.423</td>
<td>.155</td>
<td>-.192**</td>
<td>0.691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pension Generosity Score</td>
<td>-.083</td>
<td>-1.879</td>
<td>.061</td>
<td>-.165**</td>
<td>0.839</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Model - R squared .071; Adjusted R squared .066; N = 576

Note: ** = significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).